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THE DEVELOPMENT OF MIS 1909-1918 
Christopher Barry Northcott 
ABSTRACT 
The 1909-1918 era can be regarded as the formative years of MIS, as it developed 
from a small counter-espionage bureau into an established security intelligence 
agency. MIS had two main roles during this period; counter-espionage, and 
advising the War Office on how to deal with the police and the civilian 
population, particularly aliens. 
Most of the existing literature tends to focus on the development of MIS as a 
whole and pays little attention to the six individual branches that constituted MIS 
by the armistice. Recently released MIS documents in The National Archives 
(rnA) make it possible to examine MIS at the micro level and set out the intimate 
workings of its six branches. 
The study examines the evolution of MIS from its formation in October 1909 to 
the end of the First World War in November 1918, paying particular attention to 
three questions. First, what did a map of the structure of the MIS organisation look 
like and "how" did it develop during these years? Secondly, "why" did it develop 
as it did? Thirdly, "how effective" was MI5 throughout this period? 
MIS began as a one-man affair in 1909, tasked with the limited remit of 
ascertaining the extent of Gemlan espionage in Britain and an uncertain future. By 
the armistice MIS's role had expanded considerably and it had begun to develop 
into an established security intelligence agency, with 844 personnel spread over 
six branches covering the investigation of espionage, prevention, records, ports 
and travellers, overseas, and alien workers. 
This study suggests that the main driver of these developments, if one key factor 
can be singled out, was the changing perception of the nature of the threat posed 
by German espionage. However, because some within official circles equated all 
forms of opposition to Government policy with support for Germany, increasing 
attention also began to be paid to the possibility that industrial umest, pacifists 
and others who opposed the Government might actually be being directed by a 
German "hidden hand". From 1917 onwards MIS's development was driven by a 
conviction that it had defeated German espionage, such that Germany had 
switched its efforts to promoting Bolshevism and other forms of umest in order to 
undermine British society. However, MIS's activities were restricted to 
investigating if there was really any enemy influence behind such things, while 
Special Branch was to focus on labour unrest generally. 
This study makes an original and useful contribution to knowledge in three 
noteworthy respects. First, it sets out probably the most detailed description of 
11 
MI5's organisational structure available. Secondly, it poses the stimulating 
question of "how to measure" the effectiveness of a counter-espionage agency? 
Thirdly, it suggests that, contrary to claims that Vemon Kell was an "empire 
builder" who wanted a greater role in labour intelligence, Kell felt it appropriate 
that MIS's activities should be restricted to the investigation of cases of peace 
propaganda and sedition that arose from enemy activities and did not actually 
want MIS to assume a broader role in labour intelligence at that time. 
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INTRODUCTION 
MIS is Britain's security intelligence agency, countering internal threats to 
national security, such as espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism. I MIS had 
two main roles during the 1909-1918 period. First was counter-espionage, which 
can be defined as information collected and analysed, and activities undertaken to 
prevent an adversary's espionage (secret intelligence from human sources) service 
from gaining knowledge that would give him an advantage.2 Secondly, advising 
the War Office on 'military policy in dealing with the Police Authorities and the 
civil population, including aliens,.3 
While MIS only became known as such in January 1916, it will be easier for the 
reader to follow it as such throughout. Similarly, each of MIS's branches will be 
referred to by the title it was using at the end of the First World War.4 
1 M. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), p.167. 
2 This definition is based upon A. Shulsky, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of 
Intelligence (Washington DC, USA: Brassey's (US), 1991), p.99. 
3 TNA, KV1/S7, "'H" Branch Report. Organisation and Administration. VoI.VI. Annexures. 
(Books.), MIS Distribution of Duties, November 1918', p.7. 
4 MIS was formed on 9 October 1909, as the Counter-Espionage Section of the Secret Service 
Bureau. (Although it has been variously referred to as the Home Section or Military Section of the 
Secret Service Bureau or as MO(t) in its early years to August 1914, in his official reports, Kell 
always called his organisation the Counter-Espionage Section of the Secret Service Bureau.) On 4 
August 1914 the Counter-Espionage Section of the Secret Service Bureau became known as 
MOS(g). Then on 11 August 1915 MOS(g) was re-designated M05. On 3 January 1916 M05 
changed its name to MIS. For clarity see Appendix I: The Nomenclature and Organisation ofMI5. 
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This study examines the evolution of MIS from 1909-1918: paying particular 
attention to the development of the organisational structure and MIS's 
effectiveness. 
In theory, the existing literature covers the question of MIS's effectiveness quite 
extensively and outlines MIS's overall development. However, with the partial 
exception of articles by Nicholas Hiley, current works also tend to simply look at 
the development of MIS as a whole and make little mention of the six individual 
branches that made up MIS by the end of the First World War.5 
Histories of the British intelligence community, most notably Christopher 
Andrew's magisterial Secret Service: the Making of the British Intelligence 
Community, focus on MIS overall, its place within the wider intelligence 
community and its relations with the other members, particularly the Metropolitan 
Police's Special Branch.6 Surveys of the development of Britain's internal 
security apparatus, such as those by Bernard Porter and by Richard Thurlow, also 
concentrate on MIS at the macro level, its role within this apparatus and especially 
the division of labour between MIS and the Special Branch. 7 
S N. Hiley, 'Counter-Espionage and Security in Great Britain during the First World War', English 

Historical Review, Vo1.CI (July 1986); N. Hiley, 'The Failure of British Counter-Espionage 

Against Germany, 1907-1914', The Historical Journal, Vo1.28, No.4 (1985). P. Davies, The 

British Secret Services (Oxford: ABC-Clio, 1996) reviews the literature. 

6 C. Andrew, Secret Service: the Making of the British Intelligence Community (London: 

Heinemann, 1985). 

7 B. Porter, Plots and Paranoia: a History ofPolitical Espionage in Britain 1790-1988 (London: 

Unwin Hyman, 1989); R. Thurlow, The Secret State: British Internal Security in the Twentieth 

Century (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). 
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Popular accounts of MIS, like works by John Bulloch, Sidney Felstead, Leonard 
Sellers and Nigel West, tend to write around MIS itself as they cover the most 
newsworthy spy stories that MIS was involved in. In so doing they reveal not only 
much about these spy cases, but also provide insights into how MIS detected 
them.s 
Two articles by Hiley, which cover the development of British counter-espionage 
and internal security from 1907-1918, do focus more closely on the development 
of MIS's organisational structure and examine how MIS had developed six 
branches by the armistice. Understandably, in keeping within the confines of a 
short article, Hiley does not put each of these branches under the microscope and 
analyse its particular development. He simply summed up each branch's role and 
place within the overall organisation in only a few paragraphs.9 
Contemporary accounts, typically uncritically, lauded MIS as the unquestioned 
victor over its German foe. Sir Basil Thomson, whose career directing the 
Metropolitan Police Special Branch during the war is set out in Chapter Three, for 
example, concluded that, judging by the character of the information gathered by 
the spies who were arrested, the intelligence the Germans received 'cannot have 
been of great value' .10 Like his boss, Thomson, Detective Inspector Herbert Fitch, 
a Special Branch officer employed on counter-espionage, judged that Germany's 
8 J. Bulloch, MI.5: the Origin and History of the British Counter-Espionage Service (London: 

Arthur Barker, 1963); S. Felstead, German Spies at Bay (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1920); L. 

Sellers, Shot in the Tower: the Story of the Spies Executed in the Tower of London During the 

First World War (Barnsley: Leo Cooper/Pen & Sword Books, 1997); N. west, MI5: British 

Security Service Operations 1909-1945 (New York, USA: Stein & Day, 1982). 

9 Hiley, 'Counter-Espionage and Security in Great Britain during the First World War'; Hiley, 

'The Failure of British Counter-Espionage Against Germany, 1907-1914'. 
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spies were no match for MIS. It was not difficult to thwart them at all, because 
Britain possessed 'a perfect organization' to combat them, which had 'a very 
considerable amount of theoretical knowledge of the details of their methods such 
as would have caused something approaching heart failure in certain high quarters 
abroad, had we paraded it' . II 
Similarly, Felstead, the semi-official historian of MIS during the First World War, 
whose account was based on access to official sources, argued that it seemed 
likely that 'none of the spies who came here ever picked up much that could not 
have been read in our newspapers'; many of which were sent to Holland and thus 
eventually ended up in German hands anyway.12 In a review of Felstead's 
German Spies at Bay, Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, head of MOS, 
which ran the War Office's special duties section, from 1907 to 1910 and later the 
official historian of the First World War, concluded that the Germans desired 
intelligence 'which no alien spy could possibly learn'. In the early part of the war, 
they hoped to ascertain the destination, number and equipment of the new armies 
and, particularly, timely warning of the sailing of British warships for their 
submarines. 'Their spies gave them none of these things.' Even when they spotted 
a warship, 'the information reached the German Admiralty far too late for any 
action to be taken' .13 
10 B. Thomson, Queer People (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1922), p.194. 

II H. Fitch, Traitors Within: the Adventures of Detective Inspector Herbert T. Fitch (London: 

Hurst & Blackett, 1933), p.104. 

12 Fe1stead, German Spies at Bay, p.13S. 

13 LHCMA, Edmonds MSS, VIII/3S, unattributed newspaper article, 'German Espionage During 

the War'. 
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This interpretation continued well into the Cold War with Bulloch, in 1963, 
describing Captain (later Major-General Sir) Vernon George Walde grave Kell, 
whose career before he joined MIS is set out in Chapter One, first head of MIS, as 
a 'remarkable man who did a remarkable job'. Beginning in 1909, without any 
staff, records or experience, Kell developed an organisation able to "round-up" all 
except one of Germany's spies in the UK in 1914. MIS then successfully 
frustrated German efforts to establish new spies there throughout the war. 14 
The emergence of the "British School" of Intelligence Studies in the mid 1980s 
heralded a more questioning approach. IS The current academic debate is less 
flattering of Kell, but continues to conclude that MIS beat its German opponent 
convincingly. The judgements of many of MIS's harsher critics, such as Thomas 
Boghardt, Hiley, Porter and Thurlow, seem to be coloured by a distaste for the 
secrecy within which secret services have to operate, and a certain disdain for 
military officers. 
Andrew's Secret Service charts the evolution of a recognisable intelligence 
community from the formation of the Secret Service Bureau to the end of W orId 
War Two. He is primarily concerned with the key players and how they 
influenced events and organisations. 16 Andrew concludes that MIS's pre-war 
development was driven by the evidence of suspicious aliens compiled by Kell, 
14 Bulloch, MI.5, p.22. Writing as recently as 2001, Dame Stella Rimington, one of Kell's 

successors as Director-General of MI5, continued this interpretation, praising the round up of 

German spies in August 1914 and concluding that 'Kell's tiny organisation was very effective'. S. 

Rimington, Open Secret: the Autobiography oj the Former Director-General oj MI5 (London: 

Hutchinson, 2001), pp.85-86. 

15 D. Cameron Watt, 'Intelligence Studies: the Emergence of the British School', Intelligence and 

National Security, Vo1.3, No.2 (April 1988), passim. 
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which convinced the Home Office and services that there was an extensive 
German espionage network in Britain; even though the reality was that it was not 
extensiveY MIS's wartime expansion was driven by: a massive increase in spy 
mania, which lasted throughout the war even after the decline of genuine 
espionage; a much smaller outbreak of real spying; and the gradual development 
of what seemed to be subversion. 18 Assessing MIS's effectiveness, Andrew 
concludes that: 
Though Kell exaggerated the scale of his achievements in August 1914, he 
had none the less totally defeated third-rate opposition. With four 
assistants, seven clerks, and the assistance of the Special Branch and local 
police forces, he had tracked down all the real German agents in Britain.19 
Indeed, Andrew points to how the police's assistance helped Kell 'to stretch his 
own limited resources'?O However, he puts MIS's achievement into perspective, 
adding that Kell's subsequent boast that this had left Germany ignorant of the 
British Expeditionary Force's CBEF) deployment for more than two weeks was 
'wildly exaggerated'. 'The major failings of German intelligence lay not in Britain 
but in the battle area. ,21 Andrew also suggests that MIS was relatively well 
prepared for war. MIS had rolled up the entire German espionage organisation in 
the UK, before Room 40 (Naval signals intelligence) or the Army's Intelligence 
Corps had even been established.22 It went on to detect the German agents in 
16 Andrew, Secret Service, passim. 

17 Ibid., p.61. 

18 Ibid., p.l77. 

19 Ibid., p.73. 

20 Ibid., pp.84-85. 

21 Ibid., p.73. 

22 Ibid., p.174. 
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Britain throughout the war 'with great efficiency' , albeit that it had the advantage 
'of dealing with weak opposition' .23 
Hiley attests that MIS 'proved remarkably effective' at countering German 
espionage in the UK from 1911-1914 and enabled Special Branch 'to watch all 
the main agents and make a full evaluation of the danger' .24 Nonetheless, he goes 
on to deliver a stinging criticism of Kell and MIS. MIS's main role was to provide 
a fair analysis of the threat posed by German agents from a great quantity of 
suspicious reports, 'but in this they failed completely'. Kell circulated 'alarmist 
reports' despite 'access to evidence which flatly contradicted them' . 
Notwithstanding this 'strategic failure', MIS still managed to identify and order 
the arrest of all the German agents in the UK on the outbreak of war: 
but here the main work was in fact left to the police, for it was the Special 
Branch that watched the suspects and handled the bulk of the 
investigations - and indeed discovered the main forwarding address for the 
agents and so ensured Kell's limited success. 
It was also the Special Branch that investigated, and proved false, the mass of spy 
scares in the early days of the war; engaging more than 114 personnel in such 
matters, when MIS was only able to field eight officers and three detectives. Thus, 
Hiley suggests that, if the Special Branch had been given the task, rather than 
Kell, it would have done a better job, because 'their judgement would not have 
been clouded by the same alarmist fears of invasion'. Thus, giving the military 
responsibility for counter-espionage guaranteed 'the appointment of an officer 
hostile to Gem1any' such as Kell, 'an obscure junior official of limited practical 
23 Ibid., p.182. 
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p 
experience' who was 'paranoid about invasion'. Therefore, the formation of MIS 
in 1909 should 'be seen as irresponsible', because it gave strong influence and 
considerable autonomy to a solitary officer 'unsuited to the task', which enabled 
him to pass on assessments to the highest levels suggesting that Germany was 
committed to war and plotting sabotage by means of the large alien population in 
the UK. This leads Hiley to conclude that: 
Despite superficial success, the employment of military officers on 
specialist counter-espionage duties between 1907 and 1914 did nothing 
except inspire "spy fever" and encourage distrust of Germany, and in 
consequence failed as miserably as it could possibly have done.25 
Hiley observes that the First World War saw a 'dramatic advance' in British 
counter-espionage, from a small, specialist apparatus to detect spies, to a huge 
intelligence-collecting system, with a large budget, 'collecting information on 
virtually anyone opposed to government policy'. This evolution followed a 
thorough re-interpretation of counter-espionage because in 1914 this entailed the 
prevention of specified illegal actions conducted for foreign powers. By 1918 'it 
involved any act which tended to help an enemy more than it furthered the 
policies of the British government - permitting the widespread investigation and 
infiltration of political, industrial and pacifist organizations which were 
attempting to change those policies, and in 1919 spawning the first official body 
in Britain specifically dedicated to political policing'. This increased remit 'had 
come without any direct political review of the matter'; being driven solely by 
officials of the agencies themselves. 
24 Hiley, 'The Failure of British Counter-Espionage Against Germany, 1907-1914', p.857. 
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Hiley goes on to argue that the 'shameful truth' is that MIS and Special Branch 
possessed such autonomy because governments preferred to leave them alone 
rather than risk the 'political odium' of association with secret service.26 He 
opines that this autonomy meant that the development of British internal security 
would be driven by the biases of its chiefs. Such that the 'devious progress' of 
MIS and the Special Branch 'was simply the direct result of permitting such 
bodies to operate in obsessive secrecy,.27 
Porter's Plots and Paranoia: a History of Political Espionage in Britain 1790­
1988 provides a detailed account of domestic intelligence collection. He offers a 
harsh critique of the intelligence and security services.28 Porter argues that MIS's 
early development was driven by an underlying apprehension that a European war 
was looming, which eroded the 'liberal confidence that had sustained the anti-spy 
culture of mid-Victorian times,?9 MIS's wartime expansion was propelled by the 
dynamics of war: 
When war is declared, the clouds lift. The game is really on. There can be 
no doubt now that the other side is playing, and in deadly earnest. No one 
doubts that you should be playing too. Peacetime scruples disappear, as 
the higher priority of national survival overrides them. Obstacles are 
cleared from your path, and resources are poured in. The crowd is behind 
you.30 
Porter is also critical of MIS's record: 
25 Ibid., pp.860-861. 

26 Hiley, 'Counter-Espionage and Security in Great Britain during the First World War', p.660. 

27 Ibid., p.661. 

28 Porter, Plots and Paranoia, passim. 

29 Ibid., pp.120-123. 

30 Ibid., p.13S. 
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It is possible that Edmonds's and Kell's exaggerated view of the German 
spy menace actually impeded them in the task they really had on hand. 
Most of the genuine spies who were arrested between 1910 and 1914 
would probably have been picked up anyway, without any help at all from 
"K". While Steinhauer was deploying his handful of bungling amateurs 
around the coasts of Britain, and alert policemen and public-spirited young 
ladies were rumbling them, Kell's outfit was (metaphorically speaking) 
miles away, busy looking into all that nonsense of Le Queux's about 
waiters in wigs and hairdressers with funny walks, awaiting the signal for 
der Tag?l 
He suggests that this could have been due to 'Edmonds's and Kell's backgrounds 
as Army officers': 
The Special Branch had no one (or no one prominent) with a military 
background. All its personnel were professional policemen, with 
experience of the civilian grass roots. They were solider, dourer and 
generally less silly than the upper-class community who ran the military 
side.32 
Thurlow's The Secret State: British Internal Security in the Twentieth Century 
concludes that the intelligence and security agencies have developed as liberal 
principles have had to compromise with security challenges. Although critical of 
the growth of these agencies, Thurlow argues that Britain has not developed a 
secret state that acts outside the law.33 Thurlow suggests that the 'security 
revolution' that caused MIS's pre-war development was a by-product of the threat 
of war. MIS's wartime expansion was enabled by a reversal of the liberal 
disregard for security and the passage of the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA), 
which gave virtually unlimited power to the armed forces. MIS's eventual 
movement into counter-subversion was driven by a belief that the main threats to 
national security emanated from foreign powers, such that domestic subversion 
31 Ibid., p.129. 

32 Porter, The Origins ofthe Vigilant State, p.173. 
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should chiefly be viewed as an agent of enemy states. Thus, the British peace 
movement was deemed to be a puppet controlled by the hidden hand of Germany, 
for example.34 
In a review of the material in The National Archives (TNA) record class KVI, 
Thurlow concludes that it gives the impression that MIS was 'an efficient counter­
intelligence organisation', which exploited Britain's island defences to deprive 
Germany of access to meaningful intelligence and hinder sabotage. KVl suggests 
that MIS broke up the German espionage organisation in Britain, watched and 
arrested a number of spies and harassed numerous individuals that it thought 
possessed suspect sympathies but had no concrete evidence about.35 He adds: 
MIS was effective in denying enemy access to Britain's secrets, in winding 
up the enemy agent network and preventing infiltration, establishing 
passport control and postal interception, and after some administrative 
problems efficiently regulating the movements and interning enemy aliens 
during hostilities. Yet there is little sign of the imaginative deception 
operations of World War II and the feeling persists that the counter­
intelligence successes of 1914-18 owed as much to enemy incompetence 
as to the undoubted, if unimaginative efficiency of British counter­
intelligence.36 
Boghardt, whose study of German naval intelligence and British counter­
espIOnage from 1901-1918 makes extensive use of German archival sources, 
contends that MIS was born out of spy fiction, rather than fact, and that the 
perceived threat of espionage was crucial to MIS's development: MI5 grew 'not 
33 Thurlow, The Secret State, passim. 

34 Ibid., pp.45-49 & 66. 

35 R. Thurlow, 'The Charm Offensive: the "Coming Out" of MIS', Intelligence and National 

Security, Vol.lS, No.1 (Spring 2000), p.186. 

36 Ibid., p.187. 
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j2 
because it tracked down and dealt with German spies, but because German 
espionage continued to preoccupy many an Englishman,?7 
Nonetheless, as Boghardt observes, even quite questioning commentators uphold 
that MIS still beat German espionage despite its failings.38 He alone makes the 
interesting claim that: 
And while MI5 was able to arrest a handful of genuine German agents 
during the war, these represented but a fraction of all German operatives in 
Britain. After 1915 MI5 became less rather than more efficient, and the 
fact that a significant number of German secret agents were indeed 
roaming the country throughout the war, raises serious doubts as to 
whether they posed any danger at all.39 
Thus, Boghardt concludes that: 
Overall, there is very little that justifies MI5's existence during the years 
1909-1919. Cable and postal censorship, the only effective weapons in the 
detection of German agents, were not carried out by MI5, and the police 
and Scotland Yard were capable of arresting any suspect on their own. 
Had MIS's records been released earlier, the department might already 
have incurred as much ridicule as its by now largely forgotten German 
.
antagonIst.40 
However, even Boghardt concedes that there are some slight problems with the 
evidence on which his conclusions are based. Most tellingly, 'many messages are 
reproduced anonymously (e. g. "Reliable agent reports from Bristol...")" such that 
it is impossible to prove if all of these supposed agents were indeed real, or 
37 T. Boghardt, 'German Naval Intelligence and British Counter-Espionage, 1901-1918' (D.Phil.: 
University of Oxford, 2001), pp.164 & 313. 
38 Ibid., p.8. 
39 Ibid., p.313. 
40 Ibid., pp.313-314. 
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imaginary.41 Indeed, the history of espionage contains many cautionary tales of 
spymasters who invented imaginary agents in order to ingratiate themselves with 
their superiors, and agents who manufactured whole networks of bogus sub­
agents in order to earn more money out of their controllers. 
A second, related debate over democratic accountability questions whether MIS 
operated under adequate parliamentary scrutiny. Porter, for example, holds that 
the years 1909-1911 'witnessed the beginnings of the "secret state" as we know it 
today': MIS and MI6 were both founded; the Official Secrets Act (OSA) 1911 
received assent; the D-Notice system to vet newspaper articles impinging on 
national security was designed; an aliens register was begun; blanket interception 
of particular types of post was authorised; and the Special Branch moved closer to 
becoming 'a proper domestic counter-subversive agency on modem lines'. 'These 
developments marked a crucial stage in the transformation of Britain from a 
relatively open liberal democracy into the far more restrictive one we have today.' 
It occurred 'with scarcely anyone outside a narrow circle of men even being aware 
that it had happened' .42 
However, he notes that MIS 'did not venture beyond counter-espionage', since it 
did not have the necessary resources to do so, before the war.43 Porter further 
concedes that Britain did not have a genuine political police prior to the First 
World War: a true political police is concerned with activities which are classed as 
41 Ibid., p.337. 

42 Porter, Plots and Paranoia, p.120. For an introduction to the D-Notice Committee see A. 
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Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (London: 

Macmillan, 1984), pp.227-249. 

13 
p 
criminal because they are political; rather than those that would be regarded as 
criminal anyway and are simply deemed political as they have political aims or 
motives.44 
The outbreak of war altered this, with Britain soon acquiring 'a proper political 
police'. Because 'so far as subversion was concerned, there was the Special 
Branch: which ifit was not quite a proper counter-subversive police force yet, had 
all the makings of one' .45 Porter suggests that Basil Thomson's interest in the 
'political side of police work' was primarily responsible for this evolution in the 
Special Branch's role. 46 
Similarly, Thurlow views the formation of MI5 as part of 'the birth of the secret 
state'. Kell's appointment, and the Special Branch's expansion, 'marked the 
beginning of an organized security presence'; which could be employed by the 
Government, 'but was independent from parliamentary scrutiny' .47 He 
acknowledges that MI5 'was originally set up as a counter-espionage agency' but 
suggests that it 'rapidly developed techniques which could monitor public order 
and internal security'. His main concern seems to be with the secrecy under which 
this 'silent revolution' took place. Being concealed by OSA 1911, which 
prohibited making official information public without the proper sanction.48 
43 Porter, Plots and Paranoia, p.l29. 
44 Ibid., p.l33. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., pp.133-135. 
47 Thurlow, The Secret State, pAl. 
48 Ibid., pp.37-38. 
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This study calls into question those who have suggested that MI5's move into 
counter-subversion was driven by a desire to increase its territory. It reinforces 
Thurlow's interpretation that MI5 moved into counter-subversion precisely 
because subversives were deemed to be under German influence. Indeed, MI5's 
role in these investigations was limited to establishing if there really was any 
German involvement; with the domestic aspects of these investigations being left 
to Special Branch and other agencies. 
This study also suggests that the current literature does not pay enough attention 
to some of the key factors that help to explain why MI5' s organisational structure 
developed the shape that it did. Between 1909-1914 Kell was very much 
implementing a grand strategy that Edmonds and others who had worked in 
counter-espionage before then had bequeathed to him. During the war MI5 
evolved in response to what it learned about changes in the methods of German 
espionage. Only Hiley shows how MI5's six branches grew out of an appreciation 
that counter-espionage work naturally divided into investigative and preventive 
work and their mutual reliance upon records. 
Following the release ofa mass ofMI5 documents covering 1909-1945 to TNA, 
formerly the Public Record Office (PRO), since 1997, in record classes KVl-6, it 
is now possible to examine MIS at the micro level and set out the intimate 
workings of its six branches. KV1, which was released in 1997 and has also been 
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published on CD-ROM, is most relevant because it covers MIS specifically from 
1909-1919.49 
Not all of MIS's records relating to its activities between 1909 and 1918 have 
been released. Some may have been held back because they relate to sensitive 
activities. Other material has been more routinely retained or weeded before 
release under sections 3.4 and S.1 of the Public Records Act, in order to safeguard 
the identity of individuals and national security. However, some of these records 
may simply have been destroyed when Wormwood Scrubs, where they were 
being stored, was bombed in 1940.50 
KVl contains original MIS documents from the pre-war period and the historical 
branch reports produced by MIS in 1921, which described the work of each of 
MIS's six branches during the First World War as part of MIS's effort to record 
the lessons of its wartime experiences for future instruction. The authors of these 
branch reports summarised original documents from the wartime period, most of 
which were then destroyed in order to reduce the amount of papers that MIS had 
to store. This means that the vast majority of the original wartime documentation 
has been destroyed. For example, reports of meetings between officials from MIS 
and other government departments, or their correspondence, have not survived; 
and it is precisely this kind of material which could help to explain why MIS 
evolved as it did. It is also clear that the branch reports were written by quite 
49 PRO (ed.), M1.5: the First Ten Years, 1909-1919 on CD-ROM (Kew: PRO, 1998). TNA has 
also published an informative booklet to accompany the release of KVI, PRO (ed.), M1.5: the 
First Ten Years, 1909-1919 (Kew: PRO, 1997). Thurlow, 'The Charm Offensive: the "Coming 
Out" of MIS' reviews this material. 
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JUnIor MIS officers who, although they were able to produce fairly accurate 
summaries of the original records and were thus able to detail how MIS evolved, 
were not so capable of explaining why MIS evolved as it did or of offering a 
meaningful analysis of MIS's effectiveness. Indeed, Thurlow feels that the quality 
of KVl's presentation is certainly 'disappointing': it is not well organised and 
lacks 'a succinct summary' of MIS's wartime work; and although 'there is some 
useful analytical and comparative material' it is 'often drowned in a sea of case 
histories' .51 
MIS's branch reports share many of the problems common to official history. By 
its very nature, official history is pre-disposed to present a distorted, official 
viewpoint that shows its subject in a favourable light. Compilers of official 
histories are usually chosen because they can be trusted to produce a favourable 
account or have a natural mindset to do so. Even though they may have access to 
all the relevant material, compilers of official histories may choose not to reveal 
everything, or be prohibited from doing so. Thus, as "official history", the KVl 
files will have recorded what the officials wanted recorded and omitted other 
matters. Some evidence might have been "spiced up" for internal reasons, and 
some "evidence" could even have been fabricated. In most cases material simply 
does not exist to provide criticism. Of course, it can be argued that any 
intelligence history has special problems in obtaining corroboration. Some of 
what appear to be examples of an "official version" are noted in the chapters that 
follow. 
so Thurlow, 'The Charm Offensive: the "Coming Out" ofMI5', p.188. 
51 Ibid., p.186. 
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Reports written in 1921 to point to useful lessons for the future may have used the 
benefits of hindsight to rationalise lessons from the war, even though these 
lessons may not have been apparent during wartime itself, thereby confusing the 
issue of what MIS actually learned during wartime and what lessons were only 
distilled after the war as these reports were written. Nevertheless, Thurlow 
concludes that, because so few of the other personal (KV2) and subject files 
(KV3) seem to have survived from this period, this makes KV 1 'a significant 
historical documentary record'. 52 
It is necessary to analyse these documents and question their relevance to this 
study. How accurate are these reports? It seems apt to accept these reports as 
being accurate on matters of fact and detail. They do not seem a deliberate attempt 
to mislead. However, when it comes to their analysis of the successes and failures 
of MIS, they overrate MIS's achievements by largely ignoring the third-rate 
standard of the German opposition that MI5 had to defeat. Similarly, the F 
Branch Report does not acknowledge that some useful information managed to 
reach Germany through society gossip and diplomatic bags even though other 
sources do. Objectivity may have been eroded because they were partly written to 
justify the case for MIS's continued survival post-war. 
What are their uses and limits? They are uniquely useful, and could not really be 
more so, in describing the six branches of MI5 and how they developed in 
considerable detail. However, they also have limitations. Most crucially for this 
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study, these reports are much more descriptive in nature than analytical, and they 
do not really address the related question of why MIS developed as it did. 
Were these reports written to promote MIS? Clearly, these reports were never 
meant for future public dissemination. They were conceived for the purpose of in­
house training and the full branch reports were not to be seen outside MIS. 
However, the summaries of each of these branch reports were prepared with the 
intention that they could be shown to a selected few within government. They 
were the decision-makers who would decide upon MIS's role, and it seems clear 
that these swnmary reports were intended as a way to convince them of the 
continued need for MIS in peacetime. In short, they were also part of Kell's bid to 
protect his empire. 
Towards the end of the Second World War MIS's Director-General, Sir David 
Petrie, tasked a senior officer, John "Jack" Court Curry, to produce a report on 
MIS's work. They had differing views on the scope and role of Curry's report and 
the finished report differed markedly from what Petrie had intended. 53 Petrie 
envisaged a short summary showcasing the success story of MIS under his 
leadership following the security revolution of 1940. Curry produced a much 
more detailed historical study which, while presenting MIS's achievements, also 
gave an accurate portrayal of the differences between MIS and other government 
52 Ibid. 

53 J. Curry, The Security Service 1908-1945: the Official History (Kew: PRO, 1999), Curry's 
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departments and analysed why this was so. 54 Owing to Curry's literary skills and 
the far greater analysis in his report, Curry's report is in many ways superior to 
MIS's First World War branch reports. It is interesting to note that MIS's 
historical branch reports also did not turn out quite as envisaged. The rather 
ambitious project was never fully finished; perhaps staff cutbacks after the war 
meant that MIS did not have the personnel to devote to the task, with many reports 
being left in an unfinished rough draft state and no attempt made to perform the 
useful task of producing a succinct summary of MIS's aims and achievements 
during the 1909-1918 era. 
This study has also made use of published memoirs and unpublished private 
papers left by those who had been involved with MIS to supplement KVl. 
Although it can be hoped to find an openness and honesty that would not find its 
way into official reports, it must be noted that diarists - perhaps intelligencers 
especially, with their cloak-and-dagger backgrounds - are not always completely 
truthful in their accounts. They often try to put a particular point of view across, 
or to convey a self-constructed image of themselves. It is also possible that they 
may not have felt comfortable with writing about such a sensitive subject as MIS 
and censored their own accounts accordingly. 
Thurlow's assessment of the MIS records that have been released to TNA applies 
equally well to all of the material discussed here. Despite its obvious limitations 
and the gaps that remain in our knowledge of MIS, this material has its uses: 
54 Thurlow, 'The Charm Offensive: the "Coming Out" of MIS', pp.188-189. 
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Still, half a loaf is very much better than no bread at all, and the 
declassification of such material is to be unreservedly welcomed, even if 
the gaps and deficiencies need to be borne in mind.55 
This study is divided into eight chapters. Chapter One sets out the origins of MI5, 
and Two its development as a whole from 1914-1918, with a particular focus on 
the development of the organisational structure and the fundamental principles 
upon which MI5's actions were based. In so doing, they show how each of MIS's 
branches fitted into the organisation as a whole. Chapters Three to Eight lead on 
from this and focus in on MIS's branches in more detail. The branches are 
covered in the order of their creation. Chapter Three examines G Branch, tasked 
with the investigation of cases of suspected espionage. Chapter Four focuses on F 
Branch, whose remit was the prevention of espionage. Chapter Five covers H 
Branch, responsible for organisation, administration and records. Chapter Six 
looks at E Branch, with its role in the control of ports and frontiers. Chapter Seven 
concerns D Branch, its role of imperial overseas special intelligence involving co­
ordinating counter-espionage measures throughout the British Empire. Chapter 
Eight covers A Branch, which handled auxiliary war service, being concerned 
with vetting aliens employed in jobs that brought them into contact with the 
armed forces. There is then a conclusion emphasising those aspects of the thesis 
that may be regarded as a particular contribution to the historiography. Further 
supporting detail is provided in the appendices. Appendix I covers the 
nomenclature and organisation of MI5. Appendix II is an alphabetical list of the 
main German spy cases. Appendix III sets out the detailed duties of MI5's 
branches in November 1918. 
55 Ibid., p.188. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE ORIGINS OF MIS, 1909­
1914 
The work, and consequently the organisation, of such a Bureau is naturally 
divided into two main Branches, (1) the investigation of particular cases 
involving a definite suspicion of espionage and (2) the construction of 
legal and administrative machinery calculated to embarrass and, if 
possible, frustrate such attempts in general and for the future. The first 
Branch deals, in a word, with the cure of hostile espionage, the second 
with its prevention.1 
The above quotation, taken from an MIS report written in 1921, sets out the 
guiding principle behind the development of MIS from 1909 to 1918. The original 
mission was seen in terms of investigative measures to 'cure' espionage, and 
preventive measures to 'frustrate' it. Thus, on the eve of the First World War, MIS 
had two branches: one investigative and the other preventive, with a sub-section 
of the latter being concerned with records. By the end of the war MIS had six 
branches, which had all clearly grown out of the investigative and preventive 
branches. 
In March 1909 the Prime Minister, Herbert Henry Asquith, appointed a 
Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) Sub-Committee on Foreign Espionage to 
consider: 'The question of foreign espionage in the United Kingdom'. Its terms of 
reference were to 'consider such evidence as may be brought before them 
1 TNA, KV1I35, "'F" Branch Report. The Prevention of Espionage. YoU', 1921, p.8. 
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regarding the nature and extent of the foreign espionage that is at present taking 
place in this country, and the danger to which it may expose us'. The Sub-
Committee was tasked to report on four questions, which are worth quoting in 
their entirety: 
(1.) Whether it is desirable that the Admiralty and the War Office should 
be brought into official relations with the Police, Postal and Customs 
authorities, with a view to the movements of aliens suspected of being 
spies or secret agents being properly supervised. 
(2.) If such official relations are desirable, in what manner can they best be 
established. 
(3.) Whether it is desirable to increase the powers we now possess of 
dealing in times of emergency with persons suspected of being spies or 
secret service agents. 
(4.) Whether any alteration is desirable in the system at present in force in 
the Admiralty and the War Office for obtaining information from abroad.2 
The Sub-Committee decided to establish what was later to become MIS. It is 
instructive to set out its main reasons for doing so. The second meeting began 
with the chairman, Richard Burdon (later Viscount) Haldane, the Secretary of 
State for War, despite his admiration and liking of Germany, saying that, having 
just returned from visiting Germany, his impression was: 
that the German Government was not deliberately collecting information 
regarding this country with the definite intention of invading it. There was 
little doubt, however, that the German General Staff is collecting 
information systematically in Great Britain with a view to knowing as 
much as possible about a conceivable theatre ofwar. 
2 TNA, CAB16/S, 'Report and Proceedings of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence ApPQinted to Consider the Question of Foreign Espionage in the United Kingdom, Terms 
of Reference' , 25 March 1909, p.2. 
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Therefore, he felt that 'the question for the Committee to decide was how we 
could best obtain infonnation as to what the Germans were doing in this country' . 
In the discussion that followed, Major-General John Spencer Ewart, the Director 
of Military Operations (DMO), 'asked whether a small secret service bureau could 
not be established which might be in touch with the various departments'. 
Haldane directed that certain members of the Sub-Committee should meet and 
'consider the question of how a secret service bureau could be established,.3 They 
concluded that the bureau's object regarding counter-espionage would be to 'send 
agents to various parts of Great Britain and keep touch with the county police with 
a view to ascertaining the nature and scope of the espionage that is being carried 
on by foreign agents' .4 
The third meeting began with Haldane's suggestion: 
that the Committee had now sufficient evidence before them to enable 
them to issue a report. He did not think that there was any doubt that a 
great deal of Gennan espionage was being undertaken in Great Britain, 
with a view to making a detailed study of our resources and the 
topography of the country. 
It was reported that the Secretary of the CID had read the aforementioned report, 
prepared after the second meeting, to the Sub-Committee, which recommended 
that it should be accepted.5 The Sub-Committee also suggested that the OSA 1889 
should be amended; a bill to control the publication of militarily sensitive 
3 Ibid., 'Second Meeting, Tuesday, 20 th April, 1909', pp.8-9. 

4 TNA, CAB 16/232, 'Conclusions of the Sub-Committee requested to consider how a secret 
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information by the press should be proceeded with; relations should be established 
between the Secret Service Bureau, Admiralty and War Office on the one hand 
and the Post Office and Customs on the other; and the Home Ports Defence 
Committee should enquire into the guarding of docks, bridges and other 
vulnerable points against sabotage.6 All of these were later realised. 
What had led to the establishment of the Sub-Committee and its particular 
conclusions? Thurlow shows how the 'security revolution' that led to MIS's 
creation had been brought about by changes in foreign policy and military strategy 
in order to deal with the perceived threat from German espionage; not by 
domestic challenges to public order, such as the suffragettes or labour unrest. He 
discerns the interplay of three key factors: public opinion, which took the threat of 
invasion seriously and helped to induce an official security consciousness; the 
decline of Britain as a great power, evinced by its worrying performance in the 
Boer War; and increased national rivalries, embodied by Germany's challenge to 
Britain's naval supremacy. 7 
Alarmist invasion scares, spy fiction written by sensationalist authors like William 
Le Queux, popular journalism, xenophobia, politicians who felt that they could 
make political capital out of attacking the Liberal Government's perceived laxity 
on security issues and other such scare-mongering all nurtured a public opinion 
6 Ibid., 'Report', 24 July 1909, pA. 
7 Thurlow, The Secret State, pp.37-38. 
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which took such threats seriously and 'pressured the authorities to adopt a less 
liberal security policy'. 8 
These fears began to penneate into officialdom in 1906, when a committee 
established by the War Office and Admiralty to examine emergency powers 
suggested toughening the laws against spying.9 The following two reports by 
senior intelligence officers serve to illustrate this growing concern. Colonel (later 
General Sir) Fraser Davies ended a report of 21 November 1905 regarding a 
German suspected of espionage: 
the fact being established that foreigners do come here on espionage, I beg 
to suggest that the time has arrived to take action in the matter. An easy 
system of doing this would be for confidential instructions to be sent from 
the Home Office to the Chief Constables of all Maritime counties directing 
their attention to the subject and asking that a discreet look out be 
maintained. 
At present the Police and the Postal authorities are as indifferent to the 
espionage danger as the general public. 10 
Similarly, in a minute to M05 of3 June 1907, Colonel (later Major-General) Lord 
Edward Gleichen, of section M02 of the Directorate of Military Operations, 
concurred that the OSA 1889 should be amended as recommended in order to 
render it applicable in peacetime as well as in emergency times. However, he was 
concerned that this would not cover the control of aliens: 'As this question of 
Police surveillance and control of aliens during peacetime is almost as important 
8 Ibid., p.39. 
9 Ibid., p.40. 
10 TNA, HD3/131, report by Colonel Davies, 21 November 1905. 
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as a preventive measure, as the amendment of the O.S. act is as an executive 
measure, it is hoped that action will be taken on this' . 11 
The launching of the first Dreadnought type battleship in February 1906, which 
made all other ships obsolete, intensified the Anglo-German naval race, because 
the fear that Germany might build more Dreadnoughts than Britain made a 
German naval victory, which would leave Britain open to invasion, at least a 
possibility that had to be considered. There was also the related fear of a surprise 
invasion - "a bolt from the blue" - if the Royal Navy was ever caught off guard. 
Therefore, these fears of invasion began to be taken seriously. Before, they would 
have been confidently ignored, as Britain lay shielded behind the unchallenged 
supremacy of the Royal Navy. It was this feeling of vulnerability, played upon by 
invasion scares and spy fiction that warned of invading armies being preceded by 
legions of spies and saboteurs, that made the deficiencies in Britain's intelligence 
system a matter for concern. 12 
At that time counter-espionage was but one of the many duties of MOS, the small 
and hard-pressed special duties section of the Directorate of Military Operations, 
under Edmonds, which patently lacked the resources to adequately investigate 
cases of suspected espionage. Edmonds's inadequate investigations, and 
preconception that German espionage operated on a considerable scale, led him to 
conclude that there was an extensive network of German espionage in Britain and 
that a dedicated counter-espionage section was needed to check it. 
11 TNA, W032/8873, minute by Colonel Gleichen, 3 June 1907. 
12 Andrew, Secret Service, pp.48-49. 
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It was for these reasons that the sub-committee met in 1909 to consider Edmonds' 
evidence. His evidence was laughable: a lot of it seemed to have been taken from 
Le Queux, who also happened to be a friend of his. However, such 'was the mood 
of the time that the normally sceptical Lord Haldane finally agreed' that a small 
agency should be formed to investigate the matter. 13 Indeed, the fact that MIS 
began so inauspiciously, comprising only a single official on a two-year 
appointment, suggests that the Sub-Committee had not been totally convinced by 
Edmonds' evidence. MIS was initially intended as simply something to enquire 
further into the evidence, in order to better evaluate the true extent of German 
espionage. 
Accordingly, the Secret Service Bureau was formed in October 1909. It 
comprised Captain Vemon Kell, heading the military section of the bureau, 
nominated by the War Office, and Commander (later Captain Sir) Mansfield 
George Smith Cumming, heading the naval section, appointed by the Admiralty. 
They shared the espionage and counter-espionage work between them and an 
office at 64 Victoria Street, London. I4 The Secret Service Bureau came under 
MOS, whose head acted as paymaster and was 'responsible for directing the 
activities' ofKell and Cumming. 15 
13 Thurlow, The Secret State, pAO. 

14 TNA, KV1I53, "'H" Branch Report. Organization and Administration. Vol.IVB. Annexures. 

(Papers.), Annexure 2, S.S. Bureau. General Organization', n.d., p.9. 

15 IWM, Kirke MSS, Vol.Vn, p.383, Kirke's notes on George MacDonogh, 29 July 1947. 
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... 

Kell joined the counter-espionage section of the Secret Service Bureau, which, as 
already noted, was not to be designated MIS until January 1916, as its Director on 
9 October 1909 aged thirty-six years, having served with the South Staffordshire 
Regiment. By the time he was dismissed by Churchill in June 1940, his thirty-one 
years in charge of MIS would make him the longest serving head of a British 
government department during the twentieth-century. 16 
Kell's father was an army major and his mother, later divorced, was the daughter 
of a Polish count. After Sandhurst, Kell joined his father's regiment. He went on 
to qualify as an army interpreter in French and German, followed by postings to 
Russia and then China to learn those languages. 17 Kell was a gifted linguist, who 
spoke six foreign languages as fluently as his own: Chinese, French, German, 
Italian, Polish and Russian. His favourite hobbies were lawn tennis and fishing. 18 
He possessed a retiring disposition and shunned the limelight. According to 
Andrew, Kell's 'only known publication is a newspaper letter describing the 
behaviour ofthe lapwing' .19 
In 1902 he took up a post analysing intelligence in the German Section at the War 
Office. Kell' s big break came in 1904 when Edmonds, then head of the Far-
Eastern Section, chose Kell as his deputy and right-hand man. In 1909 Kell was 
working on a history of the Russo-Japanese War for the Historical Section of the 
16 TNA, KV1/59, 'Chronological List of Staff taken to 31 December 1919', December 1919, p.3; 
C. Andrew, 'Introduction', in Curry, The Security Service 1908-1945, p.6. IWM, Kell MSS, Lady 
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CID when Edmonds, then head of MOS, proposed Kell as the first head of what 
would become MIS.20 
Edmonds informed Kell that, because the bureau had to work in secret, he would 
have to resign from his army career, at least officially, and that he could never 
expect public recognition for his work. Thus, in taking the job, Kell was conscious 
that failure risked losing not only a job, but also his career?! Indeed, he accepted 
this appointment on the understanding that it would last 'for a minimum period of 
two years', but with no guarantee that it would continue beyond that.22 Porter 
bluntly sums up the precariousness of the situation in which Kell found himself: 
So Edmonds was given his 'contra-espionage' agency; but only a very tiny 
one, which suggests that ministers were not wholly convinced. It began 
with nothing but a room in Victoria Street with a desk and a filing cabinet, 
and of course Kell himself. He was junior enough to be expendable if there 
proved to be nothing for him to do.23 
Therefore, when he began his work in October 1909, 'Kell had to build up his 
organization from scratch'. 24 
The Victoria Street office soon revealed problems. Its location opposite the Army 
and Navy Stores resulted in difficult meetings with inquisitive friends. Therefore, 
Cumming, who would later become known as "C", soon stopped using this office 
20 Andrew, Secret Service, p.59. 

21 Bulloch, MI.5, p.IS. 

22 TNA, KVI!5, Kell to Ewart, 19 September 1909, p.2. 

23 B. Porter, Plots and Paranoia, p.127. 

24 Bulloch, MI.5, p.29. 
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and took a flat at Ashley Mansions, Vauxhall Bridge Road, London.25 In his 
second sixth-monthly progress report, Kell explained: 
Soon after the formation of the Bureau in October, 1909, it was found 
necessary, in order to avoid over-lapping, to define the dividing line 
between Capt. Cumming's work and my own; and it was ultimately 
decided to entrust the duty of espionage abroad to Capt. Cumming. Whilst 
I was made responsible for counter-espionage within the British Isles?6 
This marked the separation of the Secret Service Bureau into the counter­
espionage section that would become MIS, and the espionage section that would 
be known as MIlc for much of the First World War, and later become MI6 or the 
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). Kell continued to use the office at Victoria 
Street until the lease expired, when, on 21 February 1911, he moved into an office 
at 3 Paper Buildings, Temple, London?7 
Kell spent much of his first six months at the Secret Service Bureau reading the 
War Office's files to acquaint himself with the history of counter-espionage, and 
familiarising himself with the different facets of the work. 28 Two examples of this 
are instructive. 
Almost at once, in early 1910, in what became known as the Frant Case, Kell 
investigated a German, using the name De Corina, who took a farm in the Frant 
area of Sussex. He was supposed to be a poultry farmer, but it had been noticed 
2S TNA, KV1I53, Annexure 2, p.9. See A. Judd, The Quest for C: Mansfield Cumming and the 
Founding of the Secret Service (London: RarperCollins, 1999), passim for Cumming's 
~erspective. 
6 TNA, KV1!9, 'Kell's Bureau's six-monthly progress reports 1909-1914, lInd General Report', 7 
November 1910, p.9. 
27 TNA, KV1!49, '''R'' Branch Report. Organisation and Administration. Vol. 1. Chapters 1 to 5', 
1921, pp.12-13. 
28 TNA, KV1I9, 'lInd General Report', p.9. 
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that his farm at Bartley Mill was a meeting place for Germans, most of whom 
spent much of their time motoring and cycling round the area. It was obvious that 
De Corina was not making a living from the farm. However, no evidence was 
found that would definitely link him to espionage. Nonetheless, the circumstances 
were suspicious and lent themselves to the conclusion that the farm was used as a 
centre for espionage?9 
The Rusper Case was similar. Two Germans arrived, at a gap of time between 
them, each with a recommendation to a gentleman living in the village of Rusper, 
near the border of Surrey and Sussex. The recommendations came from a 
Baroness whom the gentleman had not heard of. The Germans pretended not to 
know each other, but quickly built up a friendship, and it was clear that whether or 
not they knew each other, each had a deep knowledge of the other's affairs. By 
this time Kell had a small staff and was able to send Melville, whose service as 
MIS's chief detective is examined in Chapter Three, to investigate the case. In 
early 1910 he stayed in the same house as the Germans and caused them some 
anxiety. They questioned the landlord about him very closely, being particularly 
concerned to know if he spoke any foreign languages; and they were obviously 
relieved when the landlord assured them that Melville did not. Shortly after 
Melville's arrival, the two Germans argued - it was clearly contrived - and would 
not speak to one another for the rest of Melville's stay. They drove about the 
village of Rusper constantly. Again, the circumstances of this case were very 
suspicious, but there was no concrete evidence of spying.3o Kell commented on 
29 Ibid., first progress report, 21 March 1910, pp.5-6. 
30 Ibid., pp.3-4. 
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the significance of these cases in his first progress report: 'They, in themselves, 
constitute strong supplementary and confirmatory evidence to the existence, in 
this country of an organised system of German espionage' .31 
He also drew the following conclusions from his first six months' work. First, he 
felt that the Secret Service Bureau had 'justified its institution'. Secondly, the 
'experience gained has proved that it is essential to the effective working of the 
Counter-espionage Section of the Bureau, that all information coming within its 
province should be sent to and exclusively dealt with by the Bureau'. Thirdly, for 
effective counter-espionage, it was 'essential to ensure the co-operation of the 
Chief Constables'. Finally, he urged the necessity for changes to the inadequate 
counter-espionage legislation provided by the OSA 1889.32 Kell's work must have 
impressed his superiors, because he was granted the assistance of a clerk on 14 
March 1910. 
Kell will probably have read and been influenced by the note on the organization 
of secret service prepared, most likely by Edmonds, for the DMO on 4 October 
1908. This suggested that the counter-espionage side of the work required a 
system 'to mark down spies and agents in peace' and, if they were to land in 
Britain, to stay behind German lines and spy on their troops. The fonner could be 
carried out by police, post office officials and custom-house officers, plus some 
paid agents: 'Cooperation of the civil authorities is essential, and authority for this 
31 Ibid., p.2. These two cases seem to be pretty flimsy evidence of an organised spy system. It is 
open to speculation that more was known but the "official mind" thought it either unnecessary or 
undesirable to provide further detail. However, material simply does not exist to provide criticism 
of these particular cases. 
32 TNA, KVl/9, pp.7-8. 
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must be obtained'. The note curtly summed up the prevailing situation at that 
time, commenting 'we have only casual assistance from members of police and 
Post Office', noting that it was outside police duty to take any notice of 
foreigners, unless they were criminals. It advocated that an amendment to the 
OSA should be pushed through, because it was impossible to arrest a spy or 
search his lodgings without the specific consent of the Attorney-General, which 
could take too long to obtain. It also called for the registration of aliens, which 
had been enforced by Acts of Parliament during the Napoleonic Wars, to be 
revived. The note ended with an analysis of the threat posed by GeIman 
espionage: 'There is no doubt whatever that the same careful preparations which 
were made in France before 1870 are now being made in Eastern districts of 
England' .33 It is instructive to note that MIS had acted on most of these 
suggestions before the outbreak ofthe First World War. 
In a 1909 paper on intelligence methods, which Kell will most likely also have 
seen, Edmonds explained that in peacetime military intelligence involved 
collecting or preparing maps and plans and compiling infoImation about other 
countries that would be of use in war as a basis for campaign plans. This activity 
was often divided into three sections. First, there was the collection and 
compilation of such information. Secondly, of most interest to Ken: 
The prevention of the compilation of such information regarding one's 
own country, by finding out the means used, and the persons concerned, in 
procuring, and conveying such information; by watching and if possible 
convicting the agents employed; and also by either intercepting such 
communications, or by ascertaining what is communicated; ifunimportant, 
33 TNA, KVlIl, 'Organization of Secret Service. (Note prepared for D.M.O. on the 4th. Oct. 
1908)', pp.2-3. 
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letting it pass, and if important and of great urgency, substituting other 
unimportant or misleading information for it; or in some way throwing 
doubt upon the bona fides of the person communicating it. 
Thirdly, there was misleading other countries: through the publication or 
deliberate leakage of, firstly, false information about one's own armed forces or 
intentions and, secondly, 'of opinions not really held regarding the forces of some 
other country as if they were genuine'. Edmonds also observed that, in order to 
achieve these objectives, in some continental countries there seemed to be close 
links between the diplomatic and consular services, secret service agents, the 
police and the army staff. 34 
There were other influences. The Boer War of 1899-1902 saw the British employ 
rudimentary press, postal and cable censorship, plus the intenunent of more than 
116,000 Boer civilians in concentration camps. Indeed, all of these measures were 
later introduced to Britain during the First World War.35 Therefore, it also seems 
quite likely that lessons must have been learned from the Boer War, particularly 
as most of those involved in the formation of MIS had served during the Boer 
War. However, this can only be speculation, because no evidence has been 
unearthed that explicitly sets out any such link. 
Additionally, Kell would almost certainly have read reports about how the 
intelligence services operated in other countries, such as Germany, France, Russia 
and India. He probably also drew on Britain's experiences in Ireland and 
34 TNA, KV1I4, 'Intelligence Methods', 1909, pp.7-8. See also PRO, KVl/2, 'Espionage in Time 
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combating Fenian bombings on mainland Britain, India and other such 
experiences throughout the British Empire. Indeed, Richard Popplewell notes that 
a significant number of M15' s officers had served in India: in February 1917 eight 
ofG Branch's twenty-seven officers had experience in India.36 As the author West 
explains, the former Indian policemen who joined MIS brought considerable skills 
with them, having successfully coped in a challenging environment surrounded 
'by plots, intrigues and disturbances,.37 Kell was also likely to have received 
advice from more senior officers who took a keen interest in intelligence, such as 
Edmonds. Doubtless, Captain Eric Holt-Wilson, whose distinguished career and 
significance is more fully analysed in Chapter Four, and other senior MI5 officers 
also had a notable impact. However, this can only be speculation. 
It is possible, however, that MI5's 'grand strategy' owed more to the Director of 
Military Intelligence (DMI) than to Kell, Kell merely applying and refining it. In a 
letter to Edmonds of 17 July 1942, regarding The Times obituary notice for 
Lieutenant-General Sir George MacDonogh, DMI for much of the First World 
War, Holt-Wilson explained MacDonogh's position concerning counter­
espionage, which illuminates the relative roles ofKell and the DMI: 
MacD. himself, (perhaps inherited in part from Edmonds), laid the 
foundations of the war legislation required for all Intelligence purposes, 
including Counter-Espionage. I took over all this legislative work from 
1912 to 1940. For example, we started the last war with some 35, purely 
military Defence Regulations, as devised by MacD., which I saw 
expanded to some 250 regulations in the course of the war. 
36 R. Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the 
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Similarly with the control of aliens, for which MacD. had sketched a 
tentative Order in Council. This I developed hand in hand with the Home 
Office on the outbreak of the war into the fom1idable Aliens Control 
legislation which has survived to the present day. 
Full credit belongs however to MacD. and Edmonds for their 
revolutionary pre-vision in the inception of the above measures, but when 
we come to the actual work of spy-catching and making it difficult for 
enemy agents to ply their trade as spies or saboteurs, from 1909 onwards 
the credit must be given to K. and his staff. 38 
This interpretation, that Kell's superiors initially designed MIS's grand strategy 
while Kell applied and refined it, was endorsed by Brigadier-General George 
Kynaston Cockerill, Director of Special Intelligence (DSI) and Kell's direct 
superior during the war, who described how he managed the Directorate of 
Special Intelligence in his memoirs, as follows: 
[BCI] was also authorised to communicate direct with the heads of all my 
sections. In this way such services as the Secret Service and counter­
espionage, economic warfare, propaganda, and the Cable, Postal, and, to a 
great extent, the Press Censorships were all centralized in me as regards 
policy and general direction, and as regards administration and executive 
action effectively decentralized among the several sections of my 
Directorate of Special Intelligence.39 
With especial insight Lady Kell's portrayal of her husband pointed to those who 
had the greatest influence on Kell's career. However, she did not, nor does any 
other available material, explicitly set out the precise contribution that they each 
made to MIS's grand strategy. According to Lady Kell, Kell 'would laughingly 
allude' to General Davies, who had first sought him for an intelligence post 
because of his linguistic abilities, 'as the father of the work, for he had backed 
Vernon with much enthusiasm, using his influence to help him on', MacDonogh 
38 LHCMA, Edmonds MSS, III 1165a, Holt-Wilson to Edmonds, 17 July 1942. 
39 G. Cockerill, What Fools We Were (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1944), pAl. 
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'became a close friend' and Kell 'was always sure of good advice and strong 
backing from him'. 'But the man who always claimed to have picked Vernon out 
for this intensely important job which needed such careful and delicate handling, 
was Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds', who 'became a great friend of ours 
in the years that followed' .40 
Thus, it seems fair to conclude that Kell received considerable guidance about 
grand strategy from his superiors, particularly Edmonds during MI5's early years. 
For example, Alan Judd, whose account is based upon privileged access to 
Cumming's diary, notes that Edmonds, MacDonogh, Kell and Cumming met on 4 
October 1909 to discuss the work of the newly formed Secret Service Bureau. 
Edmonds recounted what had happened before and gave a briefing on tradecraft.41 
So, in matters of grand strategy, Kell was very much putting others' advice into 
practice, rather than taking charge of designing it himself. However, it is not 
possible to measure these influences on Kell more precisely, a few personal ones 
have already been noted, owing to a lack of documentary evidence in this 
particular area. 
Were there any debates over strategy within MIS? What alternatives were put 
forward? There is no material relating directly to this question, thus there is no 
evidence upon which to base a firm conclusion. For example, there are no reports 
from the meetings of MIS's Standing Advisory Committee, which may well have 
considered such things. Judd also observes that, compared with Cumming's more 
40 IWM, Kell MSS, Lady Kell, 'Secret Well Kept', pp.lll & 114. 
41 Judd, The Quest/or C, pp.94-97. 
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personal account ofMIlc, Kell's brief office diary represents 'the mere keeping of 
a record'. It contains little of a personal nature or Kell's responses to events and 
'virtually nothing of any sort of debate with himself' .42 
However, there was some later questioning of MI5's strategy by those outside 
MI5, including officials from other government departments that worked with 
MI5. John Moylan of the Home Office's Aliens Division felt that MI5 was 
mistakenly focusing on enemy aliens, perhaps so that MI5 could simply be seen to 
be taking action, when the real threat came from British subjects and neutral 
aliens. By contrast, in early 1915 a number of Conservative politicians attacked 
Asquith's Liberal Government, particularly Reginald McKenna as Home 
Secretary, for being too lax regarding enemy aliens living in Britain. 
The author Michael Smith has accused Kell of 'inveterate empire-building' .43 
However, this charge does not bear up to examination for two main reasons. First, 
Kell simply did not possess the power to build an empire on his own. Whenever 
he wanted increased powers or staff, all Kell was empowered to do was to petition 
his superiors, who held the purse strings. Thus, there were clear checks on Kell' s 
work, and he only got what he requested ifhis superiors agreed to it. Kell also had 
to submit regular reports on the progress of his work to his superiors, which made 
him further accountable to them. When Kell first desired the help of a clerk in 
1910, he had to appeal to his superiors; who duly granted Kell the assistance of a 
42 Ibid., p.274. 
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clerk, but chided him for his extravagance.44 Secondly, Kell's views of the threat 
from German espionage were not out-of-place in the sense that he was not alone 
in holding them. 
When, having been involved in counter-espionage work for a year, Ken came to 
write the progress report covering MIS's work from April 1910 to October 1910 
he offered a telling analysis of counter-espionage methods, which is worth 
quoting at length: 
Counter-espionage work in peace-time should, I think, be divided under 
the following heads:-­
A. Passive Operations. 
(1). Locating of, and noting all useful details regarding known spies, and 
other suspected aliens and traitors. 
(2). Compilation of handwritings, description-returns and photographs of 
all suspects for immediate transmission to the G.P.O. and Police at the 
commencement of the Precautionary Period. 
(3). Collection of information in Home Ports likely to be of use during the 
Precautionary Period, for example: 
(a) Getting to know certain captains of merchant ships, who could 
be counted upon to give reliable information about an enemy's 
fleet, or any unusual activity in foreign ports. 
(b) The ear-marking of minor agents in important British ports, 
who, during the Precautionary Period, would report anything of an 
unusual nature. 
(4). The ear-marking (and training??) of our own spies in the coast 
counties, to act behind the enemy's lines in case of invasion. 
B. Active Operations. 
44 Porter, Plots and Paranoi, p.127. 
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(1). Shadowing known spies or highly-suspected persons; seeing whom 
they associate with etc thereby getting on the track of traitors. 
(2.) Dissemination of false or useless information at places where 
foreigners frequent, such as ports etc. 
(3.) The purchase of foreign information by means of an established 
agency in the city. (This proposal might be considered at a later period.)45 
The division of MI5's duties was made more explicit around April 1912, when 
Captain, later Colonel, Reginald John Drake, who had joined on 1 April, having 
served with the North Staffordshire Regiment, was put in charge of the 
investigation of cases of espionage.46 He went on to become the head of G 
Branch. Lady Kell remembered him as 'a most able man and most successful 
sleuth - small hope for anyone who fell into his net' .47 
By October 1913 the organisation ofMI5 'had been put on a definite footing'. As 
forecasted by Kell in 1910 it had 'automatically divided' into two main branches 
concerned with active and passive measures. A Branch, under Captain Drake, 
carried out 'the investigation of cases of espionage and preparations for 
mobilisation'. B Branch, under Holt-Wilson, was concerned with 'aliens 
registration, the selection of possible suspects and the upkeep of the Special War 
and other lists, with the "Observer Scheme" and the protection of vulnerable 
points' . 
The first nucleus of the organisation, administration and records branch can be 

found in a sub-division of B Branch at that time. Captain K. Lawrence was in 
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charge of a section of B Branch concerned with 'the translation, filing and custody 
of intercepted letters[;] the preparation[,] filing and custody of Secretary of State 
warrants[;] the arrangement and comparison of handwritings and photographic 
records[;] the scheduling and filing of correspondence and the indexing and 
carding of information'. However, Holt-Wilson maintained responsibility for the 
accounts, general administrative measures and supervision of the records in 
Lawrence's care.48 
By this time MIS had seventeen members of staff, including seven officers, three 
clerks, three clerical staff, three detectives and a caretaker.49 Kell was promoted to 
major in late 1913, an endorsement of his work and a clear sign that MIS was now 
well established.5o 
The key developments that occurred between MIS's formation and the outbreak of 
the First World War, so that MIS was well-prepared for war, were: the passage of 
effective counter-espionage legislation, with the OSA in 1911; improvements in 
the procedure for the granting of Home Office Warrants (HOW) sanctioning the 
interception of suspects correspondence; the development of good working 
relations with the police and other relevant bodies; an unofficial register of aliens 
residing in the UK who could thereby be classified as probably harmless or 
possibly suspect and worth investigating; and the preparation of emergency 
legislation ready for wartime, in the shape of the Defence of the Realm Act 
(DORA) and the Aliens Restriction Act (ARA). 
48 TNA, KV1I49, pp.l8-19. 
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In his first progress report on the work of MI5, in its first six months, from 
October 1909-March 1910, Kell, in his conclusions, drew particular attention to 
the necessity for legislation, which part is worth quoting in full: 
As is well known, there is at present no power to complete one's evidence 
by preliminary search on suspicion, although search-warrants are freely 
granted in trivial cases of larceny: i.e. Under the Army Act 1881.Sect.156. 
Subsect.5. a magistrate may grant a search-warrant upon reasonable cause 
for suspicion that anyone has in his possession the property of a comrade 
(e.g. a blanket!), and yet in cases involving the safety of the Empire, there 
is no such power which the Chief Constables could avail themselves of. If 
a clause were added to the Official Secrets Act empowering any 
Magistrate to grant a search-warrant on the application of a Chief 
Constable showing reasonable ground for suspicion, the proper working of 
the Counter-espionage movement would be ensured. 
Moreover, there is no direct law dealing with cases of photographing, 
planning, or sketching of forts etc., and unless absolute damage has been 
committed, the action complained of comes merely under the civil 
Common Law of Trespass, in which case the punishment is practically a 
nominal one, amounting in most cases to a small fine, which for our 
purposes is useless as a deterrent.S! 
The inadequacies of OSA 1889 were demonstrated by the Helm case. On 5 
September 1910 a telegram came from the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 
Portsmouth defences that some of his officers had arrested a German Lieutenant 
Siegfried Helm, an engineer officer of the 21 st Nassau Regiment, in the act of 
sketching Fort Widley. The following day a Captain Bonham Carter provided all 
the necessary evidence about Helm's spying. Then the unsatisfactory state of the 
law, under OSA 1889, came to the fore. The public prosecutor's opinion was that 
the required evidence was present to apply for a fiat from the Attorney-General to 
prosecute Helm. However, as the Attorney-General was away on the continent, it 
51 TNA, KVl/9, pp.7-8. 
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was necessary to wire for his authority to make the arrest. Therefore, it was 
required to detain Helm in military custody until 7 September, by which time he 
was given over to the civil power. Helm was subsequently tried and bound over to 
come up for trial if requested to do so. In fact, the fort he had been drawing had 
long been out-of-date and could not possibly be of interest to Germany. 
Nonetheless, the case illustrated the difficulty of dealing with a suspected spy. 
Indeed, it was one of a number of cases that helped in the framing and production 
of OSA 1911.52 
The OSA 1889 did not grant powers to search suspect individuals who were 
possibly spies, and there was no direct law prohibiting photography, planning, 
sketching of forts, works of defence, etc. Therefore, a considerable number of 
cases of possible spies could not be followed up, because this power was 
inadequate to deal with such people or to obtain a conviction. The OSA 1911 
provided further powers in these areas. The key point is that it placed the onus on 
the individual accused of proving, when he was caught in an area information 
about which place would be harmful to national security, his innocence and that 
he was there without illegal intent. It also sanctioned the power to search on 
suspicion, and increased the number of prohibited places. 
In his sixth progress report, covering the six months ending 22 November 1911, 
Kell briefly noted with great satisfaction that the 'New OFFICIAL SECRETS 
52 TNA, KV1I39, pp.26-27. See also TNA, DPPli14 - HELM, S. Offence: Official Secrets Act, 
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ACT is now law, and the work of counter-espionage is thereby greatly 
facilitated' .53 As Bulloch says, the passage of OSA 1911 'was also a real triumph 
for Kell - a vindication and acceptance of all the work of his department' .54 
Allied to OSA was the HOW, perhaps the most important source of detection 
during peacetime.55 As Andrew observes, MI5's investigative powers were 
greatly enhanced in August 1911, when the Home Secretary, Winston Churchill, 
simplified the procedure enabling the interception of suspects' mail. Previously, in 
a cumbersome process, Home Secretaries signed individual warrants for each 
item. Churchill established a modus operandi whereby Home Secretaries signed 
general warrants which authorised the interception of every item of 
correspondence of specified individuals on a list.56 
Between 1911 and 1914 MIS brought ten German agents to account: six received 
prison sentences, two were cautioned, one was discharged from the Royal Navy 
and another was declared insane. 57 As part of a deliberate policy to roll-up the 
German espionage network in the UK in one knock-out blow, MI5 had also been 
keeping a further twenty-two spies under surveillance ready to be rounded-up on 
the outbreak of war. 
53 INA, KVl/9, p.14. 
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According to the existing literature MI5 had nineteen members of staff, including 
nine officers, three male clerks, four female clerical staff and three detectives on 4 
August 1914. However, recently released documents show that MIS actually had 
twenty members of staff at that time, if MIS's caretaker, Mrs Sumner, is also 
counted.58 Of course, it could be argued that, as a caretaker, Mrs Sumner was not 
actively involved in counter-espionage work. It is instructive to list all of MI5' s 
staff to 4 August 1914, including when they joined and left and their designated 
task, because it illustrates the early growth of MIS and, as "founder members", 
they deserve recording (those who had left before the war are bracketed):­
W. Melville, 1 Dec. 1903-18 Dec. 1917, (Chief) Detective. 
V.O.W. Kell, 9 Oct. 1909-June 1940, Officer (Director). 
J.R. Westmacott, 14 March 1910-1921 (Chief) Clerk. 
(F.L.S. Clarke, 1 Jan. 1911-30 Nov. 1912, Officer.) 
D. Westmacott, 16 Jan. 1911-1922, Clerical Staff. 
BJ. Ohlson, 10 May 1911-18 July 1917, Officer. 
J. Regan, 7 June 1911-l3 Aug. 1916, Detective. 
F.S. Strong, 18 Sept. 1911-26 July 1916, Clerk. 
H.M. Newport, 27 Oct. 1911-1921, Clerical Staff. 
RJ. Drake, 1 April 1912-1 March 1917, Officer. 
Mrs. Sumner, 1 Oct. 1912-4 Aug. 1916, Caretaker. 
H.1. Fitzgerald, 1 Nov. 1912-(No date), Detective. 
E.E.B. Holt-Wilson, 20 Dec. 1912-June 1940, Officer. 
5S TNA, KV1I59, pp.3-4. 
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F.B. Booth, 1 Jan. 1913-(No date), Officer. 
(K.E. Lawrence, 31 Jan. 1913-31 March 1914, Officer.) 
S. Holmes, 27 Feb. 1913-31 Dec. 1918, Clerical Staff. 
M. Brodie, 1 July 1913-(No date), Officer. 
S. Strong, 10 July 1913-(No date), Clerk. 
lB. Fetherston, 1 Jan. 1914-(No date), Officer. 
D. Bowie, 7 Jan. 1914-(No date), Clerical Staff. 
M.M. Haldane, 22 April 1914-(No date), Officer. 
1.F.C. Carter, 4 Aug. 1914-28 Feb. 1919, Officer.59 
Following the outbreak of the First World War on 4 August 1914 MI5 became 
officially recognised, having hitherto been a secret and unrecognised organisation, 
as part of the Directorate of Military Operations as M05(g).60 
MIS's wartime role was as part of what became the Directorate of Special 
Intelligence, a sub-directorate of the Directorate of Military Intelligence 
concerned with special intelligence.61 It was tasked with security intelligence 
work, namely 'all the security services designed to prevent the enemy from 
gaining information' .62 The work divided: 
As regards secrecy, the problem of preventing the leakage of military 
information may be considered from two wholly separate points of view; 
(a) the repression of innocent indiscretions on the part of officers and men, 
59 Ibid. 
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the public and the press; and (b) the defeat of enemy efforts to obtain 
information by spies and agents in his employment.63 
MI7 (Press Control), MI8 (Cable Censorship) and MI9 (Postal Censorship) 
covered the former. 64 MIS dealt with the latter, its role within the sub-directorate 
being seen in terms of military security, encompassing 'Counter-espionage, 
including measures for the Control of Aliens and suspected persons' .65 
Thus, MIS began as a one-man affair. By the end of the First World War, 
however, it not only employed 844 members of staff, it had also developed into an 
effective and necessary arm of the state. Although MI5 was understandably cut 
back to a skeleton staff of only about thirty by 1920, it had still survived into 
peacetime, as a specialist nucleus ready for expansion on the eve of another war. 
Unlike previous intelligence organisations that had been hastily improvised in 
time of war and then abolished just as quickly as peace returned. In this sense, 
MIS marks the development of counter-espionage as a permanent institution. That 
process of transformation will now be examined. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 

MI5, 1914-1918 

It has been suggested that MIS's wartime expansion was a product of the growth 
of government, and of changing perceptions of the nature of the threat from 
German espionage. In the early months of the war, the main threat was seen as 
emanating from spies and saboteurs hiding in the midst of the sizeable enemy 
alien community in Britain. The response was to intern, deport or otherwise 
control enemy aliens and protect vulnerable points. Spy cases in 1915 convinced 
MIS that the threat had shifted to agents coming to Britain under cover as citizens 
of allied or neutral states, particularly in the influx of Belgian refugees. This 
prompted measures to tighten the control of ports and frontiers; and increased 
restrictions on all aliens not just enemy aliens, notably the vetting of Belgians who 
wished to work in munitions factories. Throughout 1916 MIS continued to 
perceive the main threat as coming from enemy spies and used lessons learned 
from its investigations to fill-in gaps in its defences that Germany had been 
exploiting, particularly in DORNs counter-espionage regulations and the postal 
and cable censorship. However, increasing attention also began to be paid to the 
possibility that industrial unrest, pacifists and others who opposed the government 
might actually be being directed by a German "hidden hand" as another part of the 
German secret service's attack on the British war effort. From 1917 onwards 
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MI5's development was driven by a conviction that it had defeated German 
espionage, such that Germany had switched its efforts to promoting Bolshevism 
and other forms of unrest in order to undermine British society. However, MI5's 
activities were restricted to investigating if there was really any enemy influence 
behind such things, while Special Branch was to focus on labour unrest generally. 
Like many other branches of government in wartime, growth was rapid. The 
growth in MI5's accommodation is indicative of its development. MI5 left 3 
Paper Buildings, Temple, London, on 28 September 1912, when it moved to the 
third floor of Watergate House, York Buildings, Adelphi, London. 1 The increase 
of MI5's staff after mobilisation soon required increased accommodation. On 21 
October 1914 four rooms on the second floor of Watergate House were taken 
over, but within a few months this proved inadequate. On 13 Apri11915 MI5 took 
over the top floor of Adelphi Court, an adjacent block of flats. 'Owing to the 
difference of levels between this floor and the stairway landing in Watergate 
House at which alone it was possible to obtain communication between the 
buildings, it became necessary to take over the third floor which was done on 
April 29th.'2 Due to the rapid growth of MIS, by Spring 1916 it was clear that 
Watergate House and Adelphi Court provided insufficient accommodation. In 
August 1916 MI5 took over Waterloo House, at 16 Charles Street, Haymarket, 
London; a large office with six floors.3 For a considerable time these offices 
sufficed, but at last the additional growth of the staff necessitated a further 
increase of space and 'after a great deal of trouble and much opposition the 
1 TNA, KV1I49, p.13. 
2 Ibid., pp.26-27. 
3 Ibid., pp.51-52. 
50 
a 

occupants next door, in Greener House, were evicted'. The Admiralty who 
occupied two floors was persuaded to give them up, and on 19 June 1918 the 
whole of the house was taken over and MI5 concentrated in the one block.4 
Further accommodation was provided by constructing a twin-storey temporary 
bungalow on a vacant plot to the west of Waterloo House, known as the Annexe 
and later 14a Charles Street. 5 This marked the greatest extent of the growth of 
MI5~s offices and held at the end of the war. These offices were left in December 
1919 and MIS moved to 73, 74 and 75 Queen's Gate, London. 6 
On 1 October 1914 MIS was re-organised into three branches. Increased \vork had 
necessitated the creation of a registration branch separate from the preventive 
branch, so that C Branch grew out of the sub-section of B Branch that had been 
concerned with records. A Branch, under Captain Drake~ conducted 'investigation 
of espionage and cases of suspected persons~. B Branch, under Captain Holt-
Wilson, dealt with 'co-ordination of general policy of Government Departments 
in dealing with aliens; questions arising out of the Defence of the Realm 
Regulations and Aliens Restriction Act'. C Branch, under Captain Haldane, 
whose MI5 career is set out in Chapter Five, was concerned with 'r ..:cords, 
personnel, administration and port control'. 7 MIS now had twenty-nine members 
of staff, including sixteen officers, three clerks, five clerical staff, three detectives, 
a chauffeur and a caretaker. 8 
4 Ibid., p.52. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., p.53. 
7 Ibid., p.9. 
8 TNA, KV1I59, pp.3-4. 
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A fourth branch, later to be labelled E, was formed in May 1915 to take over the 
fast developing work of organising and administering the control of ports and 
. 9firontlers. 
Following the formation of this new sub-division it was decided to reorganise 
MI5, so that on 11 August 1915 M05(g) became known as M05, with four 
branches labelled E, F, G and H. The preventive branch became known as the F 
Branch, the investigative branch was thenceforth called G Branch, and the 
administration and records branch acquired the title H Branch. 10 
In December 1915 a separate Directorate of Military Intelligence was formed in 
addition to the Directorate of Military Operations, and the intelligence 
departments that had previously been placed under the Directorate of Military 
Operations became part of this new Directorate of Military Intelligence. As part of 
these changes M05 changed its name to MI5 on 3 January 1916. 11 
By June 1916 MI5 had fifty-two officers at headquarters and 150 administrative 
staffY D Branch was added on 21 September 1916, to further the connection of 
MI5's work overseas. 13 
On 25 September 1916 a Standing Advisory Committee was formed: 
9 TNA, KV1I35, p.69. 
10 TNA, W032/10776, p.21. Despite changing its designation from M05(g) to MOS, MIS 
continued to use the former name until January 1916, because, as KeJl wrote to A.L. Dixon (Home 
Office) on 10 September 1915, 'we are better known to the Police under this "nom de guerre'''. 
~ndrew, Secret Service, p.526; TNA, H045/10779/277334, KelJ to Dixon, 10 September 1915. 
TNA, W032110776, p.21. 
;: Hiley, 'Counter-Espionage and Security in Great Britain during the First World War" p.667. 
TNA, KV1I35, p.69. 
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1. 	 To assist the Director of M.I.S. m questions of policy and 
administration. 
2. 	 To form a channel of inter-communication between the various 
branches ofM.1.5. 
3. 	 To enable Officers to bring forward matters for discussion which 
affect other branches of M.I.S. as well as their own. 14 
It consisted of the branch heads plus two extra members nominated by Kell, and it 
met weekly in his office. 15 This suggests that Kell ran MIS rather like a managing 
director running a large and diverse organisation through a board of directors. 
On 15 	January 1917 the short-lived B Branch was formed to handle questions 
affecting natives of India and other Oriental races. However, it was absorbed by D 
Branch on 1 September 1917. 16 By March 1917 MIS increased to eighty 
officers. 17 
Lastly, a sixth branch, A Branch, was formed on 23 April 1917 to deal with work 
related to the registration and control of aliens employed on war work in the 
UK. IS Thus, the complete organisation of MIS was: 
M.I.S. Special Intelligence - General 
M.I.S.A. Aliens on War Service 
M.I.5.D. Overseas Special Intelligence 
M.I.5.E. Control of Ports & Frontiers 
M.I.5.F. Preventive Branch 
M.I.S.G. Detective Branch 
M.1.5.H. Administrative Branch (Office & Records). 19 
14 TNA, KV1I49, p.50. 
:: TNA, KV1I53, 'Annexure 17, Standing Advisory Committee', n.d., pp.86~87. 
TNA, W032/I0776, p.22. 
:: Hiley, 'Counter-Espionage and Security in Great Britain during the First World War', p.667. 
TNA, KVlI35, pp.69-70. 
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MIS did not have branches named B or C at this stage. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sywnfen Jervis, whose work superintending the production of 
the MIS Historical Branch Reports gave him an intimate knowledge of the 
workings of MIS, explained how the branches were interrelated: 
F. being the branch that deals with 'The Prevention of Espionage' and the 
policy thereof all the others are obviously off-shoots from its stem. D. is 
the continuation of F. overseas and completes our net-work over the 
world. G. is the method of carrying out the work and examples of cases 
and methods will show how our end is obtained. E. is the corollary of F. 
preventing people coming in to the country and enabling G. to carry out its 
work in preventing them getting out. A. is a further offshoot of F. enabling 
control to be kept over certain alien people who, may be of interest or a 
possible danger. H. has to do with all the foregoing and would be 
descriptive of the expansion of M.I.S generally and in detail as the various 
branches sprang u~ and grew under the enforced increase due to the 
exigencies of War? 
By October 1917 MIS's strength had risen to 701, comprising ninety-one officers, 
360 administrative staff, twenty-three police at headquarters and 227 ports 
police?! 
At the end of the First World War, on 11 November 1918, at its most developed 
state during the whole 1909-1918 era, MIS had 844 members of staff. Of these, 
490 members were at headquarters, including eighty-four officers and civilian 
officials, fifteen male clerks, 291 women clerks, twenty-three police and seventy-
seven subordinate staff. The other 354 members of staff were based at controlled 
19 Ibid., p.70. 

20 TNA, KV1I68, 'Contents of Reports', 1921, p.69. 

21 Hiley, 'Counter-Espionage and Security in Great Britain during the First World War'. p.667. 
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home ports, or at permit offices and missions in Allied countries, including forty-
nine officers and civilian officials, seven male clerks, thirty-four women clerks, 
255 ports police and nine subordinate staff?2 
If MIS's wartime expansion seems excessive, it should be compared with the 
exponential growth of the Postal Censorship: from a single censor at the 
beginning of the war to a staff of 4,861 by the end.23 Indeed, MIS's wartime 
growth was not dramatically different to that of the War Office as a whole. Hiley 
has calculated that, although MI5 grew at an average of 9.8% per month during 
the first three years of war, compared to 6.2% for the War Office overall, this rate 
dropped to only 1.4% a month for the war's last year, which was similar to the 
War Office's overall rate of expansion for that period.24 
But were there any other factors besides the pressures of wartime growth that 
accounted for MI5's expansion? One factor was the gradual realisation of the 
advantages that could be gained from a centralised counter-espionage bureau 
providing a quick and direct interchange of information?5 Thus, according to one 
1917 note, a counter-espionage agency should 'by providing a link between the 
naval, military and civil authorities enable a Government to decide what concerted 
measures are necessary to prevent the betrayal to an enemy, whether actual or 
potential, of vital national interests'. 26 The note suggested that, where a counter­
22 TNA, W032110776, p.22. 

23 Andrew, Secret Service, p.I77. 

24 Hiley, 'Counter-Espionage and Security in Great Britain during the First World War', p.647. 

25 TNA, KVlII5, '''D'' Branch Report. Imperial Overseas Intelligence. YoU', 1921, pp.l5-16. 

26 TNA, KVII53 , 'Annexure 1, Notes on the General Organization of a Counter-Espionage 

Bureau', n.d., pA. 
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espionage agency comprised two or more officers, it would usually be most 
convenient to group the preventive, records and organisation duties together as the 
work of one officer, and those of detection and control as the work of the 
second.27 
Certainly, in terms of directing and co-operating with other departments in 
counter-espionage and security intelligence operations, particularly in the tracking 
down of individual spies, MI5 was very much in charge, in the sense that it had 
the directing and co-ordinating role. Other departments, such as the police and the 
General Post Office (GPO), were put into action at MI5's behest and under its 
control. Secondly, in terms of deciding policy, it should be noted that during the 
war, MI5 was part of the War Office, which had considerable influence as one of 
the great departments of state, obviously particularly so during wartime, which 
gave MI5 clout and influence by proxy; especially with MI5 basically acting on 
behalf of the Army Council on a number of matters. If any generalisation can be 
made about the decision making process, it is that pragmatism usually won the 
day. For example, the overriding reason why all enemy aliens were not interned in 
one go straightaway at the outbreak of the war seems to have been that there were 
simply not enough resources to open enough internment camps to take them all. 
Similarly, some aliens had to be employed in munitions factories, because there 
were not enough British workers to undertake this essential work. In this debate 
over the employment of aliens in munitions factories, MIS's concerns over the 
security aspects of employing aliens in such areas had to be weighed against the 
27 Ibid. 
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concerns of the Ministries of Munitions and Labour, who needed workers and 
therefore wanted aliens working in munitions factories. Thus, MIS's was but one 
of a number of voices competing to be heard by the decision-makers. 
It seems fair to say that MIS got its way more on issues when the War Office was 
the department most intimately concerned, than on issues when the Home Office 
was the most involved. Policy regarding the internment of enemy aliens is a case 
in point. MIS wanted a blanket policy whereby basically all enemy aliens were 
interned, unless they could prove a real loyalty to the UK and hostility to their 
native land. The Home Office wanted enemy aliens interned only if they were 
proven to be a threat to national security. Political considerations also intervened, 
and it seems fair to suggest that the public mood, which politicians pandered to, 
was quite hawkish and in favour of tough counter-espionage measures and strict 
treatment of enemy aliens. Indeed, one of the arguments behind interning enemy 
aliens was that it would actually protect them from being lynched by angry 
German-phobic mobs that had been whipped up by the popular press. Thus, it 
seems apt to view MIS as the axle to the wheel of counter-espionage. Although 
MIS was undoubtedly the key player in counter-espionage, many other 
departments played vital supporting roles. MIS's reports on how the various spies 
it caught were detected illuminate the integral role played by the Postal and Cable 
Censorship, MIl c and the police. 
The issue of aliens raises other factors that may have contributed to MI5' s growth. 
As will become apparent, the German threat was largely illusory. 
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Holt-Wilson, by this time Deputy-Director of MI5, provided the following 
I 
summary of the fate of the German spies caught by MIS during the First World I 
War, which illustrates MIS's wartime work: 1 
I 
During the war we settled accounts with thirty-three more bona-fide 

enemy agents. 

Of these, 21 were sentenced to death. 

[of whom] 14 were executed. 

[and] 7 sentenced to death, but sentence commuted to penal 

servitude. 

10 imprisoned - one for life, others for 10 years and under. 
2 were discharged for various reasons. 
In addition we caught and handed over spies who were found not to have 
broken British laws but to have acted against our allies, such as MAT A 
HARI the Dutch spy, who was shot by the French.28 
Colonel Walther Nicolai, head of the German General Staffs military intelligence 
department (Sektion IIIb) during the First World War, concluded that the 'number 
of spies captured is no proof of the efficiency of the defence-service; that is only 
proved if state interests are successfully kept secret' .29 Therefore, if espionage's 
principal aim is to collect information of real value, then counter-espionage's 
raison d'etre is to deny the enemy's espionage organisation information of real 
value. By this criterion MIS appears to have been exceptionally successful, 
because Germany's spies in the UK provided very little information of any real 
value, particularly during wartime. No claims have ever been made that Gennan 
28 IWM, Kell MSS, Holt-Wilson, 'Security Intelligence in War', p.27. 

29 W. Nicolai [Trans. G. Renwick], The German Secret Service (London: Stanley Paul & Co.• 

1924), pp.216-217. 
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intelligence achieved any scoops of note in the UK that might have had an impact 
on the War. As an example on an issue of very real importance, Germany did not 
learn of the BEF's despatch to France until about two weeks after it had 
happened. 
MIS also succeeded in its role of destroying the German espionage organisation in 
the UK, capturing practically all of its spies and denying Germany any really 
useful intelligence. The pre-war policy of tracking the known German spies, but 
not actually arresting them until the outbreak of the war, was a far-sighted and 
well-organised policy, which delivered the Germans a knockout blow from which 
they never properly recovered throughout the war. One spy, Rimann, whose case 
is examined in Chapter Four, one of twenty-two spies scheduled for arrest, had 
managed to slip away unnoticed a few days prior to the outbreak of the war. 
However, Boghardt contends that assessing German intelligence 'purely on the 
basis of evidence relating to captured agents "is like judging a business 
community by its bankrupts"'. Thus, he suggests that the impression that MIS 
successfully stifled German espionage has been created because there has been a 
greater focus on the agents who were caught, rather than those who got back to 
Germany safely.3o 
Yet MIS could never be absolutely certain that it had caught all of Germany's 
spies in the UK. It had to be wary that there might be other spies who had not 
been caught. Indeed, they could well have been Germany's best spies, which 
30 Boghardt, 'German Naval Intelligence and British Counter-Espionage, 1901-1918" p.220. 
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would explain why MIS had not caught them so easily. It was MIS's job to be 
wary, because it was most responsible if spies were not caught. Equally, it was 
also MIS's job to provide accurate assessments of the nature of the espionage 
threat. Not to scaremonger, or to become too complacent about its successes. Of 
course, the pre-war belief in the consummate efficiency of the German 
intelligence services made it harder to accept how poorly they actually perfonned 
during the war. 31 
MIS concluded that the increase in the wages being demanded by German spies 
was evidence of its success, because it showed that spies werc becoming 
increasingly afraid of being caught and therefore in need of greater inducement to 
brave these risks. This is exactly the deterrent effect that counter-espionage aims 
for. Of course, some of the increasing wage demands may also have been due to 
wartime inflation, or the fact that Germany would pay agents more money. 
Perhaps MIS could have built on its successes and done even more to aid the war 
effort, such as in double-agent or deception operations to mislead the enemy, as it 
did so successfully during the Second World War. This charge against MIS does 
not stand up to scrutiny, because it was arguably much easier to do this during the 
Second World War, than it would have been during the First World War. Firstly, 
during the Second World War, signals intelligence (Sigint) enabled the British to 
read Germany's communications to check if Germany had swallowed the bait 
dangled before it by deception and double-agents. Secondly, it was eflsie-r to 
31 G. MacDonogh, 'Military Intelligence and Incidents Connected Therewith During the War', n . 
Journal a/the Royal Artillery, VoI.XLVIII, No.lO (1921122) pp.400-403. 
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control double-agents when they were communicating with Germany via radio 
during the Second World War, than during the First World War when other 
methods of communication were used which were harder to supervise in order to 
make sure of the messages that were being passed on. Thirdly, during the Second 
World War, many of MI5's most successful double-agents were anti-Nazis, who 
had really come to Britain posing as spies for Germany but in fact in order to join 
the British in the fight against Germany. Therefore MI5 could be much more 
confident of their loyalties. 
The vast majority of German agents in Britain during the First World War were 
only spying for the money it paid and could not be trusted not to betray MI5 to the 
highest bidder if taken on as double-agents. Nonetheless, perhaps MIS was mor..: 
imaginative during the Second World War than it had been in the First World 
War. During the First World War, spies were generally seen as traitors who would 
sell out their own country for money and despised as such. Nevertheless, MIS did 
have some successes at deception during the First World War, such as in the case 
of Muller, discussed later in Chapter Three. They were inconsequential, howcvtr, 
because they had little impact on the course of the war. Notwithstanding, 
convicted spies were usually imprisoned or shot. Very little thought was given to 
whether they could be of any use to the British, or not. By contrast, during the 
Second World War, there was a greater willingness to at least consider if any use 
could have been made of captured spies.32 
32 For a comparison of MIS's activities during the First and Second World Wars, see CurrY, 1;,;! 
Security Service 1908-1945. ~ 
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The following items must be set against this in the debit column of an account of 
MIS's performance. Firstly, although useful, intelligence from, and sabotage 
conducted in, the UK was only of secondary importance to Germany. Germany's 
real need, and main effort, was for intelligence from the main battle-zone of 
France, Belgium and Russia. Indeed, it is striking how much of the German effort 
against the UK was concerned with either, and particularly, the Royal Navy, 
defence works or harbours in the UK. Thus, the targeting of German intelligence 
regarding Britain in 1914 appears to have been driven by naval requirements, 
which is understandable given that Germany's strategy against Britain was to 
hope for a victorious naval der Tag. 
It is worth speCUlating what the Germans expected to achieve. Details of ships' 
guns, etc were all pretty common knowledge. Gaps in this knowledge could have 
been filled when the Royal Navy visited Kiel during Navy Weeks and other such 
events. Peacetime movements and concentration of ships were well known. 
Acquiring technical details, such as the superior fire control system being 
developed and installed a little later in HMS Queen Mary, would have required 
skilled and well-placed agents. Yet, there is no evidence of this. Indeed, the one 
piece of naval intelligence that could have been of enormous use to Germany was 
a piece they never got - the strategy of a distant blockade with the Grand Fleet at I 
Scapa Flow. If they had had prior knowledge of this, they could have harassed 
Scapa Flow, not defended in any way in the early days of the war. I 
62 
When the German strategy of 1914 hinged on the Schlieffen Plan Gemlany would 
have most obviously needed to discover if, and where, the BEF was to land, its 
plans and its equipment. The inability to spot the BEF's move to France was a 
significant failure of German Intelligence. However, it is questionable how far 
this can be credited to MI5, because it seems that Germany's agents in Britain 
were not even targeted to gather the relevant intelligence, their concern being 
naval intelligence. Similarly, this failure to forecast the BEF's crucial arrival for 
the opening was more the fault of German battlefield intelligence than its agents 
in Britain. The BEF should have been spotted by German reconnaissance planes 
or cavalry patrols. One reason for this shortcoming appears to be that noted by 
Nicolai, who observes that the German General Staff, as opposed to the Navy, 
was only provided with a secret service against France and Russia. Time and 
means had not sufficed for Britain.33 Nicolai was responsible for relations with the 
press as well as intelligence. This must also have affected the time he could 
devote to intelligence.34 However, it is possible to speculate that the German 
Army's absence of interest was in part Clausewitzian - Clausewitz had little faith 
in intelligence.35 This no doubt moulded the attitudes and priorities of the General 
Staff. Related to this, money was short; the army left Britain to the navy; and no 
one co-ordinated German Intelligence, the various agencies just being left to get 
on with it. It was also partly a serious underestimation of the British Army's 
capabilities. 
33 Nicolai, The German Secret Service, pp.52 & 103. 

34 Ibid., passim. 

3S Clausewitz wrote that 'Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, 

and most are uncertain.' C. von Clausewitz (M. Howard & P. Paret eds.), On War (London: 

Everyman's Library, 1993), p.l36. 
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The Germans rather contemptuously discounted the relatively small BEF as 
unlikely to make any difference to the defence of France. In a lecture delivered in 
1934, Holt-Wilson remarked that Germany had taken: 
no interest in our army, and probably still remembered the famous remark, 
made I think by Bismarck, who upon being asked if he had contemplated 
the possibility of the British army coming to the aid of France in 1870, 
replied "yes I have, and if they do I shall most certainly ring the bell and 
send for the police".36 
Edmonds concluded in his memoirs: 'I doubt whether the Germans in 1906-14 
seriously contemplated invasion. The intention was intimidation'. In which case, 
'the main purpose of the spying was to learn all about our navy, and to frighten 
any Government from sending troops out of England to the Continent should a 
war break out between France and Germany,.37 
Secondly, it must also be entered into the equation that the fact that Britain is an 
island provides it with natural counter-espionage defences and gave MIS an 
obvious advantage over the Germans. Nonetheless, MIS still did well to exploit 
this to the full, such as with the eventual formation of E Branch. Thirdly, the 
quality of the agents employed by the Germans was decidedly third-rate. Thus, 
MIS was never fully tested by a first-class adversary. Before the war, Germany's 
agents generally passed on gossip or items from openly available sources like 
local newspapers. Indeed, the Gernlans often berated their agents that they only 
wanted them to pass on material marked secret, not from open sources. There 
were a few very minor exceptions to this rule. Parrott, whose career as a German 
36 IWM, Kell MSS, Holt-Wilson, 'Security Intelligence in War', p.l2. 
37 LHCMA, Edmonds MSS, 11115, 'Memoirs', Chapter XX, pp.3-4. 
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agent is discussed in Chapter Three, for example, provided confidential material 
of a type that would be available to most petty officers in the Royal Navy, but 
nothing of exceptional value. The Germans did not have any well-placed spies, 
with access to material of real consequence. 
German sources also concur that the vast majority of spies that Germany sent to 
Britain were of laughably poor calibre. However, they also show that Germany 
was not too concerned with intelligence about what was happening in Britain 
itself, which was only a secondary target. Germany's primary target was the 
theatre of actual fighting. Boghardt concludes that undoubtedly the Admiralty 
Staffs naval intelligence department's (Nachrichtenabteilung im Admiralstab or 
'N') 'balance sheet is overall negative'. It had failed to establish an effective 
intelligence organisation in the UK prior to the war. At the start of the war it had 
been unable to provide any material on British mobilisation and strategic plans. 
Reports on British convoys and merchant shipping did not render unrestricted 
submarine warfare a success. Sabotage did very little to prevent US goods from 
reaching western Europe and actually provided the Allies with opportunities for 
propaganda. 'In other words, in this arena naval intelligence proved not only to be 
inefficient but outright counter-productive. ,38 
Boghardt questions why, if MIS did not put up an impenetrable defence, did 
German naval intelligence fail in the UK? This seems particularly intriguing given 
that Germany had managed to score some notable intelligence successes in other 
38 Boghardt, 'German Naval Intelligence and British Counter-Espionage, 1901-1918', p.3 I 1. 
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theatres, such as the attempts to incite unrest in Persia, Agent IT s (Baron August 
Schluga) activities in France, and Nicolai's Department IIIb's part in introducing 
the Bolshevik revolution to Russia.39 
He suggests that some of the reasons were clearly 'home made'. Steinhauer, 
whose career directing Germany's pre-war espionage effort in Britain is set out in 
Chapter Three, and the German naval attache in London were not good candida.tes 
to establish an efficient intelligence system. 'While the naval attache did anything 
not to become involved, Steinhauer did everything to bungle the endeavour.' The 
German naval intelligence department also, especially before the war, 'recruited 
several persons who proved to be utter failures as naval agents'. Inter-service 
rivalry presented another obstacle.40 
'More damaging to Germany's overall war effort was the lack of civilian control 
over the services.' Boghardt feels that a civilian authority would not have 
condoned sabotage in neutral states. The outlook of naval staff was governed by 
narrow-minded tactical considerations that prevented them from appreciating the 
political consequences of military acts. For example, the UK understood the 
political benefits of being seen to treat female spies mercifully, whereas Germany 
affirmed its prerogative to kill Edith Cavell, described in Chapter Three, which, 
although 'legal under martial law', proved 'disastrous in the forum of world 
.. ,41
opmIOn. 
39 Ibid., p.314. 

40 Ibid. 

41 Ibid., pp.314-315. 
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Notwithstanding, Boghardt feels that circumstances beyond N's control should 
take even more of the blame for its failure than these 'inherent defects' .42 The 
technical means that proved crucial to intelligence during the Second World War 
were not available in 1914-1918. Unlike the Second World War, for example, 
German agents could not use the parachute to infiltrate enemy territory or the 
radio to transmit intelligence to Germany. Additionally, Britain's defences as an 
island denied any comprehensive intelligence collection there during the era of the 
First World War.43 Finally Boghardt suggests that, fundamentally, even if spies 
had been able to pass intelligence to Germany in good time, 'this would hardly 
have made a difference'. In the early stages of the war, German naval intelligence 
hoped to wear the Royal Navy down until the German fleet could meet the British 
on approximately equal terms. This never happened. And, even if spies had 
provided intelligence on allied convoys, it is unlikely that submarines would have 
risked attacking them. Destroyers were plainly superior to submarines and the 
Germans realised this. Lastly, although spies did report on the failure of 
unrestricted submarine warfare, at that stage of the war such disclosures no longer 
m.attered.44 This leads Boghardt to conclude that 'N would have failed regardless 
of the existence or non-existence of MIS'. He adds that the laments of the UK's 
formidable counter-espionage defences penned by members of the German Secret 
Service were 'more often than not defensive lies to disguise one's own 
impotence' .45 
42 Ibid., p.315. 
43 Ibid. 

44 Ibid., pp.315-316. 

45 Ibid., p.316. 
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In contrast to Boghardt, subsequent chapters will reinforce the standard 
interpretation that MIS did comprehensively win the battle against its German foe, 
albeit that this opposition was decidedly third-rate, which does somewhat detract 
from the sense of achievement. Although MIS was undoubtedly very efficient, it 
was rather unimaginative. Despite a few minor attempts at deceiving the 
Germans, it could have tried to do more to mislead the enemy by exploiting its 
successes and turning captured agents into double-agents to feed false 
intelligence; as happened with MIS's highly successful double-cross system 
during the Second World War. 
Nonetheless, there were clearly continuing fears of potential German agents, 
notably in the opening months of the war, and subsequent chapters will illustrate 
how changes in wartime legislation arose from perceptions of the need to plug 
particular gaps. 
Emergency legislation during the war was in the form of two Acts of Parliament 
and the Orders made under them, plus certain supplementary Acts and Orders. 
The Aliens Restriction Act (ARA) - Aliens Restriction Orders (ARO) were issued 
under it - applied to all aliens, enemy or friendly, but not to British SUbjects. 
DORA - Defence of the Realm Regulations (DRR) were issued under it - applied 
to all individuals regardless of nationality, including British subjects. DORA was 
originally designed as a code that would embody the powers of the executive in 
wartime for solely military purposes, including, firstly, counter-espionage and, 
secondly, the measures required to defend any given area from a threatened 
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invasion. It should be noted that the DORA conferred much more drastic powers 
for wartime use than OSA 1911, which had really been a way to cope with a 
threat to national security in peacetime. 
Following a decision of the CID, taken more than two years before the First 
World War, the civil power (Home Office) was to administer the ARA, while 
DORA was to be administered by a number of Competent Military Authorities 
(CMAs), military commanders nominated by the Army Council, each exercising 
his jurisdiction over a stated district. Following an agreement between the Army 
Council and the Admiralty, parts of the UK were administered separately by 
Competent Naval Authorities (CNAs). Generally, the officer commanding in each 
district would also be the CMA. The head of MIS and several other MIS officers 
were CMAs. However, their position differed from the district CMAs in that they 
had the power to act throughout the UK. The CMA organisation was conducted 
by instructions from the Army Council, passed through GHQ Great Britain. In 
certain matters, an individual district CMA could not issue an order, such as for 
the removal of suspects, without the approval of the Army Council, which 
practically meant the consent of MIS. Indeed, this supervision of the work done 
by CMAs all over Britain was a very important aspect of F Branch's work, as it 
included the delicate task of making sure that CMAs did not misuse their powers 
in situations that did not really require them, or leave them unapplied when 
circumstances necessitated that they should be used. Focusing on civilian 
preventive organisations, this was primarily the police; and it should be stressed 
how much the reliability, incorruptibility and tact of the police helped F Branch's 
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preventive work, especially ARO Part II (Restrictions on Aliens in the UK). Part I 
of the ARO was administered by the aliens officers, who were sanctioned by the 
Home Secretary and aided by the Military Control Officers (MeO) at ports. The 
distinction between the regulations administered by the police and those by CMAs 
lay in the fact that the CMAs carried out the provisions of the DORA, namely 
regulations that applied to all individuals, regardless of nationality, whereas the 
police carried out the provisions of Part II of the ARO, rules, mainly concerned 
with registration, that applied to aliens as such.46 
In the early months of the First World War the original versions of ARA and 
DORA were expanded considerably by means of Orders in Council. The whole 
shape of the DORA had to be changed and a new version, the Defence of the 
Realm (Consolidation) Regulations 1914, was introduced on 28 November 1914. 
The main aim of this emergency legislation was given in the DORA Act: 
(a) to prevent persons communicating with the enemy or obtaining 
information for that purpose or any purpose calculated to 
jeopardise the success of the operations of any of His Majesty's 
Forces or to assist the enemy; or­
(b) to secure the safety of any means of communication, or of 
railways, docks, or harbours.47 
Similarly, during 1916 two additions were made to DORA, which improved that 
portion dealing with espionage. Firstly, a paragraph was inserted at the end of 
46 TNA, KVl/35, pp.78-88. NID Section 29 was the Admiralty's link with MIS and the police, 

passing on information and making use of them for enquiries. TNA, ADM137/4688, notes on I.D. 

Section 16A, n.d. See also TNA, ADM1311120 - suspected enemy agents; aliens regulation; 

censorship; Defence of the Realm Act, 1914-September 1918, p.559, which sets out the division of 

duties between CMAs and CNAs. 

47 TNA, KV1I3S, p.147. See also E. Troup, The Home Office (London: G.P. Putnam's Sons Ltd., 
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DRR18 forbidding the communication or publication of any information 
concerning any ships passage along any part of the UK coast. Secondly, 19A was 
added to stop the loss or misuse of plans, confidential documents, models, 
photographs, etc. F Branch felt that these additions completed the regulations 
needed for the purpose of counter-espionage in the narrower sense. 
Two important amendments were also added to the censorship legislation 
regarding hidden communication. DRR24A was replaced by another regulation 
that was framed to include, in the prohibition against invisible ink etc, any 
mechanical method of secret communication, such as conveying a letter between 
two pages of a pamphlet stuck together, etc. DRR24B prohibited the carrying of 
any written or printed material from the UK to any neutral or enemy country; 
apart from ships papers, etc sent with special permission.48 
Implicit in the changes, however, was an apparent fear of aliens generally, the 
context for which was the influx ofBelgian refugees in the summer of 1914. More 
will be said on this later but some measures were introduced specifically to deal 
with an alien threat. Thus, in July 1915, the question of interning enemy aliens 
was re-opened by the Home Office with chief constables. Previously, it had been 
agreed in May that all applications for exemption should go via MIS. In July 1915 
it was also agreed that the names of all enemy aliens wishing to leave for 
America, or any other neutral country, would be passed through MI5 first. 
48 TNA, KV1I36, '''F'' Branch Report. The Prevention ofEspionage. VoUL', 1921, pp.147-151. 
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F Branch also brought forward three proposals that year. First, that marriage 
between male British subjects and enemy alien women was to be prohibited 
throughout the war. Secondly, that all subsequent spy cases should be tried in 
camera. Thirdly, it recommended an inland pass that was to be used by particular 
approved officials and officers of allied countries working for their governments 
in the UK. A local control system was also begun at Harwich, out of which the 
system for the protection of areas known as special military areas eventually 
came, which was further developed in 1916.49 
Similarly, in January 1916 five important changes were made to the ARA. Firstly, 
prohibited areas were expanded to encompass all places within ten miles of the 
coast. Secondly, aliens found in prohibited areas where they did not reside without 
an identity book and passport could be expelled. Thirdly, all aliens had to register, 
except those who had been residing in the Metropolitan Police District before 14 
February 1916. Aliens coming into the district after that date or leaving to live 
elsewhere in the UK were obliged to register. Fourth, registered aliens who 
wished to enter a prohibited area had to be provided with an identity book. Fifth, 
all hotels had to keep a register of visitors. However, possessing an identity book 
did not mean immunity from police supervision, or provide right of entry to 
prohibited areas; it was a formality devised by MI5 to provide greater certainty 
and convenience in controlling aliens. 50 The available evidence does not explain 
why these decisions were reached at this particular time. However, it seems fairly 
49 Ibid., pp.127-131. 

50 TNA, KV1I38, "'F" Branch Report. Summary.', 1921, pp.l28-131. 
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clear that they were driven by a conviction that the threat came from aliens rather 
than British subjects. 
Moreover, it is worth questioning how far the threat was driven by public hysteria 
rather than actual evidence. The pre-war spy scare had conditioned public opinion 
to believe that the German community in Britain contained quite literally 
thousands of spies and saboteurs just waiting for the moment to strike. Therefore, 
when the government issued statements designed to reassure the public that the 
threat from German espionage had been checked by the round-up of the entire 
network of twenty-one German spies in Britain plus the internment of a few 
hundred suspicious enemy aliens, they only added fuel to the fire. Public opinion 
was incensed by what it perceived as official inactivity or incompetence: 
otherwise, it was reasoned, why else had the thousands of German agents in 
Britain not been caught! Indeed, this spy mania was so virulent that it persisted 
throughout the war. For example, the registration of aliens was fully completed 
after 8 June 1918, from which date no exceptions were permitted. Yet public 
opinion still demanded even greater restrictions on aliens, such that in July 1918 a 
strong press and parliamentary campaign over the control of aliens ended in 
revision by the War Cabinet and a valuable development in policy, from the 
security perspective, regarding the control over enemy aliens and people of enemy 
origin. The main proposals announced by the Home Secretary on 11 July 1918, 
over which control became much stricter, were as follows. Firstly, internment of 
enemy aliens. Secondly, the granting of naturalisat ion certificates. Thirdly, change 
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of name. Fourth, employment in government offices. Fifth, the system of identity 
books. Sixth, enemy patents. Seventh, enemy businesses. Eighth, enemy banks.51 
Some 66,000 enemy aliens were registered during the war, plus over 34,500 
'other persons in the country who not only had definite ties of blood-relationships 
with the enemy, but in many cases were actually full-blooded enemies born and 
bred' on a register known as the grey list.52 Of these 100,000, 32,000 were 
eventually interned and another 25,000 deported. 53 
As Andrew observes, the 'chief scapegoats of spy mania were inevitably enemy 
aliens'. However, he concludes that 'there is no evidence that Kell suffered from 
spy mania', although 'he took a hard line on internment'. Therefore, he suggests 
that 'MIS's hard line derived not merely from a realistic concern for national 
security but also from sensitivity to criticism of War Office "inertia" by victims of 
spy mania'. 54 
The actual evidence did suggest that spies were largely to be found amongst aliens 
rather than British subjects. However, the evidence also suggested the more 
important conclusion that the perceived threat from espionage was largely 
illusory: MIS had indeed destroyed the entire German espionage organisation in 
Britain at the outbreak of war; Germany only sent a few more agents during 
wartime, they were ofpoor quality and quite easily caught. 
51 TNA, KV1I36, pp.179-186. 
52 IWM, Kell MSS, V. Kell, 'The Control of Civil Populations in War', 1930, p.l O. 

53 Smith, The Spying Game, p.76. 

54 Andrew, Secret Service, pp.181-182. 
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Public hysteria also focused as much on enemy saboteurs as spies. Yet, there was 
never any evidence that enemy aliens had conducted even a single act of sabotage 
in Britain. Albeit that public opinion was ever ready to ascribe genuine accidents 
on ships and in munitions factories to alien saboteurs. Of course, Germany had 
been conducting sabotage in America to prevent shipments of US supplies from 
ever reaching Britain. It was, also, always possible that there had not been any 
similar acts of sabotage in Britain only thanks to Britain's greater vigilance, or 
because saboteurs were waiting for the moment to act in deadly concert with a 
German invasion. 
Virtually all of the spies caught were detected thanks to MIS's understanding of 
the methods of German espionage and role in co-ordinating all of the sources of 
detection, the postal and cable censorship, the control of ports and frontiers and 
information from MIl c and other sources abroad. In a few cases the registration of 
aliens provided information that quickened the process of locating suspects 
pointed to by these sources of detection. Otherwise, the measures for the control 
of aliens contributed very little to the business of catching spies. In which case 
they were clearly out of all proportion to the real threat: like using a 
sledgehammer to crack open a walnut. 
The evidence indicated that the threat from German agents was only slight and 
certainly no cause for panic. However, public hysteria, which was shamelessly 
whipped up by authors like Le Queux whose alarmist fiction found a new lease of 
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life, xenophobic sections of the press and opportunistic politicians, vastly over­
inflated this threat. It also seems that many of the measures introduced to control 
aliens were clearly motivated more by a desire to placate criticism of the 
government's aliens policy, than by an objective assessment of the threat that they 
posed. 
It has also been argued that MIS's growth was influenced by the fear of dissent in 
wartime. Certainly, in October 1915 G Branch was given the additional duties of 
'investigation of all cases of suspected fomentation of strikes and sabotage, and 
dissemination of peace propaganda' and recommending amendments to 
legislation and regulations 'for the purpose of preventing espionage, sedition or 
treachery, or of impeding the activities of naval and military spies and agents'. 55 
A further series of amendments to legislation also resulted from the Irish 
rebellion. On 8 June 1916 DRR14B was amended to give power to deal with 
those interned under DRR14B as if they were prisoners of war. This was needed 
so as to be able to guard the considerable number of Irish rebels interned in 
England under DRR14B. In autumn 1916 DRR14, concerning local restrictions on 
suspects, was strengthened. Due to the distribution and number of munitions 
works, it had become dangerous to remove suspects to inland areas, as had been 
the practice. Therefore, an amendment was prepared empowering CMAs to give 
orders restricting the movements of suspects within their district. It was deemed 
sensible that these restriction orders from CMAs should, unless really urgent, be 
SS TNA, KV1I43, "'G" Branch Report. The Investigation of Espionage. Vol.V', 1921, pp.6-9. 
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put to F Branch before being put into effect, so as to centralise the administration 
of these new regulations. 
Owing to the trouble caused by an English woman, Miss Emily Hobhouse, a new 
regulation 14F was added in November 1916: she had been permitted, against 
MIS's advice, to enter Switzerland and had conducted a tour of the German side 
of the Western Front. This made it an offence for any British subject to 
voluntarily enter into an enemy country or any foreign territory occupied by the 
enemy, unless they possessed a special permit issued on the authority of the 
Secretary of State, except during military operations. 56 
Above all it has been argued that Bolshevism became a newly identified threat 
after 1917 and that by the armistice Basil Thomson and Special Branch had 
become 'the prevalent force in British domestic intelligence operations'. 
Concerned that Bolshevism posed a greater threat than anyone appreciated, the 
Government also established a Directorate of Intelligence in March 1919. 
Thomson, however, was chosen to lead it, not Kell. 57 
The historian, Brock Millman, argues that, from a modest start at the outbreak of 
war, an extensive and very effective system of dissent management had evolved 
by the armistice, while even further controls had been devised but never 
introduced. However, the British system of control had developed incrementally, 
56 TNA, KV1I36, pp.147-151; TNA, KV1I43, p.213. 
57 Smith, The Spying Game, p.77. See Thomson, Queer People, pp.274-275; & TNA, KV41128, 
letter and accompanying circular from Troup (Home Office) to Kell, explaining Thomson's duties 
as Director ofIntelligence, 2 May 1919. 
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growing in relation to the perceived level of threat to the war effort. It did not 
become more repressive than a majority of the population would accept. It was 
designed to suppress the specific kind of British anti-war sentiment. He contends 
that Britain's comparative success in managing domestic opposition helped enable 
it to outlast Germany. 58 In 1917 'surveillance was systemized and became a police 
responsibility'. MIS was thus '[d]enied a role in domestic surveillance', which 
was very much Thomson's domain. 59 
This study suggests that Millman is right that domestic surveillance was the 
responsibility of Special Branch rather than MIS. However, it contends that he is 
wrong to say that MIS was denied this role. This implies that MIS had coveted this 
role but failed to gain it. On the contrary, this study suggests that Kell did not 
want MI5 to assume this role. When PMS2, the labour intelligence section of the 
Ministry of Munitions, was due to be disbanded and its activities passed on to 
MI5, Kell made it quite clear to his superiors that he was willing to take on 
PMS2' s work concerning the investigation of the bona fides of aliens employed 
on munitions, sabotage and counter-espionage; but not its work regarding strikes 
and labour troubles, which was passed on to Thomson. 
An MI5 report written in 1921 recorded how the spy cases of 1917 had convinced 
MI5 that it had broken the German espionage system by then. However, the 
impetus of the German attack was re-targeted upon the political and social fabric 
of the British Empire, such that peace propaganda, sedition and revolution became 
58 B. Millman, Managing Domestic Dissent in First World War Britain (London: Frank Cass, 
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59 Ibid., p.178. 
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their main efforts.60 This suggests that in 1917-1918 MI5 perceived - even if it 
was later proven to be wrong - that pacifist groups, industrial unrest and other 
subversive activities were being encouraged and financed by Germany. Therefore, 
MI5 investigated them because it viewed them as another fonn of the Gennan 
secret service's attack; not primarily because they opposed government policy. 
The case of Nicholas Klishko demonstrates that MI5' s investigations of 
Bolsheviks during the war were most concerned with detecting signs of links to 
Germany. Klishko was a Russian engineer and revolutionary who had come to 
England as a political refugee in 1907, eventually gaining employment as a 
technical translator with the armaments manufacturer Vickers.61 In September 
1915 the British military attache in Petro grad infonned the War Office that the 
Russians were concerned that Klishko was in a position to provide information 
about Russian munitions produced at Vickers to a suspected German agent, 
Litvinov, who was known to be a close friend ofhis.62 MI5 was certainly worried , 
T 
about Klishko's Bolshevik views, that he was in touch with leading pacifists and i 
i 
~ 
had influential friends who kept him well-infonned about what was going on in 
official circles. However, MI5 was primarily concerned with his pro-Gennan 
views, his association with a suspected Gennan agent and the danger that the 
knowledge he had gained at Vickers might fall into enemy hands.63 After a long 
investigation and much pressure from MIS, the authorities eventually agreed to 
60 TNA, KV1I44, '''G'' Branch Report. The Investigation of Espionage. Vol. VI', 1921, p.92. 

61 TNA, KV2/1411 , Nicholas Klishko. Summary made in HI from papers filed between l.9.15 & 

9.9.18, n.d. 

62 TNA, KV2/141O, MI5 copy of report from Military Atttache, Petrograd to War Office, 17 
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63 Ibid.,report on Klishko by Captain M.W. Bray ofMI5, July 1918. 
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Klishko's internment under DRR14B in September 1918, shortly after which he 
was included in a party sent back to Russia.64 
Much the same can be said for MIS's interest in pacifist groups. The available 
documentation suggests that when these organisations had material confiscated in 
police raids, MIS was most concerned with their accounts, to check if they were 
being financed by Germany, and their membership lists, to ascertain if any of their 
members had links to Germany.65 
Recent research by Victor Madeira has shown how MIS continued to have only 
this limited role in counter-subversion up to the end of the war. Indeed, when the 
Secret Service Committee (SSC) began to meet in February 1919 to consider 
reform of the intelligence services, MIS maintained that its responsibility was for 
counter-espionage and 'declared its scrupulous adherence to a policy of non-
investigation of political and labour unrest, except in cases of clearcut enemy 
activity,.66 
As a result, MI5' s 'role was limited to military counter-espionage and preventing 
the spread of Bolshevism within the armed forces', and Kell's budget was reduced 
64 TNA, KV2114II, Nicholas Klishko. Summary made in HI from papers filed between 1.9.15 & 
9.9.18. Other files on Klishko at TNA include KV2114I2-14I6. 
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from £100,000 per annum to £30,000.67 However, MI5 survived into the post-war 
period, which Smith credits to its files about undesirable aliens: 
Despite seeing his staff slashed by more than 800 to just 30, Kell fought a 
rearguard action to keep MI5 alive. He centred his activities on his registry 
of undesirable aliens, now renamed the Precautionary Index, using this to 
monitor the activities of all Russians and their sympathisers in Britain. 
MIS expanded the list to include anyone who held or was suspected of 
having held left-wing views and might therefore pass them on to 
unsuspecting soldiers, sailors and airmen. 68 
E Branch disappeared on 1 August 1919, when military control at home ports 
ceased and missions abroad were re-tasked to keep Bolshevik agents out of 
Britain. Called the Passport Control Department, it was given, with its MIS 
personnel, to MIlc.69 A Branch was absorbed by F Branch on 1 September 1919. 
The changes of the immediate post-war era were completed on 31 March 1920, 
when MI5 was reorganised back into three branches, very much as it had been in 
the early stages of the First World War. The Preventive (F) Branch was renamed 
MI5(a), the Investigative (G) Branch was re-titled MI5(b), and the Organisation 
and Administration (H) Branch absorbed D Branch and became MI5(O).7o In May 
1920 the Defence Security Intelligence Service, as MI5 had also come to be 
known by then, produced a distribution of duties, with the following main 
features: 
Director of Security Intelligence (D.S.I.) 
Counter Espionage. Defence Security Policy in dealing with the 
Police Authorities and the Civil Population (including Aliens) in 
the United Kingdom and British Possession Overseas. 
67 Smith, The Spying Game, p.77. 

68 Ibid., pp.77-78. 

69 TNA, W032110776, p.22; Smith, The Spying Game, p.77. 

70 TNA, W032/10776, p.22. 
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A. Branch. 
Prevention of Activities prejudicial to Defence Security. 
A. I. 
Defence Security Control within the United Kingdom. Co­
operation with the Naval, Military, Air Force, Munitions, Police 
and Civil Authorities in the routine application of Security 
Intelligence Precautionary Measures. 
A.2. 
Defence Security Control of Ports and Frontiers. Policy and 
Measures for the control of civilian passenger traffic to and from 
overseas territory in occupation by British Armed Forces. 
A.3. 
Legal procedure and advice concerning the duties of the Security 
Intelligence Service. 
B. Branch. 
Organisation of the Detective Branch and supervision of measures 
for detecting espionage or sabotage by agents of foreign powers. 
B.l. 
European Powers group. 
B.2. 
America and Far Eastern Powers group. 
B.3. 
Scandinavia and Russian group. 
BA. 
Administrative and Liaison. 
B.5. 
Intelligence Police Section. 
B.6. 
Scientific Section. 
O. Branch. 
Organisation and Administration. 
0.1. 
Secretariat. 
0.2. 
Personnel. 
0.3. 
Interior Economy. 
004. 
Financial. 
Records Section. 
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Rl. 
Registry. 
R2. 
Personal Records. 
R3. 
Subject Records. 
R.4. 
Trade Records. 71 
To sum up, by the First World War, therefore, MIS's role had expanded 
considerably and it had begun to develop into Britain's counter-espionage and 
security intelligence agency. MIS was to act as the link between the civil, military 
and naval departments to allow the Government to decide what actions were 
needed to stop the betrayal of essential national interests to an adversary. 
In pursuance of this aim, MI5' s duties lay in five key directions: prevention, 
detection, control, records, and organisation. MIS had assumed the following four 
key roles. First, it was the central clearing-house for all counter-espionage 
information; which eventually functioned as the hub of a network spreading 
throughout the British Empire and also liased with allied states. Secondly, it co­
ordinated, directed and oversaw all of the various activities and organisations 
involved in counter-espionage. Thirdly, it was the Government's expert on 
counter-espionage and security intelligence matters. Fourth, it provided training or 
personnel trained in counter-espionage and security intelligence matters. This 
development was aptly summed up by MIS towards the end of the First World 
71 TNA, KV1I63, 'H. Branch Report. Summary', 1921, pp.31-32. 
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War, when it tended to describe its role no longer simply as counter-espionage, 
but in wider terms as defence security intelligence. 
The key stages in the development of MIS's role can be further summarised as 
follows. In 1909 Kell was appointed to look into the question of German 
espionage in Britain. Having discovered a German espionage network operating 
in the UK, MIS developed so as to be able to also undertake the investigative 
work to counter this network, which later became the province of G Branch. As 
MIS's interests developed from counter-espionage into the wider arena of defence 
security intelligence, G Branch broadened the scope of its investigations into 
Bolshevism, pacifist groups and industrial unrest; but only to check if these 
groups were under German influence and as such another part of the German 
Secret Service's attack on Britain. MIS became the central clearing-house for all 
counter-espionage information, developed its own investigative staff, and 
assumed the role of directing and co-ordinating the other organisations involved 
in counter-espionage, such as the police. MIS's early frustrations with its 
investigative work revealed the weaknesses in Britain's counter-espionage 
defences and prompted MIS to act to have the situation improved, such as with the 
OSA 1911, HOW and the unofficial Register of Aliens. These legislative and 
administrative measures, as well as the desire to develop security schemes to 
protect vulnerable points from potential saboteurs, would become the work of F 
Branch. As well as producing papers on the methods employed by German agents 
to help the police and other government departments to defend against them, these 
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preventive duties would see MIS become the UK's specialist on counter­
espionage and security intelligence matters. 
Both successful investigations and preventive measures depended upon records, 
and MIS's position as the central clearing-house for all counter-espionage 
information, which developed into H Branch. The control of ports and frontiers 
was an essential wartime counter-espionage measure, such that E Branch was 
soon formed to deal with this in its own right. The fact that MIS played a part in 
port control, but was not solely responsible for all aspects of it, is quite telling. It 
shows how MIS's expertise in counter-espionage matters was recognised and used 
to help with port control. It also illustrates how MIS had to work with other well­
established government departments, and demonstrates the power and influence 
that MIS had and also what it did not have. It could not simply dictate policy and 
control everything on its own. Representatives of E Branch were posted to a 
number of allied and neutral countries to scrutinise the applications of those who 
wished to travel from these countries to Britain. It would be a mistake, however, 
to describe them as liaison officers, or to suggest that MI5 had liaison 
relationships with allies worldwide at that time. Their role was limited to 
controlling who could travel from these countries to Britain. With the eventual 
formation of D Branch, MIS became an Imperial counter-espionage and security 
agency at the centre of an Empire-wide network. 
Finally, the creation of A Branch illustrated a number of key points about MIS's 
place. It demonstrated how MIS's knowledge of dealing with aliens, its records of 
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aliens and its expertise in organising such a system of records could help in a 
vetting process. The fact that MI5 absorbed the parts of PMS2 that were 
concerned with vetting aliens employed, or applying to work, on munitions work, 
but did not take on PMS2's other work in gathering labour intelligence, which 
was passed on to the Special Branch, illustrates that MIS's role was counter­
espionage and security intelligence, not collecting intelligence on domestic 
democratic opposition to the British Government. A Branch's concern expanded 
from aliens employed in munitions to dealing with the wider issue of aliens 
employed on auxiliary war service, which provides a good example of how MIS's 
role expanded, particularly once it was shown that MIS's expertise could be of use 
in such related areas. 
It is more difficult to relate the success of MI5 to the organisational changes. It is 
abundantly clear that MIS underwent considerable organisational change between 
1909-1918, that these changes were guided by a desire to plug gaps that had 
become apparent in MI5's defences and thereby improve efficiency, and that these 
measures usually succeeded in doing so. The development of E Branch offers the 
prime example of this. Indeed, this does show that MI5 was a dynamic 
organisation, always alive to the need for change, which was probably one of the 
key factors in its success. However, MI5 remained on top of the game and was 
never truly tested by its third-rate opponent throughout this period. Therefore, it is 
more difficult to gauge how much of a difference these organisational changes 
actually made, because MI5 was always winning the battle. 
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To the reason for and impact of change on individual branches we can now turn. 
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CHAPTER THREE: G BRANCH: 

INVESTIGATION OF ESPIONAGE 

G Branch's origins go back to October 1909, when Kell carried out both MIS's 
investigative and preventive work himself. l As already noted earlier, the division 
of MIS's duties was made more explicit around April 1912, when Captain Drake, 
who had joined on 1 April, was put in charge of the investigation of cases of 
espionage.2 In October 1913 MIS was divided into two branches. A Branch, under 
Drake, which later developed into G Branch, handled the investigation of 
espionage, and B Branch dealt with the registration of aliens.3 
G Branch's primary role was to investigate cases of suspected espionage. This 
entailed the related secondary duties of detecting, arresting and bringing the 
offenders to justice, and preparing the cases for prosecution against those to be 
arrested. Surveillance of suspects and employing intelligence police personnel at 
headquarters also served this purpose. Classification of the methods used by 
enemy agents was a natural adjunct to these investigative duties. As MIS was not 
self-sufficient in every way, co-operation with the military and naval authorities 
1 TNA, KV1I49, p.18. 
2 TNA, KV1I39, pp.37-38. 
3 TNA, KV1I49, p.l8. 
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and government departments was required to conduct investigations successfully, 
which was undertaken by G Branch. G Branch could also: 
be called upon to undertake enquiries into the bona fides of particular 
persons, and in many other matters, at the request of the Police or 
Government Departments, or of the Naval or Military Authorities of the 
Allied Nations and the British Overseas Dominions. 
G Branch also worked with the preventive branch in suggesting new legislation, 
and amendments to existing regulations, to prevent espionage.4 
The continuity of the German espionage attack is shown by the succession of spy 
cases from 1911-1917 which were linked to each other by shared properties, such 
as a spy address, knowledge ofnew developments, or a method. Indeed, as Drake, 
by then a major, in his MIS paper "The History of German Espionage in England" 
observed, this relationship was often close enough that one case would shed light 
upon another. Thus, although each case was an entity in itself, it was also only one 
link in a long chain, and its intricacies needed to be understood and brought to 
mind when handling all other cases.5 Hence, a cardinal principle emerged: 
successful investigation depended on mastery of detail. The corollary of this was 
that nobody could predict which details might not turn out to be of prime 
importance in one particular case or in a subsequent one. Contacts were of 
4 TNA, KV1I46, "'G" Branch Report. The Investigation of Espionage. Vol. VIII. Apppendices and 
Annexures. Appendix A, Detective Intelligence Work: General Notes on the Functions and 
Methods of the Detective Branch with Description of the Bureau's System of Records', 1921, 
fP.7-9. 
TNA, KV1I39, pp.9-10; TNA, KV1I46, 'Appendix C, Rough Notes on the History of German 
Espionage in this Country', by Major R.J. Drake, 4 January 1917, passim. 
89 

primary importance. Therefore, as mundane as it might appear, all contacts must 
be noted.6 
This demonstrated that, during peacetime and wartime, espionage should be 
handled by one counter-espionage organisation: the store of continuous records, 
methods and traditions. It was also revealed that there should be a free sharing of 
information between the organisation responsible for counter-espionage, the 
defence security service, MIS, and that handling the maintenance of peace and 
order, the public security service, the police.7 
MIS had and still has no executive powers. Therefore it could not arrest suspected 
spies itself, and it had only a small staff in its early years. 'For that reason it 
needed the closest possible co-operation of the police to identify, track and if 
necessary arrest' suspected spies.s MIS worked particularly closely, if not always 
harmoniously, with the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, which came under 
Thomson. 
Thomson was the son of the late William Thomson, Archbishop of York. After 
Eton and Oxford, he embarked on a remarkable and varied career beginning in the 
Colonial Service. He was Prime Minister of Tonga at only twenty-eight years old, 
and then private tutor to the Crown Prince of Siam, after which came very 
different work as the Governor of Dartmoor Prison. In June 1913, at the age of 
fifty-two, Thomson became the Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan 
6 TNA, KV1I39, pp.10-11. 
7 Ibid., p.ll. 
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Police in charge of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), of which the 
Special Branch was apart.9 After his dismissal from his post as Director of 
Intelligence in 1921, Thomson wrote volumes of his memoirs and detective 
stories with titles like Mr Pepper, Investigator. In December 1925, at the age of 
sixty-four, Thomson and one Miss Thelma de Lava were arrested in Hyde Park 
for committing an act that violated public decency. He was found guilty and fined 
five pounds. 10 
The Special Branch had been fonned in 1883, as the Special Irish Branch, 'to 
cope with the Irish dynamite outrages in London and elsewhere'. Under Thomson, 
its role was 'to foresee and to prevent political agitators from committing crime in 
order to terrorise the community into granting them what they want'. 11 The 
Special Branch had 114 staff in November 1914, rising to 700 by the end of the 
warY As Thomson wrote after the war, the 'War Office had none of the 
machinery for arresting and keeping men in custody: the Metropolitan Police had; 
and so we found ourselves playing the role of general servant to the Admiralty 
and the War Office' . 13 As Andrew observes, the Special Branch arrested 
suspected spies at MIS's behest: 
but Kell seems to have resented the way Basil Thomson sought to 
monopolise the interrogation of spies once taken into custody at Scotland 
Yard. As a secret organisation MIS could not publicly claim credit for its 
part in the capture of German spies. The more flamboyant Thomson, 
8 D. Stafford, Churchill and Secret Service (London: Abacus, 2000), p.36. 

9 Andrew, Secret Service, p.60; Hiley, 'Counter-Espionage and Security in Great Britain during the 

First World War', pp.635-636. 

10 Andrew, Secret Service, p.283. 

11 Thomson, Queer People, p.47. 

12 Porter, The Origins ofthe Vigilant State, p.179. 

13 B. Thomson, The Scene Changes (London: Collins, 1939), p.227. 
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already well used to publicising his achievements, could and did. In the 
process he earned the collective enmity of most of MI5. 14 
This enmity was forcefully expressed by Drake in a letter to Captain (later 
Admiral Sir) William Reginald 'Blinker' Hall, Director of Naval Intelligence 
(DNI) during the First World War, as 'you know B.T. did not know of the 
existence, name or activity of any convicted spy until I told him; but being the 
dirty dog he was he twisted the facts to claim that he alone did it'. 15 Holt-Wilson 
summed up the relative roles ofMI5 and Special Branch in a post-war lecture: 
Contrary to popular fiction and journalism, "Scotland Yard" never had any 
concern with "spies", unless or until information happened to be passed to 
them by the Defence Security Service for keeping them under observation 
or affecting their arrest. 16 
Compared to the problems with Special Branch, MIS's relations with the chief 
constables of the UK's other police forces seem generally to have been very good 
indeed. 17 
A good MIS investigator it was argued needed the following qualities: 
mental alertness, elasticity, knowledge of men, intuition, an accurate and 
powerful memory combined with imagination, judgement to choose the 
right method of handling a case and the moment to strike. 
His attainments should include besides the special knowledge of counter­
espionage legislation and preventive measures, some knowledge of law, 
legal procedure and the laws of evidence. He should also know one or two 
languages thoroughly. 18 
14 Andrew, Secret Service, p.l91. 
15 CCAC, Hall MSS, Drake to Hall, 1 November 1932. 
16 IWM, Kell MSS, Holt-Wilson, 'Security Intelligence in War', p.10. 
17 Many of the chief constables were retired army officers, who shared Kell's military background. 
Cumming referred to them as 'Hear Hears'. Judd, The Quest/or C, p.174. 
18 TNA, KV1I39, pp.ll-12. 
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Perhaps the most outstanding ofMI5's investigators was William Melville, MVO 
MBE. Known as 'M', Melville became MI5's chief detective. He had joined the 
War Office much earlier on 1 December 1903, became MI5's first detective on its 
formation, and retired on 18 December 1917.19 Melville had spent much of his 
earlier highly distinguished police career combating Irish terrorism, becoming the 
superintendent in charge of the Special Branch. He had retired from the Special 
Branch in 1903 in order to undertake special investigative missions for the War 
Office.20 
The initial concern of G Branch, of course, was German espionage. Germany's 
intelligence effort against Britain was largely the responsibility of the Admiralty 
Staffs naval intelligence department. The General Staffs military intelligence 
department focused on France and Russia.21 
The German espionage organisation in the UK before the First World War 
functioned through its post boxes or intermediaries. Rather than communicating 
directly with its agents in the UK, the German Secret Service communicated with 
intermediaries, who then passed these communications on to the agents. Similarly, 
the agents did not communicate directly with the German Secret Service. They 
19 TNA, KV1I59, p.3. 

20 Smith, The Spying Game, pp.57-61 & 63-65. See TNA, KVlIS, 'Memoir by William Melville 

MVO MBE, ex-Supt of Metropolitan Police who was Kell's first detective', 31 December 1917; 

A. Cook, M: MI5's First Spymaster (Stroud: Tempus, 2004); Porter, The Origins o/the Vigilant 
State, passim. 
21 Boghardt, 'German Naval Intelligence and British Counter-Espionage, 1901-191S', p.6. See 
Nicolai, The German Secret Service. L. Richter, 'Military and Civil Intelligence Services in 
Germany from World War I to the end of the Weimar Republic', pp.1-S, in H. Bungert et al. (eds.), 
93 

also communicated with the intermediaries, who then forwarded these 
communications on to the German Secret Service. Thus, the Germans' 
communications with their agents formed a kind of circle. Indeed, Gustav 
Steinhauer, a former naval petty officer whose service had included time on the 
imperial yacht Hohenzollern, who directed the pre-war German espionage system 
in the UK, conducted all his activities through intermediaries. An intermediary 
functioned to protect both the agent in the UK and the German Secret Service 
abroad. This system entailed the use of two intermediaries, one for incoming 
letters and pay, and another for outgoing reports. For out-going reports posted by 
intermediaries, foreign addresses, for example in Denmark and Belgium, were 
much used. This system was designed to provide protection in two ways. Firstly, 
if an agent did not know the spymaster's name and address, he could not be 
indiscreet about it. Secondly, if an agent in the UK wrote letters to and received 
letters from only British addresses used by intermediaries, he would not arouse 
suspicion. This system had the obvious drawback, which MIS exploited to the 
full, that once spy addresses and intermediaries were discovered, postal 
interception could uncover the wider spy network that communicated through 
these links. Besides posting letters and registering and forwarding agents' pay, 
intermediaries' duties included keeping the Germans supplied with British stamps 
and stationery, forwarding press clippings of interesting events and undertaking 
enquiries. These special enquiries were generally to establish the credentials of 
would-be agents?2 
Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (London: Frank Cass, 2003), provides a brief 
overview of the main Gennan intelligence agencies during the First World War. 
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This reveals a key weakness in the German espionage system in the UK: namely 
that, 'the problem of conveying intelligence from Britain was never entirely 
solved and led to the detection of several agents,,z3 Boghardt suggests that the 
Germans 'simply did not possess enough safe cover addresses' .24 
Faced with the potential German threat, initial methods of detection involved both 
ordinary and special machinery. Ordinary machinery consisted of other 
government organisations functioning in their normal way, but put into action at 
the investigator's behest. Special machinery involved methods peculiar to 
counter-espionage, but undertaken by ordinary government agencies during 
peacetime, and by agencies specially created in wartime,z5 
A typical investigation fell into three stages, dictated by the investigator's aims, 
quoted from an MI5 report: 
1. To discover enemy agents. 
2. To collect evidence against such persons. 
3. To bring them to justice or to nullify their efforts. 
Spies were classified into two main classes: (1) the foreigner, on a mission or 
resident, and (2) the traitor, of alien or British origins. 
22 TNA, KV1I39, pp.73-75. 

23 Boghardt, 'German Naval Intelligence and British Counter-Espionage, 1909-1918', p.227. 

24 Ibid., p.248. 

25 TNA, KV1I39, p.12. 
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Detection could come via either MIS's actions, or it could follow on information 
received from an outside source. These sources varied between peacetime and 
wartime. The peacetime sources of detection were seen as: 
Inside: (1). 
(2). 
(3). 
The Precautionary Index. 
Home Office Warrant. 
Spy contacts established 
investigation. 
in pursumg an 
Outside: (1). 
(2). 
(3). 
(4). 
Private informer. 
Military or Naval. 
Government Offices. 
Police. 
(S). 	 Chance: a Returned Letter or a letter picked up and 
submitted, a conversation overheard and reported.26 
The precautionary index, of those classified as "possibly suspect" in MIS's 
unofficial registration of aliens, does not appear to have resulted in the detection 
of any proven spy, although it provided information that was of considerable 
importance during wartime. The HOW and the spy contacts established in 
pursuing an investigation often overlapped, and as indicated previously the former 
was the most important source of detection during peacetime.27 
MIS's notes on detective intelligence work, partly derived from lecture notes by G 
Branch's Major Anson, explain how G Branch depended upon the records held by 
H Branch. A typical investigation began upon receiving information that an 
individual might be suspect, then this 'information is compared with what is 
already available in the Bureau's records, and unless the matter is satisfactorily 
explained by the light there thrown upon it, the Detective Branch makes an 
26 Ibid., pp.l2-13. 
27 Ibid., pp.l3-14. 
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enquiry,?8 Various actions were taken, depending on the type of spy and the 
source and nature of the information received. For example, if information 
against an alien or civilian came from a private individual, the first stage would 
probably be to verify these details through police enquiry; if the accused was a 
government official or in the armed forces, the enquiry would begin in the 
department in which he worked. If a spy's existence was known but his identity 
was in doubt, identification was the first step. The most successful means of 
identification adopted was to compare specimens of handwriting. The best way to 
procure a sample ofhandwriting was to obtain a receipt from the local Post Office 
signed by the suspect; however, this assumed that the investigation had reached a 
stage where suspicion was pointed at a particular individual. The pre-war cases of 
Graves, Ireland, and Frederick Schroeder, and the wartime cases of Muller and 
Hahn, and Rysbach all provide particularly instructive examples of such 
identifications. MIS also engaged its own special agents in this demanding work, 
such as in the cases of Hagn, and Bournonville?9 Full details of each of these 
German spy cases can be found in Appendix II. 
The second investigative stage, namely collecting evidence, exhibited notable 
differences between peacetime and wartime. During peacetime, it could be a 
drawn out and painstaking process, involving the repeated surveillance of an agent 
and the delay of arrest until, from a series of means worked out between MIS, the 
police and the GPO, it was confirmed that particular incriminating evidence 
would be found on the suspect or in his lodgings. During wartime, the agent's 
28 TNA, KV1I46, 'Appendix A', p.lO. 
29 TNA, KV1I39, pp.14-15. 
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arrival could be known in advance; he could be invited or taken to Scotland Yard 
on landing, duly cautioned and cross-examined, and, if he failed this interrogation, 
he could be arrested. Indeed, this questioning could be used in evidence against 
him. This difference of procedure was due to the difference in the authority that 
sanctioned these proceedings: in peacetime it was in the hands of the law officers 
of the crown, in wartime it was in the hands of the CMA.30 
Thus, the collection of evidence involved two stages: namely, (1) prior and to 
justify arrest, and (2) post arrest and to prepare the case. Both stages consisted of 
a series of verifications, which as quoted from an MI5 report were: 
The man's civil status, movements, business, money affairs and receipts, 
communications, friends and associations both in England and abroad 
form the object of enquiry. 
On top of this, in all spy cases involving information that had actually been 
communicated to the enemy, it was necessary to verify the truth and value of this 
information in COurt.31 
The preparation of cases was under legal direction. Secrecy was the one governing 
principle during both peacetime and wartime. In peacetime, the trials were heard 
30 Ibid., pp.l5-16. Basil Thomson explained why during wartime a spy could be interrogated 
before a charge was brought against him and how this questioning could be used as evidence 
against him: 
under what are known as the "Judges' Rules", which preclude the questioning of 
prisoners whom the police are about to charge with a serious offence. During the war 
these rules were held to be in abeyance in spy cases, when it was explained to the judges 
that unless suspected spies could be questioned about the meaning of cipher documents 
they were carrying, it would be impossible to bring them to justice .... ' B. Thomson, The 
Story o/Scotland Yard (London: Grayson & Grayson, 1935), p.212. 
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in open court and fully reported. Thus, it was vital to hide the counter-espionage 
methods used. For this and for reasons of evidence, much damning information 
against the agent could not be presented in court. In wartime, with the press 
controlled and trial by court martial, the danger of revealing counter-espionage 
methods was reduced. Besides which, the special preventive measures were 
necessarily known to the enemy. Therefore, secrecy bore upon another facet of 
these cases; the enemy had to be kept oblivious to his agent's arrest and the nature 
of the charge for as long as possible. However, there was one difficulty here 
during wartime - the spies could be subjects of neutral states and an official of that 
country would be at the trial as a matter of course. The official was held to 
secrecy, but doubtless he furnished a report to his government. Whatever the 
methods employed, whether by leakage or inference, the record of the spy cases 
showed that Germany reached fairly accurate conclusions about the fate of its 
agents and the weaknesses in the methods that resulted in their arrest. In seeking 
improved tactics they revealed weaknesses in Britain's counter-espionage 
defences.32 Indeed, it was part of the investigator's job to record these results and 
to make proposals to strengthen preventive measures to those who dealt with 
them, namely F (Preventive) Branch.33 
A number of the pre-war cases illustrated these methods in action. The head of the 
espionage effort against Britain, Steinhauer, was said to have spent some time in 
America, possibly as a detective with the Pinkerton detective agency. He then 
See also Thomson, The Scene Changes, p.227. 

31 TNA, KV1I39, p.l6. 

32 Ibid., pp.l6-17. 

33 Ibid., p.17. 

99 

joined the German police and moved into the Secret Service. The discovery of the 
addresses in the name of Reimers at Potsdam, Reimers being one of a number of 
aliases used by Steinhauer in his correspondence with his agents in the UK, led to 
the taking out of a HOW for all letters addressed to G. Steinhauer, Potsdam on 30 
October 1911.34 The HOW on Steinhauer's address and numerous aliases 
provided invaluable intelligence that kept MIS informed about his agents in the 
Indeed, MIS's first real break into the German network derived from the 
identification of F. Reimers as a significant name in August 1911. Francis L. 
Holstein, the German proprietor of the Peacock Hotel, Leith, received a letter 
from Germany in August 1911, asking for information about the UK's feelings 
concerning war with Germany, and its preparations for war. He gave the letter to 
the German Consul at Leith. Captain Stanley Clarke, Kell' s deputy at that time, 
claimed that he overheard this story being discussed on a train by an indiscreet 
German Admiralty official on a visit to Britain; in fact it is possible, but can never 
be confirmed, that Holstein had already been under suspicion and the overhearing 
of the train conversation was either no coincidence or a cover story. The Chief 
Constable at Leith discovered that Holstein had earlier also received two letters of 
a similar nature from the same source in June and August 1909, namely F. 
Reimers. Holstein had mislaid these letters, and it was only in February 1913 that 
34 Ibid., pp.54-55. See S. Felstead (ed.), Steinhauer: the Kaiser's Master Spy. The Story as Told by 
Himself (London: John Lane, 1930). Steinhauer's numerous aliases included Reimers, Peterssen, 
Stein, Schmidt, Reimann, Tornow, Tomer, Dinger, Tobler, Fritsches and others. Cook, M, p.203. 
3S TNA, KV1I48, 'Rough Draft Summary of the G Branch Report', 1921, p.15. 
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he found them amongst old bills and gave them to the police, who passed them on 
to MIS. A HOW was taken out for Reimers on 14 September 1911.36 
The first German agent MIS brought to trial, Dr Max Schultz, was arrested as a 
result of his approach for information to a Plymouth solicitor, who informed the 
police. Schultz also tried to engage an employee of the National Cash Register 
who had access to the dockyard. 37 Once MIS had been informed, checks were put 
on the correspondence of those involved, and MIS took over the direction of the 
case, guiding the police and the two informers.38 Another agent, Heinrich Grosse, 
was similarly betrayed by a man whom he had tried to solicit for information, but 
who turned informer. Grosse's correspondence formed a circle. Letters from 
Peterssen, an alias used by Steinhauer, had been posted in Kilburn by Otto 
Kruger, an intermediary, whose case is examined in Chapter Four. Letters from 
Grosse went to Kronauer, of Hampstead, another intermediary, described in 
Appendix II, who forwarded them to Peterssen.39 
The Home Secretary, at that time McKenna, disagreed with those in the House of 
Commons who suggested that Grosse should have been freed in a gesture of 
Anglo-German friendship. The rationale for this decision says much about MIS's 
work and why even the most incompetent of German spies were punished so 
36 Ibid., pp.32-34, the relevant pages are missing from TNA, KV1I39; Andrew, Secret Service, 
pp.69-70. This episode also provides a prime example of how intelligence history has special 
problems in obtaining corroboration. 
7 TNA, F037111126, pp.307-311, report by Detective Sergeant Alfred W. Martin, 22 July 1911. 
38 TNA, KV1I39, pp.127-142. An interesting example of the double cross technique of MI5's 
Major le. Masterman during the Second World War. See Curry, The Security Service 1908-1945, 
ft245-257. 
TNA, KV1I39, pp.152-171. See also TNA, DPPlI16, GROSSE, H. Offence: Official Secrets 
Act, 1911. 
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severely. According to Bulloch, in this, and other cases, the Home Secretary had 
acted on MIS's advice, that 'it was important to make examples of any spies 
caught, and that nothing should be allowed to change that policy, except the 
prospect of further catches or information' .40 
MIS occasionally deemed it better not to bring agents to any trial which could 
involve revealing methods, evidence or information about an agent's fate in court 
that MIS preferred to keep secret. Rather to nullify the threat that they posed, MIS 
acted in other ways that did not attract so much attention, of which the Ireland 
case is a prime example. The identity of Frederick Ireland, who had become an 
assistant to the hairdresser and German agent, Kruger, his uncle by marriage, was 
first revealed in one of Kruger's letters in November 1911 to Steinhauer, whose 
name, as already noted, had been on check sine late October. A warrant had been 
opened on all correspondence to Kruger's name and address and, by December, 
Ireland had been identified by clues in his letters, though it was not until January 
1912 that his actual name was revealed by the correspondence. By this time, 
Ireland had joined the Royal Navy at Kruger's prompting and he was eventually 
arrested on 21 February 1912. It was thought undesirable to bring Ireland to trial, 
however, because of the type of correspondence that would need to be produced 
in court. He was dismissed from the Navy and sent back to Bristo1.41 Ireland had 
been discharged from the Navy but not prosecuted, so as not to reveal how MIS 
worked and that it knew about Steinhauer's important intermediary and other 
agents. Indeed, at the time, Steinhauer did not realise that Ireland had been 
40 Bulloch, MJ.5, p.39. 
41 TNA, KV1I39, pp.202-210. 
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detected because of mail interception, believing Ireland had been compromised 
through Kruger's carelessness.42 Another agent, Armgaard Karl Graves, was also 
uncovered thanks to postal interception and arrested in April 1912.43 
The use of intercepted correspondence could often provide evidence needed to 
place a case on a solid footing. In the case of Karl Hentschel, for example, a 
circular advertising his services as a language teacher at Sheerness came to the 
notice of MIS in November 1909. Eventually, a HOW opened on Hentschel in 
March 1912 revealed his contacts with George Parrott, a petty officer on HMS 
Agamemnon, who had been befriended by Hentschel's attractive wife, Patricia.44 
Occasionally, it was detective work rather than postal interception per se that 
resulted in arrest. John James Hattrick, for example, a Royal Navy deserter, was 
revealed initially by an intercepted letter in March 1912 seeking employment by 
the Germans. Hattrick offered information and provided the wording of an advert 
to be inserted in the Daily Mirror if his offer was accepted. Melville, posing as a 
German agent named Pfeiffer, placed the advert. The correspondence continued 
for some weeks, until Melville persuaded Hattrick to show his hand and 
eventually drop all pretence and provide his real name and address.45 
42 Bulloch, MJ.5, p.7l. 

43 TNA, KV1I40, '''G'' Branch Report. The Investigation of Espionage. Vol. II', 1921, pp.22-58. 

44 Ibid., pp.91-190. See also TNA, DPP4/48, PARROTT, G. Offence: Official Secrets, 1913; TNA, 

H0144/1250/233717, Parrott, George G. Court: C.C.C. Offence: communicating information to 

the enemy. Sentence 4 years p.s, 7 January 1913. 

45 TNA, KV1I40, pp.191-193. 
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Incitements to treason was the term used to describe a new type of assault by the 
German Secret Service, which came to MIS's attention in 1913 also by postal 
interception. Under a cover of producing a work on the 'Navies of the World' 
published by Danish, Russian or French firms, attempts were made to establish 
direct contact with and procure information from officers and men of the Royal 
Dockyards. Names were gathered through German agents, men later tried by court 
martial, and by advertisements in British papers. Various petty officers responded 
to the advertisements and were first asked questions of a general and harmless 
kind. The second series of questions attempted to procure information of a 
confidential or secret nature. Money was offered for satisfactory responses. The 
letters inciting to treason were signed with different names, which were revealed 
to be the pseudonyms of German agents. They also came through the post to 
German agents, such as Ernst, an intermediary whose case is examined in 
Appendix II, who were required to submit large numbers of envelopes for this 
work. A naval weekly order was eventually issued telling those who received 
these letters to hand them to their commanding officer. They were forwarded to 
MIS and eighty names of senders were noted.46 
Owing to the difficulty of bringing charges under the 1911 OSA, MIS sometimes 
employed subtler means of countering the danger presented by German spies. One 
such was having individuals moved to another job where they would not have 
access to confidential information, as in the case of Peter E. Gregory, or recalled 
to their home country through diplomatic channels, as happened with Lieutenant 
Ahmed Nedjib. Gregory was a former RN artificer engineer and dockyard ship­
46 Ibid., pp.241-259. 
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fitter of Portsmouth who had offered information on naval recruitment and 
training to the Germans. It was calculated, however, that he was not in a position 
to learn much and that he could be transferred to the tool-shop. On 19 June 1914 
Gregory was placed on the list of men to be watched on the outbreak of war. In 
October 1914 the dockyard police pushed for action to be taken. MIS replied that, 
although there was no doubt that Gregory had been corresponding with a foreign 
agent, they did not think that he had been able to give away any important 
information. In view of the difficulties of bringing a charge under OSA, they 
would submit the case for disciplinary action to the Admiralty. There is no record 
of the Admiralty'S decision.47 
In 1914 a Turkish officer, Nedjib, was working for the Turkish Government as 
chief overseer on a Turkish battleship being built at Armstrong's of Newcastle, 
and as torpedo gunner on another Turkish ship being constructed at Vickers of 
Barrow. He was discovered to be communicating with a German agent in Berlin. 
Arrangements were made, through diplomatic channels, for Nedjib's recall. He 
was reported to have left for the continent on 30 March 1914. On 29 June 1914 
Nedjib was placed on the special war list as wanted or to be watched if in Great 
Britain.48 
The only apparent pre-war failure concerned the German success between 1909 
and July 1914 in managing 'to obtain continuous access to copies of the most 
secret correspondence passing between Count Benckendorff, the Russian 
47 TNA, KV1I41, "'G" Branch Report. The Investigation of Espionage. Vol. III', 1921, pp.6-18. 
48 TNA, KV1I39, pp.93-95. 
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ambassador in London, and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in St Petersburg'. In 
a 'spectacular triumph in classical espionage', a German agent, von Siebert, who 
had served in the Russian Embassy in London, had managed to gain access to 
these documents.49 However, it is difficult to know how MIS could have been 
expected to detect him, as the correspondence would have been covered by 
diplomatic protection. 
With the outbreak of war in August 1914, additional detection methods became 
available. These were: 
Inside: 	 General check on the transmission of money orders, 
telegraphic orders, cheques, drafts. General check on 
telegrams. General check on passenger traffic at ports and 
certain areas. H.O.Warrants and special checks. British 
Intelligence Services at home and abroad. Foreign Office. 
... 
Outside: Special Departments: 

Censorship, 

Passport Office, 

Military Permit Office, 

Allied Services, 

Police, 

Private informers, both 

British and Foreign. 50 

The most important of these by far were the agents working for British officials in 
contact with MIlc.51 
49 C. McKay & B. Beckman, Swedish Signal Intelligence 1900-1945 (London: Frank Cass, 2003) 

pp.49 & 63. These documents were published in Germany after the war as Ora! Benckendorffi 

Diplomatischer Schriftwechsel herausgeben von B. von Siebert, Band I-III (Berlin & Leipzig, 

Germany, 1928). 

50 TNA, KV1I39, pp.13-14. 

51 Ibid., p.14. 
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Inevitably, the work of G Branch increased and was reflected in organisational 
changes. Moreover, in the prevailing atmosphere of spy mania and owing to pre­
war invasion and spy scares, it was widely believed that Germany had hundreds of 
agents in the UK. On 9 October 1914 the Home Office issued a statement 
designed to allay the public's anxiety.52 Although the level of hysteria died down 
considerably as the war progressed, largely thanks to news of the successes of 
British counter-espionage, there continued to be constant questions about 
espionage in parliament throughout the war. 53 However, criticisms in parliament 
tended to be against the perceived laxity of the government's policy towards 
enemy aliens, arguing that all enemy aliens should be interned, rather than against 
MIs.54 
By November 1914, Major Drake, the head of the branch, was supported by Miss 
s. Holmes, the branch secretary, and there were four staff officers and three 
secretaries. G Branch's duties were then generally defined as: 
Investigation of cases of espionage. Correspondence regarding suspected 
persons. Action on intercepted correspondence. Correspondence with 
D.P.P. and A.G.3. Activities of foreign agents and measures to counteract 
them. 
It became necessary, however, to further expand these duties in order to counter 
the wartime actions of enemy espionage so that they became: 
S2 'Spy Organization in England. Germany's Wasted Efforts. Home Office Statement of 

Precautions. Espionage Punishable by Death', The Times, 9 October 1914, p.3. See also Bulloch, 

MIS, pp.81-86. 

S3 Ibid., pp.87-93. 

S4 See for example, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 9 September 1914, cols.563-567; 

Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 18 November 1914, ColsAI2-413; Parliamentary Debates, 

Commons, 26 November 1914, cols.l399-1402. See also W. Le Queux, German Spies in England: 
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Action on intercepted cables, telegrams, and letters. Investigation of 
causes of espionage, including uses of homing pigeons, wireless 
telegraphy, signalling, aircraft, etc. 
Investigation of cases of outrafe and sabotage. Vise of Prisoners' letters 
and those of Prisoners ofWar.5 
Duties were distributed to sections on a geographical basis. G 1 dealt with cases 
that arose in the Metropolitan area and City of London. It comprised Captain 
J.F.C. Carter, whose career and service with MIS is described later in this chapter, 
and, as assistant secretary, Miss M.E. Haldane. G2 covered cases that began in 
England south of a line from the Bristol Channel to The Wash, including the 
counties of Gloucestershire, Oxfordshire, Northamptonshire, Cambridgeshire and 
Norfolk, and also the Channel Islands. It was staffed by Major P.M. Peters with 
Miss M.C. Robson as assistant secretary. G3 handled the cases that arose in 
England north of the area given to G2, and in Wales and the Isle of Man. It 
included Commander F.B. Henderson, CMG DSO, of the Royal Navy, and Miss 
Robson, who was the assistant secretary to this section. G4 dealt with cases in 
Scotland, including the Orkneys, Shetlands and Hebrides. It comprised Mr R. 
(later Sir Robert) Nathan, whose career and service with MIS is set out in Chapter 
Five, with Miss Tunningley as assistant secretary. The allocation of cases by 
location only referred to the area where a case arose; it was one of G Branch's 
principles that the section that started a case should continue it to its conclusion, 
even if it subsequently moved to another area.56 
an Exposure (London: Stanley Paul & Co., 1915) as an example of popular criticism; also critical 

of the government, rather than MIS. 

55 TNA, KV1I42, "'G" Branch Report. The Investigation of Espionage. Vol. IV', 1921, pp.8-9. 
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MI5 wanted there to be a uniform procedure; instructions were given to all GOCs 
of the main military centres to guide officers dealing with suspects. In its twofold 
work of distributing information concerning espionage and investigating reported 
spy cases, MI5 established contact with: the Metropolitan Police, intelligence 
officers, city police, Admiralty coalfields police, diplomatic and consular services 
(through the Foreign Office), ports and aliens officers and customs officers 
(through the Home Office), permit office, Admiralty, Scottish Office, Local 
Government Board, Board of Trade, Registrar General, Labour Exchanges, and 
the Belgian Relief Committees.57 For example, during 1912, in order to help the 
police co-operate with MIS, MIS produced notes on the work of counter­
espionage and the methods used by enemy agents and distributed them to all chief 
constables.58 Indeed, this circulation of information regarding suspicious cases 
was one of the largest parts ofG Branch's work. In this, MIS stressed that its role 
was largely administrative, advisory and coordinative, rather than executive.59 
The increase in G Branch's work from April to August 1915 was demonstrated by 
the number of general suspects investigated each month. In April 1915 128 
general suspects were investigated, this rose to 251 during May, 449 for June, 736 
in July, and it had grown to 852 in August 1915.60 
S6 Ibid.,pp.9-10 

57 Ibid., pp.35-38. 

S8 TNA, KV1I39, p.39; TNA, CAB17/90, 'Secret Paper A. B2068. For Chief Constables Only, 

Notes on the Work of Counter-Espionage', October 1912; TNA, CAB 17/90, 'Confidential. Paper 

B. B2068. Notes on the Work and Methods of Foreign Secret Service Agents', October 1912. See 

also for example, TNA, H045/10779/277334, circular from the Home Office to chief constables, 

10 June 1916; TNA, H0451107791277334, circular from the Home Office to chief constables, 6 

July 1916. 

59 TNA, KV1I42, p.38. 
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A great number of cases of supposed spying occurred, but most of them proved of 
little significance.6! The outbreak of war stimulated a massive assault of spy 
mania and the first six months of the war witnessed a huge increase in reports of 
imaginary spies and saboteurs. Thomson of the Special Branch came across 
numerous cases of suspected illicit signalling to the enemy, particularly at night to 
guide V-Boats and Zeppelins to their targets. None of these suspicions were found 
to be correct. 62 
The case of Stephen Horvath, the Austro-Hungarian principal of Corona Lamp 
Works, provides one example of this spy mania and how MI5 handled it. On 25 
February 1914 the police were infonned that the children of a foreigner named 
Horvath attended school under the name Howard. They were also reported to have 
been friendly with the Goulds, an alias adopted by the convicted spy Frederick 
Schroeder, whose case is discussed in Appendix II. A check was put on Horvath's 
correspondence, which was found to be potentially suspicious, but also possibly 
genuine. The warrant was cancelled after 30 April 1914. On 15 October 1914 MI5 
60 Ibid., pp.39-40. 
61 Ibid., pp.41-43. 

62 Andrew, Secret Service, pp.I77- 182. Thomson cites an entertaining example of this spy mania, 

which is worth quoting at some length: 

On one occasion the authorities dispatched to the Eastern Counties a car equipped with a 
Marconi apparatus and two skilled operators to intercept any illicit messages that might 
be passing over the North Sea. They left at noon; at 3 they were under lock and key in 
Essex. After an exchange of telegrams they were set free, but at 7 P.M. they telegraphed 
from the police cells in another part of the county, imploring help. When again liberated 
they refused to move without the escort of a Territorial Officer in uniform, but on the 
following morning the police of another county had got hold of them and telegraphed, 
' Three German spies arrested with car and complete wireless installation, one in uniform 
of British officer'. Thomson, Queer People, p.39. 
See also TNA, W0158/989 - General Headquarters, Home Forces: Intelligence Circulars. No.6: 
alleged enemy signalling in Great Britain, 1 May 1916-31 May 1916, regarding the spy scare of 
early 1915 and how almost all such reports were proven to be wrong. Spy fever was not unique to 
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reported Horvath to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) as a suspicious 
character who should be watched. On 26 October the police concluded that there 
was nothing suspicious to report. In July 1915 Horvath, who had registered as a 
Hungarian subject, applied for exemption from internment, which was granted. 
On 9 May 1917 Horvath's neighbours insisted on his internment and Wandsworth 
residents signed a petition to this effect. Nothing was done, because it was found 
that Horvath had an enemy, Mrs Clutterbuck Barnett, and a neighbour, William 
Jones, wrote that Horvath really was loyal. 63 
In fact, the only genuine Gennan spy caught during this early period of the war 
was Carl Hans Lody, a lieutenant in the 2nd German naval reserve and a travelling 
agent for the Hamburg-Amerika Line. The first spy to be tried by court martial 
following the commencement of hostilities, he was shot at the Tower of London 
on 6 November 1914 having been detected by the postal and cable censorship.64 
It was suggested that Lody's death sentence should be commuted to penal 
servitude for life. However, Kell was wholeheartedly against this, feeling strongly 
that Lody should be executed as a deterrent. In Felstead's words, it 'was argued, 
with excellent reason, that the execution of a spy and the public announcement 
thereof would have a most deterrent effect on future German spies who might be 
the UK. Germany, France and most other countries at war were similarly afflicted. There were also 

sPy scares in the battle zone. J. Charteris, At GHQ (London: Cassell, 1931), p.43. 

6 TNA, KV1/41, pp.163-167. 

64 TNA, KV1/39, pp.30-33. The German Navy of the Nazi era named a destroyer after Lody. Other 

files on Lody at the TNA include: DPP1I29; W032/4160-1; W0141182. See also TNA, 

W0941103 - Documents concerning prisoners confined in the Tower of London for espionage 

during the First World War, including those executed, 1914-1918. 
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thinking of coming to this country' .65 Lody's execution took place at the Tower of 
London partly because, in MIS's effort to deter others, it was hoped that its 
gruesome history would 'place a chill in the heart of a potential enemy agent and 
a doubt in the mind of all but the most committed spy' .66 
This great increase in the work led to the growth and some reorganisation of G 
Branch in May 1915. G Branch's duties were more carefully defined, which 
showed the growing importance attached to particular features of the work. For 
example, the importance of Irish affairs was demonstrated by the creation of a 
section to concentrate on them. G Branch's duties were now defined as follows: 
(l) 	 Investigation of all cases of suspected espionage, sedition or 
treachery by individuals. 
(2) 	 Co-ordination and organisation of auxiliary action by government 
departments, naval and military authorities, and police for the 
above purposes. 
(3) 	 Preparation of the cases of persons arrested at the instance of the 
Bureau for prosecution by the military or civil authorities. 
(4) 	 Examination of censored or intercepted correspondence and 
communications as submitted by the Censorship and Investigation 
Branch, G.P .0., and decisions as to the disposal of such papers. 
(5) 	 Classification of the methods employed by espionage agents. 
(6) 	 Recommendations for amendments to legislation and regulations 
for the purpose or preventing espionage, sedition or treachery, or of 
impeding the activities of naval or military spies or agents. 
(7) 	 Employment of the Intelligence Police personnel and provincial 
agencies, except with the Expeditionary Force. 
(8) 	 Recommendations for first appointments of personnel to "G" 
Branch. 
65 Felstead, German Spies at Bay, p.25. See also Thomson, The Scene Changes, p.234. 
66 Sellers, Shot in the Tower, pp.ix-x. . 
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(9) 	 Semi-official correspondence and first draft official letters on the 
above subjects.67 
The staff now comprised Major Drake, as head of the branch, with eight section 
officers and four secretaries under him, an increase of four section officers 
compared to November 1914. Captain Carter and Commander Henderson carried 
out the work of G1, cases that arose in the Metropolitan area. G2 was re­
organised, with three officers, Mr P.W. Marsh, Mr Nathan and Captain H.S. 
Gladstone, to deal with all cases in Great Britain outside the Metropolitan area. 
G3, under Major F. Hall, later the head of D Branch, whose service with MI5 is 
described in Chapter Seven, was allocated all cases of suspected espionage, 
sedition or treachery in Ireland. G4, under Mr H. Hawkins Turner and Lieutenant 
W.E.H. Cooke, was given the new duties of examining censored or intercepted 
correspondence. The secretarial duties were divided between Miss Holmes, Miss 
Haldane, Miss Robson and Miss Hodgson.68 
G Branch's definition of duties for August 1915 showed an advance in MI5's 
status and closer co-operation with other departments. The following words were 
added to clause 1: 
Issue of orders to police, military and other authorities for arrest, search or 
observation of such persons (e.g. spies and suspects) and scrutiny of their 
correspondence. 
A GPO official, Mr Cousins, was appointed to act as a link between G Branch and 
the GPO, with the position of secretary in G Branch for the special purpose of 
67 TNA, KV1I42, pp.43-44. 
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examining mail that had been stopped under HOWs. The new definition of duties 
also included co-operation with the GOCs, GHQ and Allied counter-espionage 
services in counter-espionage, and responsibility for all official and semi-official 
correspondence on all issues dealt with in the detection of espionage. 
This expanSIOn of work required an increased staff. Major Drake was now 
supported in the general branch work by two section officers, Captain Carter and 
2nd Lieutenant G.C. Peevor, with four secretaries. G 1 comprised three officers, 
with three secretaries. G2 was staffed by four officers, with six secretaries. G3, 
Major Hall with one secretary, added to its duties the examination of reports on 
enemy agents in foreign countries, apart from Scandinavia, Holland and Denmark, 
and enemy territory on mainland Europe. G2a was formed, with five officers, to 
take over the work of the preliminary investigation of cases of espionage in Great 
Britain outside the Metropolitan area. G2b was created, with one officer, Mr H.L. 
Stephenson, to deal with cases of sedition amongst Indians and Egyptians in the 
UK and co-operate with police and counter-espionage services in India and Egypt 
in all cases falling under Gland G2a. G2 and these two sub-sections had a 
clerical staff of twelve. G3 undertook like investigations concerning Ireland, and 
co-operated with counter-espionage services in the overseas dominions, crown 
colonies and protectorates, except Egypt. A third officer went to G4, which added 
the duty of examining the documents of suspected persons after arrest, to the 
examination of intercepted correspondence. GS assumed the duty of preparing the 
cases of individuals arrested at the instance of MIS for prosecution by the military 
or civil authorities. 
68 Ibid., pp.44-45. 
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In October 1915 two further additions were made to the definition of duties. 
Firstly: 
investigation of all cases of suspected fomentation of strikes and sabotage, 
and dissemination of peace propaganda. 
Secondly: 
recommendation for amendments to legislation and regulations for the 
purpose of preventing espionage, sedition or treachery, or of impeding the 
activities of naval and military spies and agents. 69 
The first showed the increase of certain means of attack, and the second clause 
emphasised the experience that had been gained in the previous six months. 
By the end of the year after some minor reorganisation the distribution of duties to 
the five sections and two sub-sections was based on the two principles of 
geographical areas and race. Major Drake, with one section officer and four 
clerical staff, maintained the general direction and dealt specially with the means 
of known or suspected enemy agents. G 1, under Major V. Ferguson and Major 
H.B. Matthews with two secretaries, was given the added section dealing with the 
preliminary investigations of the fomentation of strikes, sabotage and peace 
propaganda. G2, under Mr Nathan, was concerned with all cases of espionage, 
treachery and sedition in Great Britain. 70 
69 TNA, KV1I43, pp.6-9. 
70 Ibid., p.9. 
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This development in G Branch's organisation had been driven by growing 
operational needs, as is illustrated by the far greater number of spies MI5 brought 
to trial during 1915 than in previous years. Throughout 1915 ten spies were shot, 
one was hung, another committed suicide while undergoing trial, and five were 
imprisoned.71 
During 1915 the mam sources of information that led to the arrest of these 
German spies were: checks on spy addresses, scrutiny of telegrams to the 
continent, scrutiny of telegraphed money orders from the continent, postal 
censorship, intelligence officers, British agents and the Belgian counter-espionage 
service.72 
The case of Private Barry Sampson demonstrates that MI5 did not always press 
for the draconian punishment of German agents. Sampson a former sergeant in the 
RMLI had been reduced to the ranks and deserted. He opened correspondence 
with a German department and was investigated by the police for a time, who then 
lost sight of him when he left home unobserved. A conversation overheard by 
chance in the Lansdowne Hotel, Cardiff enabled MIS to pick him up on 6 January 
1915. By this time, Sampson had enlisted in the Gloucestershire Regiment, having 
admitted that he was a deserter, for which he was given twenty-eight days in the 
cells. He told MI5's detective that he had received money from Germany as the 
71 Curry, The Security Service 1908-1945, p.74.
72TNA, KV1I42, p.160. 
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result, he claimed, of a bluff. His officers were informed of this and nothing was 
done to him, because he had been honest on re-enlistment and to the detective.73 
There is some evidence of further attempts to initiate a double cross system in the 
case of Karl Muller. A Russian of reputed German parentage, Muller was arrested 
in February 1915 having landed at Sunderland a month earlier carrying Russian 
identity papers. He was executed in June 1915 but no news of Muller's capture or 
death reached the Germans. While Muller was in custody and for some time after 
his execution, the censorship intercepted replies to his correspondence, payments 
and requests for further intelligence. MIS made good use of this opportunity to 
deceive the Germans by passing on misleading war news, ostensibly from Muller. 
By the time they realised that Muller's information was bogus, the Germans had 
paid MIS about £400 for it.74 MIS used the proceeds to buy a car, which, with a 
delightfully dark sense of humour, was christened 'The Muller'. 75 
Andrew concludes that Kell had: 
thus anticipated the Double Cross system successfully employed during 
the Second World War. But the deception lacked two of the essential 
elements of the Double Cross system. The bogus intelligence was not 
devised with the same elaborate care and MUller was no longer available 
to add credibility to it. Before long the German intelligence station in 
Rotterdam broke off contact. 
Similarly, Robert Rosenthal, whose case will be further examined in Chapter Six, 
volunteered to become a double agent after his arrest in May 1915 and, to 
73 TNA, KV1I41, p.181-182. 

74 G. Aston, Secret Service (London: Faber & Faber, 1939), p.l 04. 

7S LHCMA, Edmonds MSS, VII1/35, newspaper cutting, 'Anecdotes ofIntelligence', n.d. 
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demonstrate this, provided accurate information on the workings of German 
intelligence. However, 'Rosenthal's offer to change sides, which MI5 would 
doubtless have accepted in the next war, seems in 1915 merely to have inspired 
contempt at his capacity for treachery' .76 
Amidst the myriad of ludicrous accusations born of spy mania, MIS occasionally 
received useful tip-offs from members of the public. In 1915, for example, a 
private citizen in Cardiff received information from a friend in America that a 
German, using the name Lathom Mahon, was serving in the Royal Naval Division 
at Crystal Palace. Lathom Ramsey Mahon was discovered to be the alias of 
Kenneth Gustav Triest, the nineteen year old son of an American of German 
origin. He was arrested, interrogated and released. He then wrote to Baron Bruno 
von Schroeder, a well-known philanthropist among the German community in 
Britain, offering his services to Germany. The Baron handed this letter in to the 
British authorities; the available documentation does not, however, provide any 
indications of his motivation for doing so. Triest was arrested once again and it 
was proposed to try him by Naval court-martial. The US Ambassador intervened 
and Triest, who was found not to be fully sane, was given over to his father, who 
took him back to the USA.77 British nurse Edith Cavell's execution for spying by 
a German firing squad in Belgium on 15 October 1915 had shocked the world. 
Kell and others thus 'saw an opportunity to contrast the behaviour of the British 
76 Andrew, Secret Service, p.186. 

77 TNA, KV1I42, p.130. See also TNA, ADM178/99 Gustave K W Triest alias Latham R Mahan 

RNVR. American citizen of German extraction charged with spying, 1915. 
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and the Germans', by releasing Triest to the custody of his father, in an act of 
clemency calculated to win favour in American eyes.78 
Nonetheless, Kell took a different view of a female German agent. A naturalised 
Swede, Eva de Bournonville was arrested through postal interception in 
November 1915 and her death sentence commuted to penal servitude for life on 
the advice of the Home Secretary.79 Kell felt that it was a grave mistake. He 
opposed a reprieve simply because she was a woman, protesting that once they 
learned that Britain would not execute female spies, Germany would crowd 
Britain with them. 80 
German agents were also exposed thanks to information from British officials 
abroad. David Stad and Cornelius Marinus den Braber were Dutch seamen 
purporting to be representatives of a firm selling custard powder, van Brandwijk 
and Company. On 9 June the British consul-general at Rotterdam wrote that Jan 
van Brandwijk, whose shop was known to be the centre for a section of the 
German Secret Service, was reported to be sending Dutchmen to spy in the UK, 
that Stad had already arrived and Braber was corning to the UK on his behalf. 
Stad arrived that day and Braber came over on 18 June. Neither had done any 
business. At MIS's behest, the police searched both their rooms and found dummy 
cases of custard powder and no samples, and ordered them to report to the police 
78 Bulloch, MI.5, p.90. For more on Cavell, see Proctor, Female Intelligence, pp.lOO-106. 

79 TNA, KV1I43, pp.86-93. See also TNA, DPP1I32 - DE BOURNONVILLE, E. Offence: neutral 

assisting enemy, 1915; TNA, DPP4/51 - E De B [Bournonville], relates to an unidentified 

Swedish body. Offence: Official Secrets, 1916. 

80 Smith, The Spying Game, p.74. Whereas, female spies were executed in France. Aston, Secret 

Service, p.153. 
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station daily. On 23 June 1915 they were both arrested for not having given 
proper particulars to their landlords. Ironically, both landlords were also arrested 
for not having maintained a proper record of their guests. The charges against 
Stad and Braber failed on a technical point, and they were freed on 14 July 1915. 
There was no doubt as to their intentions to spy and they were interned under 
DRR14B on 16 July 1915. Stad's landlord, Liebfreund, was sentenced to six 
months' hard labour, and Braber's landlord, Carlishe, was fined £5.81 
German agents were also compromised by information received from British 
secret service agents abroad. On 16 March 1915 a British agent in Holland 
informed MI5 that E.W. Melin was working for the Germans. On 14 June 1915 
three letters contained in two envelopes addressed to Melin were intercepted. 
Questions in secret writing about British ships were written between the lines of a 
warm family letter. The house was searched and spy equipment was found. Melin 
was arrested on 14 June 1915 and confessed whilst in gaol. He was shot on 10 
September 1915.82 
It is interesting to note that Melin was tried under DRR18 - with an act 
preparatory to the commission of a prohibited act - plus three other regulations, 
which had been added to the original DRR in order to plug gaps that had been 
revealed in Britain's counter-espionage defences. DRR24A made it an offence to 
send any document from the UK containing anything written in any medium that 
was not visible unless subjected to heat or some other treatment. DRR4 forbade 
81 TNA, KV1I42, pp.105-107. 
120 
being in possession of a code. DRR22A provided that anyone possessing any 
code, cipher or other means that could be adapted to secretly communicating 
naval or military information was guilty of an offence unless he proved that it was 
intended solely for commercial or other legitimate purposes. 83 
The threat from some German agents was removed by the less drastic measure of 
having them leave the UK with a no return permit, of which the case of Pauline 
Slager and Georgine Ulrich provides an example. Slager and Ulrich (or Ulricht or 
Ullrich) were signalled as spies from Rotterdam on 16 July 1915. They arrived at 
Tilbury on 29 July 1915, where they were searched and their passports were taken 
from them and they were told to call at Scotland Yard. They were informed that 
their passports would be returned to them as soon as they notified the authorities 
of their permanent address. At interview, they claimed that they had come to 
England to work as music-hall entertainers. Without informing the police, they 
moved on to Glasgow and then Edinburgh on 14 August. As a result, Slager and 
Ulrich were arrested in Edinburgh for entering a prohibited area without the 
required identity papers. They left the UK on 25 August with a no return permit. 84 
Edward Edwin was detected due to statements by soldiers from whom he had 
tried to solicit information in March 1915. Edwin, a Swedish masseur, was 
employed to treat wounded soldiers at the Duke of York's School, Dover. He 
came to MIS's notice via the intelligence officer at Dover, who had received 
82 Ibid., pp.l18-121. Other tiles on Melin at the TNA include: DPPII35; DPP1I37; DPP4/49; 

W014112/3. 

83 TNA, W07111237, A. Bodkin's opening for the prosecution, 20 August 1915, pp.5-6. 

84 TNA, KV1I43, pp.78-83. 
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statements from two wounded soldiers that Edwin had asked specific questions 
about the number, organisation, etc of British troops in France and Belgium. He 
incited the men to desert and promised to get them out of the UK if they did so. It 
was later discovered that he had in fact been arrested earlier in April for 
examining military works near Dover. On 2 October he was found guilty, by 
court-martial, on three counts of attempting to elicit information and sentenced to 
seven days' imprisonment with hard labour and to be deported at the end of his 
sentence.85 
The bungling of the case of Abdon Jappe by detectives of the Plymouth garrison, 
employing unsuitable agent provocateur tactics, provides a telling contrast with 
MIS's methods. Around 20 May 1915, posing as the manager of a timber and 
copper company that dealt with the dockyard, a Detective-Sergeant Bellinger of 
the intelligence office, Plymouth garrison, established contact with Jappe, a 
Danish electrician. By pretending to be considering illegal traffic in copper to 
Germany, he induced Jappe to show his hand. Jappe replied that he could smuggle 
the copper across the Danish frontier if the manager would ship it to Copenhagen. 
Jappe then proposed that the manager, being frequently in the dockyard, might 
send information about ships' movements to him in Copenhagen. When the 
manager enquired how this intelligence was to be conveyed by telegram, Jappe at 
once explained two secret codes.86 He was arrested on 29 May 1915 by order of 
the CMA caught in possession of the two codes. On 2 November 1915 he was 
sentenced to three years' penal servitude. The detective's action had forestalled 
8S TNA, KV1I42, pp.132-133. 
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MIS, and the improper agent provocateur methods of investigation employed 
meant that evidence of hostile association could not be procured. Thus, when the 
Home Office decided to reduce his sentence, Jappe could not be interned under 
DRR14B. He seems to have been subsequently deported.87 
In 1916, a further reorganisation was necessitated by cases of sedition among 
Indians and Egyptians. In April 1916 G2a disappeared and its duties, the 
preliminary investigation of cases of espionage in Great Britain, were absorbed by 
G2. A new section, G6, comprising two officers and six secretaries, took over the 
work of G2b, cases of sedition among Indians and Egyptians, etc. G2 then 
consisted of seven officers and seven secretaries. 
By September 1916 the work in Ireland, following the Easter Rising, and in the 
Dominions had increased to such an extent that G3 was re-constituted into a 
separate branch, labelled D Branch. GS, which dealt with the preparation of cases 
of individuals arrested at the instance of MIS, was absorbed by the direction of G 
Branch, and 06 was re-Iabelled as G5. In November 1916 the photograph and 
handwriting books were transferred into the keeping of H2, and the work needing 
translation was passed on to the Military Translation Bureau (MI7c). A further 
sub-division took effect from 18 December 1916 when the enquiries necessitated 
by intercepted correspondence, previously G4, were transferred to G2a, and the 
remaining work of 02 was allocated to G2b.88 
86 TNA, ADM1311120, pp.30-31, report on Abdon Jappe by Major W.P. Drury (Intelligence 
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87 TNA, KV1I42, pp.130-131. 
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One example of the increased interest in Ireland was MIS's involvement in Sir 
Roger Casement's trial for high treason. Casement, a British subject, served in the 
Consular Service from 1895-1913, being knighted in 1911, and ending his career 
as consul general in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. After his retirement, Casement 
returned to Ireland, where he took an active part in organising the Irish National 
Volunteers. As war broke out, Casement was in New York espousing Sinn Fein 
propaganda and soliciting money to procure arms for the Irish National 
Volunteers. Casement soon travelled to Germany, in the hope of gaining support 
for a rebellion in Ireland, where he endeavoured to enlist POWs from Irish 
regiments to form an Irish Brigade - a military force formed by the German 
Goverrunent to fight against Britain.89 Casement's attempt was a dismal failure: 
he only managed to recruit fifty-five men and the Germans did not provide 
anything like the support he had been hoping for. Casement returned to Ireland in 
a German submarine at the time of the Easter rising, landing in a coUapsible boat. 
However, it seems that he travelled to Ireland not so much to join in the Easter 
Rising, but to try to stop what he thought would be futile. 9o He was arrested 
immediately, near Ardfert, on 21 April 1916. Casement was tried at the High 
Court on 15 June 1916. He was found guilty of high treason and sentenced to 
death, being hanged at Pentonville in August 1916.91 The degree of MIS's 
involvement in the Casement case is not clear, apart from a role in the preparation 
89 TNA, KV41113, "'Game Book" Volume 2. - 1916-1937', n.d., defence security case no.66. 
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for his prosecution. Certainly, MI5 was responsible for investigating cases of 
suspected espionage, sedition or treachery in Ireland. However, Andrew suggests 
that the intelligence chief most interested in the political situation in Ireland was 
'Blinker' Hall.92 
Another indication of the Irish dimension was the case of Lance-Corporal Joseph 
Dowling, who had been tempted by Casement's Irish Brigade. Dowling, a British 
subject, joined the Connaught Rangers in 1904. He had been born in Queen's 
County, Ireland in 1885, the son of John Dowling a prominent Sinn Fein member. 
He went to France with the BEF and was taken prisoner by the Germans on 26 
August 1914. On 8 July 1915 a report had been received from a Major Furness, of 
the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC), a POW repatriated from Germany, that 
Dowling had joined the Irish Brigade and also acted as a recruiting agent amongst 
Irish POWS.93 On 13 April 1918 the Naval Intelligence Department (NID) 
informed MI5 that a man had reportedly landed on the Galway coast on the 
morning of 12 April 1918, stating to be the sole survivor of S.S. MiSSiSSippi, 
which had been torpedoed off Arran Island, Galway the previous night.94 Enquiry 
by NID revealed that the Mississippi had not yet left the Clyde, and NID 
requested that the prisoner should be brought over to London for immediate 
interrogation. Under interrogation by NID, Dowling admitted that he had been 
brought over by a German submarine and landed in a collapsible boat and that he 
had instructions to get in touch with the leaders of Sinn Fein, and spoke of a 
German expedition to Ireland. Dowling was tried by court martial on 8 July 1918 
92 Andrew, Secret Service, pp.l14-115 & 247-249. 
93 TNA, KV4/113, defence security case no.79. 
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and charged with having joined the Irish Brigade, trying to persuade other POWs 
to join, and landing in Ireland from a German submarine with the object of aiding 
Britain's enemies. He was found guilty and sentenced to death but subsequently it 
was commuted to penal servitude for life.95 
Curiously, as the case of Albert Bright demonstrates, MI5 was clearly not 
involved in every espionage case that occurred in the UK during the war. Bright 
was a British subject born in Sheffield, residing in Rotherham, and an engineer by 
trade although he had no place of business and was known to be in fmancial 
difficulties. On 28 March 1916 Bright was remanded in custody by the Sheffield 
police, charged under DRR18 with attempting to elicit infonnation regarding the 
manufacture of war materials. He had tried to obtain details of the exact 
ingredients used in the manufacture of the steel made by Vickers Limited for the 
manufacture of war materials, which was strictly confidential.96 Bright pleaded 
guilty at the Leeds Assizes on 5 May 1916, being sentenced to penal servitude for 
life.97 Later, on 11 May 1916, Carter wrote to the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP) asking if he could provide MI5 with a report of Bright's tria1.98 This 
strongly suggests that MI5 had nothing to do with this seemingly straightforward 
case. 
94 TNA, DPP1I51, report by MI5D, 13 April 1918. 
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Captain, later Colonel, John Fillis Carre Carter himself joined MI5 on 6 August 
1914, having served with the Indian army, leaving on 4 March 1918 for a posting 
in Rome.99 He subsequently served as a Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Crime) 
with the Metropolitan Police. lOO By May 1915 Carter was a section officer in G 
Branch.lOl Drake left MI5 in January 1917 to become head of secret service work 
at GHQ, succeeding Walter Kirke, and Major Carter became head of 0 Branch on 
15 January 1917. 102 G5 was re-constituted into a new branch, B Branch, 
concerned with Oriental affairs. G2, under Major Anson, was divided into four 
sub-sections. G2a dealt with enquiries out of intercepted correspondence. G2b 
handled enquiries from matters referred by the port control. 02c covered enquiries 
that arose out of matters referred by F Branch. G2d focused on enquiries arising 
from any other source. !O3 
G Branch underwent considerable change in February 1917. The general duties 
laid down that recommendations to amend legislation and regulations were to be 
reached in co-operation with F Branch. G1 's duties were restricted to the 
investigation of cases of sedition and peace propaganda that arose from enemy 
activities. G2 continued to investigate cases of suspected espionage in Great 
Britain. G4 took over the investigation of intercepted correspondence from G2a. 
(E Branch retained control of investigations of people in transit through the UK.) 
Three new sections were formed to deal with matters connected with secret 
99 TNA, KV1I59, pA. 
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writing and correspondence. G3 dealt with photography, chemistry and technical 
research. G5 handled translation. G6 worked on procedure and investigation in 
special questions. 104 The reasons why these changes took place are unclear from 
the available documentation. However, there was much alarm at this time over 
pacifism and pacifist movements and it can be speculated that G 1 's restriction to 
investigations arising only from enemy activities may have been due to the 
scandal caused by PMS2's agent provocateur tactics, Kell's desire not to spy on 
the British labour movement, and the fact that this was becoming Thomson's turf. 
The new sections concerned with secret writing and correspondence were 
probably a response to the increasingly sophisticated secret writing techniques 
that had been used by captured spies. The co-operation with F Branch in 
designing legislation seems to have been driven by a desire to more efficiently 
plug-in gaps in legislation that spy cases had revealed. 
With these changes, G Branch comprised the following personnel on 11 June 
1917. The head of the branch was assisted by five secretaries. G 1 consisted of 
four officers and three secretaries. G2 included an officer with five secretaries. 
G2a was made up offive officers and four secretaries. G2b employed four officers 
with two secretaries. G2c had four officers assisted by three secretaries. G3 
comprised two secretaries. G4 consisted of an officer with two secretaries. G5 
employed one officer. G6 had four officers. Thus, G Branch had fifty-one 
members of staff, made up of twenty-five officers and twenty-six secretaries. IDS 
104 Ibid., pp.6-7. 
IDS TNA, KV1I46, 'Appendix F. List of staff of 0 Branch', n.d., pp.62-63. The available material 
does not mention 02d's personnel in June 1917. It seems likely that 02d was disbanded between 
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Further re-organisation occurred in September and again in October 1917. G 
Branch's general duties remained the same, but changes were made in the 
sections. Photography, chemistry and technical research were removed. G2's 
duties were taken over by G3 and expanded under the new definition: 
Executive duties connected with investigation, arrest or trial of persons 
suspected of espionage. 
02 was allocated general duties related to enquiries into individuals' credentials. 
04 was concerned with special duties.106 It is not clear why these developments 
occurred. However, it seems likely that they were only minor changes, possibly to 
streamline G Branch, by removing work not directly related to the investigation of 
espionage, so that G Branch could concentrate on this. By September 1917 H7 
was conducting laboratory work, which strongly suggests that G Branch's 
photography, chemistry and technical research work were relocated there. 
In October 1918 Captain Radcliffe, of G3, was tasked to maintain liaison between 
MIS and allied military missions in the UK, including military attaches. The 
examination of special censorship documents was transferred from G3 to H3. The 
collection of codes and ciphers was moved over to D5, and co-ordination of 
British special intelligence missions in allied countries was handed over to D4. 
The threat of Bolshevism clearly had a marked influence upon the further changes 
to G Branch's duties in November 1918, most notably in the addition of 
Report does not suggest this. It is also possible that the author of the G Branch Report simply 

neglected to cover G2d's staff in June 1917. 
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'investigations into the activities, where detrimental to national interests, of 
persons of Russian, Finnish, Polish and Czecho-Slovak nationalities' .107 
At the end of the war, the final strength of G Branch was sixty: the head of the 
branch was assisted by seven secretaries. G 1 comprised seven officers. G2 
consisted of an officer with three secretaries. G2a had four officers and six 
secretaries. G2b was made up of five officers and five secretaries. G3 employed 
three officers with two secretaries. G3b had one officer and three secretaries. G4 
consisted of four officers assisted by four secretaries. GL had one officer. GP 
comprised two officers and one secretary. Thus, of the total of sixty, twenty-nine 
were officers and thirty-one secretaries. 108 
It is widely accepted that MI5 successfully discovered all of the German agents 
operating in the UK between 1909 and 1918. However, Silber may provide a 
possible exception to this rule. Bulloch makes the interesting claim that: 
JULES eRAWFORD SILBER is the one German spy known to have been 
completely successful throughout the war. There were a few others who 
made quick trips to Britain and managed to return to their base with scraps 
of information but Silber alone lived and worked in enemy territory for 
years, constantly sending reports of the utmost importance to Germany. He 
was probably one of the most consistently effective spies of all time. 
Silber was born in Silesia. As a young man, he worked for a German firm in 
South Africa. When the Boer War started in 1899 he offered his services to the 
British Army as an interpreter, was appointed to POW and internment camps and 
was eventually sent to India to work with Boer prisoners. He spent one-and-a-half 
107 Ibid., pp.l13-118. 
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years stationed in the Punjab and became friends with a number of the junior 
British officers in the garrison there. After the war ended, in 1902 he migrated to 
the USA, where he worked until 1914. When the First World War started, Silber 
decided to serve Germany by becoming an intelligence agent in Britain. He 
passed immigration by pretending to be a Canadian without a passport; his service 
in South Africa and India also helped him to convince immigration. Once in 
Britain, he applied for a job in the postal censorship, was accepted and given a 
censor's job. His linguistic abilities and his record of service in South Africa and 
India and his genuine friendships with officers there who had provided him with 
testimonials, also helped him to pass the interview for this post. He learned much 
from the letters he censored and passed this on to Germany. His job as a censor 
enabled him to post information to Germany: he put information into an envelope, 
addressed it to a suspect address that he thought would pass it on to Germany, and 
then sealed the envelope with his own 'opened by censor' tag, so that nobody else 
would open it again before it got there. Silber was stood down on 27 June 1919. 
He worked for film companies in England, before his eventual return to Germany 
in 1925.109 
Boghardt, however, has concluded that Silber 'was not a master spy'. Rather, he 
'was either an outright fraud', or a former censor 'who had waited for his files to 
be destroyed and now used his inside knowledge to make some money'. Indeed, 
the 'files of Silber's alleged employer, the German Admiralty Staff, remain 
completely silent on the topic'. Boghardt reasoned that, if Silber 'had conducted 
108 TNA, KV1I46, 'Appendix F', pp.66-67. 
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such ingenious work, surely he would have left some trace In the German 
records' .110 
G Branch had thus succeeded in its mission. In the course of its development 
between 1909 and 1918 a number of changes had taken place. These had reflected 
how the scope of counter-espionage work had widened in response to changes in 
the nature of the threat posed by Germany. On the eve of the First World War G 
Branch's role was limited to counter-espionage in a narrow sense; namely, 
investigating suspected spies. War was to serve as the engine of G Branch's 
growth. As G Branch's workload increased, it needed a growing staff. However, 
although this accounts for much of the increase in G Branch's size, the way in 
which it grew and its role evolved can be explained by how the perceived threat 
that MIS faced changed as the war went on. By 1916 G Branch had also begun to 
assume an interest in industrial unrest, pacifists and others deemed subversive, 
because some within official circles equated opposition to the government's 
policies with support for Germany and thus felt that such activities should be 
investigated to see if they were being directed by Germany. G Branch's 
development from 1917 onwards was driven by a conviction that it had defeated 
German espionage, such that Germany had switched its efforts to promoting 
Bolshevism and other forms of unrest in order to undermine British society. 
However, G Branch's development was guided by the fact that it was restricted to 
109 Bulloch, M.1.5, pp.122-132. See J. Silber, The Invisible Weapons (London: Hutchinson, 1932); 
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243. 
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investigating only those cases that arose from enemy activities. It was not to have 
a wider interest in counter-subversion. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: F BRANCH: PREVENTION 

As already noted, by October 1913 MIS had divided into two main branches, A 
Branch, which dealt with the detection of espionage, and B Branch, with the 
registration of aliens. 1 Thus, B Branch contained the preventive duties that would 
later be undertaken by F Branch, but it also carried out the administrative, 
secretarial and records duties that would become the work of C Branch, later 
labelled H Branch.2 The preventive work was eventually separated from the 
administrative duties so that the branch could become specifically dedicated 
preventative without the concerns of administrative duties; on 1 October 1914 a 
third, C Branch was formed to perform this administrative work.3 Thus, what was 
to become F Branch purposely kept its staff small in order to be able to 
concentrate on general policy issues more easily, by jettisoning the sections that 
became confronted by a disproportionate growth of solely administrative work.4 
Similarly, F Branch later passed on parts of its administrative duties to A Branch 
and E Branch. 5 
1 TNA, KV1I49, pp.l8-19; KVl/35, p.67. 

2 Ibid., p.7l. 
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The head of F Branch - the other preventive branches, A, D and E also came 
under his control - was Captain (later Brigadier Sir) Eric Edward Boketon Holt-
Wilson, who had joined MI5 on 20 December 1912, to succeed Captain Stanley 
Clarke, having been recommended for the post by Edmonds.6 According to 
Edmonds, Holt-Wilson chose to leave the Royal Engineers and join MI5, because 
'he did not like the prospect of serving in the tropics again': his wife had been ill 
in Singapore and they lost a child there.7 Lady Kell remembered him as 'a man of 
almost genius for intricate organisation' and 'an intensely loyal and devoted 
friend' .8 Holt-Wilson became Kell's deputy during the war, a post which he held 
until he was sacked with Kell by Churchill in 1940, when 'he paid for his loyalty 
by being granted a pension related solely to his rank in 1912 - just £440 per 
year,.9 In a distinguished military career, the Old Harrovian, Royal Engineers 
officer had been an instructor in military engineering at the Royal Military 
Academy, Woolwich prior to joining MI5. In 1914 he published a small book on 
field entrenchments, which sold more than 70,000 copies. He also held the 
Distinguished Service Order (DSO), having fought in some twenty actions during 
the Boer War.lO The athletic, six-foot-three-inches tall Holt-Wilson was also 'a 
formidable all-round sportsman', who described himself as 'a champion revolver 
6 Curry, The Security Service 1908-1945, p.72; Andrew, Secret Service, pp.59-60; TNA, KV1I59, 
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shot' and later became the President of the Ski Club of Great Britain. ii Hiley 
concludes that aged 'thirty-eight on the outbreak of war, he had proved a willing 
and efficient deputy to the older Kell, devotedly sharing the latter's belief in a 
threat from "secret enemies of the Empire'" . i2 
The work of the head of F Branch was largely of a general nature, formulating 
counter-espionage policy and initiating new legislation, including: 
Co-ordination of the general methods of the Police, of Government 
Departments, and Co-operation with the Allied Forces, in the application 
of Naval and Military Measures for the Control of Aliens and Prevention 
of Espionage in the United Kingdom; 
Questions of Counter-Espionage policy arising out of the Defence of the 
Realm Act and Aliens Restriction Act; and-
Draft proposals for Naval and Military amendments to Legislation dealing 
with Counter-Espionage and the Control of Aliens. 
He also examined the proposed removal orders presented by the CMAs, to be 
issued under the DORA, and considered proposals to extend or alter the list of 
prohibited areas. 13 
Prohibited areas were of four kinds. Firstly, prohibited areas that were only 
prohibited to enemy aliens. Secondly, special military areas, to which the 
commandant had the power to refuse any individual an entry permit. Thirdly, 
medium protected areas, government land, premises, docks, etc, to which the 
CMAs could prohibit any or all people. Fourth, small protected areas to which a 
11 Hiley, 'Counter-Espionage and Security in Great Britain during the First World War', p.642; 
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local or central authority could deny entry, or to adjacent ground. Theoretically, 
the prohibited area provided a belt round the coast from ten to forty miles deep, 
that had been completely cleared from known enemies. British counter-espionage 
was thus freed to detect the enemies disguised as friendly aliens or British 
subjects, who could operate in this coastal zone. 
Therefore, MIS's policy, particularly F Branch, was to gain protection from 
enemy agents by moving enemy aliens from the protected area, and maintaining 
close watch on all of them who might harm national security. Registration was 
proved valuable here, and people who seemed dangerous according to MIS's 
records could be interned or subjected to other personal restrictions as appropriate. 
It is informative to note that even during the wars from 1803-1814 aliens were not 
allowed to live within ten miles of a dockyard or the coast, their homes could be 
searched, and they were required to possess passports and be registered. 14 
The preventive work of MIS before the First World War did not require any sub­
division of personnel or duties within F Branch. The work comprised primarily in 
preparing the unofficial aliens register, which provided the basis of the action 
carried out during the precautionary period in late July 1914. It required co­
operating with a number of government departments, principally the police chief 
constables and particularly those on the east coast. 15 The legislative measures 
begun and developed by MIS in the pre-war period consisted, firstly, of the OSA 
13 TNA, KV1I35, pp.73-74. 
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1911; and, secondly, of drafts of the DORA and regulations, and other emergency 
measures to be enacted at the commencement of hostilities.16 As well as the 
unofficial registration of aliens and the general supervision of foreign 
communities, the administrative work of F Branch during the pre-war period also 
included the development of emergency schemes to be enacted on mobilisation: 
(a) to protect especially vulnerable points; (b) the observers scheme, to rapidly 
enrol a civil intelligence service in the coastal areas; and (c) to arrest, search, or 
specially watch over 200 chosen enemy subjects, whom were felt likely to be used 
as spies, on top of the twenty or so known spies who would be apprehended at the 
start of the precautionary period as a matter of course. 17 
The OSA 1911 played such an integral part in all of the pre-war activities of F 
Branch that it is worth examining the thirteen clauses, which were under the 
following headings: 
1. 	 Penalties for spying. 
2. 	 Wrongful communication, &c., of information. 
3. 	 Definition of prohibited places. 
4. 	 Attempts to commit offence or incitement to commit offence under 
Act. 
5. 	 Person charged with felony under Act. 
6. 	 Power to arrest. 
7. 	 Penalty for harbouring spies. 
8. 	 Restriction on prosecution. 
IS TNA, KVl/35, pp.71-72. 

16 Ibid., p.16. 
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9. Search warrants. 
10. Extent of Act and place of trial of offence. 
11. Saving for laws of British possessions. 
12. Interpretation. 
13. Short title and repeal. 
Clause 1 enacted that any individual would be guilty of a felony and liable to 
three to seven years' penal servitude if, for any purpose prejudicial to the national 
security of the state, he (a) entered, approached or was in the vicinity of a 
prohibited place, as defined in clause 3, (b) prepared any sketch, plan, model or 
note that was, or might be, of direct or indirect use to an enemy, (c) obtained or 
communicated to any individual any sketch, plan, model, note or other document 
or information that was, or could prove, of direct or indirect use to an enemy. 
Prejudicial purpose no longer had to be demonstrated by a specific act, but could 
be established by the character or conduct of the accused, or by the circumstances 
of the case. The key point, and the one that really strengthened MIS's hand, was 
that the onus probendi was placed on the accused to satisfy the court that there 
was not a prejudicial purpose in his act. 
In clause 2, the guilt of a misdemeanour, liable to a fine or up to two years' hard 
labour, referred to those who wrongfully keep in their possession or communicate 
to unauthorised persons any sketch, plan or information, etc. Clause 7 applied 
especially to people who knowingly harboured any person who had committed, or 
was about to commit, an offence under OSA 1911, or who enabled individuals to 
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meet for this purpose and who refused to provide the police with information 
about these people. Clause 4 dealt with incitements or attempts to encourage other 
people to commit offences under OSA 1911. 
These four clauses, 1, 2, 7 and 4 dealt with offences and their punishment under 
OSA 1911 and they are typical of the preventive legislation initiated by F Branch. 
Clause 6 provided increased powers of arrest, because it could be carried out 
without a warrant, not just by a policeman, but also by any individual on any 
person who was reasonably suspected. Clause 8 protected the public because it 
limited prosecutions under OSA 1911 to those carried out by the Attomey­
General or those having his consent. Clause 9 allowed search warrants to be 
granted by a justice of the peace (JP) on satisfactory information under oath or, in 
cases of great emergency, by a police superintendent. Clause 10 covered the 
extent of OSA 1911: against British subjects throughout the world and against any 
person in any part of the British Empire. Clause 3 increased the scope of 
prohibited places and provided the Home Secretary with the power to declare any 
area a prohibited place. The other clauses dealt with technical points and 
interpretation. 18 
The first and most important part of the pre-war preventive work on the 
administrative side was the unofficial registration of aliens throughout the UK that 
was carried out with the police's help. From the start, MIS went to great lengths to 
get in touch with the chief constables of the east coast counties, subsequently with 
all the inland counties, cities and boroughs throughout the UK. Chief constables 
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were asked to send in reports on individual suspects, which served as the basis of 
registration, and 300 aliens had been registered by October 1910. This experience 
taught the necessity of a standard form of report. 19 Kell broached this matter with 
the Home Office, and a printed Aliens Return form was put to the Home Secretary 
and approved.2o Importantly, all such information requested was to be gathered 
confidentially. By November 1910 approximately 1,500 of these forms had been 
given to chief constables, primarily in the east coast counties, and in January 1911 
MI5 reported that excellent progress had been made in the unofficial registration 
of aliens in the country districts. By April 1911 when about 4,500 aliens had been 
registered, MI5 found that this scheme had the following benefits. Firstly, a rough 
estimate of the number of aliens in each county could be reached. Secondly, the 
areas most favoured by aliens could be seen. Thirdly, aliens could be divided into 
probably harmless and probably harmful. Fourth, it provided the details of aliens 
working in or near government works. Fifth, it showed which aliens travelled 
around a lot. Sixth, it made it possible to prepare a list of the aliens whom it 
would be advisable to remove from martial law areas at the start of war. 
The following key issues arose and were resolved during the compilation of the 
unofficial register of aliens. Firstly, information concerning changes of address, 
arrivals and departures of aliens should be reported immediately if possible, and 
definitely be included in the yearly revision of the aliens return. Secondly, 
naturalised British subjects of alien birth should be included because MIS felt that 
18 Ibid., pp.21-38. 
19 Ibid., pp.39-40. 
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naturalisation counted for nothing in espionage matters. Thirdly, alien returns 
should be sent in during the first quarter of the year and amended annually. 
However, it was later decided that amendments should be received at least once 
every quarter. 
The unofficial registration of aliens progressed steadily. By November 1910 over 
500 aliens had been registered. By March 1911 this figure had risen to 4,500. By 
January 1913 10,320 aliens of all nationalities had been registered, including 
3,574 Germans and Austrians. By April 1913 these figures had increased to 
21,397 and 5,241 respectively. By July 1913 the totals stood at 28,830 and 
11,100.21 
By 3 March 1914 MIS had opened correspondence with all the county chief 
constables of England and Wales, twenty-three in Scotland, the Isle of Man and 
the Royal Irish Constabulary, and with the chief constables of fifty-two boroughs 
in England and Wales and eighteen in Scotland?2 In 1914 70,000 enemy aliens 
over the age of fourteen lived in Great Britain. By the outbreak of war, all of those 
outside London - about half of the total - had been registered.23 Following the 
outbreak of war, an official and open registration of aliens was conducted by the 
police. 
20 TNA, H045/10629/199699, folder I, Return of Aliens fonn, n.d.; TNA, H045/10629/199699, 
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In order to prevent potential enemies from realising the existence of the unofficial 
register of aliens, it was of the utmost importance that all police enquiries were 
carried out in a confidential and quiet manner. The police did an admirable job, 
with great tact, as is shown by the fact that only two complaints were received 
from nearly 30,000 registrations?4 
In order to add to the value of the registration, in April 1911, Kell asked the police 
to send in quarterly reports, called special aliens returns, on twenty-five or more 
possible suspects from each county selected by MIS. MIS would periodically 
revise these lists and send all amendments to the relevant chief constables. It was 
hoped that this would help to mark down really dangerous individuals and 
uncover the identities of the resident and travelling agents and possibly even the 
centre 	of the German spy organisation in the UK. MIS specified the following 
information as especially valuable in these special aliens reports: 
l. 	 Name in full and description 
2. 	 Occupation and whether the person in question has more money at 
his command than his apparent occupation can bring in. 
3. 	 Where did he come from and what reason does he give for settling 
in this particular locality. 
4. 	 Does he go away to pay visits and, if so, where does he go? Does 
he ever go to Germany? Do people come to stay with him? If so 
who and what are they? A description of his visitors, if any, would 
be useful. 
S. 	 Does he seem to know a great deal about the country round and 
does he appear to take an interest in horses, supplies etc. generally. 
6. 	 Is he of military appearance and does he ever go to Germany for 
periodical military training? 
7. 	 Does he correspond much with Germany? Does he receive 
periodical supplies of foreign money, notes etc? 
8. 	 Photographs and specimens of handwriting are always useful.25 
24 TNA, H045/10629/199699, folder 5, Kell to Troup, regarding progress with the unofficial 

registration of aliens, 11 December 1913. 

25 TNA, KV1!38, pp.18-19. 
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The Schutte case, detailed later in this chapter, provides an example of how the 
special aliens returns unearthed a German spy. The pre-war possible suspect list 
also served as a way of teaching the police about certain aspects of a job that was 
new to all. This was especially so when they tended to think that, if an individual 
appeared respectable and was free from criminal suspicion, he could not be a 
As with the aliens registration, a printed form was used, which elaborated on the 
above, and was given to the police in books of tear out forms with these questions 
numbered on them and on the counterfoil. As a precaution against the possible 
leakage of information in the post, the forms themselves did not include these 
questions, only their numbers, and no name or address, with the individual in 
question being identified by MIS by his own serial number.27 
F Branch also arranged to co-operate with a number of other government 
departments, as well as the police, during the pre-war period. First, there was the 
GPO. Right from the start, it was obvious that the GPO's help would be required 
in order to intercept suspect's mail. Owing to the potential of using wireless 
telegraphy to evade censorship in wartime, it was also essential that wireless 
telegraph stations were controlled. On 23 August 1910 Kell met the Inspector of 
Wireless Telegraphy, who offered his help and gave a list of call stations. This 
enabled the police to be familiarised with the whereabouts of all authorised 
26 TNA, KV1I39, p.l? 

27 TNA, KV1I35, pp.49-50. 
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wireless stations. They needed this information in order to detect any unauthorised 
wireless stations that had been established with hostile intent. Secondly, there 
were the Coastguards. On 30 August 1910 the Admiralty agreed that henceforth 
coastguards should pass on information directly to MI5, rather than via the 
standard official channels. A section regarding a third department has been 
removed from both the F Branch Report and the Summary Report, under section 
5.3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958. This mysterious department may 
conceivably have been the Registrar-General, whose census data would have been 
of obvious use to MI5 in gauging the number of enemy aliens living in the UK. 
Fourth, there were dockyards, arsenals, etc. During the summer of 1911 the 
Admiralty instructed that aliens working in government establishments under the 
Controller of the Navy should be registered. In May 1911, the Admiralty having 
agreed to provide lists of aliens employed in government dockyards, a scheme 
was begun for MI5 to gain lists of aliens engaged in private shipbuilding yards. 
The returns from the Admiralty were registered by MI5 before October 1911. As 
well as the aforementioned, MI5 also co-operated particularly closely with the 
Admiralty, Home Office and Foreign Office before and throughout the First 
World War?8 
F Branch did not take any steps to control dangerous or doubtful individuals 
during peacetime beyond censoring their correspondence. It was deemed 
advisable to leave them alone as much as possible. Nonetheless, arrangements 
28 Ibid., pp.58-60. The police's role is set out in TNA, W032/9098, memorandum on 'The Duties 
offue Police in the Event of War', 30 July 1914. 
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were in place to ensure that whenever action was taken it would be swift and 
effective. In May 1913 all county chief constables were informed that, in case of 
emergency, they would be sent a warning letter including the names of all those in 
their jurisdiction who had been selected for (a) immediate arrest, (b) search, or (c) 
careful watch. Even if there were none in a particular county, the chief constable 
was still sent a warning letter to inform him that the precautionary period was 
being considered and to put the police on alert. In late 1913 similar information 
was passed on to the chief constables of all cities and boroughs containing people 
on the possible suspects list, but not otherwise. The warning letter had been 
approved by the Home Office and the Public Prosecutor, and was sent out on 29­
31 July 1914. Although the warning letter listed the people under a, band c above, 
it did not request immediate action to be taken. Its intention was simply to ensure 
that the police had the information they needed to be ready to act at the shortest 
notice. Arrests and searches were to be conducted immediately upon receiving a 
telegram. The warning letter specified the wording of this telegram and the legal 
authority on which this action was to be taken. Chief constables were also c
-
required to act against anyone under a, b or c above against whom they deemed 
there was sufficient evidence, and to inform MIS ofany action taken. 
These telegrams were sent on the afternoon of 4 August 1914, after Britain's 
ultimatum but prior to the actual declaration of war. As previously indicated, of 
the twenty-two people on the list for immediate arrest, twenty-one were arrested, 
the other, Rimann having left England a few days earlier. Fifty-six suspects were 
searched under b above and many of them were detained and subsequently 
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transferred to military custody as enemy aliens likely to be dangerous. Under c 
above, 155 others were placed under special observation. A number were 
subsequently interned as enemy reservists?9 
MIS's plan for the control of suspects on the outbreak of war was thus based on 
the pre-war policy with the primary objective of paralysing the German espionage 
organisation in case of war with one crushing blow. The Investigative (G) Branch 
was to refrain from arresting known agents whenever it was possible to do so 
without putting national security in immediate danger. The correspondence 
between agents and spies was intercepted, examined and then sent on, as a rule 
without any amendments. By this device, MIS uncovered the whole of Germany's 
existing espionage organisation in the UK and was able, within twenty-four hours 
of the declaration of war, to apprehend virtually all the members of this 
organisation. As already noted, this policy, which was developed by F Branch, 
was so successful that on 21 August 1914, two weeks into the war, the German 
High Command was still unaware ofthe BEF's despatch to France.30 Of course, at 
the time MI5 was not then absolutely certain if these twenty-two spies constituted 
the entire network of German agents in Britain, although this was later shown to 
be the case.3l 
In his memoirs, Edmonds claimed that he had designed this strategy, which 
suggests that MIS's strategy was influenced by those who had worked in counter­
29 TNA, KV1I35, pp.51-57. 
30 Ibid., pp.51-52. 
31 IWM, Kell MSS, Holt-Wilson, 'Security Intelligence in War', p.17. 
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espionage in MOS before Kell was appointed to the newly formed Secret Service 
Bureau: 
I was opposed to the arrest of even undoubted espionage agents: it was 
better to let Germany live in the fool's paradise that we had no counter­
espionage system. This was accepted: the agents were marked down, and 
all but one (on leave) seized on declaration ofwar.32 
The round up began on 3 August 1914, with Albert Celso Rodriguez, who had 
been placed on the special war list in early April 1914. He was charged under 
Section 6 of OSA. He was dealt with under ARO and interned in Portsmouth 
Prison on 11 August 1914.33 
Among others detained were those identified as intermediaries for the German 
Secret Service before the war. August Klunder, a German hairdresser and 
tobacconist in London had been suggested as a contact to Steinhauer by Kronauer 
in January 1912. Arrested on 4 August 1914, Klunder made three voluntary 
statements to the police concerning his links to Reimers, an alias used by 
Steinhauer. However, he did not betray other agents. He was charged with having 
collected certain papers and documents calculated to be, or that could be, of direct 
or indirect use to the enemy. However, he was dealt with under the ARO and 
32 LHCMA, Edmonds MSS, III/5, 'Memoirs', Chapter XX, p.3. In his account of the campaign, 
Generaloberst von Kluck, who commanded Germany's fIrst army in August 1914, revealed his 
total lack ofknowledge about the BEF. He asserted that they would arrive at Boulogne, Calais and 
Dunkerque and their lines of communication would be east-to-west, and therefore easy for him to 
cut. Thus, the BEF's arrival at Mons came as a great surprise to the Germans. A. von Kluck, The 
March on Paris and the Battle of the Marne 1914 (London: Edward Arnold, 1920), pp.lO-45. A 
translated and edited version of von Kluck's Der Marsch auf Paris, und die Marneschlacht 
(Berlin, Germany: Mittler, n.d.) published under the auspices of the cm. 
33 TNA, KV1/41, pp.32-62. 
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detained in Brixton Prison pending deportation, later being moved to Knockaloe 
internment camp on the Isle of Man.34 
Otto Kruger, another German hairdresser, had his correspondence under check 
since November 1911. Observation of Kruger was stopped after he fled to 
Germany in 1912, ostensibly to raise funds for Ireland's defence from his uncle in 
Berlin. He returned to England and, in April 1913, three letters posted in London 
addressed to people at the Hotel Stadt Konigsberg, Potsdam were identified as 
Kruger's work. After some difficulty in finding him, Kruger was eventually 
located by the Police at Abercynon, Wales. At the end of June 1914 his name was 
submitted on the quarterly return of aliens. He had apparently been in that district 
since August 1913. A police report describing Kruger was received on 4 August 
1914, and orders were given that he was to be arrested immediately as a known 
German agent. He was arrested. He was then discharged by order of the Director 
of Public Prosecutions on 13 August and immediately re-arrested and detained 
pending deportation. In December 1916 F 1 allowed his application to be 
repatriated as a POW over forty-five years 01d.35 
I 
·1 
Action was also undertaken against those whose activities had been investigated 
before the war. Frederick Ireland, whose pre-war career has already been noted, 
for example, was re-arrested on 5 August. Sight of him had not been lost after his 
dismissal from the Royal Navy and in June 1914 he was placed on the special war 
list to be searched. A search was conducted on 4 August 1914 and a pocketbook 
34 TNA, KV1I39, pp.86-89. 
35 Ibid., pp.214-234. 
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was discovered, containing an account of the Lee-Enfield magazine rifle and the 
addresses of foreigners living in London. Ireland was arrested by the police and 
detained awaiting orders. He was released by order of the DPP because no new 
incriminating evidence had been uncovered, and it was undesirable to produce 
that which had prompted his arrest in 1912. He was released and kept under 
casual observation, which suggested that his conduct no longer gave rise to 
suspicion.36 
On 6 August 1914 Heinrich Grosse was also re-arrested. Grosse had been released 
from prison on 8 May 1914. Despite MI5's best efforts to frighten him, Grosse 
refused to leave Britain on his liberation from prison. He tried to get work in the 
German Secret Service again. He was placed on the special war list, arrested on 6 
August 1914, imprisoned and subsequently deported in June 1917.37 
As indicated earlier, the case of Heinrich Schutte provides an example of how the 
" 
.t:;" 
-;special aliens returns uncovered a German agent. Schutte, a German subject, had 
settled in Portland in 1900. He had been treated as a possible suspect and seven of 
the special reports on aliens had been furnished on him by the police. It was 
through the registration of aliens that attention was first drawn to the possibility 
that Schutte was a German agent. One of his sons, John, was employed in the 
dockyard in a position to give valuable information, as an assistant storeman for 
the Royal Navy Service Stores at Portland. When, on MI5's suggestion, he was 
offered a transfer to another place, John Schutte resigned from the dockyard rather 
36 Ibid., pp.202-213. 
37 Ibid" pp.180-183. 
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than be moved. In 1913 Schutte applied for naturalization. Although strongly 
supported by local people of standing and the police, at MI5's instance this was 
turned down. In July 1914 Schutte was discovered to be living at Weymouth and 
put on the special war list. On the outbreak of war Schutte was arrested and 
interned at Dorchester. At the same time that Schutte was interned, both his sons' 
premises were searched, but nothing incriminating was found. 38 
One of the twenty-two due to be rounded-up had managed to get away. Walter 
Rimann, a German, worked as a teacher of languages in Hull. In January 1912 the 
check on Steinhauer's correspondence showed that he was corresponding with a 
man writing from Grimsby and Hull. Rimann, who had been placed on the 
possible suspect list in 1911, was placed on the special war list in 1912 for arrest. 
However, when action was to be taken he had already escaped, having left for 
Zeebrugge on 1 August 1914, upon receipt of a wire earlier that day informing 
him that he had not been called up and that money was on the way.39 
According to Bulloch, it was MIS's strategy that the German spy ring in the UK 
should be 'quietly broken, and its members put where they could do no harm'. 
Therefore, the enemy aliens were interned, for deportation later on, rather than 
brought to trial. MI5 desired not to bring them to trial for two reasons. First, 
evidence given in open court would reveal how British counter-espionage worked. 
Secondly, MI5 wanted to keep the Germans in the dark about the fate of their 
espionage network for as long as possible: 
38 Ibid., pp.109-121. 

39 TNA, KV1I40, pp.6-18. 
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Obviously the Germans would try to replace the organization once they 
knew of the British success. The longer that could be delayed, the greater 
the time in which Britain could prepare for war without risk of the enemy 
learning what was being done. 
However, this was revealed just over a month later, when Ernst was tried. Ernst 
had to be tried, because he was a British subject and therefore had the right to trial 
in an ordinary criminal court.40 
The historian David French has challenged this interpretation, commenting that if 
'the government was convinced that they were spies, its subsequent behaviour 
towards them was certainly peculiar'. Only one of the twenty-one rounded-up was 
ever brought to trial. In October 1914 the Home Office issued a statement 
excusing their inaction, saying that to have tried them would have informed the 
Germans how MI5 worked. French feels that this is not a valid excuse, as the 
statement went on to reveal how MI5 worked: namely, by scrutinising foreign 
letters and telegrams. Later writers ignored the fact that there had only been one 
prosecution and argued that the government had not wanted to warn Germany that 
its agents had been caught by bringing them to trial. Yet The Times had printed 
the names of all those caught shortly after they were arrested. This leads French to 
conclude that 'the government did not prosecute because they could not find 
enough evidence to do so' However, to have admitted this, when the public was 
'becoming hysterical' about espionage and calling for tougher action against 
40 Bulloch, MIS, p.70. 
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enemy aliens, 'would only have provided more ammunition for its critics, and 
have damaged public confidence further' .41 
While the public was unaware of the scheme of unofficial aliens registration, it 
was not hard for the police to identify an alien whose name had been given to 
them by MI5, because aliens had not felt that there was any need to try to hide 
their identity. It became much more difficult to identify a suspect during wartime, 
when controls had been constructed, such that spies would take on an assumed 
identity in order to avoid them.42 
On the outbreak of the First World War F Branch's duties were: 
Co-ordination of general policy of Government Departments in dealing 
with Aliens. Registration of Aliens. Foreign Communities. Applications of 
Alien Enemies to leave the United Kingdom. Records of Alien soldiers, 
sailors and police. Records of Alien Enemies permitted to reside in 
Prohibited Areas. Co-ordination of Police methods in dealing with Aliens. 
Questions arising out of the Defence of the Realm Act and Aliens 
Restriction Act. 
Correspondence on the above subjects. Investigations connected with 
technical naval and military questions.~3 
However, with the war only a few weeks old, the volume of such co-ordination 
and administrative work coming in necessitated sub-dividing F Branch into four 
divisions, besides the work that was undertaken by the head of the branch. A fifth 
division was soon formed, comprising an officer who acted as assistant and 
41 D. French, 'Spy Fever in Britain, 1900-1915', The Historical Journal, Vo1.21, No.2 (1978), 

pf..364-365. 

TNA, KV1I35, p.53. 

43 Ibid., p.72. 
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deputy to the head of F Branch. This re-organisation was completed in November 
1914, and then no significant changes were made before 20 May 1915.44 
Part II of DORA was the section that F Branch was particularly concerned with, 
namely regulations constructed to stop people communicating with the enemy and 
gathering information for disloyal purposes, and to protect communications, 
railways, docks and harbours.45 The areas of DORA Part II of most direct interest 
to F Branch can be grouped under five headings: 
(i) Prohibition of acts directly connected with espionage. 
(ii) Safeguarding of means of communication. 
(iii) Protection of defended harbours. 
(iv) Forgery and personation and other subsidiary offences. 
(v) Trial and punishment.46 
The first and fourth of these were the most significant from F Branch's 
perspective. The first in DRR paragraph 18 was the single most important: 
Publication or communication of information, if it is calculated to be or 
might be directly or indirectly useful to the enemy, with respect to the 
movement or disposition of any of the forces, ships or war materials of His 
Majesty or any of His Majesty's Allies, or with respect to the plans of any 
naval or military operations by any such forces, or with respect to any 
works or measures undertaken for or connected with the fortification or 
defence of any place.47 
The fourth was covered under DRR45: 
44 Ibid., pp.72-73. 
45 Ibid., pp.l50-151. 
46 Ibid., p.152. 
47 Ibid., pp.152-153. 
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Forgery or alteration or use of falsified pass or permit with object of 

obtaining information for purpose of communicating it to the enemy, or of 

assisting the enemy, or with intent to do injury to any means of 

communication or to any railway, dock or harbour. Personation with like 

object of anyone to whom a pass or permit has been issued. (The burden of 

proof of innocence of purpose is expressly thrown on the accused).48 

The headings under ii above were dealt with under DRR20, 32 and 33, and those 
under iii by 12, 13,26 and 27. 
The original DORA (Consolidation Stage) was considerably amended and 
enlarged by Orders in Council of 12 August and 17 September 1914. These 
provisions were amalgamated with the original regulations on 14 October in the 
Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Regulations, 1914. As published, the 
DORA (Consolidation Stage) was split into ten groups, rather than six as before, 
as below: 
1. 	 General Regulations. No.1. 
2. 	 Powers of Competent Naval and Military Authorities, etc. Nos.2­
--.I';17. 
3. 	 Provisions respecting the collection and communication of 

information &c. Nos. 18 - 27. 

4. 	 Provisions against injury to railways, military works, &c., Nos. 28, 
29. 
5. 	 Provisions as to arms and explosives. Nos. 30 - 35. 
6. 	 Provisions as to Navigation. Nos. 36 - 39. 
7. 	 Miscellaneous Offences. Nos. 40 - 50. 
8. 	 Powers of Search, Arrest &c. Nos. 51 - 55. 
9. 	 Trial and Punishment of Offences. Nos. 56 - 58. 
10. 	 Supplemental. Nos. 59 - 63.49 
The main amendments that F Branch was involved in were as follows: Number 16 
(later 21) regarding carrier pigeons; 13A (later 54) concerning letter smuggling; 
48 Ibid., p.155. 
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16A (later 22) for wireless telegraph apparatus; 16C (later 24) about new postal 
communications; 21 and 27 (later 27 and 67) regarding the prevention of reports 
liable to spread alarm or disaffection; 24A (later 14) concerning powers of 
imposing personal restrictions on suspects; and 16B (later 23) about the 
prevention of the embarkation of any person suspected of attempting to leave the 
country in order to communicate directly or indirectly with the enemy. 
F Branch's chief duties in relation to the DORA were as follows. Firstly, 
attending inter-departmental committees and conferences to discuss amendments 
to regulations that impacted on MI5. Secondly, military examination of the 
resulting draft Orders in Council. Thirdly, drafting circular letters to be issued by 
the Army Council and public warning notices. Fourth, interpreting the regulations 
for administrative purposes to the relevant authorities. Fifth, examining the 
credentials of applicants for permits to visit protected areas. Sixth, examining 
CMAs proposals to issue restriction or removal orders under DRRI4. 
.... 
....:;: 
The most important of the amendments and additions to the original DORA made 
through the action of F Branch were as follows. DRR9 gave CMAs powers to 
remove part, not just all, of the inhabitants of any area. 18 prohibited the 
collection or attempted collection, recording or eliciting of information on 
whatever subject that could be useful to the enemy. 19 prohibited photographing, 
sketching, etc of things other than military or naval works if it was done with the 
intention of assisting the enemy. 24 prohibited non-postal communication to and 
from the UK, including the suppression of private and unregistered courier 
49 TNA, KV1I36, pp.41-42. 
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services. 45 prohibited tampering with or forging military, naval, or police passes, 
etc, or impersonation of their rightful bearers, for whatever purpose. so 
MI5's role in enforcing DORA should not be exaggerated and needs to be seen in 
the wider context. Hiley has calculated that actions brought by MIS resulted in 
conviction or executive action under DORA in 1,742 cases between 1914 and 
1919. However, this represented only a minute fraction of the action taken under 
emergency legislation. Over 136,000 people were proceeded against in 1916, for 
example.51 The historian, David Englander, places MIS's role in the wider 
context, noting that '[m]ost offences were dealt with locally, by court-martial or 
by the civil power, depending on the gravity of the offence and status of the 
offender'. When espionage, or the influence of a foreign power, was suspected the 
case was passed on to MIS.52 
Although not changed quite so much, the ARA was also re-issued during 
September 1914. The ARA's aim was implicit in its full title: 
An Act to enable His Majesty in time of war or imminent national danger 
or great emergency by Order in Council to impose Restrictions on Aliens 
and make such provisions as appear necessary or expedient for carrying 
such restrictions into effect.53 
50 Ibid., pp.42-60. 

51 Hiley, 'Counter-Espionage and Security in Great Britain during the First World War', p.669. 

See also TNA record class AIRl; TNA, H01441l484/349684; TNA, W032/5553, regarding the 

sistem for the collection of domestic intelligence in the UK. 

5 D. Englander, 'Military Intelligence and the Defence of the Realm: the Surveillance of Soldiers 

and Civilians during the First World War', Bulletin ofthe Society for the Study ofLabour History, 

Vo1.52, No.1 (1987), p.25. 

53 TNA, KVl/35, p.l49. 
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The ARA could impose restrictions for the following purposes, all of which were 
of interest to F Branch. Firstly, it prohibited aliens from landing in the UK, either 
at specific places or generally, and imposed conditions and restrictions on aliens 
arriving or landing at any port in the UK. Secondly, it prohibited aliens from 
embarking in the UK, either at specific places or generally, and imposed 
restrictions and conditions on aliens embarking in the UK. Thirdly, to deport 
aliens from the UK. Fourth, to require aliens to live and remain within specific 
places and districts. Fifth, it prohibited aliens from living or remaining in any 
areas specified in the ARA. Sixth, it required aliens living in the UK to obey such 
provisions over registration, change of residence, travelling, and others as made 
by the ARA. Seventh, to appoint officers to put the ARA into effect, and to confer 
on these officers and the Secretary of State such powers as were required for the 
purposes of the ARA. Eighth, to impose penalties on individuals who aided or 
abetted any contravention of the ARA, and to impose such obligations and 
restrictions on ships masters and all other individuals specified in the Order as 
appeared required to give effect to the ARA. Ninth, it conferred upon such people 
as were specified in the ARA such powers of arrest, detention, search of premises 
or persons, and otherwise, as were set out in the Order, and for any other ancillary 
matters for which it appeared apt to provide in order to give full effect to the 
Order. Tenth, and for any other matters that appeared necessary or expedient for 
national security. 54 
The ARA gave general powers to a Secretary of State or officials acting under his 
authority like aliens officers or registration officers. The action taken under ARO 
S4Ibid., pp.l49-150. 
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B 
Part I, restricting aliens entering or leaving the UK, was the concern of E Branch. 
ARO Part II included nearly all of the key measures to establish a preventive 
system throughout the UK. The main provisions were straightforward, namely to 
create a zone of prohibited areas to cover all of the areas where spies were most 
likely to gather valuable information. The zone developed to form a belt around 
the coast and the Aldershot district. The first was because the enemy's main 
objective was naval information, and the second was the centre of military 
activity. Next, all aliens living in prohibited areas and all enemy aliens wherever 
they lived were made to register with the registration officers (the police) and to 
inform them of any change of address. Enemy aliens were not allowed to enter or 
live in a prohibited area unless they possessed a permit from the police. They 
were also prohibited from travelling more than five miles from their home unless 
they had a local registration officer's permit. Aliens were not allowed to have (a) 
telephones, (b) photographic equipment, or ( c) military or naval maps, charts, or 
handbooks. 55 
The main problem that MI5 faced from the preventive branch's perspective once 
war began was protecting the government's activities against assault by possible 
enemy agents. The solution adopted to this problem was in an array of controls. 
Some of them precluded individuals from carrying or sending uncensored 
communications to the enemy. Others ensured that no individual whose 
credentials were suspect in any way would be granted access to any area of 
military or naval importance or vulnerable point, whether they were inside zones 
of actual operations or not. Vulnerable points and areas included arsenals and 
55 Ibid., pp.l57-164. 
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shipyards, flotilla and fleet bases, munitions factories, ports of embarkation for 
transports, training grounds and experimental stations, strategic railway lines and 
other such places where spies could gather information of use to the enemy, or 
create explosions and incite industrial unrest that would harm the armed forces' 
operations. The measures required to protect these areas against attempted 
espionage or sabotage varied considerably. They ranged from conducting 
investigations at permit offices to check the bona fides of individuals wanting to 
travel to zones of operations abroad, to the employment of soldiers with bayonets 
fixed to guard fortified positions. 
As the war went on, the amount of vulnerable points in the country grew 
considerably, and it eventually became extremely difficult to find any places 
where suspects who could not be interned could live without posing a threat. This 
meant that, as the war progressed, the actions taken early during wartime to 
remove individuals classified as potentially dangerous from vulnerable points 
"'1 ­
c::­
-.;:;became of ever reducing value. The value of personal restrictions on such people, 
regardless of where they lived, increased by a corresponding amount. 
All the action carried out by F Branch, whether administrative or legislative, 
justified itself as an adaptation or extension of the three fundamental preventive 
principles of identification, classification and control. They are illustrated by the 
following passage, which is worth quoting at some length here: 
in order to control the admission of civilians to military, naval and 
munition areas, it is necessary to examine the credentials of applicants for 
permission to enter such areas. In the case of British Subjects of British 
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descent, it may be sufficient, in most cases, to make sure by consulting 
references given by them that their character and history contains nothing 
criminal or sinister, and that their ostensible business is their true one. At 
the same time, it is evidently of vital importance that such persons should 
be able to establish their personal identity and their claim to British 
nationality by means of some document which it would be very difficult to 
forge or to pass from hand to hand. In the case of aliens, or British subjects 
of alien origin or descent, the document of identity acquires, if possible, an 
added importance; and, above all, in every case of application for the grant 
of facilities which might lead to dangerous results, if obtained by persons 
in league with the enemy, it is absolutely essential that the S.LB's central 
Registry of counter espionage information should be consulted before the 
facilities are effectually granted. By means of this consultation, together 
with the facts obtained from references, by personal examination of the 
applicants, and in various ways, (including, if necessary, a special 
investigation by the Detective Branch), the S.LB. will be enabled to 
classify applicants for facilities as (1) dangerous, (2) possibly dangerous, 
and (3) doubtfully or (4) certainly reliable, and the grant of facilities, or 
restrictive action, as the case may be, will follow in accordance with this 
classification. 56 
Personal and physical identification was necessary before an individual could be 
examined and his credentials classified for preventive intelligence purposes. This 
procedure ended when it identified an individual to the extent that he had been 
completely ruled out from impersonating someone else.57 It was one of F 
Branch's roles to persuade the relevant authorities to make sure that a document 
that was as secure against forgery or transfer as possible was possessed by every 
individual who could be legitimately required to have one in the interests of 
national security. This included passports, identity books and permit books. 
Classification generally came next. For the purposes of preventive intelligence in 
war, classification was the procedure that decided whether a particular individual 
was really an ally or an enemy, and then, if an enemy, in what specific ways and 
S6 Ibid., pp.10-14. See also TNA, W0158/981, 'Lecture on Prevention of Leakage oflnforrnation', 
by Lt-Col W. Kirke, May 1916, for an example of the BEF's preventive intelligence principles. 
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to what extent his hostility was liable to result in activity threatening to national 
security.58 There were three particular types of classification for wartime needs. 

Two of them were military and they were assessed by F Branch, while the third 

was civilian and produced by the police and immigration authorities. The civilian 

classification was into "British", "Allied", "Neutral", or "Enemy". However, this 

was unimportant from the preventive aspect, because one of the gravest and most 

subtle problems facing preventive intelligence came from the easy process of 

naturalisation, which provided a cover for the potential betrayer of his adopted 

country. MIS's classification carried this civilian classification two stages further, 

namely those of general military (S.l.) classification, and MI5's sub-classification 

into one or more of the twelve black list classes. The general military (S.l.) 

classification went further than the military classification of aliens as either 

"friendly" or "hostile" and was divided into six classes according to their 

suspected national sympathies:­
'AA': true personal sympathies are believed to be "Absolutely Anglicized", or 

allied and undoubtedly friendly. 

'A': "Anglicized", or allied and friendly. 

'AB': "Anglo-Boche", friendly. 

'BA': doubtful, probably hostile. 

'B': "Boche", and hostile. 

'BB': "Bad Boche", and undoubtedly hostile. 

57 TNA, KV1I35, p.114. 
58 Ibid. 
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An individual classified as "British", "Allied" or "Neutral" could also receive any 
of these six military classifications from AA to BB, depending on where their 
suspected sympathies lay. Anyone classified as BA, B or BB was liable to be 
subjected to some kind of control, like (a) internment for BB or B, (b) close 
restrictions for B or BA, and (c) ordinary restrictions regarding BA. 
The black list classes were only applicable to suspects. However, they could come 
under any of the civilian categories given above. These twelve classes were 
lettered from A to K and had catchwords by which they were easily remembered:­
'A', 'Antecedents': in a civil, police or judicial sense so bad that patriotism may 
not be the dominant factor, and sympathies not incorruptible. 

'B', 'Banished': during the war from or forbidden to enter one or more of the 

Allied States. 

'C', 'Courier': letter carrier, intermediary or auxiliary to enemy agents. 

'D', 'Detained': interned or prevented from leaving an Allied State for security 

intelligence reasons. 

'E', 'Espion': enemy spy or agent engaged in active mischief, (not necessarily 

confined to espionage). 

'F', 'False': or irregular papers of identity or credential. 

'G', 'Guarded': suspected, under special surveillance and not yet otherwise 

classified. 

'H', 'Hawker': hostile by reason of trade or commerce with or for the enemy. 

'1', 'Instigator': of hostile, pacifist, seditious or dangerous propaganda. 

'1', 'Junction': wanted. The person, or information concerning him wanted 

urgently by MI5 or an Allied security intelligence service. 
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'K', 'Kaiser's': man. Enemy officer or official or ex-officer or official.59 
However, just because an individual's name was on the black list was not 
normally enough to enable MIS to decide the kind of control to be imposed on a 
suspect. It needed to know what the suspect was suspected of, in order to decide 
on the appropriate action. 
The decision regarding control rested on this classification.6o The principles of 
information, communication and records, described below, furnished material for 
a person's classification, which was only a preliminary to a decision over the kind 
of control to be employed. This was a system designed by preventive intelligence 
in a narrower sense, as opposed to the broader sense that included counter-action, 
which was an investigative rather than preventive principle. According to a 
narrow definition, control could mean the minimum personal supervision, 
interference with normal life or restriction of liberty by the military or civil power 
that was required for the purpose of military security in war. In a broader sense it 
could mean, as well as personal restrictions, local and general restrictions that 
came under censorship and protection. In this sense, registration offices and 
passport bureaux were also found under the heading of control. 
The principle of examination made up the controls that led to all protection of a 
preventive nature. Such examination posts covered not just MCOs at ports and 
permit and passport offices, but also police stations, hotels and other places where 
S9 Ibid., pp.116-121. 
60 Ibid., p.114. 
I, 
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aliens registered their details, and military civilian posts where people applied for 
war facilities of numerous kinds, like permission to enter special areas, etc. 
Examination posts referred doubtful cases to MI5. The work of checking the bona 
fides of such applicants was one of the duties of F Branch (particularly F 1), apart 
from applications for munitions work (A Branch) and travel (E Branch). 
Preventive protection could be divided into two degrees. Firstly, general or co­
operative protection of relatively large and inhabited regions. Secondly, local or 
technical protection of small vulnerable objects. The first had to be organised by 
MIS because civilian and public assistance was required. Whereas, the decision 
over the need of protection for a given area was not a matter for MI5, but the 
military operations branch.61 
Personal controls could be general or individual. It might be general as applicable 
to every male enemy subject of military age, or individual to a chosen enemy 
alien, or any person of hostile origin and association. Individual controls were 
sub-divided into the two classes of standing war controls and emergency war 
controls, which were all provided by the ARA and DORA. These controls could 
be simplistically classified under five headings. Firstly, personal identification and 
restriction on movement, such as registration and reporting. Secondly, local 
protection, for example trespassing, entering or residing. Thirdly, frontier 
protection, like landing or leaving. Fourth, dangerous articles, for example 
weapons or explosives. Fifth, general controls, such as replies to questions. Many 
of the individual controls above needed a specific order from a CMA or similar 
61 Ibid., pp.98-112. 
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person to be carried out and in many cases the consent of the Army Council, 
which meant F Branch in practice. 62 
It is instructive to examine the combined work of the F (Preventive) and G 
(Investigative) Branches of MI5, in order to see how each aided the other. G 
Branch decided what action to be taken in any individual case, for gathering extra 
information on top of that in MI5' s records, and for choosing the right time to 
arrest the suspected spy once the chain of evidence against him had been 
completed. F Branch provided G Branch with all of the legislative and 
administrative machinery needed for effective counter-action. Thus, if G Branch 
uncovered a hole in the preventive legislation, this was pointed out to F Branch 
with an explanation of the practical needs of the case. F Branch then assumed the 
work of devising changes to the current regulations that would meet these 
requirements; to make sure that the draft amendments were legally flawless as 
well as practically effective (the duty of the legal section); and lastly to get these 
amendments approved by the authorities concerned. F Branch also put forward 
amendments to the more preventive regulations and orders in a like fashion. 
In normal wartime conditions MI5 was responsible for protecting the whole of the 
UK, being the area under civil government and not a part of the fighting zone. 
However, if the UK had become a fighting zone, emergency conditions would 
have been imposed, and the executive part of the preventive work in each area 
affected by the fighting would have moved from the civil authorities co-operating 
with MI5 to the headquarters (HQ) intelligence section of the General Staff of the 
62 Ibid., pp.122-132. 
-
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forces-in-the-field. Outside of the areas affected, MIS would have continued to 
perform its role. In the normal conditions that prevailed, there was no actual 
fighting within the UK - other than the uprising in Dublin in 1916 - except for air 
raids, etc, F Branch's role was to make arrangements for and co-ordinate all such 
action that required the co-operation of the staff of more than one British 
intelligence service, government department, etc. Whereas, action of an 
exclusively military nature came within the province of the Provost-Marshal's 
Department, acting on intelligence provided by the field intelligence branch. 
In theory, possessing a single preventive intelligence organisation to protect all 
government departments, not just the air force, military and naval, but also 
foreign, imperial, colonial, commercial and domestic affairs, against intelligence 
attacks would doubtless have been best. However, MIS, while providing 
information to all, was especially concerned with protecting the War Office, 
Admiralty, Air and Munitions Ministries from enemy espionage, and each of the 
<:­
other government departments was responsible for its own protection.63 -:;::, 
- .. I 
.Ie:"':- r 
I 
MIS and the other new sections of the Directorate of Military Intelligence did not I 
operate on their own. They were strictly hedged about with a circle of 
constitutional safeguards, such as the necessity of obtaining a warrant from the 
Home Secretary before starting to censor the letters and telegrams of an individual 
or of a particular country's postal service. This was true above all of the 
preventive side of the work, because for administrative purposes MIS relied very 
largely on existing civilian departments. Such organisations as the police and the 
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aliens branch (both under the Home Office) were in actual practice almost solely 
charged with the detailed execution of those restrictive measures which MI5 had 
planned for the control of aliens and other special classes whose supervision 
appeared desirable. In the management of these organisations, MI5, and indeed 
the military authorities of whatever kind, had no direct influence at all. The most 
that could be done was to bring pressure to bear on the governing authority (e.g. 
the Home Office) from as many quarters as possible. 
The British system was very different to the Prussian system, for example, where 
the General Staffs wishes would obviously dominate those of any or all other 
government departments that held the opposite view, and where it would have 
been quite possible to create a single military office with the authority to give 
orders to all those involved in work bearing on military security. However, the 
British system had certain advantages over a centralised or Prussian system. 
Firstly, it conserved energy and entailed relatively little duplication of personnel; 
which was vital when locked in a struggle against an enemy with greater 
manpower. Secondly, it reduced the need to improvise new departments. Thirdly, 
provided there was an attitude of close co-operation, there was less chance of 
friction in the British system, between the various departments concerned with 
different parts of national policy toward a particular individual. Notwithstanding, 
the British system faced a disadvantage in co-ordinating the various organisations 
for preventive purposes, and standardising administrative instructions and routine. 
Overall, the British system represented an acceptable and very practical 
63 Ibid., pp.93-98. 
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compromise between the two undesirable extremes of bureaucratic absolutism or 
utter disorganisation. 
Following the suggestion made by a branch of the War Office, that a single 
military authority should be in charge of the administration of the ARA, the head 
of F Branch examined the merits of other possible systems in a memorandum of 
29 December 1915. He responded: 
I do not agree with the suggestion that the entire administration of the 
A.R.O. should have been in military hands, unless it is also suggested that 

the whole Police Force of the country should have been placed under the 

central military control. The proper organisation would have been to form 

a central War Police Staff for the whole country, with control of all Police, 

Special Constables and Aliens (Customs) Officers etc; with a general 

officer in executive command, and ample funds to pay for the necessary 

expansion of personnel. The A.RO. and D.RR could then have been 

administered as one consolidated Defence Code. 

He concluded that since universal registration of aliens had become a routine 
., 
...
...::
.
affair, and the residue of the orders could well be absorbed into the DRR, it was 
--~ 
no use moving in the matter until the Central War Police Staff problem had been 
solved. Thus, 'a miscellaneous assortment of C.M.As. would be far worse police 
chiefs than the present' chief constables. 64 
The work of F Branch, as put down in the official manual IP Book 9, which set 
out the duties of the various branches and sections of MIS, included, in general 
and above all else the policy of measures for preventing espionage; the military 
policy in dealing with police authorities and the civil population, including aliens; 
and the initiation and examination of legislative proposals relating to counter­
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espionage, and of executive schemes and instructions for the application of 
measures for counter-espionage and the control of aliens and undesirable 
persons.65 
For these reasons, F Branch had a legal section during the war, whose primary 
role was to examine legislative drafts and measures for the purposes of counter­
espionage and special intelligence. However, not all legislative drafts and 
measures were preventive; such as the punitive regulations under which spies 
were executed in wartime, or DRRI8A that made it an offence to communicate 
with the enemy. Although such punishments functioned as deterrents, they were 
only used when there was a definite suspicion. Therefore, the task of preparing the 
cases to prosecute for such offences, and other similar regulations, fell to the G 
(Investigative) Branch, not F Branch. Nonetheless, the legal section undertook the 
initiation and examination of these investigative measures. The development of 
these measures also illustrates the co-operation of the F (Preventive) and G 
(Investigative) Branches. 66 
It is useful to examme the constitutional and historical basis for preventive 
legislation. Two perspectives influenced the issue of obtaining emergency powers 
for the executive's use in wartime or an invasion, namely those of international 
law and the British constitution. Obviously, the British Government's duties and 
rights toward its own subjects were no concern of international law. The issue of 
concern was the wartime treatment of (I) aliens in general, and (2) hostile aliens. 
64 Ibid., pp.88-92. 
65 Ibid., p.14. 
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The general consensus from the point of view of international law was that the 
state had a right to enact the following legislation. Firstly, regarding aliens in 
general, they could only be detained to the extent that a national subject could be 
legally detained. They could be tried, and, if found guilty, punished for any crime 
committed in the national territory. They could be deported from, or denied entry, 
to the national territory for cause. Secondly, concerning hostile aliens, they could 
be made subject to special police supervision and regulation, but they could not be 
made prisoners of war unless they committed an offence against the laws of war. 
They could nonetheless be interned if they freely overstayed the time generally 
granted to leave the national territory; the same applied if their conduct or position 
afforded reasons for special treatment, and possibly if they belonged to the 
enemy's armed forces. They could only be deported en bloc in very special cases. 
They could be removed from the theatre of war and areas open to attack. If they 
provided help or information to the enemy, they could be treated as prisoners of 
war, traitors, or spies and punished accordingly. 
Indeed, regulations enacted under DORA and ARA 1914 were constructed largely 
on this basis. The broad principle was that hostile aliens could be interned 
individually or on mass if their being at large posed a real threat to national 
security. However, whatever the law of nations, it did not necessarily follow that 
the British executive actually had these powers from a constitutional perspective. 
Thus, it was extremely important to F Branch to know the exact extent of the 
powers that it could rely on in an emergency. The powers conferred in the first 
66 Ibid., pp.l5-16. 
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version of the DORA in 1914 had been considered in 1888 and subsequently in 
1895, but these measures had never actually been put to parliament before.67 
The internment of enemy subjects did not depend upon statutory powers derived 
from emergency legislation. It formed part of the royal prerogative and the courts 
had no right to challenge it. Internment was the most drastic and useful of all the 
controls. F Branch in particular always pushed for all enemy subjects to be 
interned, on the grounds that, to be exempt, a person born in an enemy country 
should be made to show that not only had he done nothing to help the enemy, but 
that he was really hostile to the country of his birth. Enemy subjects at large were 
viewed as a possible threat to national security. The government accepted the 
principle, in theory, that all doubtful cases should be interned. However, the civil 
authorities tended to interpret this principle in a way that MIS felt was too lenient. 
.. 
Even though a tougher stance was taken towards the end of the war, this situation 
still caused considerable concern even when most male enemy aliens had been 
interned. Contrasted with internment, the less strict provisions of the ARA 
concerning registration and entry into prohibited areas were used on the relatively 
less dangerous remainder of enemy aliens and other aliens, the latter it was felt 
were in many cases no safer than Germans or Austrians. 
From the mass of aliens registered by MIS, a few hundred were picked as possible 
suspects deserving particular attention, because they lived near vulnerable points, 
they had been officers in the German or Austrian armies, or for similar reasons. 
Reports were periodically received from the police about the connections and 
67 Ibid., pp.33-144. 
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activities of these possible suspects, and individuals were added to or removed 
from the list as experience suggested.68 
F Branch also worked with many other preventive organisations outside MI5 
throughout the war. It was F Branch's role, within the limits of its power, to co­
ordinate the activities of all the preventive intelligence organisations and 
government departments. As these departments did not come directly under MI5, 
they could not be given orders, only co-operated with. This included such 
departments as Scotland Yard and the Home Office with its chief constables and 
their police forces; recently created sections of the Directorate of Military 
Intelligence, such as censorship, CMAs, etc; and intermediate functionaries, like 
the Home Office aliens officers. The departments which F Branch relied on for 
support with its preventive work can be divided into three categories: first, parts 
of the Directorate of Military Intelligence; secondly, other military organisations; 
and, thirdly, civilian departments. 
' t:" '~J 
MI5 was responsible for counter-espionage on land in the UK, but once at sea 
such matters were entirely the responsibility of the Naval Intelligence Division 
(NID). However, F Branch worked with the Admiralty in initiating new 
legislation and schemes of control, especially regarding prohibited or special 
military areas or districts that were important from a purely naval perspective. 
Although it often provided useful information on people, and had to be consulted 
about matters concerning the treatment of foreigners, the Foreign Office had little 
to do with the administration of preventive measures in the UK. 
68 Ibid., pp.18-19. 
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Looking at parts of the Directorate of Military Intelligence, some of them were 
solely wartime, and preventive, creations. The Legal and Economic Section (MI6) 
dealt with the traffic in arms, with which MIS was not greatly concerned. By 
contrast, MI7, MI8 and MI9 were powerful preventive weapons. MI7, the Press 
Bureau, supervised foreign journalists employed for propaganda purposes. MI8 
and MI9, the Cable and Postal Censorship sections, were perhaps of greater value 
as preventive organisations than any other single department. A considerable 
number of the amendments to the war legislation were calculated to make it more 
difficult to send or carry correspondence so as to evade this censorship.69 
By late 1914, and up to May 1915, the staff ofF Branch comprised the head of the 
Branch, five other officers and four clerks. The distribution of duties and staff of F 
Branch, which was still then called B Branch, were as follows. F 1, concerned with 
Alien Intelligence, had one officer. Fl 'was responsible for Black Lists. Aliens 
Registration[,] Records of Searches and Removals under Defence Regulations, 
Aliens Statistics and Reports of Alien Convictions, Credentials of Aliens (as 
referred by Government Departments) and all other questions of detail concerning 
aliens except those covered by the duties of F2 and F3. F2 and F3, which were 
involved in the prevention of military and naval espionage respectively, shared a 
single officer between them, Major F. Hall. F2 and F3 'dealt with the credentials 
of aliens serving in or employed by the Army and Navy, with alien resorts 
favoured by Military and Naval personnel, with lists of Vulnerable Points, 
(Military and Naval) and so forth'. 
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F4's duties were special measures for the supervision and control of Belgian 
refugees, the investigation of the credentials of Belgian residents and lists of finns 
employing Belgian workmen, and it comprised two officers; one of whom, a 
Colonel in the Belgian Army, was an attached officer with the position of 
Auditaire Militaire Belge. F5 worked on general F Branch duties, including 
assisting the head of the Branch, and comprised one officer, Major J. Sealy 
Clarke, who went on to become the head of A Branch, and later the head of G 
Branch, whose service with MI5 is set out in Chapter Eight. 70 The distribution of 
staff illustrated that the most pressing concerns in the early part of the war were 
related to the surveillance of Belgian refugees, in whose midst it seemed fair to 
suspect that some enemy agents might have entered into the UK.71 The 
supervision of these Belgian refugees later became part of the work of A 
Branch.72 
In terms of alien control, a number of orders and amendments were introduced to 
the ARA (Consolidation Stage) between the outbreak of war and the end of 1914. 
AR025A was of particular importance to counter-espionage because it forbade 
any change of name. MI5 co-operated with the Registrar-General in the 
compilation of a central register of all Belgian refugees in the UK, which was also 
of real value to MI5. Belgian refugees required a police permit to enter prohibited 
areas and changes of address had to be reported. MI5' s expertise was of 
69 Ibid., pp.78-84. 

70 Ibid., p.74; TNA, KV1I52, p.3. 

11 TNA, KV1I35, pp.74-75. 

72 Ibid., p.75. 
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considerable value in this. The ARA (Consolidation) Order 1914 Part III included 
paragraphs relevant to F Branch in the penalties and restrictions on aliens 
,-;. 
.::1 
-­
breaching the regulations designed to hinder their serving the enemy both directly 
and indirectly, particularly 26, 27,28,29,30 and 33. 
The ARA's powers, mainly originated by F Branch, provided a strong hold over 
enemy aliens and aliens, within whose midst spies were primarily looked for. F 
Branch's work in relation to the ARA after the advent of war rested mostly in 
developing amendments to meet new challenges as they arose, such as the 
following additions. AR022 prohibited the possession of some additional articles 
to the list of dangerous articles that had been prohibited, AR025 provided the 
power to close clubs frequented by enemy aliens, 25A prohibited the change of 
name, and AR027 prohibited passengers refusing to answer questions from aliens 
.. 
officers or giving false statements to them. MI5 had been involved in preparing 
<:-­
.. ­the original list of prohibited areas, and in their expansion. F Branch co-operated 
.
,.­
... 
.­
.,...~ Iwith the Home Office in revising and drafting forms used under the ARA. F .... ­
Branch had the unique role of assessing the bona fides of applicants for permits 
for prohibited areas and other prohibited districts; F Branch obtained the 
necessary information from the records kept by H Branch. The work of providing 
military advice and opinion on the desirability of allowing the exemption of 
enemy aliens from repatriation or internment in particular cases was devolved to F 
Branch.73 
73 TNA, KV1I36, pp.7-37. 
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During the early part of the war, between August and December 1914, F Branch 
was predominantly concerned, in its administrative capacity, with the ARA, rather 
then the DORA. Even the DORA spy regulations only required normal 
investigative action by G Branch, with which F Branch was not immediately 
concerned. Thus, the wholesale internment of enemy aliens under the royal 
prerogative involved primarily the Adjutant General's Directorate and not that of 
Military Operations, which included MI5. This internment of enemy aliens, from 
whom the enemy might recruit potential spies, greatly reduced what F Branch had 
to protect against. The number of alien enemies interned, excluding military or 
naval prisoners, by 1 November 1914 was 17,283; at 1 December it stood at 
18,203 and, by 1 January 1915, this figure had risen to 18,333. This demonstrates 
the degree to which the ARA, initially devised by F Branch, aided it in removing 
potential threats during the opening months of the war. 74 
In October 1914 MI5 found that some counties and boroughs had not forwarded 
any extracts from their aliens register regarding those who had served in any 
I ...... · .... ... 
army, navy or police force. It seemed unlikely that there could be none in these 
.i -- .. 
areas, and MI5 drew the Home Office's attention to this matter and it was 
requested that returns of nil should be returned if this was actually so. 
As previously stated, enemy aliens were prohibited from possessing telephones. 
The policy was not to allow new telephones; however, because aliens could use 
call offices, it was best to leave telephones with those who already possessed them 
and then to tap their conversations. 
74 Ibid., pp.61-69. 
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The US Embassies in London and Berlin had agreed to transmit special printed 
enquiry forms by which means families could obtain information about their 
relatives who were POWs. MI5 realised that this could also possibly provide a 
means of communicating with the enemy. The Home Office passed these forms 
on to MI5 before sending them back, as it was sometimes felt that the information 
sent was possibly a code. 
MIS also impressed upon the GPO the need to issue orders that all telegrams sent 
should bear the sender's name and address on the back, which proposal the GPO 
subsequently enacted. Even though this did not automatically guarantee that the 
name and address were genuine, it still helped to confirm suspicions when a 
telegram was held up and the original sender appeared not to exist. The above 
examples demonstrate the various matters that F Branch had to consider and 
...
r. 
<:: 
legislate for during the first few months of the war. 75 
- '" 
The main changes to the ARA during 1915 were in respect of (1) passports for 
prohibited areas, (2) hotel registration, and (3) the Aliens Restriction (Seamen's) 
Order 1915. 12A was added to the ARA, requiring that all aliens landing or 
embarking in the UK as a passenger had to possess a valid passport, or similar 
document, not more than two years old and, importantly, bearing the alien's 
photograph. Under 18B aliens not already living in prohibited areas were not 
allowed to enter them without a passport. 
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The Aliens Restriction (Belgian Refugees) Order was introduced in late 1914 to 
provide further control over undesirable individuals who had managed to enter the 
UK as Belgian refugees. Its two main provisions were, firstly, that all Belgian 
refugees had to register with the police wherever they were in the UK and report 
all changes of residence and, secondly, that every Belgian refugee entering a 
prohibited area had to obtain a police permit first. A third regulation, introduced 
with the above, provided for a system of hotel and lodging-house registration for 
all visitors, aliens and others, however, aliens were required to provide more 
details than British subjects. 
The Aliens Restriction (Seamen) Order 1915 comprised two sections. Article 1 
provided that no alien seaman or master could land at a port unless he possessed a 
valid passport. Article 2 provided that if a ship stayed at a port for twenty-four 
hours or more, any aliens on the ship were considered to be residing in the area 
(AR019) and were therefore required to register with the police. 
The chief improvements to DORA during 1915 can be split into four groups. 
Firstly, in terms of censorship regulations, 24A strengthened 24 by prohibiting the 
conveying of letters for any other person, thereby stopping letter-carrying. It also 
made secret writing an offence against these regulations. Related to 24A, 22A was 
passed on 10 June 1915, forbidding the possession or use of any code, cipher or 
other method for the secret communication of military or naval information 
without the authority to do so, and guilt was to be assumed unless innocence 
could be proved. The introduction of DRR22B in late 1915, aimed at 
75 Ibid., pp.75-93. 
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accommodation addresses, further strengthened the censorship regulations. 
Anyone whose business was to be paid to receive letters, etc was compelled to 
register his business with the police, and to maintain a register of all the letters 
received that could be inspected by the police. Secondly, espionage regulations. 
During 1915 DRR18 was brought into line with OSA 1911, by changing the 
words 'any other information intended to be communicated to the enemy or' in 
favour of 'any information'. This made it an offence 'to collect, record, publish, 
communicate or attempt to elicit any information of such a nature as to be directly 
or indirectly useful to the enemy' .76 The burden of proof was thrown on to the 
accused, as for OSA 1911. DRR18A was added, making it an offence to 
communicate, or attempt to communicate, with a spy. The term spy was also 
expanded to include 'any person who has committed or attempted to commit an 
offence under Regulation 18, and who is reasonably suspected of having done so 
with the intention of assisting the enemy'. 77 It also encompassed any individual 
outside the UK who was, or was reasonably suspected of being, an individual to 
whom information had been, or attempted to be, passed on to in breach of 
DRR18.78 Thirdly, personal restrictions. DRR14B, one of the most useful 
paragraphs of the DORA, was also introduced in 1915. It applied to people of 
hostile origin or association, who could thereby be interned or otherwise restricted 
at the behest of the Secretary of State. F Branch had a key role in this, because the 
details of all cases for internment under 14B submitted by the CMAs were sent to 
MI5 and dealt with by F3, a new sub-section formed during the summer of 1915. 
Under 14C, added on 30 November 1915, passports became mandatory for all 
76 Ibid., pp.104-112. 
77 Ibid., p.113. 
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passengers leaving or entering the UK, including British subjects. Fourth, 
miscellaneous. DRR41 was improved to counter those wrongly claiming to serve 
in the armed forces. DRR45 made obtaining or abusing military, naval or police 
permits much more difficult. Regulation 51 A conferred powers to JPs, moving on 
information from CMAs, CNAs or the police, to authorise the searching of 
premises and seizure of papers. All of the above alterations to the legislation were 
made on F Branch's recommendation.79 
However, by no means all security measures suggested were eventually adopted. 
Some were turned down as impractical, as the following example demonstrates. 
On 6 August 1915 the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Southern 
Command proposed, in order to guard against enemy spies masquerading as naval 
officers, an order for all naval officers visiting Weymouth or Portland to report to 
.. 
the senior naval officer, who would record this in an arrival report book.80 The 
War Office informed the Admiralty that it was against the idea because of the 
great difficulty in establishing a truly effective system, and the inconvenience that 
it would cause to naval officers. 81 
Generally, lobbying had to be done before a change was accepted, and the 
procedure was broadly as follows. The proposals began on the basis of ideas put 
forward, usually by G Branch, following an event which revealed a weakness in 
the regulations at that time, they would then, in every case, be developed by F 
78 Ibid. 

79 Ibid., pp.l13-117. 

80 TNA, ADMl/8429/221, GOC Southern Command to War Office, 6 August 1915. 

81 Ibid., War Office to Admiralty, 20 September 1915. 
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Branch. When agreement had been reached by the different branches of MIS, the 
draft amendment would be presented to a higher authority, such as the Director, or 
Sub-Director, of Military Intelligence. Having received his assent, the draft would 
be informally, and then officially, discussed with the Home Office or other 
government departments. When the next inter-departmental conference gathered 
to discuss matters raised by MIS, it would decide for or against every different 
point, often adding extra provisions that would have to be added to the draft 
proposals, then every department's approval was needed for the final draft. The 
parliamentary draftsman then examined it and made any alterations that were 
necessary. Only then would the Order in Council be authorised. 82 
By August 1915 F Branch had six officers, one extra compared to late 1914. 
Three female clerks had been taken on, plus the four male clerks who had been 
there in May 1915. F Branch still comprised five sections, but the distribution of 
duties to them had been slightly re-organised. F4, the Belgian section, had 
1::­
widened the scope of its work to cover the supervision of aliens of all ·-;::1 
,,-. ...... 
-".... 
nationalities, no longer just Belgians, employed on munitions or in prohibited 
areas. F5 remained concerned with general preventive branch duties. Back in May 
1915 F2 and F3 had needed only a single officer between them. By August 1915 
F2 combined both the military and naval protective duties that had been allotted to 
F2 and F3 respectively. The work of F1, the aliens section, had been divided up 
between F1 and F3, both involving one officer each. 
82 TNA, KVl/36, pp.117-125. 
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Fl was responsible for black lists; for the central register of aliens, undesirables, 
foreign clubs, resorts and communities; and for records of aliens in government 
service, alien soldiers, sailors, police and other officials in the UK, British 
subjects employed by foreign governments, and foreign embassies and consulates 
and their personnel. It also examined applications for naturalisation, as passed on 
by the Home Office, and assessed the bona fides of those applying for passes, 
passports and permits to enter, leave or travel within the UK in wartime. 
F3 was concerned with civil records regarding aliens, like reports of alien cases 
and convictions and records of searches and removals under DORA, and aliens 
allowed to live in or enter prohibited areas. It also checked proposals for 
internment orders or restrictions under DRR14 and 14B and had responsibility for 
the credentials and records of alien enemies interned or proposed for release or 
exemption from military internment or repatriation. F3' s duties also included the 
collection and upkeep of inforn1ation regarding police personnel and distribution, 
and studying census reports, alien statistics and the distribution of the alien 
population. The work of F Branch in general, and that of the head of the branch, 
remained much the same as beforeY 
During June 1916 an official Army Council letter, drafted by F Branch, drew the 
Home Office's attention to the number of enemy aliens who had up to that point 
been exempt from internment - recent official figures had been 22,249. The Home 
Office created a special commission to consider the situation, and after four 
months it found considerable differences in chief constables actions and that 
183 
CMAs had exhibited differences in policy. The commission prompted a number 
of chief constables to confer with CMAs when they were in doubt, which led to 
the withdrawal of residence permits in some cases that, plus voluntary removals, 
added up to 126 men and 333 women. Twelve of those the commission called 
attention to were interned, four were removed and four others were repatriated. 
The registration of aliens was extended in early 1916. After 14 February all aliens 
(not just enemy aliens) were required to register everywhere, except in London. 
After 7 July all male aliens over eighteen years of French, Russian, Italian or 
Serbian nationality who had been living in London prior to 14 February 1916 also 
had to register with the police. 
Identity books were improved and changes were made to the classes of people 
required to possess them. Aliens working in munitions or desiring to enter the new 
special military areas were added. Whenever possible, aliens were generally 
issued with identity books rather than registration certificates. The police were 
reminded that identity books were not a guarantee of an alien's bona fides, but 
simply a standardised and convenient identification document. Chief constables 
were asked to make sure that the issuing of an identity book was noted on the 
alien's passport. The importance of paying particular attention to photographs in 
identity books was also emphasised. An exception to this rule was made for 
Belgian soldiers on leave in uniform and in possession of an official furlough 
pass. 
83 Ibid., pp.l 02-1 04. 
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After 16 December 1916 all male aliens in the Metropolitan Police district had to 
register. Romanians, Montenegrins, Portuguese and Japanese by 23 December, 
and all other nationalities by 6 January 1917. Henceforth, the only aliens not 
registered were single females who were resident in London prior to 14 January 
1916 and who had not left London after that day. 84 
The new regulation DRR29B had probably the greatest value of any of the 
changes made in 1916, authorising the creation of special military areas. The first 
of these was created on 28 July 1916, when all of Scotland north of the 
Caledonian Canal was designated an area of supreme naval importance. This was 
later followed by the Isle of Sheppey, because of the naval port of Chatham and 
its anti-aircraft defences, and also Newhaven, Harwich and Dover. It was an 
extension of 29 and 29A's provisions for the restriction of admission to camps, 
defence works, munitions factories and other places of military importance. Its 
purpose was the general control of all people entering such a place. 
,. 
~-'-'~~I 
.... ...~ -­
F Branch was also involved in the following three minor amendments to DORA I,
in 1916. Firstly, a paragraph was added to DRR55 to enable fingerprints and 
f 
photographs to be taken of individuals arrested under this regulation. Secondly, f 
DRR27, which forbade the spreading of prejudicial or false statements and acts 
prejudicial to the recruiting, training, discipline or administration of the armed 
forces, in order to check the work of enemy agents and enemy sympathisers, was 
amended to also include films and stage performances of this nature in May 1916. 
Thirdly, for the same purpose, in July, an addition was made to 27 to prohibit 
84 TNA, KV1I38, pp.l28-131. 
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sending reports or making statements intended to undermine public confidence in 
currency or bank notes. 85 
In mid June 1916 F Branch concentrated its structure by abolishing F5, the 
general duties section, and cutting loose F4, the aliens section that would later be 
transferred to the Ministry of Munitions as PMS2 and which would later return to 
MIS as A Branch. F Branch's general branch duties remained much the same, 
except for the inclusion of the new duty of: 
Policy and details associated with the use of Intelligence Passes and 
Permits, Papers of Identity, and other documents purporting to establish 
personal bona-fides for naval and military purposes. 
The work ofF1, F2 and F3 continued much the same as before.86 
By February 1917 two new sub-sections had been created. F4 took on the 
... -.;following duties: ~~ 
--. 
-::.::. ' 
I 
-~t .
Measures for maintaining military registers and records of aliens and .­
others. -~ 
-. 
Statistics relating to aliens, with special reference to enemy aliens at large 

or in prohibited areas, and in H.M. Service. 

Collecting and filing instructions and circulars issued by Government 

Depts. Concerning counter-espionage. 

Intelligence records of Prohibited Areas, Special Military Areas, and 

competent naval and military authorities. 

Liaison duties between F. and H.1., the section now responsible for 

compiling historical records and Black Lists. 

85 TNA, KV1I36, pp.151-154. 
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Some of these duties were new, but others had been undertaken by other parts ofF 
Branch. 
Before its transfer to F Branch, as FS, the legal section had been part ofB Branch 
since October 1914. In February 1917 it had the following duties: 
Examination of legislative drafts and measures for counter-espionage. 
Examination of draft Administrative Instructions arising out of the 
Defence of the Realm Re~ulations. Consultations with Law Officers and 
Draftsmen. Legal Advice.8 
By October 1917 the following duties had been added to F5, mostly from work 
carried out by the head of F Branch: 
Examination of proposals to make, or vary the Administration of 
Prohibited Areas, Special Military Areas, Controlled Photography and 
Dock Areas, and Government Lands. Powers and jurisdiction of 
Competent Military Authorities for Special Intelligence purposes. 
In October 1917 F Branch had the following distribution of duties: 
M.I.S.F. Prevention of Espionage 
F.1. Co-operation with the Civil Authorities regarding Personal 
Credentials of aliens and others. 
F.2. 	 Co-operation with the Naval & Military Authorities 
regarding Personal Credentials of aliens and otherwise. 
F.3. 	 Disposal and supervision of suspects and undesirables, 
otherwise than by prosecution. 
F.4. 	 Records and the classification of measures for the 
prevention of espionage. 
86 Ibid., pp.135-136. 
87 Ibid., pp.160-161. 
187 
, 
F.S. Legal procedure.88 
By early 1917 the preventive system as a whole had achieved its final, definitive 
form. Further changes, although making improvements in detail, did not really 
alter or add to the fundamental system. Nonetheless, F Branch's work did not 
decrease. On the contrary, its administration of ARA and DORA actually 
increased. As time progressed, the growing likelihood of an end to the war 
provided F Branch's head and partiCUlarly the legal section much work in 
developing post-war legislation for the anticipated time of reconstruction and for 
the permanent peacetime protection of the British Empire. This included 
proposals for post-war aliens restriction. During 1917-1918 the frontier controls 
carried out by E Branch were completed, the legislation for this being the work of 
F Branch.89 
The legislative and administrative changes made throughout 1917 were mostly 
concerned with frontier control and the control of aliens on war service. The 
arrival of the German wife of a British subject interned in the Ruhleben district of 
Berlin in March 1917 opened the issue of restricting, in some cases, the return of 
such people to the UK. The Home Office agreed with the proposal that prior to 
granting visas to such individuals, MI5 should be consulted.9o However, some 
relaxations were made for British-born wives of aliens.91 Turning to powers of 
88 Ibid., p.161. 

89 Ibid., pp.l55-156. 

90 Ibid., pp.l64-169. 

91 TNA, H045/10882/343995, folder 1, Kell to Pedder (Home Office), suggesting that it might be 

safe to soften the ARO in the particular case of women of British birth who have become by 

marriage subjects of Britain's allies, 10 July 1917. 
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deportation, the Court of Appeal held that the ARA empowered the Home 
Secretary to deport any alien, even a political refugee.92 
The changes to the legislation and administration of DORA during 1917 can be 
analysed under five sections. Firstly, regulations for local protection. 35C gave the 
Home Secretary powers to unify the police control in certain districts. Under 29C, 
if they were not British-born subjects, or if their father had been at any time the 
subject of an enemy state, ship-owners, brokers, surveyors, etc were forbidden to 
enter ship-building yards unless they had the written permission of the Admiralty 
or the Army Council. Secondly, owing to the increased number of vulnerable 
points, regulations conferring power to impose personal restrictions were 
introduced. It became possible to substitute local restrictions for removal orders 
under DRR14, and other minor changes completed F Branch's powers to impose 
restrictions on individuals. Thirdly, a new regulation, 51 C, offered valuable 
ji 
powers to close and deal with premises where undesirable aliens, or other 
....--. 
c::- ... 
..-..~.1 
.,..-~ .suspects, were known to frequent. Power was given to CMAs, under DRR53, to 
' ........ ­
.. -­
delegate their authority in cases where it was better that they should not carry out 
a specified duty themselves. Fourth, the censorship regulations were strengthened 
in a number ofways. 
As it was not possible to check all outward parcels thoroughly, it was arranged 
that they should only be sent by persons holding permits to do so, and 24C was 
therefore made. 24 B was altered to stop the sending of any prohibited material to 
a neutral or enemy country independent of the need to prove that it was being sent 
92 TNA, KV1I36, p.169. 
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to a hostile person. DRR24 was also amended to stop the censorship being evaded 
by (a) transmission by a privileged bag, and (b) addressing to a country, whose 
post was not censored, to be forwarded to another country, which would normally 
have involved censorship. Two new regulations, 24D and 27B, dealt with the 
export and import of undesirable printed matter respectively. 
Fifth, looking at the espionage regulations, the scope of 18A, which prohibited 
communication with spies, was increased to cover consorting with a spy or 
visiting him at his home. This made it dangerous to make verbal reports to agents. 
It was further amended to encompass the case of someone who was found in the 
UK after having consorted with an enemy agent abroad.93 
MI5 was criticised for not focusing enough on alien friends and British subjects, 
most tellingly by Moylan of the Home Office Aliens Division.94 In October 1917 
<~ 
the War Office informed the Home Office that as there averaged one vulnerable 
point to every seven square miles of the UK, each enemy alien restricted to a 
rradius of only five miles would have access to approximately eleven vulnerable 
... 

points. Therefore, further surveillance and internment were requiredYs Moylan 

found the War Office's evidence of the suspicious activities of aliens residing near 

vulnerable points unconvincing and minuted the following critique: 

93 Ibid., pp.172-179. 

94 Moylan had himself spied for the Home Office during the labour unrest in South Wales of 1910­
1911, keeping Government informed about the public order situation there. Thurlow, The Secret 

State, pp.30-31. 

9S TNA, H045/10881/338498, folder 13, letter from B.B. Cubitt (War Office) to Home Office, 24 

October 1917. 
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Not a single instance of an alien enemy having improperly gained access 

to a vulnerable point is adduced nor apparently can be adduced and it is 

well known to MIS that it is not amongst alien enemies now at large that 

the real danger from enemy agents exists but amongst alien friends and 

British subjects without any German blood, whether whole or half. But 

enemy agents are elusive and hard to find in the mass of British subjects 

and alien friends, while the alien enemy presents a known and easy target 

at which MIS owing to the difficulty and scarceness of the other quarry, 

keep firing away in their natural anxiety to appear always on the qui 

vive.96 

Andrew suggests that in 'one important respect, Moylan's minute was unfair. So 
far from finding the real German agents in Britain "elusive and hard to find", MIS 
tracked them down with great efficiency,.97 It is also apparent that MIS's strategy 
did cover the entire population, including alien friends and British subjects, not 
just enemy aliens. For example, counter-espionage measures like DORA and 
censorship also applied to alien friends and British subjects. Indeed, MIS seems to 
have caught all of the German agents who were either alien friends or British 
subjects. 
"'-
-
. 
,~' 
,;.- .....
... _J,Some time after March 1918 and shortly before the Armistice F4 was abolished 	
.""' ~ ~ &". , .. ' 
~..'­
and FS was re-Iabelled as FL.98 
In March 1918 F Branch's personnel were distributed as set out below: 
Branch Staff: 	 1 G.S.O.2 and 1 

Attached officer. 

2 personal secretaries 

3 branch clerks. 

96 Ibid., memorandum by J.F. Moylan, 10 November 1917. 

97 Andrew, Secret Service, p.182. 

98 TNA, KV1I36, p.161. 
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F .1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 attached officer 
1 personal secretary 
F.2 ................................. 1 attached officer 
1 personal secretary 
F.3 ................... .. ............ 1 attached official 
1 attached officer 
2 personal secretaries. 
F.4 ................................. 1 attached officer 
1 personal secretary 
F.S ... ................ . .... ......... 1 G.S.O.3 
2 law officers 
3 personal secretaries.99 
No completely new ARA or DORA regulations of particular interest to MIS were 
introduced during 1918; just a few small changes. Post-war issues took up much 
ofF Branch's time. By May 1918 the draft for a National Security Bill had been 
prepared; its key points were that it became a penal offence to approach certain 
prohibited places, or to communicate with an enemy spy, trials were to take place 
in camera, and impersonation, forging credentials, harbouring spies, etc were also 
...
....
.. 
-
.. 
.. 
prohibited. ._­
:.... ­
In May 1918 F Branch took part in an inter-departmental conference concerning 
the powers to be given to the Air Ministry under the DORA. MIS was particularly 
interested in the question of the appointment of Competent Air Authorities. The 
UK was divided into areas controlled either by a CMA or CNA and the intrusion I 
of a third authority threatened misunderstanding. A satisfactory solution was 
reached, with the Army Council nominating three members of the Air Council as 
CMAs. 
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During May 1918 the power under DRRI4B, which had been invaluable to F 
Branch, to intern or impose restrictions, was granted to the Chief Secretary for 
Ireland. Other amendments were introduced to deal with dangerous Sinn Fein 
members in Ireland. 
Two further minor amendments of interest to MIS were introduced. DRR43A 
made it an offence for anyone to obstruct, impede or interfere with any member of 
the armed forces carrying out his duties. A new article added to the ARA in 
February 1918 provided that Poles were to be classed as alien friends. The 
available evidence does not explain why Poles were reclassified as alien 
friends. IOO However, it can be speculated with some confidence, that it was part of 
a political strategy to win Polish allegiance for the Entente, which had seen the 
allied powers formally recognise Poland as "an allied belligerent nation" on 3 
June 1917, the French raise a Polish army in June 1917, and British recognition of 
a Polish National Committee in October 1917 in the hope of raising Polish forces 
to continue the war in the east after the evident collapse of the Provisional 
Government in Russia. IOI 
,... 
-:::I 
(.~
-­-~ 
.S-:),
''-jI , 
• I 
":... 
i 
Towards the end of summer 1918 F Branch was involved in a new review of all 
cases of enemy aliens who had up until then been exempted from internment or 
repatriation undertaken by the Aliens Advisory Committee. MIS had finished the 
99 TNA, KV1I35, pp.76-77. 
100 TNA, KVl/36, p.179. 
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reView for Scotland by September. By October the committee had revised 
approximately 3,200 cases; about 300 decisions were for internment, about 220 
were for repatriation, and the other 2,680 people were again discharged to police 
supervision under the ARA. 
Three days prior to the armistice DRR46A, which covered the supervision of 
POWs in camps, was amended to make the regulations regarding helping POWs 
to escape, sending letters for them and parcels to them, etc much stricter. 102 
At its full development, the preventive legislation of DORA comprised some 
sixty-six paragraphs and sub-paragraphs. A considerable number of them did not 
concern MI5, some were only of minor importance, but particular ones were 
intimately bound up with MIS and especially F Branch. MIS shared the 
administration of some of them with other War Office sections, but MIS's role 
was unusual in that it represented the interests of the Directorate of Special 
.-
t:.­
... ;::.~Intelligence (MIS-9) in all DRR. , 
A distinction should be made between the spheres of policy and administration. It 
was MIS's duty, and this was especially F Branch's work, to frame the special 
intelligence measures in general. Thus, it was involved from the policy 
perspective with a number of regulations the administration of which did not 
lOll. Beckett, The Great War 1914-1918 (Harlow: Longman, 2001), pp.129, 133 & 139-140; O. 

Halecki [Trans. M. Gardner & M. Corbridge-Patkaniowska], A History ofPoland (London: J.M. 

Dent & Sons, 1942), pp.223-224. 

102 TNA, KV1I36, pp.179-188. 
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concern MI5. For analytical purposes the DRR can be separated into six divisions, 
as follows: 
A. 	 General or Interpretative Regulations. 
B. 	 Regulations prohibiting espionage and similar activities. 
C. 	 Control Regulations for Purposes concerned with Military 

Operations. 

D. 	 Local Restrictions for Special Intelligence purposes. 
E. 	 Personal Restrictions for Special Intelligence purposes. 
F. 	 Miscellaneous (Preservation ofMorale, etc.) 
MIS was most concerned with: (B) espionage regulations, then (D) local 
restrictions for special intelligence (SI) purposes, and (E) personal restrictions for 
SI purposes.1 03 
! 
·;:t:lRegulations 18, 18A, 19 and 19A prohibited espionage. DRR20 protected 	 .~ 
-.:-' 
telegraph and telephone communications. Regulations 21, 21A, 22, 25, 25A and 

26 related to signalling and other forms of communication. DRR22A, 22B, 24, -. 

. , 
" 
24A and 24B covered the evasion of postal and telegraph censorship. Regulation 
23 provided powers to prevent those suspected of communicating with the enemy 
from embarking at ports. DRR27, 27 A, 27B and 27C regulated the publication of 
reports, information, etc. 104 
DRRI8, 18A and 19 formed a key self-contained set that could be referred to as 
"the spy section", During wartime they assumed the role of OSA 1911, being far 
103 TNA, KVl/38, pp.69-70. 
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more severe. It should be observed that they dealt with the civil spy, who gathers 
and passes on information to the enemy, not the military spy who sneaks through 
the enemy's lines for intelligence covertly or disguised, thus they were counter­
espionage regulations in the fullest sense. DRR18 included three main 
prohibitions against spying: 
1. You are not to collect etc., information of the kind specified. 
2. You are not to collect etc., undefined but dangerous information. 
3 . You are not to have in your possession any document containing 
such information without lawful excuse. 105 
It was irrelevant whether such information was true or false, and its gathering and 
communication could follow an indefinite pattern, such as papers, oral statements, 
etc, therefore there was a very wide potential range for an offence. 18A used a 
very broad definition of a spy, and the onus was placed on the accused to prove 
that he did not realise, and did not have any cause to suspect, that whoever he was 
communicating, or trying to communicate, with was a spy. The definition of " , .... 
communicating was also a very wide one, because if it was proven that a spy's 
name or address or information was found on an individual, or was given to him 
under dubious circumstances, or he was communicating with a spy address, he 
had to prove his innocence despite these circumstances. Lastly, a spy address 
referred to any person, wherever they were, used to receive enemy 
communications. 106 
104 Ibid., pp.71-72. 

lOS TNA, KV1I35, pp.177-178. See also TNA, H045/10890/355539 - CRlMINAL: definition of 

'enemy agent' in the Defence of the Realm Regulations, 1918, regarding the revision ofDRRI8A. 
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Local restrictions for SI purposes were provided by the following DRR, which 
regulated the approach and entry into places of national or military importance. 28 
concerned the penalty on injury to railways, etc. 28A regarding restriction on 
access to railways, Government land, foreshore, docks, etc. 29 about the 
prohibition on approaching defence works, etc. 29A concerned prohibition on 
entering safeguarded factories. 29B regarded prohibition on entering special 
military areas. 29C was about prohibition on certain individuals entering 
shipbuilding yards. 
Personal restrictions for SI purposes were provided by the following DRR, which 
regulated the civil populations movements, and aided F Branch in curtailing the 
potential threat posed by suspicious and undesirable individuals. 14 provided 
power to remove suspects from specified areas. 14B sanctioned imposing 
restrictions on, or the internment of, individuals of hostile origin and associations. 
14C prohibited embarking or landing without a passport. 14D covered restrictions 
on British subjects leaving the UK as crew members of neutral ships. 14E gave 
-. 
-.. 
power to prohibit aliens from going to Ireland. 14F restricted British subjects I 
entering enemy countries. 14G concerned restriction on embarkation at ports in 
the UK. Paragraphs 14 and 14B dealt with inland controls and the others with 
frontier control. Sections 14 and 14B provided the power to place dangerous and 
disaffected individuals under personal restrictions, who were not enemy subjects 
and therefore could not be interned under the royal prerogative. 
DRR14B was a notably powerful preventive measure, because: 
106 TNA, KV 1/35, p.178. 
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Under 14B, the Secretary of State can by order require a person of hostile 
origin or associations to remain in, or proceed to and reside in, any 
specified place, or to comply with any specified directions as to reporting 
to the police, restriction of movement, and otherwise, or to be interned in 
any specified place; provided that, on the recommendation of a C.N. or 
M.A., or of the advisory committee on internment and deportation or of a 
specially appointed committee, it appears to the Secretary of State that in 
view of the person's hostile origin or associations, it is expedient, for 
securing the public safety or the defence of the Realm that he or she shall 
be subjected to the above restrictions and obligations.107 
The CMAs were concerned with recommending people for restriction or 
internment under DRRI4B. However, in practice, following the first two cases, 
the Home Secretary decided only to consider the cases emanating from the CMA 
commanding MI5, Kell. It had proven impossible for the considerable number of 
CMAs, most lacking legal experience, to conduct a uniform system. Indeed, 
during the early stages of the war, MI5 had warned CMAs that recommendations 
under 14B had to be founded on strong evidence and had to be accompanied by ...
... 
written statements from those giving the evidence. However, the 
recommendations of local CMAs directly to the Home Secretary proved 
unsatisfactory, so it was decided that this could only be done by the MI5 officers 
who were also CMAs, including the head of F Branch, in whose branch this work 
fell, as a duty of F3. DRRI4, having power to remove suspects from specified 
areas, was later dealt with in a similar fashion, no order took effect before 
ratification by the Army Council, effectively F Branch. 108 
DRR56, 56A, 57, 57A and 58 regulated the procedure for prosecutions. The most 
important point for MI5 was that trials could take place in camera, which 
107 Ibid., pp.174-175. 
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prevented the enemy from learning which agent had been caught, and protected 
the identity of witnesses and officials whom it was unadvisable to make known. 
The ARA went largely unchanged throughout the war. Its great use was in the 
expanding area over which it was applied. Particular sections of Part II were 
originated by F Branch and proved of notable value to them. Especially those 
regarding hotel and lodging house registration (AR020A), identity books (18B 
and C), aliens employed on munitions work (22A) (later the work of A Branch), 
and change of name of enemy aliens (25A).109 
F Branch performed its duties very successfully in terms of preventing both the 
leakage of information, with little intelligence of any consequence reaching 
Germany, and sabotage, with no acts of sabotage being conducted by German 
agents in the UK. F Branch played a central role in developing and refining the 
ARA and DORA, which Andrew describes as 'a formidable array of 
legislation' .110 Felstead concluded that MI5 had 'a good deal of success' at 
,preventing the leakage of information of real value to the enemy 'if the examples 
"" . 
of the landing of our Expeditionary Force in France, the withdrawal from 
Gallipoli, or the manufacture of Tanks are to be regarded as any criterion' .111 
Holt-Wilson himself examined the value of these preventive measures in a 
lecture: 
108 TNA, KV1I36, pp.175-176. 

109 Ibid., pp.l79-187. 

110 Andrew, Secret Service, p.IS1. 

1lJ Felstead, German Spies at Bay, p.l8. 
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but the efficiency of the Security Service is not to be measured merely by 
the number of spies caught. Allowance has to be made for efficient 
preventive measures, and their effect in producing general 'wind-up' 
amongst the enemy agents. The best test is the level attained by the wages 
paid or offered by the enemy to their agents. 
We know that whereas the normal payment offered to a spy to go and 
work in this country in the early days of the war was £10 to £25 a month, 
and 10/- a page for copies of secret documents, it rose in June 1916 to 
£100 a month, and in 1918 was as high as £180 a month. 
In fact in the last months of the war, a good spy could get any money he 
asked for. The supply of German volunteers had completely dried up. For 
work in France they received less than half those salaries. 112 
F Branch developed the far-sighted and highly successful strategy of keeping 
known German agents under surveillance but not apprehending them until the 
outbreak of war, when a paralysing blow was delivered, which was a very 
important part of MIS's doctrine. It is also widely acknowledged that, in the well-
informed words of Sir George Aston, a senior intelligence officer at the time, 
German agents did not commit 'a single case of sabotage in the United Kingdom' 
during the First World War. ll3 
However, not all channels that conveyed information to Germany were 
completely checked. Sir Edward Troup, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Home 
Office during the First World War, suggested that such 'information as reached 
Germany by secret channels was carried either in the mail bags of neutral 
112 IWM, Kell MSS, Holt-Wilson, 'Security Intelligence in War', p.26. 

113 Aston, Secret Service, p.62. However, some commentators, such as Bulloch, have claimed that 

four ships which sank at British ports during the First World War were victims of sabotage. 

Bulloch, M1.5, pp.92-93 & 184. This may be the case but no definite evidence exists. 

Nevertheless, it seems more likely that they sank because of innocent accidents, probably 

explosions in their magazines caused by unstable ammunition, which can decay and become 

dangerous, particularly bagged cordite. 
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legations which could not be opened, or by the crews of neutral ships who could 
not be excluded' .114 Captain Maurice (later Lord) Hankey, Secretary to the em 
during the war, later reflected that the 'real danger of leakage of important 
information, however, was never checked in Britain or in any other country, 
namely, society gossip'. He recalled a conversation that he had had at the time 
with Lord Kitchener, then Secretary of State for War, who told Hankey that the 
reason he shared so little of his plans with his Cabinet colleagues was because 
they were 'so leaky'. Kitchener added, if 'they will only all divorce their wives I 
will tell them everything' . 115 
114 'hTroup, T. e Home Office, p.241. 
115 Lord Hankey, The Supreme Command, 1914-1918, YoU, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1961), pp.220-221. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: H BRANCH: RECORDS 
It is possible to trace the keeping of records, one of the distinguishing 
characteristics of H Branch, to the first days of MIS. Kell's diary and notes from 
1909 can be taken as the seed from which H Branch grew. In March 1910, six 
months into the life of MIS, Kell was provided with a secretary, who was to 
become MIS's chief clerk, Mr J.R. Westmacott, previously a soldier clerk at the 
War Office, to handle correspondence, file records under the names of suspects 
and begin a card index. I The card index represented the embryo of what became 
the centralised Registry - 'the mainspring of the DEFENCE SECURITY 
INTELLIGENCE BUREAU and the basis of all useful Counter-Espionage work'. 
'The Registry is the essential link between the various duties coming within the 
province of the Defence Security Intelligence Bureau.' The role of linking up can 
be tracked to the beginning, when Kell predicted that, in peacetime, his work 
could be divided into the two main spheres of passive operations and active 
operations, and their inter-dependence owing to a shared reliance on records.2 The 
employment of a secretary was MIS's first growth and it represented the first 
indication of the fledgling H Branch. The main duties of this embryonic H Branch 
at that time were: 
1 TNA, KV1I49, p.IO. This chapter is heavily dependent on material in KVI, since other record 
classes contain almost no references to H Branch. This is probably because H Branch was very 
much an internal branch, servicing MIS's other branches, and did not really have external relations 
with other departments outside MIS. 
2 TNA, KV1I49, pp.lO-ll. 
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(a). The carding and noting of all useful details regarding suspect 
aliens. 
(b). The compilation of particulars regarding handwritings. 
(c). Descriptive reports and photographs of suspected persons. 
(d). The collation of information received. 
(e). The indexing and filing of all information received.3 
It will be recalled that by October 1913 MIS was divided into two main branches. 
A Branch was concerned with investigating espionage and preparations for 
mobilisation. B Branch was responsible for registering aliens, selecting likely 
suspects plus maintaining the special war and other lists, the observer scheme and 
the security of vulnerable points. The first nucleus of the future H Branch can be 
found in a section of B Branch. Within it, Captain Lawrence was responsible for 
intercepted letters, Secretary of State warrants, handwritings and photographs, 
correspondence, and the indexing and carding of information. This was the germ 
of the Registry. Holt-Wilson, however, retained responsibility for the accounts 
and general administration and supervised the records in Lawrence's care.4 
.. 
, 
i 
In January 1914 a personal secretary, Miss D. Bowie, was taken on to work for 
Kell.5 As noted earlier, Captain K.E. Lawrence, late Royal Marines Light Infantry 
(RMLI), had joined MI5 on 31 January 1913 and he retired on 31 March 1914.6 
He was succeeded on 22 April 1914 by Captain, later Lieutenant-Colonel, M.M. 
3 TNA, KV1I63, pp.6-7. Collation is a specialist intelligence term, which can be defined as the 
putting together of intelligence from different sources and agencies as a preparation for analysis. 
TNA, KV1I49, pp.l8-19. 
5 TNA, KV1I63, p.9. 
6 TNA, KV1I59, p.3. 
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Haldane, late Royal Scots, who had occasionally assisted MIS while working at 
the War Office.7 In the words of Bulloch the fact that Captain Haldane, a cousin 
of Lord Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, 'was another recruit' provided 'a 
sure sign that the young department was officially accepted, and that the value of 
the work being done was recognized,.8 
In terms of operational procedure it is instructive to outline the system of filing 
and indexing employed before the First World War. The method of filing and 
indexing at that time was basically the one that was still being used at the end of 
the First World War. Indeed, no definite change of principle was found necessary, 
'except that the filing of papers under the heading of the official from whom 
correspondence originated, specially divided into subjects, had been abandoned 
for the filing under subjects sub-divided by the office of origin or county 
concerned' .9 
The principle by which papers were filed was that only one file should be created 
for a particular person and that every paper concerning him or her should be filed 
there, including excerpts from papers mentioning him that had to be placed in 
other files. The guiding principle behind these personal files was that all 
documents received should, if practicable, be placed in the personal file of some 
person; if this could not be done, whenever possible, all documents were then put 
into one of the official files. The official files corresponded practically to the place 
card index, because each one concerned a particular government or police office 
7 TNA, KV1I49, pp.19 & 25. 
8 Bulloch, MI.5, p.20. 
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sub-divided into different sub-divisions. Papers that did not belong, in either a 
personal or official file, were homed in the subject files which were, thus, at that 
time, the least important of the files maintained. All the correspondence that was 
received was recorded in a schedule book, which noted 'the date of receipt or 
dispatch of any communication; its serial number; the office from which it 
emanated or to which it was addressed; the subject of the communication and the 
action taken together with a note as to by whom the paper was "put away'''. All 
the names of people or organisations mentioned in a report were indexed in the 
general card index and 'the subjects connected with the report were recorded, 
either on the index sheet kept in each subject-file or cross-indexed by means of a 
subject-card-index' .!O 
Changes were introduced after the outbreak of the war, because this system that 
had been sufficient in peacetime was unable to meet wartime demands. 
Censorship and other wartime measures were in operation, and the need for 
quicker communications with other government departments necessitated some 
changes.!! As the work increased the subject files promptly increased in 
importance, and the official files eventually became 'little more than bundles of 
index sheets containing cross references to papers which were either in personal 
or subject files, that is to say that with greater experience it was found that if a 
9 TNA, KVl/49, p.20. 
10 Ibid., pp.20-21. TNA record class KV2 contains a number of personal files from the First World 
War. The two remaining subject files from the First World War are: TNA, KV311, 'COUNTER 
ESPIONAGE LAWS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES: other nations' laws regarding the offence of 
espionage, 1908-1918', 1905-1918; & TNA, KV3/2, 'INVISIBLE INK AND SECRET 
WRITING: frrst volume on World War 1 secret writing', 1917-1919. 
11 TNA, KV1I49, p.23. 
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paper could not be "put away" into a personal file the next best place was to try a 
subject file' .12 
H Branch also kept an index known as the special card index, which recorded the 
names of all aliens or individuals of alien origin reported by the police under the 
census scheme. The cards were ordered by their serial number. Whenever a chief 
constable notified MIS of the presence of a new alien a card was opened on which 
seven leading particulars were noted, if possible, and then filed in the special card 
index under the name of the police district from whence the report had originated. 
MIS assigned the card a serial number, which number was then passed on to the 
chief constable concerned, who recorded it in his register of resident aliens. \3 
Shortly after the outbreak of war the amount of papers became so great that one 
schedule book only was no longer enough. Work was considerably delayed by 
having to make entries in the schedule book and it was also necessary to open a 
second and then, in November 1914, a third schedule book, making a schedule 
book for each of MIS's branches. However, this process was soon shown to be 
inadequate and, because it was often impossible to put papers into the file where 
they belonged, all kinds of papers floated around the office and there was the 
prospect of their being mislaid. 14 A system ofjackets, or J.P. (Intelligence Police) 
covers as they were officially known, was instituted: 
Each cover contained spaces for recording its own contents; its 
movements; the action taken upon it and its ultimate disposal, as well as a 
12 Ibid. 

13 Ibid., pp.23-24. 

14 Ibid., p.24. 
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space for minuting between Branches. These covers enabled action to be 
taken on any document received and for the whole of the correspondence 
involved in that particular transaction being kept together with a record of 
everything that had taken place, in a unified form. When the papers were 
eventually filed the front page of the cover was put away in a special box. 
When the paper was first put into this cover a brief record was kept in the 
Registrar's schedule book in order that if necessary papers might be traced 
firstly, by their own number, secondl~, by the date of receipt or dispatch, 
or by the office number of the sender. 5 
In late 1914 the Bureau Central Interallie (BCI) was set up in Paris - the British 
section being the Mission Anglaise - 'to exchange information between the allies 
in regard to suspected persons and all other matters dealt with in the Directorate of 
Special Intelligence' .16 Following the institution of the BCI, in September 1915 
MI5 chose to standardise the ways of circulating names, to observe the same 
methods that had been drafted by Holt-Wilson and chosen for the central office in 
Paris. It was also decided that a more intelligible system of organising the details 
known about an individual should be instituted. Therefore, Captain W. Maxwell 
was recalled from his post as press censor at Gallipoli to serve as an attached 
officer with MI5. Maxwell's main task was to produce the MI5 black list, which 
developed to twenty-one consecutive volumes containing 13,524 entries.17 The 
system used was broadly to give the suspect's real name and aliases, followed by 
an identifying number, which was the serial number of his entry on the black list. 
Next came letters indicating the categories of suspicion held against him, such as 
E (Espion) if he was suspected of espionage, or F (False) if he was suspected of 
using false or forged identity papers. These were followed by letters denoting the 
countries where the information came from, A stood for Anglais, B for Belgian, F 
IS Ibid., p.2S. 

16 Hiley, 'Counter-Espionage and Security in Great Britain during the First World War', p.649; 

TNA, INF4/9, p.43. 
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for French and so on. Then the particulars that could not change were given, like 
date of birth, age, personal appearance and such. After that the general details of 
the reasons for suspicion were provided as simply as possible, distinguishing 
between things that were proven or probable and those which were only 
allegations. 18 
Black list entries were quite detailed, as the following example demonstrates: 
LAMBERT, OLYMPE FANNY CHARLOTTE, nee GUILLOT or 
QUILLOT or NUILLET. 
(F.) 11091 
Class-AEJ. Source-AF. 
10 Ap 18, whereabouts uncertain. French, born 6 Feb 1879 Meteren, Nord. 
Father, Jules GUILLOT or QUILLOT or NUILLET. Mother, Octavie nee 
LAGACHE. Widow of Francois LAMBERT. Domiciled 29 rue de Bourg, 
Lausanne. Before war lived Lille, kept a dairy with her mother. Was 
interned Holzminden until July 1916, was then sent Switzerland as 
repatriee. Went Lyons, states had stationery shop there, was there Aug 
1917, was expelled and sent into department of Allier, has crossed Swiss 
frontier several times, is reported to have escaped surveillance Mar 1918 
and is believed to have gone to Switzerland to join her lover Maurice 
BOURGEOIS at 29 rue de Bourg, Lausanne. Photograph with M.I.5, War 
Office, ports and controls. Possibly identical with LAMBERT (see 984) 
whose description corresponds with hers. 
Speaks English and Flemish fluently. 
A.- 31 Mar 13, for fraud, sentenced Tribunal of Douai 10 months' 
imprisonment. 6 Sept 16, for fraud, sentenced Tribunal of St. Julien 
en Genevois, 6 months' imprisonment. 
E.- lO Ap 18, repatriated from Holzminden where she was mistress of 
camp Kommandant; is now mistress of Maurice BOURGEOIS, 
French, born 25 May 1896, Paris, formerly interned Holzminden, 
now in Switzerland; is also in relations with one VULLIEND, 
French, born 27 Oct 1889, mistress of MAUZACQ, French, born 
27 Nov 1892, Bordeaux, formerly interned Limburg, now in 
Switzerland, and JERLY, born 25 May 1876, Pont la Ville, 
17 TNA, KV1I49, p.55. 
18 Ibid., pp.55-56. 
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Fribourg, living 29 rue de Bourg, Lausanne; all above persons 
lodge with JERL Y and are accomplices of LAMBERT. 21 May 18, 
was expelled from Lyons where she made constant efforts to get 
into relations with French and British officers; was arrested 21 Jan 
18 crossing French-Swiss frontier without passport; is considered 
dangerous. 
J.- 11 Sept 18, signalled British ports and authorities concerned for 
arrest. 
(19 Sept 18. Reference M.I.S/T.C. 1438.)19 
To someone familiar with the black list classes, already set out in Chapter Four, 
this informed them that: Olympe Lambert was a spy (E for Espion), with a 
criminal record (A for Antecedents), and a wanted person (J for Junction wanted). 
At first the black list had a very limited circulation, as only eight copies of the 
first volume were distributed. This grew rapidly and, at the end of the war, 115 
copies of the black list were issued to British officers at home and abroad. Only a 
single copy was ever given to a foreign official, and this was restricted to volumes 
1-3, which were issued to Colonel Van Deman, head of the US General Staffs 
intelligence department, by Lieutenant-Colonel Claude Dansey, whose service 
with MIS is set out in Chapter Six, when he went to Washington accompanying 
Balfour's mission?O Following the USA's declaration of war against Germany, 
Arthur Balfour, then Foreign Secretary, led a diplomatic mission to the USA, 
arriving in Washington for top-level talks on 22 April 1917. Balfour's twenty-five 
19 TNA, KV1I61, "'H" Branch Report. Organisation and Administration. Vol. VII. Annexures. 

(Books.) No 30. M.I.S. B.L. - Volume XIV (October 1918)', p.62. 

20 TNA, KV1I49, p.S6. 
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strong team included the recently promoted Lieutenant-Colonel Dansey 
representing the intelligence services.21 
The black list was MI5's primary official notification regarding suspect 
individuals.22 It was meant to comprise the names of those about whom suspicion 
was credible. However, 'unfortunately, owing to a certain indiscriminate use of 
the authority exercised by branch officers, the black list became much overloaded 
with names of persons who should not have been on it'. Therefore, it was strongly 
recommended that in future the right to add an individual to the black list should 
be restricted to the director and branch heads, or officers specially chosen for this 
role. When subordinate officers wished to place an individual on the black list, 
they should suggest this to the relevant official who would choose whether he 
belonged on the black list or just the warning circular.23 
However, the black list was not a full record of the available information by any 
. : .)
means. While working on the re-organisation of the duties of the Special 
Intelligence Mission in Rome Haldane and his assistant, Miss Matheson, 
concluded that the working of the military controls abroad would be made much 
simpler if an index of all known black lists and suspect circulars could be 
produced. This led to the production of a special intelligence index. It comprised 
the names of every individual contained in the MI5 black list, the BCI List, the 
Belgian Calipan des Signales, the Eastern Mediterranean Black List, the China 
21 A. Read & D. Fisher, Colonel Z: the Secret Life of a Master of Spies (London: Hodder & 

Stoughton, 1984), pp.98-99. 

22 TNA, KV1I49, p.56. 

23 Ibid., p.57. 
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Command List, the Contre Espionage Index Part II issued by GHQ France, and 
certain parts of the War Trade Black List. Nonetheless, it was not meant to be a 
basis for any action: it was simply a list that referred the reader to documents that 
he possessed or to information that he could request, which would permit him to 
assess what needed to be done. It had a wide circulation and was shown to be 'one 
of the most valuable productions issued by any of the Allies during the War' .24 
To give an example of the use of the list, Emil Brugman, a Dutch chemical 
engineer, had visited England on business and then returned to Holland in October 
1915. In November 1915 the Bel list reported to MIS that Brugman associated 
with German agents and was also said to be passing contraband rubber into 
Germany. In March 1916 an Mllc agent, agent "T", reported that Brugman was 
coming to England?S On 9 May 1916 an agent "R", a British agent acting as a 
double agent in Holland, reported that he had accidentally seen Brugman in 
London. Brugman was arrested on 10 May 1916. Owing to insufficient evidence 
for trial, because there was no direct evidence against him, Brugman was deported 
to Holland on 15 July 1916.26 
On mobilisation MIS did not have any messengers at all. Letters were taken to the 
War Office and other offices by the MIS officers who often went there. This was 
unsatisfactory, so arrangements were made for the Brigade of Guards to provide a 
staff of orderlies.27 However, they were fully employed with outside messages, 
24 Ibid., p.S8. 
25 TNA, KV1I43, pp.101-102. 
26 Ibid., pp.1 02-1 OS, 
27 TNA, KV1I49, p.40. 
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and some arrangements had to be made for the internal transit of papers, because 
it was considered wasteful to use the clerical staff for this. Accordingly, boy 
scouts were engaged from 29 October 1914 to 4 September 1915. However, boys 
were 'found to be very troublesome'. 'The considerable periods of inactivity 
which fell to their share usually resulted in their getting into mischief.' Therefore, 
when the Admiralty began to employ boys as coast watchers, these boys 'were 
advised to take up this work; outdoor work being much more fitted to their 
energy,.28 
The boy scouts were then replaced with girl guides 'and the results were most 
satisfactory'. 'The girls proved more amenable and their methods of getting into 
mischief were on the whole less distressing to those who had to deal with them 
than were those of the boys.' A Miss Roubaud looked after the girl guides for a 
considerable time. Following her departure for Paris, she was succeeded by a Miss 
Enid Balance. When she was urgently needed elsewhere, on 23 January 1917, 
Miss A.D. Campbell Tiley, a captain of a troop of girl guides took charge. She 
remained in charge of the girl guides until 21 October 1918, when she resigned 
due to ill health. She was succeeded by one Miss Evelyn Erskine Hill, who stayed 
until 1 November 1919.29 
The orderlies provided by the Brigade of Guards continued to work as outdoor 
messengers for a long time, although a number of changes were made so as to 
meet the need for extra soldiers to serve in the field. The following example 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., p.4l. 
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shows the high calibre of these men chosen from the Brigade of Guards. In his 
Most Secret War, Professor R.V. Jones, Britain's Assistant Director Intelligence 
(Science) during the Second World War, mentioned that his father, a career 
soldier and sergeant in the Grenadier Guards, who was recommended for the 
Victoria Cross at Neuve Chapelle in March 1915 and then seriously wounded at 
Festubert in May 1915, after spending about a year convalescing, Jones became a 
guard at MI5 headquarters, then a drill sergeant at Aldershot.3o Once the 
Guardsmen were withdrawn, they were replaced with men from a labour 
battalion. When they were then removed, their places were filled by discharged 
soldiers engaged as War Office messengers.3l There does not seem to have been 
any form of vetting procedure. 
Soon after the outbreak of war it became clear that a substantial addition to the 
staff would be required and further reform in the way that papers were handled. 
Therefore, MI5 decided to appoint a man who had experience of registry work. 
Thus, MI5 approached Mr Pedley, who was in charge of a department within the 
War Office, who responded that his staff was so busy that it was not possible to 
spare anyone to help MI5. MI5 sought assistance in the commercial world and 
Kell acquired, from a friend in business, the name of a man seeking employment 
whom he felt was qualified to register correspondence. Mr A.G. Brown joined 
MI5 but he only survived a week. 'The system already employed proved itself too 
much for his comprehension and he left declaring that he had never been in a 
place where things were in such a muddle.' Mr Campbell of the Foreign Office 
30 R.V. Jones, Most Secret War (London: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1998), pA. 
31 TNA, KV1I49, ppA1-42. 
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recommended a Miss Lily Steuart, as a trustworthy individual looking for 
Government employment. Captain Haldane interviewed Miss Steuart at the 
Foreign Office and she was taken on to be the head of the Registry that was to be 
set up. On 4 November 1914 Miss Steuart and two or three others were placed in 
a back room in Watergate House with all of the index cards and files, constituting 
the germ of the Registry. 32 
The need for more staff was soon felt. According to the author West the pattern 
for MIS's recruitment policy was set in the early years when Kell personally 
interviewed all candidates himself. Kell maintained very high standards of 
reliability for his staff, which tended to mean that his officers and secretarial staff 
were drawn from his social circle, typically having a military and county 
background. This policy has been attacked as arrogant and snobbish, 'but actually 
its basis was financial'. 'His officers were appallingly badly paid and the 
secretaries fared even worse.' Therefore, as a matter of simple expediency, Kell 
was compelled to employ those of independent means, who could afford to take 
such relatively low salaries.33 Moreover, during wartime, in order to save 
manpower for active service at the front, MIS was not permitted to recruit officers 
who were medically fit for general service, apart from in exceptional 
circumstances. It was also to employ female rather than male clerks whenever 
possible.34 
32 Ibid., pp.34-35. 

33 West, MI5, p.36. 

34 TNA, KV1I54, "'H" Branch Report. Organisation and Administration. Annexures. (Books.) 

No.23. Duties of"H" Branch (Dec. 1917). I-P. Book 12', pp.6 & 8. 
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With the need to expand rapidly, however, MIS first turned to an organisation in 
Grosvenor Gardens, London under Miss Beaves. However, applications came in 
rather slowly. Therefore, Miss C. Spurgeon, of the professorial staff at Bedford 
College, was asked if she could recommend any ladies from there, and Miss 
Lilian Clapham, of the Labour Department of the Board of Trade, also agreed to 
look for suitable people. A certain number were forthcoming. However, it was 
necessary to look further a-field, and, following the advice of Miss M.E. Haldane, 
Miss Will's secretarial bureau in Victoria Street, London was approached.35 
As the staff grew affairs started to get progressively better. However, it was felt 
that, despite all of her qualifications, Miss Steuart 'did not possess that of 
managing a large staff satisfactorily, and she was accordingly transferred to M.1.9. 
at which she did excellent work in the CODE Branch'. She was succeeded on 20 
February 1915 by Miss E.A. Lomax, who also brought Miss E.L. Harrison with 
her.36 On 1 January 1918 Miss Lomax was awarded an MBE. Then, on 1 January 
1920, she was also awarded an OBE, and Miss Harrison was awarded an MBE. 
Miss Harrison and four other ladies were mentioned in The London Gazette of 2 
September 1918, and a further ten ladies were mentioned on 18 August 1919.37 
Some time after her arrival Miss Lomax was asked what she thought the 
maximum number of staff needed in the Registry would be and she concluded that 
fifteen would probably be enough. This was passed in about two months.38 
35 TNA, KV1I49, Ibid., pp.3S-36. 
36 Ibid., p.36. 

37 TNA, KVIISO, '''H'' Branch Report. Organisation and Administration. Vol. II. First Supplement. 

Report on Women's Work', 1921, p.S6. 
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Due to a lack of accommodation it was not possible to find enough room to 
employ an adequate staff in the Registry. Therefore, a night shift was introduced 
and the daytime staff was split into two shifts. The first shift worked from 9am to 
5pm, the second shift worked from 2pm to IOpm, when the night shift came on 
and worked until 7am the next moming.39 The night shift was expensive and 
inconvenient and it was abandoned shortly after the move to Charles Street, as the 
more spacious accommodation allowed the night staff to be added to the daytime 
staff. However, two day shifts were maintained, partially as many of the executive 
staff continued working past normal hours and also because the greater quiet in 
the evenings allowed that shift to process much more routine work, which had 
proven prone to interruption in normal working hours.4o It was decided that 
something more than the normal shorthand typist was required. Therefore, MIS 
sought to employ well-educated ladies and preferred those who had attended the 
larger public schools or colleges. The salary was not good enough to attract many 
university graduates, and the majority hailed from the bigger public schools. In 
early 1915 MI5 chose not to engage ladies older than forty, because the system 
used in the Registry 'threw a very considerable strain on those whose minds were 
not elastic enough to adapt themselves to new methods'. Within a year this limit 
was lowered to thirty, apart from very exceptional cases. This age limit helped in 
recruiting a teachable and adaptable workforce. However, it had the disadvantage 
that 'comparatively few women of the world were engaged'; and when recruiting 
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38 TNA, KV1I49, p.36. 
39 Ibid., pp.36-37. 
40 Ibid., p.37. 
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a staff to compile the black list and write historical records, it was decided to 
abandon the age limit and to recruit, rather than reject, more mature candidates.41 
In the distribution of duties for 5 August 1914 the administrative duties were 
directed by B Branch. As part of B Branch Captain Haldane worked on duties at 
the War Office.42 As noted earlier, on 1 October 1914 MI5 was reorganised and 
the H Branch, known as C Branch at that time, was born. Its duties were 'records, 
personnel, administration and port control'. The growth of MI5' s workload had 
necessitated the creation of a registration branch, separate from the Preventive (B) 
Branch. Captain Haldane, who had been in charge of some of B Branch's duties, 
became the head of the new branch under which these duties had become 
grouped.43 
From late 1914 onwards, H grew to be far larger than any other branch contained 
entirely within the bureau itself. H Branch soon began to divide itself into 
sections, and inside one week of its formation its distribution of duties and staff 
had developed considerably. Throughout November 1914 and the beginning of 
1915 H Branch was divided into four sub-sections.44 By February 1915 H Branch 
(known as C Branch until 11 August 1915) had divided into the following four 
sub-sections. C 1 dealt with general office procedures and with the male clerical 
establishment together with orderlies and messengers. C2 was responsible for 
recording the transit of registered papers. C3 was responsible for the receipt, 
41 Ibid., pp.37-38. For more on MIS's female staff, see Proctor, Female Intelligence, pp.S3-73. 

42 TNA, KV1I49, p.26. 

43 Ibid., p.28. 

44 Ibid. 
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registration and distribution of documents. C4 recorded documents passing 
between the bureau and the War Office.45 By May 1915 a fifth sub-section had 
been formed to provide legal advice, in the charge ofW.H. Moresby as its section 
officer.46 Kell's cousin Walter Moresby, 'the barrister son of Admiral John 
Moresby', had joined MIS on 9 October 1914 as its legal adviser. 47 The Registry's 
Transit Division was born on 31 May 1915.48 
On 11 August 1915 C Branch changed its designation to H Branch by which time 
a sixth section, H6, had been added to deal with work at the War Office.49 In the 
distribution of duties to sections, HI drafted official War Office letters, compiled 
MIS's historical records, and had custody of official War Office documents. H2 
handled the registration and transit of documents, indexing, filing and custody of 
MIS's correspondence records, and was custodian of official War Office 
documents under instruction from C 1 (W ar Office). H3 was responsible for the 
receipt of correspondence, providing and maintaining office premises and 
-. 
equipment, and the interior economy of MI5. H4 controlled office procedure, =·i 
issued office instructions, and undertook printing, and estimates, accounts and 
payments. H5 provided legal advice, and prepared draft bills, orders and 
regulations. H6 conducted work at the War Office.5o 
45 Ibid., pp.28-30. 

46 TNA, KV1I52, pp.6-8. 

47 Andrew, Secret Service, p.59; TNA, KV1I59, p.4; IWM, Kell MSS, Lady Kell, 'Secret Well 

Kept', p.IIO. 

48 TNA, KV1I52, p.8. 

49 TNA, KV1I49, p.32. 

50 TNA, KV1I52, pp.24-25. 
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At that time H Branch had sixty-seven members of staff, including eight officers 
and fifty-nine other staff; comprising one assistant director as head of the branch, 
seven section officers (including Miss Lomax of H2, who was also superintendent 
of the card room), nine clerical staff, also one deputy superintendent (Miss 
Harrison) and forty-six other staff in the card room, and one assistant 
superintendent (Miss A. Bliss) and two other staff in the Transit Section. 5 I 
In May 1915 a new branch, E Branch, was formed for the control of ports and 
frontiers. Although controlled by E Branch, this system was administered by H 
Branch.52 Thus, H Branch assumed the complete administration of MIS's four 
branches.53 On 18 December 1915 a seventh sub-section, H7, was added to 
distribute information and prepare records. 54 H7 had four section officers and six 
clerical staff. 55 
.....Since its new designation as H in August 1915, H Branch continued to grow, not 
::.just into sections but also these into sub-sections, such that by the end of the war ....:, , 
designations like H6c or H7d could be seen, each performing distinctive duties.56 
By February 1916 the detailed duties of H7 were the circulation of useful 
information to all counter-espionage organisations of the British and Allied 
armies, maintaining MIS's black list and its accompanying special card index, 
51 Ibid., pp.21-23 . 
52 TNA, KV1/49, pp.32-33. 
53 TNA, KV1I63, p.15. 
54 TNA, KV1I49, pp.33-34. 
55 Ibid., p.34. 
56 Ibid., p.43. 
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compiling the monthly report of MIS's work, and the preparation of precis and 
summaries for record or circulation. 57 
H7 underwent some changes in May 1916, and the inter-working of the E and H 
Branches is illustrated by office instruction number 192 of 19 May 1916, signed 
by Major Haldane. Information concerning counter-espionage was to be 
distributed by E Branch or H7 as follows. E Branch was to circulate information 
needed by the controls under MIS's orders or directly associated with it. While H7 
was tasked to communicate information to Allied counter-espionage services and 
other organisations. 58 
In June 1916 MIS produced the first book of office instructions (LP. Book 9), 
which set out the distribution of duties of MIS and its branches. HI produced 
historical reports and statistics; compiled, held and issued the black list; examined 
newspapers and prepared extracts; summarised and made precis of documents; 
produced and distributed records of important decisions; and, compiled and issued 
counter-espionage reports from abroad. H2 handled the registration and transit of 
documents; indexed, filed and had custody of documents; temporary 
custodianship of documents possessed by other departments; and, destroyed 
obsolete documents. H3 received and distributed correspondence; issued money; 
and, maintained and held the service records of MIS's staff. H4 was responsible 
for estimates; accounts; and, contracts. H5 handled legal questions. H6 conducted 
interviews at the War Office; and, work at the War Office. H7 dealt with MIS's 
57 Ibid., pp.43-44. 
58 Ibid., pp.44-46. 
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interior economy; allocated rooms; stationery; furniture and office equipment; 
and, despatched correspondence. 59 
H Branch also carried out other editorial work. In the summer of 1916 the volume 
of material collected through the working of the ARA was put into an intelligible 
format.6o Captain Maxwell's section (H7 and later HI) also wrote up MIS's 
monthly reports. This had been neglected from mobilisation until April 1915, 
when Mr Nathan produced a report. 61 Robert Nathan was a former Chief 
Commissioner of the Dacca District of India, who had recently retired from the 
Indian Civil Service after twenty-six years and been appointed Vice-Chancellor of 
Calcutta University.62 He joined MIS on 4 November 1914 and left on 29 
February 1916, to work for the India Office monitoring Indian seditionists in the 
USA.63 Reports were subsequently produced every month. They were first edited 
by Mr R.E.A. Elliot, then by Captain Maxwell and, lastly, by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Jervis: 
They gave a very good history of the principal cases dealt with by the 
Service during the War and still more so of the legislation for which the 
office was responsible. With the exception of the statistical tables, which 
are of the greatest value, they do not contain very much of interest as 
regards the administrative working of the Bureau.64 
59 Ibid., pp.46-48. 

60 Ibid., p.60. 

61 Ibid. 

62 Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence, pp.219-220. 

63 TNA, KV1/59, p.4; Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence, p.248. 

64 TNA, KV1I49, p.60. See TNA, KV1I51, "'H" Branch Report. Organisation and Administration. 

Second Supplement. Vol. III. Copy of a Monthly Report (June 1918)'. 
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HI compiled or edited all reference books produced by MIS, like the ''Notes on 
the German Espionage Methods" and the "Port Officers' Guide".65 
In July 1916 the duties of H7 were taken over by H1.66 In August 1916 H6 was 
expanded considerably to become a secretarial section, having an officer from 
each branch on attachment. The secretarial section was formed to make sure that 
War Office documents were handled speedily by the relevant branch or branches; 
miscellaneous questions were fielded within a decent time; and, telephone 
requests for information, papers, etc were noted and passed on to the branch 
involved to respond. The officers seconded were at the disposal of their branch 
heads. Their special duties were drafting official letters on standard lines 
according to War Office procedure, and following the branch heads' instructions; 
replying to requests for information on issues related to the branch's work; and, 
taking charge of War Office documents in temporary custody of the branch.67 
Office instruction 236d of 14 September 1916 set out the re-formation ofH7 with 
new duties. All matters of interior economy, stationery and office equipment were 
to be handled by H7, to whom all requisitions were to be sent. H7 was also 
responsible for 'the despatch of correspondence and all questions relating to men 
clerks, orderlies, lift attendants, charwomen and cleaners, as well as with the 
arrangement and supervision of messing'. The staff comprised one officer, Major 
G. Pepper, and three clerks, Mr Westmacott, Mr C.G. Riley and Miss D. 
6S TNA, KV1I49, p.61. 

66 Ibid., p.48. 

67 Ibid., pp.48-49. 
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Westmacott.68 In December 1916 H Branch had 134 staff, comprising eighteen 
officers and 116 other staff. 69 
MIS's distribution of duties for February 1917 showed some changes in the work 
of H Branch. The main difference was the attachment of H Branch officers to 
MIS's branches in agreement with the branches affected. The legal work 
undertaken by H Branch was transferred to F Branch, becoming F5, and H5 was 
disbanded.70 HI assumed the additional duties of compiling and issuing counter­
espionage reports from abroad; and, printing indexes and lists of those of interest 
to MI5. H2's duties remained as they had done in June 1916. H3 took on special 
censorship. H4 added the duties of pay and allowances that did not arise from the 
Royal Warrant for Pay and Allowance Regulations. H6 continued with the same 
duties as before. H7 added the duties of catering; travel expenses; and, allowances 
and pay questions that arose from the Allowance Regulations and Royal Warrant 
for Pay.71 .... 
1-
.. 
,." 
Slight modifications occurred in September 1917, when H5 was recreated to deal 
with the control, selection and discipline of all women employed on executive and 
clerical duties as well as general control of the work of the Registry and branch 
clerical staffs. 72 
68 Ibid., pp.49-50. 

69 TNA, KV1I52, pp.46-50. 

70 TNA, KV1I49, pp.63-64. 

71 Ibid., pp.64-66. 

72 Ibid., p.66. 
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The head of H Branch also became the adjutant to the Director Intelligence Police 
(DIP), and the duties of sections HI to H7 were re-arranged as follows. HI and 
H2 continued to perform the same duties that they had done in February 1917. H3 
dealt with office premises, equipment, stores and supplies, stationery, telephones, 
passes and keys; interior economy, duty rosters, catering, cleaning, waste paper, 
posts, receipt of documents, address books, motor cars, laundry; male clerks, 
orderlies, menials, car drivers; and, girl guides. H4's duties showed no change 
from February 1917. H5 performed the duties set out above. H6 had the same 
duties as in February 1917. H7's duties were cash, laboratory, office routine, 
correspondence, office instructions, circular memoranda, advisory committee; 
instructional courses; returns; officers, agents, military ports police, telephonists; 
and, records of service.73 
By October 1917 H Branch had 164 members of staff, including eighteen officers 
-....and 146 other staff. The head of the branch was assisted by one other member of 
staff. HI had eight officers and twelve other staff. H2 comprised two officers and 
112 other staff. H3 included three officers and three other staff. H4 was made up 
of one officer and two other staff. H5 comprised one officer and two other staff. 
H6 had one officer and one other member of staff. H7 was made up of one officer 
and three other staff. H Branch also included seven printers and three telephone 
operators.74 
73 Ibid., pp.66-67. 
74 TNA, KV1I52, pp.59-64. 
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. 
From 21 January 1918 H Branch was further enlarged to ten sections, and the 
duties of the three new sections were as follows. H8 compiled counter-espionage 
black lists; and, produced printed indexes and lists of individuals of interest to 
MIS. H9 was responsible for printing; and, compiling the grey list. HID dealt with 
action in cases of seditious speeches in the UK; and, the collection of infonnation 
concerning pacifist organisations and propaganda.75 
In February 1918 H7 was relieved of the duty of 'Maintenance and custody of all 
records of service, other than those of women actually serving', which was 
transferred to H4. H4 also gained the duties of 'Preparation of Office Gazette', 
and 'Preparations of Lists of staff for Office use' .76 
In March 1918 H8 was divided into the following three sub-sections. H8a 
compiled MIS's black list. H8b produced the military intelligence index, which 
comprised the names of all those mentioned in the Allied black lists. H8c prepared 
and compiled I.P. Forms 94c, 95c and 96c. It was considered vital that these 
identity forms should be processed uniformly, so H8c was made the only 
authority for handling them from that point on.77 
In May 1918 HI0's duties were taken over by F4, and HI0 ceased to exist.78 
7S TNA, KV1I49, pp.72-74. 

76 Ibid., p.75. 

77 Ibid. 

78 Ibid. 
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In September 1918 H7 was divided, as set out below. HTs general duties were 
office routine; correspondence; preparing office instructions and circular 
memoranda; officer personnel; compiling minutes of MIS's weekly conference; 
preparing lists and books for MIS's use; and, administration related to Special 
Intelligence Missions in Allied countries. The distribution of specific duties to 
sub-sections was as follows. H7a handled photography; and, MIS's laboratory 
work. H7b conducted interviews at the War Office; and, work at the War Office. 
H7c was tasked with printing; and, the grey list.79 
By this late stage in the war Lieutenant-Colonel Gunn was in charge of H7. Miss 
Dallas was in charge of H7a, Major Peebles was in charge of H7b, and Captain 
H.S. Gladstone and Captain Duguid were in charge ofH7c.8o H Branch ran MIS's 
own printing press. It was begun by Mr Riley, who purchased a small "Arab" 
machine plus some second-hand type, which enabled him to perform minor 
printing jobs for MIS. This worked so well that MIS decided to acquire more 
equipment and engage professional printers. Consequently, Misses M. and G. 
Ewen were engaged and the personnel was increased. The extra accommodation 
provided by the annexe allowed further growth to take place. Captain Gladstone 
was placed in charge of the printing press, the staff was increased, and a Lanston 
Monotype outfit was brought. 'The press grew until the printing staff comprised 4 
men, 8 women and 2 girls, working 2 Lanston Monotype outfits, 2 Cylinder 
machines and 2 small platen machines.' MIS's printing press not only did much 
79 Ibid., pp.75-76. 

80 Ibid., p.76. 
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work for MIS, but also for other sections of the intelligence directorate and 
govenunent departments that needed emergency printing undertaken.81 
The figures presented in a table showing the statistics for papers dealt with to the 
end of 1918 demonstrate the amount of work that was done by H Branch. The 
total number of papers registered and unregistered to 31 December 1918 was 
383,346, 67,445 files were made and 358,964 letters were posted.82 Similarly, 
Andrew notes that by 'the spring of 1917 MI5's Central Registry contained 
250,000 cards and 27,000 personal files on its chief suspects kept up to date by 
130 women clerks' Y 
The H Branch Report urged that 'It is most essential that on a future mobilisation 
both H.l. and H.6. should be among the first sections to be created': 
Had the machinery existed at the beginning for producing black lists, for 
writing up periodical reports of the work of the Service and for the 
weeding out of the useless from the useful files, much time and labour 
would have been saved; the records would have been kept to more 
manageable dimensions, and the search for names mentioned in new 
papers would have been greatly facilitated. As it is, the enormous bulk of 
the personal files will entail work for a very long time before any end can 
be reached in the process of elimination and the consolidation of useful 
material. Much has been done, but far more yet remains to be done.84 
The H Branch Report closed with a section on notes and lessons. Firstly, with 
respect to 'Lists of personnel', 'Complete lists showing the composition of the 
various branches and sections, should be issued at definite intervals', and notable 
81 Ibid., p.88. 

82 TNA, KVlISO, pp.57-58. 

83 Andrew, Secret Service, pp.174-17S. 

84 TNA, KV1I49, pp.84-8S. 
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changes should be embodied in a circular memoranda, so as to keep all concerned 
informed of these changes as they occur. Any re-organisation of duty should also 
be notified in this way. Secondly, in terms of 'Movements of personnel' , records 
of the monthly returns of the staff are useful, and something like an office gazette 
should be produced every month. Thirdly, under 'Preparation before war', it was 
recommended, 'At the beginning of a war, people are as a rule too much occupied 
with the urgent matters of the moment to attend to the necessary routine; but it 
should not be overlooked or the omission will sooner or later be regretted.' 
Therefore, an adequate staff to maintain returns of individuals and distribution of 
duties is necessary from the very beginning. 'Even if current work in other 
directions is falling behind, it is sheer folly to neglect the details of administration; 
and the remedy is to be sought not in cutting down the administrative branches but 
in re-inforcing the executive branches with new recruits.' Fourth, it was 
considered that 'Time after mobilisation' was very important. Clearly the first few 
months after mobilisation would always be a period of considerable 
disorganisation and almost disorder, and although officers would have their 
specific duties allotted to them the enormous influx of work necessitated almost 
everyone lending a hand. This was particularly the case with regard to the 
enquiries which arose from the innumerable letters which came pouring in from 
every kind of source, regarding persons suspected of being German agents. 
Probably the worst month of all in this regard was November 1914.85 
85 Ibid., pp.90-92. 
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The system was, however, not above criticism. Thurlow's colourfully expressed 
assessment is fairly typical of those who have criticised what he calls 'the 
infamous Registry of MIS': 
the file index of unchecked information, gossip, rumour and innuendo 
which was collected by British counter-intelligence and which originally 
related to aliens but extended to so-called subversives in the latter stages 
of the First World War. The list was to prove invaluable to the authorities 
during the roundup and internment of aliens in 1915. It was to ensure a 
meal ticket for Kell until he was sacked as director-general of MIS in 
1940, and gave employment to an ever expanding number of upper class 
female clerks, or 'queens', as they became jocularly known, in what was 
to become the hub of British counter-intelligence. 86 
Thurlow did not cite the sources upon which his criticisms were based, which 
makes it more difficult to judge their accuracy. This problem is compounded 
because too few examples of the material stored in MIS's Registry have survived 
to allow any meaningful analysis of its contents. Furthermore, it should also be 
acknowledged that it was the Registry's role to store all the information that was 
passed on to it, even that which seemed frankly laughable, just in case it might 
turn out to have relevance in future. Thus, the Registry may have retained some 
quite ludicrous reports. As MacDonogh, DMI during the First World War, 
explained in a lecture the intelligence department's results were produced by: 
hard work, great diligence, and untiring watchfulness, and the painstaking 
collection and collation of every possible form of information. Nothing is 
too small to be unworthy of the attention of the I.D., and no problem too 
big for it. Even the most unlikely rumours should be forwarded by 
intelligence agents to Headquarters, for it is there alone that their worth 
can be apprised. 87 
86 Thurlow, The Secret State, pA2. 

87 MacDonogh, 'Military Intelligence and Incidents Connected Therewith During the War', p.404. 
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In tenns of the checks on the quality of the infonnation stored by the Registry it 
can be noted, as Chapter Three has shown, that the evidence MIS provided for spy 
trials had to stand up to proper scrutiny in court and court martial proceedings. 
Therefore, the pertinent question is not really of the quality of the information 
stored in the Registry, but of how well this information was analysed and 
assessed. Was the true information correctly sifted from the false? Then other 
questions of how well this information was managed arise, such as, was it then 
stored and indexed so as to be easily retrievable for use and cross-referencing with 
other information, for example? 
Infonnation scientists, Alistair Black and Rodney Brunt, present another 
seemingly more fruitful and objective way of jUdging the information stored by 
MIS by analysing the quality of the information management procedures practised 
by MIS. By comparison to Thurlow, Black and Brunt conclude that: 
Established in 1909, MI5 was immediately faced with the huge task of 
organising the mass of disparate information which its investigations 
generated. In response to problems thrown up by both the period of 
international tension which preceded the First World War and the war 
itself, MIS developed a relatively efficient, labour-intensive information 
management infrastructure. 88 
This provides an instructive example of MI5' s readiness to acknowledge problems 
with its performance, proactively implement changes to overcome them and 
successfully improve effectiveness. 
88 A. Black & R. Brunt, 'MI5, 1909-1945: an information management perspective', Journal of 
Information SCience, Vo1.26, No.3 (2000), p.185. See also A. Black & R. Brunt, 'Information 
Management in Business, Libraries and British Military Intelligence: Towards a History of 
Information Management', The Journal of Documentation, Vo1.55, No.4 (September 1999); A. 
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The Registry functioned very much as the heart of MIS, enabling it to fulfil its 
role as the central clearing-house for all counter-espionage information. 
Infonnation was perceived as the life-blood of counter-espionage work and the 
Registry was the essential artery which ensured that it circulated between the 
different branches, which were all united by a shared reliance on information. 
Indeed, the great volume of infonnation about undesirable aliens stored in the 
Registry, which could be used to monitor the activities of Russians and their 
supporters in Britain, plus the expertise MIS had shown as an efficient clearing­
house for infonnation may well have been the keys to MIS's survival after the 
war, when it assumed the role of defence security intelligence and checking the 
spread of Bolshevism within the military. 
.. 
.. ­
Black & R. Brunt, 'Infonnation Management in MI5 Before the Age of the Computer', 
Intelligence and National Security, Vo1.16, No.2 (Summer 2001). 
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CHAPTER SIX: E BRANCH: PORTS AND 

TRAVELLERS 

E Branch did not have any antecedents prior to the First World War: its history 
begins on 5 August 1914, when an attempt was immediately made to prevent 
undesirable aliens from entering or leaving the UK, with the issue of the ARA. 
Alien enemies were prohibited from entering or leaving the UK without a Home 
Office permit and no alien passengers were allowed to go in or out of the country 
apart from specified approved ports. 1 Other ports were declared prohibited? All 
passenger traffic was soon restricted to the approved ports because the shipping 
finns found that it was not profitable to keep the services at other ports open just 
for British subjects. Under the ARA, a Home Office aliens officer, responsible to 
.t 
the Home Office's Aliens Branch, was appointed at every approved port to 
supervise passenger traffic, and authorised to stop any suspicious individuals 
embarking or landing. Passengers were also supervised by customs and police 
officers.3 
1 TNA, KV1I20, '''E'' Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. Vol. 1',1921, p.23. 

2 Bird, The Control ofEnemy Alien Civilians in Great Britain 1914-18, p.263. 

3 TNA, KV1I20, pp.23-24. See also TNA, H045/10732/255987, folder 231, Home Office note, 

which outlines the role of the Home Office Aliens Branch, 27 June 1917; Bird, The Control of 

Enemy Alien Civilians in Great Britain 1914-18, pp.263-279. 
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In reality, the control exercised by the aliens officers at the ports in September 
1914 was rather superficial.4 Felstead notes that at the outbreak of war: 
But there was no ready-made system for dealing with the large numbers of 
neutrals who carne through our ports, and it was primarily owing to this 
cause that Germany was enabled to send many spies to this country, 
usually in the guise of a commercial traveller of South American or Dutch 
origin. We had no means of sifting the harmless trader from the German 
agent who came spying under the cloak of commerce.5 
In September 1914 an agent was sent to Folkestone to inform MIS ofthe measures 
affected by police and aliens officers. Passports were not stamped, 'and there was 
practically no check whatever on passengers going in or out'. 6 This system of 
control had three inherent defects. Firstly, the Home Office aliens officers were 
not in contact with MIS. Secondly, they were not trained in counter-espionage 
work. Thirdly, owing to the considerable number of travellers, there was 
insufficient time for a thorough examination at the ports.7 
In MIS's reorganisation of 1 October 1914 the newly created C Branch's, later re­
labelled H, duties included port control.s MIS sent Mr W Rolph and Mr Haag to 
Folkestone to keep a watching brief over Belgian refugees crossing from Ostend 
to Folkestone and to report suspicious cases. At that time, it was H Branch's duty 
to deal with their reports and circulate warnings about suspects.9 By November 
1914 these port control duties had been assumed by F Branch. 10 
4 TNA, KV1I20, p.24. 

S Felstead, German Spies at Bay, p.ll. 

6 TNA, KV1I20, p.24. 

7 Ibid., pp.24-25. 

8 TNA, KV1I49, p.9. 
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In the winter of 1914-1915 MI5 became concerned about the particularly serious 
danger posed by Belgian and French people, mainly women, travelling from the 
invaded territory via Holland and England to visit relatives serving in the Allied 
armed forces and then going back to their homes behind enemy lines. I I For 
example, in response to a request from a Vice Consul, Mr Farmer, for a German 
governess, Marie Geugenbach, to be allowed to travel from Boulogne to Flushing 
via Folkestone, the Home Office robustly replied on 1 September 1914 that 'there 
appears to be no reason why the United Kingdom should be used as a means of 
transit from France to Germany of a German subject as to whom nothing is 
known'.12 It was felt that this traffic provided a good chance for the Germans to 
acquire intelligence. 13 In order to ensure that urgent intelligence carried by this 
route would arrive too late for it to be of great use to the Germans, a temporary 
arrangement was introduced that all passengers travelling from France to Holland 
would be delayed in the UK for a short time. 14 Another means of control was 
introduced which still operates even today. From New Year's Day 1915 passports 
became compulsory for those travelling from France or Holland to the UK: 
From this small beginning there was developed that world-wide system of 
consular control, which was afterwards strengthened by the appointment 
of Military Control Officers throughout Europe and the United States of 
America. 15 
9 Ibid., pp.30-31. 
10 TNA, KV1I20, p.l3; TNA, KV1I52, pA. 
11 Le Queux, German Spies in England, pp.198-199, also voiced this concern. . 
12 TNA, H0162/28, p.lO, Home Office to Under-Secretary of State at the ForeIgn Office, 1 
September 1914. 
13 TNA, KV1I20, p.25. 
14 Ibid., p.26. 
IS Ibid. 
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In light of these experiences, Field Marshal Sir John French, Commander-in-Chief 
of the BEF, proposed a conference between the British, French and Belgian 
services to co-ordinate and improve means for combating espionage, particularly 
'to ensure that every possible suspect was thoroughly searched at one place on the 
through journey, instead of partially at several,.16 On 4 January 1915 an inter-
allied conference met at Boulogne to discuss what could be done to stop 
undesirables entering into Northern France, particularly the areas under military 
occupation. 17 The conference decided upon a number of measures that were 
brought into effect on 1 March 1915. They included appointing British agents to 
help a specially formed control staff at French channel ports, French agents at the 
ports of call in England, and regulations to make Red Cross organizations 
responsible for the bona fides of their members working in the Army Zone.18 A 
tighter control over passengers between England and France was introduced. All 
travellers from England to France required a French consular visa, a police visa 
was necessary for all travellers from France to England, and letter carrying 
between the two countries was prohibited. 19 In order to strengthen the French 
consular control of passengers from England, which had proven unsatisfactory, an 
officer representing the counter-espionage section ofthe French General Staff was 
attached to the consular staff in London. This indirectly led to the formation of the 
British Military Permit Office next to the French Consulate General in Bedford 
Square, London.2o 
16 TNA, W032/4892, Field Marshal Sir John French to Secretary, War Office, 24 December 1914. 

17 TNA, KV1I20, pp.26-27. 

\8 Ibid., p.27. 

19 Ibid. 
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At the beginning of March 1915 the control of the aliens officers over passengers 
from France and Holland to the UK was supplemented with the control of the 
consular authorities. In the opposite direction, a French consular visa was required 
for passengers from England to France; however, there was no increase in the 
aliens officers control on travellers from England to Holland, save for the brief 
delay put on those in transit from France. Apart from the agents who had been 
sent to aid the control staff at French channel ports, there was no British military 
control over passengers, and on other routes, apart from those to Holland and 
France, the aliens officers maintained their role as the sole control authorities.21 
On 3 March the Home Office Permit Office (HOP 0) was opened in London to 
issue permits for travellers to Holland. Between March 1915 and February 1919 
the HOPOs, except for the zone of the armies in France, handled 228,234 
applications for permits, of which 224,187 were granted and 4,047 refused.22 
By March 1915 ways to provide a better control over both inward and outward 
'--. 
•traffic had been being considered for some time.23 In May 1915, owing to the 
experience gained by the investigative branch, a senior MI5G officer conducted a 
tour of the principal ports. The decision was then reached to post permanent 
representatives of MIS to assist and advise the aliens officers at the approved 
20 Ibid., pp.27-28. 
21 Ibid., p.28. 

22 TNA, H045/10774!276355, folder 229, 'Report on the Organisation & Working of the Home 

Office Permit Offices for the Control of Passenger Traffic from Great Britain during the War', 

Appendix 15, Table 6: Summary, n.d. See also TNA, H045!10773/276355, folder 59, 

memorandum regarding 'Principles Regulating the Issue of Permits', July 1915. There was also a 

Foreign Office Passport Office (FOPO), concerned with the first issue of passports to British 

SUbjects. Its function in the system of control was to make sure of the bona fides of British subjects 

applying for passports. TNA, KV 1120, pp.88-96. 

2 Ibid., p.29. 
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ports, where 'shortage of staff and the lack of time and accommodation combined 
to make the control ineffective,.24 
The wartime control of the UK's frontiers as a way of defending against the 
attacks of the enemy's intelligence service was theoretically the Preventive (F) 
Branch's concern. But this vital work needed so large an organisation that it was 
considered necessary to form a distinct branch to focus on the policy and 
administration of the control of ports and frontiers.25 This new branch was 
labelled MI5E and formed as a separate branch to F Branch in May 1915, its 
duties were: 
Military policy connected with the control of civilian passenger traffic to 
and from the United Kinfdom. Passes and permits for the Zone des 
Armees. Port Intelligence? 
The measures instituted to control passengers and seamen leaving or entering the 
. :1 
UK and civilians wishing to enter the Army Zone were, firstly, appointing MCOs 
to assist and advise aliens officers at approved ports and, secondly, the 
establishment of permit offices to issue permits and passports. It was the role of E 
Branch to supervise the MCOs and the Military Permit Office. E Branch was also 
involved with the drafting and administration of the regulations regarding tlle 
Military Permit Office, the control of passengers and seamen at the ports, plus 
developing and extending the permit office system in the UK and overseas. 
24 Ibid. 
2S Ibid., p.13. 
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It should be noted that the control of civilians travelling to the Army Zones, which 
was handled by the Military Permit Office, differed from the normal frontier 
control. The Military Permit Office functioned as the London bureau of the 
intelligence sections of the General Staffs in the various Army Zones. The 
Commanders in the Army Zones obviously held the final say about the admission 
of civilians into the areas occupied by their troops, and in theory it was the role of 
the Military Permit Office to transmit particulars about applicants for Army Zone 
permits to the authorities there. Nonetheless, in practice, the Military Permit 
Office found that its advice concerning the grant or refusal of a visa was usually 
taken. However, the key point here is that the ultimate decision lay with the 
Annies in the Field, and the policy and methods used to control Army Zone traffic 
did not fall strictly within MIS's domain?7 
MIS held a key position within the system of control. It established close relations 
both with the HOPO and the FOPO; had direct authority over the Military Permit 
Office, the Paris Permit Office, and MCOs at the British ports; and it also co­
operated closely with MIl c in directing the work of MCOs abroad. The 
information that MIS alone possessed regarding enemy agents and suspects 
worldwide was made available to the control authorities by the black list and 
supplementary circulars. Owing to its understanding of enemy methods, MIS was 
not only able to provide answers to enquiries, but also to supply constant warnings 
against both specific individuals and the many subterfuges they had been shown 
to employ. Besides the detail work, due to its expertise in counter-espionage, MIS 
26 Ibid. Some sources date E Branch's formation at August 1915. This seems to be the result of 
confusion following branch name changes. For clarity, see Appendix I. 
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was also able to propose policy initiatives and legislative measures in response to 
the results of methods employed and the wider context of the counter-espionage 
system as a whole. It was for these reasons that, as soon as proper passenger 
control had been achieved, a scheme to improve the control of alien seamen was 
suggested by MIS, mainly through E Branch's efforts.28 
The reason for military rather than civilian control was that the system existed to 
prevent the enemy's acquisition of military and naval intelligence, which required 
that it should not be under exclusively civilian control. It was also felt that the 
guiding principles of the control should be set by MIS, as the counter-espionage 
agency. Additionally, the unique nature of counter-espionage, and the secretive 
character of the papers routinely used in a Permit Office, made it appropriate that 
the staff should be chosen and trained by those with experience of this kind of 
work. Lastly, the records that every Permit Office needed could only be provided 
by MIS.29 
Geography affected the British system of traffic control in two particularly 
important ways. Firstly, because the UK is an island, the authorities had no land 
frontier to control. This made the system relatively simple to enforce, because 
ships could be concentrated at a few ports, which were much easier to guard than 
a whole land frontier. 3o As Colonel Nicolai ruefully recounted, 'England and 
America were all but completely protected by the sea against the penetration of 
27 TNA, KV1I20, pp.14-15. 

28 Ibid., pp.42-44. 

29 Ibid., pp.15-16. 

30 Ibid., pp.19-20. 
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our espionage. For the same reason both countries could reduce the leakage of 
news to a minimum' .31 Secondly, owing to the concentration of all railway and 
steamer routes in Northern and Western Europe upon London and because of the 
war, London became the hub for passenger traffic between allied and neutral 
European countries and even many non-European ones, particularly the USA and 
Canada.32 
In June 1915 representatives of MI5G (who would later become known as MeOs) 
were assigned to assist the aliens officers at Hull, Newcastle, Southampton and 
Folkestone.33 Felstead recounts how 'one of the first things insisted upon by the 
officer in charge was that he should have a representative of his own at every port, 
and thus have a direct check on people passing to and fro' .34 
An MeO's duties were very demanding. They involved examining passengers 
and crews, limiting and controlling the individuals permitted at the arrival and 
departure of vessels, supervising alien seamen aboard and off their vessels, 
collecting information about passengers and seamen and searching ships and 
crews. The MeO was also responsible for censoring mail to seamen on out-going 
ships, maintaining office records and transmitting reports to MI5. He was 
additionally supposed to propose ideas to MIS for discussion with the Home 
Office, liase between the civil, military and naval authorities at the port, swap 
information and discuss problems with them, and encourage the co-operation of 
31 Nicolai, The German Secret Service, p.197. 

32 TNA, KV1I20, p.19. 

33 TNA, KV1I34, "'E" Branch Report. Summary', 1921, p.42. 

34 Felstead, German Spies at Bay, p.137. 
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the local railway, dock and shipping companies and businessmen when their help 
was needed. 'In short the Military Control Officer at a Port was "a kind ofaxle" to 
"the wheel" of Counter Espionage. ,35 
Initially, MCOs carried a notebook containing lists of suspects and other details, 
which was replaced with the Port Officers' Guide: 
Containing descriptions of suspects, lists of suspect addresses, suspect 

firms, suspect hotels, suspect seamen and suspect ships, followed by a list 

of private letter-carriers. There were also lists of books, and publications 

which were either to be confiscated, detained or destroyed. The whole was 

compiled with a view to ready reference and the book was liberally 

interleaved to allow of additions.36 

The MCOs also received suspect lists from: 
M.I.5., Scotland Yard, the Home Office, the Home Office Permit Office, 
G.H.Q Home Forces (through the Local Commands) as and when they 

were issued. They also received the Liste des Suspects of the Bureau 

Central Interallie, the Suspect List of the Eastern Mediterranean Special 

Intelligence Bureau, Cairo, the War Trade Intelligence Department's 

Black List and Supplements and other publications.37 

On 1 July 1915 the Military Permit Office was opened in Bedford Square, London 
to examine the bona fides of those applying for permits to travel to the Army 
Zone, passing applications on to GHQ and obtaining the required passes for those 
involved.38 
35 TNA, KV1I34, pA2. 
36 Ibid, pA6. See also TNA, KVlI72, "'E" Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. 
Annexure No. 85. The Port Officers' Guide', n.d.; TNA, KVI171, "'E" Branch Report. The 
Control of Ports and Frontiers. Annexure No. 84. Aliens Restriction Order. Passenger Traffic. 
General Instructions to Aliens Officers at Approved Ports (Home Office, 31 January 1918),. 
37 TNA, KV1I34, pA8. 
38 TNA, KV1I20, p.30. 
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At this time, attention was still largely focused on traffic between the UK and 
France or Holland. From 25 April 1915 all aliens and British subjects coming 
from France or Holland, or going to France or Belgium, were required to possess 
passports in order to land or embark in the UK.39 It was soon discovered advisable 
to extend the Permit Office system. In July 1915 it was found that certain 
individuals were leaving the UK for Scandinavia, thence moving on to Germany 
or Holland via Copenhagen. Accordingly, the Home Office permit became 
necessary for all people leaving the UK for Norway, Sweden and Denmark.4o The 
Boulogne route to France was also closed to normal passenger traffic, thus 
restricting the cross channel services to Folkestone-Dieppe and Southampton- Le 
Havre.41 
Until July 1915 there were few restrictions on alien seamen. Thus, there was no 
check on their movements while ashore and they enjoyed obvious opportunities to 
gather information and communicate with others.42 The Aliens Restriction 
(Seamen's) Order was issued on 28 July 1915, which required that all alien 
seamen had to be registered and to carry passports or other identification 
documents with photographs attached, to be produced on landing at the request of 
an aliens officer.43 
39 Ibid., pp.30-31. 
40 Ibid., p.3l. 
41 Ibid., p.32. 
42 Ibid., pp.46-47. 
43 Ibid., p.47. 
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In August 1915 the head of E Branch was Major (later Colonel Sir) Claude E.M. 
Dansey, Assistant Director and Inspector of Port Intelligence.44 Dansey, who had 
been given a wartime commission in the Monmouthshire Territorial Force 
Regiment, joined MIS on 14 December 1914.45 As previously explained, 
following the USA's entry into the war, Dansey was chosen to serve on an 
intelligence liaison mission to the USA, between 12 April and 11 July 1917. He 
then left MIS on 19 August 1917, having been posted to MIl c to reorganise the 
Secret Service in Holland.46 As the culmination of a most successful career in 
intelligence, Dansey went on to become Assistant Chief of SIS during the Second 
World War.47 
E Branch now had fourteen members of staff, including two officers (Dansey 
himself and a section officer) and three clerical staff at MIS's headquarters, one 
military permit officer and two examiners (graded as assistant military permit 
officers) at the Military Permit Office, and six port officers ofthe Port Intelligence 
Service. E Branch's duties were as follows: 
Military Policy connected with traffic to and from the United 
Kingdom. 

Policy connected with the grant of passes and permits for the "zone 

des armies". 

Control of port intelligence service. 

Control of Military Permit Office. 

Distribution of counter-espionage reports and circulars. 

44 See Read & Fisher, Colonel Z, a biography ofDansey. 

45 rnA, KV1I59, p.4. 

46 Andrew, Secret Service, p.357; rnA, KVl/59, p.4; Read & Fisher, Colonel Z, p.l42. 

47 Andrew, Secret Service, p.357. 
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Examination of reports on enemy agents in Scandinavia, Denmark 
and Holland and in belligerent territory in Europe.48 
As an example of the kind of circular issued by E Branch, on 6 December 1917, it 
warned that: 
Information has been received that the Germans are glvmg agents, 
employed for sabotage, pencils which have the appearance of being 
ordinary large blue or red pencils. 
In the interior of these is a glass tube containing chemicals, the extremity 
of the tube being finished off with blue lead. When the pencil is cut, the 
tube is exposed and the end removed. The contents coming into contact 
with the air, after a period varying from 15 to 20 minutes, produce a 
powerful flame, which lasts 90 seconds. 
The German Service is likely to employ these pencils to produce fires on 
quays and ships.49 
In late August 1915 an inter~allied conference met in Paris to consider how to 
improve the control over people entering the Army Zone. It resulted in the 
introduction of new passport regulations for the Army Zone in February 1916, 
known as the French camet regulations. However, the French camet system was 
soon found to be cumbersome and changes were later introduced at the suggestion 
of the Military Permit Office. 50 
The initial measures to improve the control at ports were not a complete success. 
The MCOs were beset with many problems; one of the main ones was their want 
of authority, which placed them at a disadvantage with the aliens officers. This 
48 TNA, KV1I52, pp.9-10. 

49 TNA, MUN4/3588, circular letter from MI5E, 6 December 1917. See also TNA, 

H045/10841133598 - ALIENS: Precautions against enemy agents at British ports, 1917-1918. 

And WAR: Precautions against enemy agents in British ports, 1917-1918. 
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was partly overcome in October 1915 when MCOs received the extra title and 
status of military advisers to the Home Office, and were officially recognised as 
military advisers to the aliens officers at ports in matters relating to counter­
espionage.51 
Until this time, the control exercised by the permit offices was only over outward 
traffic to certain countries, and it was becoming ever clearer that more checks 
were needed to deter non-essential travel and hinder the movements of suspicious 
individuals. On 30 November 1915, as noted earlier, passports were made 
obligatory for all travellers; by an Order in Council that made passports 
compulsory for all individuals, of any nationality, leaving or entering the UK.52 
According to Felstead it was MI5 that: 
was responsible for the travelling restrictions which made passages to and 
from the Continent so difficult. Naturally, travelling was discouraged as 
much as possible; it was no part of our policy to create endless trouble for 
ourselves by permitting more or less unrestricted intercourse. Nor did our 
Allies desire it. 53 
In autumn 1915 it was discovered that German agents were being sent to Britain 
as seamen, discharging themselves on arrival, and then returning to Germany by 
passenger ship, 'having probably acquired a considerable amount of useful 
information during their stay in England'. 54 On 16 August 1915 Dansey sent a 
circular letter to the Home Office for issue to port officers, advising them to be on 
the look out for enemy agents coming to the UK on tramp steamers from Holland 
50 TNA, KV1I20, p.32. 
51 Ibid., pp.32-33. 
52 Ibid., p.33. 
53 Felstead, German Spies at Bay, p.19. 
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and Scandinavia.55 Therefore, from 15 March 1916, alien seamen on short-voyage 
ships from Holland and Scandinavia were not allowed to take their discharge; 
however, long-voyage ships were not felt to pose a threat. 56 
In autumn 1915 Sir John French suggested that the permit office system should be 
extended to inward traffic, because it was superior to the granting of visas by 
individual consuls. The results of permit office control of outward passenger 
traffic led to the same system being adopted for the control of individuals wanting 
to travel from allied and neutral countries to the UK.57 This prompted the opening 
of a permit office, under military control, at Berne on 15 November 1915. A 
passport control officer was appointed for Athens, and the Paris Permit Office 
opened on I March 1916. The aims of the permit office system in allied and 
neutral countries were summed up in a memorandum on the working of the Paris 
Permit Office: 
(a) 	 To prevent suspects travelling to the United Kingdom 
except in certain cases when it is desired to get them 
here for arrest; to give facilities to persons who are 
travelling on bona-fide business; and to refuse visas to 
those who cannot show an adequate reason for 
travelling. 
(b) 	 To curtail examination at ports as far as possible and to 
indicate passengers who should be especially watched 
or searched in the United Kingdom. 
(c) To forward information which may be of use to Contre­
Espionage and Trading with Enemy organisations. 58 
54 TNA, KV1I20, p.47. 

55 TNA, H045/10727/254753, folder 98, letter, and accompanying copy of circular to port 

officers, from Dansey to Haldane Porter (Home Office), 16 August 1915. 

56 TNA, KV1I20, pp.47-48. 

57 TNA, KV1I34, p.2S. 

58 Ibid., p.38. 
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Together the Military Permit Office in London and the Permit Office in Paris 
provided an efficient check on cross channel traffic.59 The controls abroad were 
soon extended, as British MCOs were sent to Petro grad, Christiania, Stockholm, 
Copenhagen, Madrid and Lisbon. In July 1916 a permit office was opened in 
Rome and an Mea was sent to work at the Consulate General in New York. In 
November 1916 an MCO was appointed at Bucharest.60 
Two cardinal principles were universally applied. Only certain consuls had the 
authority to issue visas, and, no matter what route he was taking, a traveller was 
required to have his passport endorsed in the country where his travels began by 
an official of the country that was his final destination.61 MCOs stationed abroad 
placed a secret symbol on the passports of suspicious individuals to alert port 
control officers when they reached the UK. However, the visa of an MeO or 
, ...­British Consul was not a definite guarantee of entry into the UK. The aliens 
officer at the port of arrival had the final say. Nonetheless, it was an unwritten 
rule that British subjects should not be stopped from disembarking in their own 
country.62 
The experience of MCOs at British ports had demonstrated that it was not 
possible to perform searches of passengers and maintain security of the docks 
59 TNA, KV1I20, p.36. 
60 Ibid., pp.37-38. 
61 TNA, KV1I34, p.32. 
62 Ibid. 
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without sufficient personne1.63 In June 1916 the Military Foot Police (Port 
Section) was formed to work under the MCOs and to assist the aliens officers at 
the various ports. Their original establishment was 200, but in September 1917 a 
full establishment of 300 was approved.64 In October 1917 there were 227 ports 
police, this figure had risen to 230 by December 1917, and on 11 November 1918 
it stood at 255.65 
The Germans tried to exploit all the gaps in this system. Before the issue of 
DRR14D in May 1916, passports or other identifying documents were not 
necessary for British seamen. Hence, it had become a well-known ruse of German 
agents to adopt this guise. DRR14D failed to put an end to this threat. Therefore, 
attempts were made to provide British seamen with proof of identity. However, 'it 
was not until J ul y 1918 that a satisfactory system was adopted'. 66 The insistence 
upon identity papers was not an effective deterrent, because traffic in both genuine 
-
...
and false seamen's papers was a typical enemy tactic. Other means were needed 
to render these efforts to evade the control unsuccessful. 67 Provision of Military 
Foot Police at ports, and additional aliens officers, improved the physical control 
at ports and effectively tightened the control over alien seamen. This made it 
possible to impose effective physical restrictions and introduce more systematic 
and thorough ways of searching people and baggage.68 
63 TNA, KV1/20, pp.38-39. 
64 Ibid., p.39. 

65 Hiley, 'Counter-Espionage and Security in Great Britain during the First World War', p.667. It 

is not clear whether the ports police were paid from War Office funds. 

66 TNA, KV1/20, p.48. 

67 Ibid., pp.48-49. See also 'Spies and Passports', The Times, 1 February 1917, p.8. 

68 TNA, KVl/20, p.49. 
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MIS's list of staff for 11 December 1916 names E Branch's staff at MI5's 
headquarters, but does not mention its staff at places away from headquarters. E 
Branch had sixteen members of staff at MIS's headquarters, including seven 
officers and nine clerical staff. Three officers and eight clerical staff were 
assigned to E Branch (but not to a particular section), section E1 comprised two 
officers, and E2 consisted of two officers and one member of clerical staff. 69 
Control at ports was tightened in early 1917 by increasing the aliens officers' 
powers under DRR14G and ARO articles 4 and lOA. The permission of an aliens 
officer was necessary for the landing of any alien in the UK and for the 
embarkation of anyone, British or alien. Aliens officers were empowered not only 
to refuse any alien permission to disembark, but also to add conditions to their 
permission to land. Extra powers were soon granted to the MCOs. They were also 
authorised to grant permission to embark, like the aliens officers. However, the 
..­permission to land continued to be exclusively the prerogative of the aliens -' 
officers, although in doing so they often followed the advice of the MCOs, 'with 
whom they had come to work on excellent terms' .70 
The discovery and seizure of letters, photographs and other documents under 
DRR54 was an important part of the MeO's duties at the ports. An effective 
search was essential for this. This had two objectives: to hinder enemy agents, and 
it was also of great importance to the War Trade Intelligence Department and the 
69 TNA, KV1I52, p.21. 
70 TNA, KV1I20, pAO. 
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Ministry of Blockade that business papers that could refer to enemy trading 
should not enter or leave the UK without censorship.7l 
During the first six months of 1917 a number of the controls were reorganised and 
the precise powers of the MeOs and consular authorities at every location were 
defined. The permit office system was set up throughout almost all allied and 
neutral countries in the world by the end of July 1917.72 The main aim of the 
passport and permit offices was to deter undesirables by checking the credentials 
of those wishing to travel. This control aided the aliens officers and others at the 
ports, not just because it eliminated some potential travellers, particularly the most 
suspect ones, but it also allowed greater time to search for concealed papers. 
Enquiring into bona fides also had a detective role, leading to the discovery of 
much intelligence relevant to counter-espionage. 73 
It is instructive to look at the restrictions that were gradually imposed on seamen 
before the advent of the Neutral European Port (NEP) Scheme. In the early days 
of the war there was a want of restriction. The reach of the German espionage 
system was not fully appreciated, such that the necessity for precautions 
concerning seamen was then little understood. While the Germans were able to 
disguise their agents as passengers, there was less concern with the threat posed 
by seamen. It was also vitally important, because of supplies, that alien crewmen 
of neutral traders should not be pushed away from the UK. Therefore, means of 
71 Ibid., pp.40-41. 
72 Ibid., p.38. 
13 TNA, KV1I34, p.19. 
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control akin to those applied to passengers were only introduced very slowly.74 
The main dangers remained the gathering and passing on of intelligence and the 
conveying of German agents in and out of the UK disguised as British or alien 
seamen. Other dangers included letter carrying, sabotage, smuggling and hostile 
propaganda. Seanlen on short-sea traders between Scandinavia, Holland, Spain 
and the UK were regarded with great suspicion and revelations about the methods 
of German agents emphasised that it was this class of seamen that posed the 
greatest danger. 75 
In March 1917 the censorship of letters to seamen on out-going short-voyage 
ships was assigned to the MCOs at the principal ports. This proved not only a 
defence against the leakage of information, but also a way of discovering 
suspects.76 
In autumn 1917 the authorities reviewed the situation regarding neutral short-
voyage ships and concluded that it was still unsatisfactory. Indeed, because of the 
successful controls over passenger traffic and the strictness of censorship, the 
enemy then appeared to be focusing on the opportunities offered by the short-sea 
trader, as had been evinced by the Bergen spy trial of June 1917 and other 
discoveries. 77 The German espionage bureau at Bergen, fonned to report on the 
movement of ships trading with allied countries, came to the Norwegian Police's 
notice in May 1917. Following a trial in Bergen on 7 June 1917, three Germans 
74 'M.TU'IA, KVl/20, p.45. 
75 Ibid., pp.45-46. 
76 Ibid., p.SO. 
77 Ibid., pp.SO-Sl. 
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and seven Norwegians were found guilty of conducting espionage on behalf of 
Germany and sentenced to terms ranging from thirty days to nine months' 
imprisonment.78 With these revelations, it was felt that the threat from enemy 
espionage was more serious than the risk of reducing neutral trade and that only 
the strictest controls would thwart it. Thus, the NEP Scheme was designed, so that 
ships from neutral European countries could be prohibited from any contact with 
the shore while lying in UK ports. 79 Once MI5 had explained the scheme to all 
concerned, and gained broad agreement, steps to implement the scheme could be 
begun by spring 1918.80 
The control of ports and frontiers was helped by the great decrease in passenger 
traffic during 1916 and 1917, particularly that between England and France. This 
was partly due to the submarine menace and also because of the strengthening of 
the control in every direction. sl 
Following Dansey's transfer to MIle, Major H.E. Spencer, OBE, late Captain in 
the 13th Hussars, Reserve of Officers, succeeded him as head of E Branch in 
August 1917. Spencer joined MIS on 27 May 1915 and served with E Branch, 
interrupted by a brief stint as head of A Branch from 16 July to 26 August 1917, 
78 TNA, KVl/28, '''E'' Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. Appendices. Appendix 

N, Control ofNeutral Seamen', 1921, pp.l51-157. 

79 TNA, KV1I20, p.5l. 

&0 Ibid., pp.51-52. See also TNA, H0451108811338498, folder 16, Home Office memorandum 

regarding Aliens Restriction, section III, 'Enforcement of Regulations as to the Landing of Alien 

Seamen in the United Kingdom', February 1918. 

81 TNA, KV1I20, p.4l. 
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-before returning to take over E Branch, and finally leaving on 8 September 
1919.82 
As in December 1916 MIS's list of staff for 22 October 1917 lists E Branch's staff 
at MIS's headquarters, but again does not include its staff posted away from 
headquarters. E Branch had twenty members of staff at MIS's headquarters, 
including nine officers and eleven clerical staff. Three officers and three clerical 
staff were assigned to E Branch (but not to a particular section), section E 1 
consisted of four officers and four clerical staff, and E2 comprised two officers 
and four clerical staff. 83 
The NEP Scheme was put into force in June 1918. The landing of all alien 
seamen, including masters and officers, was prohibited; exceptions were only
, made in very exceptional cases. All business was to be transacted on board ship 
and guards were placed to prevent all exits from these ships. These newI 
regulations first took effect at certain ports only from 15 June 1918; they were 
then extended to the UK's other principal ports in the months that followed.84 In 
order to prevent any communication between NEP ships and the shore, stringent I 
control over all visitors to these ships was needed. From October 1918 only I 
officials and ships' brokers were allowed to board short-voyage ships, and when 
people were allowed on board the port authorities reserved the right to attend 
I 
I 82 TNA, KVlIS9, p.S; TNA, KVlI13, 'Report on the A. Branch ofM.I.5.', 1921, pp.44-45. 83 TNA, KV1I52, p.3S. 

84 TNA, KV1I20, p.52. 
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meetings. NEP ships were segregated to prevent them from communicating with 
each other. 85 
Under the NEP Scheme the main measures for the control of docks were patrols, 
closing gates or (if there were none) erecting barriers, segregating NEP ships, and 
regulating access to the docks and to ships alongside and in the river or harbour.86 
Thereby, admission to docks became much more strictly controlled. Previous 
schemes to exclude undesirable persons from docks, such as they were, had not 
been overly successful. Under NEP policy, permits to docks and ships were only 
to be given to British subjects; and, when employed by an alien firm, only to those 
of British birth. Full particulars regarding the applicants' nationality, occupation, 
reason for requesting a permit, etc and photographs had to be provided. These 
applications were scrutinised by the chief constable, senior aliens officer, MCO 
and dock representatives.87 In order to control access to NEP ships, the local 
commands were required to provide guards from the Royal Defence Corps, and 
by July 1918 up to 2,000 were deployed. 88 
An MI5 report written in 1921 assessed the NEP scheme as having severed any 
possible contacts between Germany and Britain through neutral seamen. Other 
advantages had also been gained. The control had been made effective with the 
minimum disturbance to shipping, as ships from neutral European ports formed 
the smallest percentage of the total shipping, and it had been possible to withdraw 
85 Ibid., pp.52-53. 
86 TNA, KV1I34, p.67. 
87 Ibid., pp.68-69. 
88 Ibid., p.7l. 
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to a great extent former restrictions upon neutral and allied seamen in allied and 
extra-European traffic. 89 
The report concluded that the 'control system in force at the end of the War 
approximated very closely to the ideal.' Although not absolute, pennit office 
control over outward and inward passengers covered all routes between Britain 
and the continent of Europe, and inward traffic from the USA and Japan. Turning 
to seamen, 'it is hard to see how the methods developed at British ports in the last 
year or so of the war could have been improved'. There was a division of 
authority between MI5 and the Home Office Aliens Branch, 'but co-operation 
between these two departments remained at all times so close and so friendly that 
the practical disadvantages of dual control were reduced absolutely to the 
minimum' .90 
MIS's list of officers and branches in which they were employed for August 1918 
is very revealing. E Branch had now twelve officers at MIS's headquarters, 
including four who were assigned to E Branch (but not to a specific section), six 
in El and two in E2. The Military Permit Office comprised six officers. There 
were twenty-two MCOs in the UK assigned to Aberdeen, Folkestone, Glasgow, 
Gravesend, London Docks, Hull, Liverpool, Newcastle, Plymouth, Southampton 
and the South Wales ports. There were also twenty-one MCOs abroad: in Paris, 
89 Ibid., pp.72-73. 
90 TNA, KV1I20, p.22. 
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Rome, Milan, Genoa, Turin, I(B.)G.H.Q Italy, Washington, New York, Tokyo 
and Malta.91 
A further MIS list of staff for 20 September 1918 shows that E Branch had 
twenty-three members of staff at MIS's headquarters, including ten officers and 
thirteen clerical staff. Of these, three officers and six clerical staff were assigned 
to E Branch (but not to a given section), E1 consisted of five officers and four 
clerical staff, and E2 comprised two officers and three clerical staff. 92 
The eventual system of control that evolved was not MIS's ideal choice, although 
it was still very pleased with it. In fact, there were alternatives to the scheme of 
control that was actually chosen. Every permit office could have been directly 
subordinated to MIS, which would have supplied it with its trained personnel and 
its records, and with which it could be in constant communication. It was not 
possible, however, to carry out this ideal programme. 'Nevertheless, both in 
theory, and practice, the actual system which was gradually developed did not fall 
far short of the ideal. ,93 
One example of how E Branch was positioned to contribute to the catching of 
spies by either detaining suspects when they attempted to enter the UK, notifying 
the authorities of their arrival so that they could be placed under surveillance, or 
stopping them as they attempted to leave the UK, is the Rosenthal case. 
91 TNA, KV1I52, pp.43-44. 
92 Ibid., p.46. 
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Robert Rosenthal, a German, made three journeys to the UK on behalf of the 
German Admiralty Secret Service in Berlin from November to December 1914, 
during January 1915, and from mid-April until his arrest as a result ofa stroke of 
luck in May 1915. He used American identification documents and his ostensible 
business was to dispose of a patent concerning smoking. On 8 April 1915 
Rosenthal wrote a letter from Copenhagen to Franz Kulbe in Berlin containing a 
secret message that he was going to start spying in the UK using the cover of 
selling patent gas lighters. Through some postal miss-sort, the letter came to 
England, where the censorship tested the letter and found the secret message. MIS 
knew that the address of Franz Kulbe was that of Captain von Prieger, Chief of 
the Admiralty Secret Service in Berlin, and ordered the arrest of any commercial 
traveller in patent gas lighters.94 In an exceptionally accurate circular of 4 May 
1915 MIS alerted the ports: 
From information received it is likely that a GERMAN Agent (or agents) 
posing as a traveller in patent gas lighters, may attempt to enter the 
UNITED KINGDOM, most probably from COPENHAGEN. 
Any such persons should be closely questioned as to the name of their 
employer, and should they give the name as ROSENTHAL, they should 
be arrested, ... 9S 
On the night of 11 May Rosenthal was arrested at Newcastle attempting to 
embark for Bergen. He confessed under interrogation. Spy equipment was also 
found amongst his possessions. He was court-martialled on 6 July and hanged on 
93 TNA, KV1I20, pp.16-17. 
94 TNA, KV1I42, pp.ll1-114. 
95 TNA, W0l41/1/5, MI5 circular letter, 4 May 1915. 
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16 July 1915.96 However, the very fact that Rosenthal was caught on his third 
mission to the UK, after two successful attempts at entering and leaving the 
country, clearly illustrates that the control at ports and frontiers was not absolutely 
infallible. 
The Hensel case offers another example of how a passport check, albeit by the US 
Consulate, contributed significantly to a spy's detection. Paul Hensel, a German, 
landed at Liverpool on 4 July 1915, impersonating Irving Guy Ries, with a forged 
US passport, his supposed purpose being to make new clients for three American 
fIrms dealing in hay or com.97 The Foreign Office's enquiries with these firms in 
the USA revealed that Hensel's claim to represent them was unfounded.98 When 
Hensel approached the American Consulate for a visa to get a permit to travel 
from Hull to Copenhagen, the American Consulate noticed the forgery and 
impounded his passport. He was arrested on 10 August 1915.99 
Interestingly, none of the spies caught by MIS was actually initially detected by 
passport checks or baggage searches at the ports. Nonetheless, a number of spies 
who were initially detected by other means were subsequently discovered to have 
used false passports, particularly American ones, which added tellingly to the 
96 TNA, KV 1/4:2 , p.114. Other files on Rosenthal include TNA, DPP1I41 - ROSENTHAL, R. 

Offence: Spying, 1915; TNA, H0144/1429/288639 - Rosenthal, R. Court: London Court Martial. 

Offence: Espionage. Sentence: Death, 6 July 1915. 

97 TNA, KV1/42, pp.101-102. 

98 TNA, DPP1I39, Report on Foreign Office telegram of 4 September 1915, by Major R.J. Drake 

(MIS), S September 1915. 

99rnA, KVl/42, pp.102-104. 
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evidence against them; and to the desire for a thorough examination at the 
ports. lOO 
The case of Sopher illustrates how effective the vetting for travel permits could 
be. Sopher, an Indian who had worked as a dresser and a clerk at the Indian 
Hospital in Brighton, and had aroused suspicion for wearing his unifornl after he 
had been discharged, applied in February 1916 for a permit to visit :Mrs 
D'Aumont at The Hague. At interview, he first lied that D'Aumont was a 
journalist but, on being shown his error, he dropped all pretence and admitted a 
brief acquaintance with D' Aumont and De Regals, aliases used by known spies. 
He was interned under DRR14B, on the grounds of his hostile associations and 
. 101
attempt to renew a dangerous connectlOn. 
On 30 January 1916 the Admiralty informed MI5 that in all likelihood Spanish 
journalists would be coming to the UK to spy for Germany. This warning was 
passed on to the ports of Folkestone, Southampton and Falmouth on 31 January. 
On 1 February 1916 Adolfo Guerrero, a Spanish journalist, landed at Folkestone. 
He could not speak English. The port officer at Folkestone signalled Guerrero's 
arrival and that he was heading for the Regent Palace Hotel London. 
Comprehensive checks were put on all telegrams and letters to and from Guerrero 
and he was also kept under observation. Certain marks before initials were noticed 
in the letters that Guerrero wrote. He was arrested on 18 February and a spy 
address was found amongst his papers. He also had a forged identity card. He was 
100 See TNA, KV1I27, "'E" Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. Fifth Supplement. 
Illegal Methods of Obtaining Passports', 1921. 
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tried as a spy on 13 July. He was found guilty and sentenced to death, which was 
commuted to ten years' penal servitude. J02 
On 9 January 1917 the S.S. Zeelandia arrived in Falmouth and on the next day 
Captain Hans Boehm, a German, was apprehended on board on route from Spain 
to Holland using the American passport of Jelks Leroy Thrasher. He subsequently 
broke under interrogation at Scotland Yard and confessed to his true identity. He 
had been working, under Captain Franz von Papen, German Military Attache in 
Washington, on sabotage in the USA and Canada and associating with Irish 
extremists there. He was detained as a prisoner of war, because in order to secure 
a conviction the Admiralty would have had to disclose information that they felt 
inadvisable so to dO. 103 In light of the Admiralty's success in decoding the 
Zimmermann telegram it seems most likely that the Admiralty was reading 
telegrams from the German Embassy in Washington to Berlin, which alerted them 
to Boehm's travels, but did not want to risk compromising this prize source. 
Bird concludes that 'it is doubtful whether more than [a] handful of enemy agents 
were able to evade the system of control at the ports' .104 Felstead assessed the role 
that MI5 played in this: 
[Once] the officer in direct charge of counter-espionage was given the 
opportunity of checking the ingress and egress of "neutrals" by keeping 
his own staff at our ports, ... it was more than a coincidence that from that 
time onward we were not so seriously troubled with German spies. lOS 
101 TNA, KV1I43, pp.83-84. 
102 Ibid., pp.108-117. 

103 TNA, KV 41113, defence security case no.71. 

104 Bird, The Control ofEnemy Alien Civilians in Great Britain 1914-18, p.279. 

105 Felstead, German Spies at Bay, pp.11-12. 
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On 14 November 1918 Kell wrote to Pedder of the Home Office expressing his 
appreciation of the great value of this work: 
The efficiency of the control at the Ports of all movements to and from this 
country has undoubtedly been one of the decisive factors in defeating the 
enemy's endeavours to communicate prejudicial naval and military 
information to their forces and has been of incalculable military value as a 
factor in our great victory. 106 
Pedder's reply of 16 November 1918 also acknowledged: 
the value to us in carrying out our powers and duties of having a calIon 
your special sources of information and points of view. The results of the 
co-operation of our two Departments in safeguarding the national interests 
need not, I am confident, fear the most searching examination. 107 
The available evidence suggests that E Branch accomplished the task that it was 
set up to achieve and should thus be rated as having been very successful. It 
performed its preventive role and provided leads for investigation and intelligence 
on the methods used by German agents, it managed to run the system to control 
ports and frontiers, and because the German spies were caught. An analysis of the 
system developed and supervised by E Branch leads to the conclusion that it was 
effective, notably thorough and quite sophisticated for its time. It did not take too 
many staff to impose this system, nor cause overly great disruption to trade and 
passenger traffic considering the wartime circumstances. No system can be perfect 
and, considering the technology available at that time, E Branch did about as good 
ajob as could legitimately be expected. 
106 TNA, KV4/129, Kell to Pedder, 14 November 1918. 
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107 Ibid., Pedder to KeU, 16 November 1918. See also ibid., F.J. Willis (Local Government Board) 
to Secretary, War Office, expressing gratitude for the invaluable services rendered by Dansey and 
four other E Branch officers, 16 February 1918. 
262 

CHAPTER SEVEN: D BRANCH: IRELAND, 

DOMINIONS, COLONIES AND OVERSEAS 

Even before the First World War MI5 had considered the need to establish close 
relations with the Colonies, a term still used at this time in respect of the 
Dominions as well as the colonial empire.! In March 1913, following an enquiry 
from the Australian High Commission 'whether the British Government asks 
Foreign Representatives to keep them supplied with lists of their nationals, or 
whether any other steps are taken to obtain complete lists of foreigners resident in 
Great Britain', Kell had proposed to Troup of the Home Office, that it would be 
mutually beneficial if an occasional exchange of lists of undesirable aliens could 
be introduced between MI5 and the Empire? However, it seems that nothing came 
of this. 
When MI5 raised the question of establishing relations with the Colonies with the 
Colonial Office in July 1915, India was the only part of the Empire that was 
already in personal communication with MI5. Links had been established with 
India's Criminal Intelligence Department (CID), in the same way as relations with 
1 TNA, KVlI19, 'D Branch Report. Summary', 1921, p.4. It should be noted that most of the 
Colonial Office's correspondence with the Colonies concerning counter-espionage seems to have 
been destroyed. For example, TNA, C0694/28, the Colonial Office's register of secret 
correspondence, 1914-1927, contains many intriguing references to letters under the subject 
heading counter-espionage that have been stamped "DESTROYED UNDER STATUTE". 
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the police chief constables in the UK had been maintained, correspondence being 
carried on with the Director of Criminal Intelligence (DCI) through his 
representative in London, Major lA. WaUinger. However, although the DCI kept 
MIS fully supplied with information concerning Indian seditionists, it was found 
that very few reports on the subject of European suspects were forthcoming.3 
As the war progressed MIS became ever more convinced that Germany's covert 
activities stretched across the Empire, such that it became vital that MI5 should be 
equipped to acquire intelligence wherever trouble was fomenting. 4 MIS was 
particularly concerned that, as well as trying to collect military and naval 
intelligence, 'it was a special feature of Germany's policy to foster and encourage 
any movements of un-rest and sedition directed against the British Empire'. Thus, 
the Sinn Fein movement in Ireland and America, the Home Rule and seditionary 
movements in India, the Egyptian nationalist, Turkish nationalist, Pan-Islamic and 
Greek royalist movements, which were supported and in some instances promoted 
by Germany, came to be MIS's concern.s 
It is now fairly clear, with the added benefit of hindsight, that Germany's support 
for such movements was never really more than half-hearted, being much rhetoric 
but little actual material assistance, such that MIS had exaggerated this threat. 
Germany never seriously considered landing troops in Ireland to support Sinn 
Fein in starting a rising. 
2 TNA, H04511 06291199699, folder 4, R. Muirhead Collins (Australian High Commission) to 

Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, 11 February 1913; TNA, KVlI15, p.32. 

3 Ibid., p.63. 

4 TNA, KVlI19, pA. 
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Moreover, it is equally important to appreciate that the above quotation provides 
an expression of what MIS felt at the time. This perceived reality was an 
important influence on the formation of D Branch, even if its analysis was 
someway off the mark. Indeed, examining what he terms Germany's 'global 
strategy', historian Hew Strachan shows that Germany certainly had intentions of 
promoting revolt throughout the British Empire, and gave out some signals to this 
effect. Typical of Germany's pan-Islamic rhetoric, on 30 July 1914, the Kaiser 
wrote of Britain: 
Now this entire structure must be ruthlessly exposed and the mask of 
Christian peacefulness be publicly tom away.... Our consuls in Turkey 
and India, our agents, etc., must rouse the whole Moslem world into wild 
rebellion against this hateful, mendacious, unprincipled nation of 
shopkeepers; if we are ever going to shed our blood, then England must at 
least lose India. 
Helmuth von Moltke, then Chief of the German General Staff, had soon, 'drawn 
up a shopping list that embraced, as the Kaiser told Enver on 15 August, Asia, 
India, Egypt and Africa. But, to continue the metaphor, he had no money with 
which to purchase his wants'. Primarily, the army's European commitment left 
few resources for other areas. Communications between Germany and the Near 
East were very basic. The army also lacked knowledge of the areas where it 
sought influence. 'Broadly speaking, Moltke was looking to diplomacy to create a 
myriad revolutionary armies.,6 However, the hollow nature of this threat may not 
have seemed so clear at the time. For example, some Irish rebels did hope for, if 
5 Ibid., pp.4-5. 

6 The Kaiser is quoted in H. Strachan, The First World War, Volume I: to Arms (Oxford: OUP, 

2001), pp.696-697. 
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not really expect, German troops to land in Ireland. More tangibly, Germany later 
tried to support the Easter Rising by unsuccessfully attempting to ship arms to 
Ireland aboard the A ud in April 1916.7 
The first real origins of D Branch are to be found at the beginning of July 1915, 
when the officers of MIS discussed the question of establishing closer relations 
with the Colonies regarding counter-espionage. This had been under consideration 
even before the war, having only been deferred due to the huge amount of work in 
other areas that had to be dealt with.8 On 15 July 1915 Kell and Hall of MIS, 
whose career and service in MIS is discussed later in this chapter, discussed this 
with Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the CID. Hankey favoured an opening by 
personal letter from the DMO to the military staffs at Colonial bases, but 
suggested consulting Mr Lambert, Assistant Under-Secretary at the Colonial 
Office. Later that day, Kell and Hall called on Lambert, finding him entirely in 
agreement with the scheme. On 1 August 1915 the approval of Sir John Anderson, 
Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, was obtained.9 
Appreciating the need, which MIS had suggested, of establishing direct 
communication with the Self-Governing Dominions and Colonies in order to 
facilitate co-operation in counter-espionage, the Colonial Office issued a secret 
circular memorandum, the draft of which had been prepared by Drake, Holt-
Wilson and Hall, to Governors-General, Governors and Administrators of all the 
Self-Governing Dominions and Colonies. The intention was that, if MI5 could 
7 M. Foy & B. Barton, The Easter Rising (Stroud: Sutton, 1999), pp.41-45. 
8 TNA, KVlII5, p.6. 
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establish relations with the Colonies, it could be a clearing-house for the whole of 
the Empire and a rapid interchange of counter-espionage intelligence would result. 
'In this way a watch could be kept on the movements of suspects, and means 
could be taken to prevent the entry of any undesirables into the United 
Kingdom.' 10 
At that time MIS knew little of events in the Colonies. It only received occasional 
papers through the War Office, Foreign Office and Colonial Office. An inquiry 
i into all possible sources of information had shown that, apart from the intelligence 
summaries of the naval and military commands abroad, there was no organised 
system of records. Thus, if the machinations of enemy secret service agents 
throughout the Empire were to be checked, it was considered vital that there 
should be an exchange of counter-espionage intelligence. 1I The aim throughout I 
was to promote the same close personal relations with the constituent parts of theI 
Empire as had been established between MIS and the various police forces in the 
UK. 12 
I 

I 

Thus, on 5 August 1915 this memorandum was sent semi-officially to theI 
Governors-General of the Self-Governing Dominions, with a covering letter from 
I 
Andrew Bonar Law, the Secretary of State for the Colonies. On 18 August copies 
I were also sent to all Governors and Administrators in territories not possessing 
f 
9 Ibid., pp.9-1 O. 
10 TNA, KVlII9, pp.5-6 & 15; Ibid., KV1/15, p.6. 
II TNA, KVl/19, p.15. It is interesting to note that the military authorities in the East African 
Protectorate (later Kenya) deported one L.W. Ritch who had organised a railway strike and was 
continuing to preach unrest. He was deported to England, and the colonial governor, Sir Conway 
Belfield, informed afterwards. Belfield approved this action. TNA, C0533/1 5 I, telegram Belfield 
to the Colonial Office, 22 January 1915. 
I 
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responsible government. 13 The memorandum, which became the starting point for 
later developments, pointed to the need for a state organisation for counter­
espionage work, having access to every source of intelligence there. Having 
outlined what was being done by MI5, it proposed that, ifnot already in existence, 
a like agency should be established in each Colony, and that its head should be put 
in direct personal communication with Kell. It also asked for feedback on the 
points raised, and requested that MI5 should be provided with copies of existing 
regulations akin to OSA 1911, DORA and the ARA, with commentary on how 
these Orders and Regulations were being enforced. 14 
Replies to these proposals had been received from nearly all of the Dominions and 
Colonies by February 1916. By March 1916 counter-espionage services had been 
established in Australia and Malta, and, apart from a few exceptions, other 
Governors or officials had established contact with MI5. 15 
The following episode suggests that this system experienced some early teething 
problems. On 19 February 1916 Kell wrote to the Colonial Office, in reply to a 
letter regarding Robert E. Whelan, a suspected German spy, who had been 
arrested in Melbourne , Australia, to ask if the Australian Government could 
investigate. 16 On 23 February 1916 Hall was informed that a telegram had been 
12 TNA, KV1I19, pp.21-22. 
13 Ibid., pp.16-l7. 
14 d d' .TNA, C08541168, circular letter and accompanying memoran um regar mg counter-esplOnage, 
from the Colonial Office to Colonial Governors, 18 August 1915. 
15 TNA, KVI/19, p.17. 
16 TNA, C0616/63, p.221, letter regarding suspected spy Robert E. Whelan, from Kell to Under­
Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, 19 February 1916. 
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despatched to Australia about Whelan. 17 On 25 February 1916 Hall acknowledged 
this letter, adding: 
We would certainly have made these enquiries ourselves and hope to do so 
in future, but as we have not yet had an acknowledgement of our letter 
telling the people who we are and what our telegraphic address is, we 
thought it advisable in this instance to let the enquiry take the established 
official route. 18 
The reports sent to MIS regarding the existing conditions in the Colonies at that 
time demonstrated that, except for Malta, where a small agency had been set up 
under the Military Intelligence Department to collect information at the start of 
the war, no definite counter-espionage organisation had ever existed in any of the 
Colonies. Since the war, some preventive measures, such as censorship, had come 
into effect; in some Colonies Martial Law had been declared; and in others the 
Governor had used his authority under an Order in Council of 26 October 1896 to 
declare emergency regulations. Wherever military and naval interests were 
involved, counter-espionage was the domain of military and naval units, usually 
in co-operation with the civil police. 'In some cases the arrangement was 
satisfactory, in others it suffered from an insufficiency of personnel and from the 
difficulties entailed by the combination of counter espionage with other duties.' In 
Canada this was being conducted efficiently by the police but where the work was 
being handled by a number of different agencies, as in Australia or Egypt, a want 
of centralization was telling. 19 
17 TNA, C0616/63, p.223, letter concerning Whelan, from the Colonial Office to Hall, 23 

February 1916. 

18 TNA, C0616/63, p.225, letter about Whelan, from Hall to Tait (Colonial Office), 25 February 

1916. 
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MIS observed the grave consequences of the want of an Empire-wide counter­
espionage system. In some cases, the need of a definite organisation had serious 
repercussions. The trouble that had arisen among the native troops of the Malay 
States Guides in December 1914 and the mutiny of the 5th (Native) Indian Light 
Infantry at Singapore in February 1915 was thought to have been due to German 
influence.2o Analysing the mutiny at Singapore, which led to the deaths of thirty-
two Europeans and the public execution of thirty-seven mutineers, historian Ian 
Beckett concludes that: 
In reality, while rumours of the regiment's impending despatch to fight in 
Mesopotamia provided the trigger, internal divisions between Indian 
officers and men lay at the root of the mutiny. The situation was 
compounded by poor rations and the strained relationship between the 
commanding officer and the other British officers.21 
A comprehensive system of German espionage had been discovered in British 
East Africa that had been totally unsuspected owing to the lack of a central 
clearing-house for information. It was suggested that better intelligence might 
have been provided if an organisation had been established there before the war.22 
By October 1915 correspondence with the Colonies was being undertaken by 
sections of G Branch. The duty of Imperial Overseas Special Intelligence was first 
entrusted to G3, which was already assigned, working with Gl, the preliminary 
investigation of cases of espionage, sedition, treachery, fomentation of strikes and 
sabotage and dissemination of peace propaganda in Ireland. Co-operation with the 
19 TNA, KVlI19, pp.17-18. 

20 Ibid., pp.l8-19. 

21 Beckert, The Great War 1914-1918, p.222. 

22 
rNA, KVlI19, p.19. 
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police and counter-espionage agencies in India and Egypt on these subjects was 
the work ofG2(b).23 
When corresponding with the Colonies, MIS soon learned that the phrase counter­
espionage was misunderstood by many, and in some instances the concern over its 
connotations with secret service caused them to become reluctant to comply with 
the proposals to establish a universal system across the Empire. Owing to the 
memory of the Boer War, South Africa might have feared that the aim was to spy 
on the Boer community, rather than to counter German espionage?4 Thus, the less 
threatening term special intelligence was employed instead of counter-espionage 
and used in all correspondence with the Colonies and Dominions. Hence, MIS, as 
represented by D Branch, was known by its counterparts throughout the Empire as 
the Central Special Intelligence Bureau (CSIB)?5 
G3 was eventually made into a separate branch, called D Branch, in September 
1916, because the colonial work had grown to such an extent that it warranted the 
formation of a specialised branch to handle it. The work remained the same as 
before, plus correspondence with the Eastern Mediterranean Special Intelligence 
Bureau (EMSIB), which had been set up at Alexandria to undertake counter­
espionage work in Egypt in co-operation with MIS?6 As Sheffy explains, in 
23 Ibid., p.6. 

24 TNA, KVlII5, pp.53-54. There had also been an Afrikaner rising in September 1914 involving 

former die-hard bitter-enders like De La Rey and De Wet. 

25 TNA, KVlII5, p.7. 

26 TNA, KVlII9, pp.6-7. 
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February 1916, Holt-Wilson had conducted a tour of the region, leading to the 
formation of EMSIB one month later?7 
As an example of MIS's advisory role, in December 1915, Hall went to Malta to 
assess the situation there. Having consulted the senior officials concerned, he 
prepared a plan of organisation, in which he stressed the importance of keeping all 
branches under a single roof, and of setting up a direct telephone link via cable-
lines between the central bureau and its sources of information. Soon after his 
return to the UK, Hall sent his secretary, Miss Hodgson, to Malta to organise the 
working of the new bureau. She arrived on 17 January 1916 and succeeded in 
putting the clerical, secretarial and registry work on similar lines to MI5.28 
The principles of D Branch's organisation were that the 'duties of the several 
Branch sections had from the first been apportioned according to geographical 
areas and race divisions. These principles were followed in the formation and 
development of D. Branch,?9 
MIS's list of staff for 11 December 1916 shows that D Branch had eight members 
of staff, including three officers and five secretaries.3o The head of D Branch, 
Major F. Hall, of the General Staff, joined MIS on 7 December 1914, having 
27 Y. Sheffy, 'British Intelligence and the Middle East, 1900-1918: How Much Do We Know?', 

Intelligence and National Security, VoU7, No.1 (Spring 2002), pA5. See also TNA, KVlI17, 'D 

Branch Report. Imperial Overseas Intelligence. Vol. III. Eastern Mediterranean Section and 

Appendices', 1921, an MI5 report on EMSIB. 

28 TNA, KVlII5, pp.91-93. 

29 TNA, KVl/19, p.5. 

30 TNA, KV 1152, p.2l. 
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served in the Royal Garrison Artillery (RGA).3! Before heading D Branch, he had 
served as a section officer with G3.32 
MIS's distribution of duties of February 1917 gave D Branch's duties as a whole 
as: 
"the co-ordination of Imperial Counter-Espionage", this included both 
Colonial and Irish affairs.3 
Following the discovery of the aid that Germany had given to Ireland in 
connection with the rebellion of April 1916, the Irish work of MIS had assumed 
greater importance. By February 1917, as well as working with G Branch in the 
investigation of cases of espionage and sedition in Ireland, D Branch had also 
become concerned with the examination of intercepted correspondence related to 
Colonial or Irish-American affairs. It worked with the Home Office and other 
Government Departments on subjects linked to German-Irish-American intrigues; 
it also handled Irish intelligence reports, in co-operation with GHQ Home 
Forces.34 
An MI5 file on Eamon de Valera provides an example of D Branch's role in the 
censorship of Irish correspondence. The postal censorship (MI9) intercepted a 
letter from A. Ginnell, the honorary secretary of the Pearse memorial committee, 
in Dublin, to de Valera, then imprisoned in Lincoln for his leading role in the 
31 Ibid., p.46; TNA, KV1I59, pA. 

n TNA, KV1I52, pp.2-3. 

33 TNA, KV1119, p.7. Little has been said about what actually happened on the ground in the 

Colonies themselves, because this was the work of the local counter-espionage officials there and 

thus outside the work of D Branch. 
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Easter Rising, asking de Valera's permission to add his name to an appeal for 
funds for a Pearse memorial. The deputy assistant censor (DAC) felt that this 
appeal 'may be considered undesirable' and, on 27 August 1918, MI9A requested 
D Branch's advice whether the letter should proceed. Hall's reply to MI9A was 
pragmatic: 
I should be inclined to let the letter go on - so as to obviate a "grievance" 
and let Irish Govt. know through H.O. 
One more name on the list of patrons wont hurt and they will put De 
Valera's name on anyhow.35 
The short-lived B Branch, which dealt with questions affecting natives of India 
and other Oriental races, was absorbed by D Branch on 1 September 1917, 
thereby increasing the scope ofD Branch's work.36 In the distribution of duties of 
October 1917: 
D. Branch was then divided into three sections, each with one or more 
officers, subordinate to the Head of the Branch, and with its own secretary 
and clerical staff. Besides the general duties performed by B. and D .... the 
work apportioned to the Branch as a whole and to each section 
individually was as follows:­
D. 	 Co-ordination of Imperial Special Intelligence services in the 
Overseas Dominions, India and the Colonies; Correspondence with 
the Dominions, India and the Colonies by letter and cable; 
Collection and communication of Special Intelligence affecting the 
Dominions, India and the Colonies. 
Co-operation with Colonial Office. 
Investigation of cases of espionage and sedition m Ireland in 
consultation with G. 
34 TNA, KVIII9, p.S. 

35 TNA, KV2/S15, MIS report on intercepted letter from Ginnell to de Valera, 29 August 1915. 

36 TNA, KV1/19, p.S. 
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Co-operation with Home Office and other Government 
Departments on matters connected with German-Irish-American 
intrigues. 
Ciphers. 
Dl. 	 Irish-American Affairs. Examination of censored letters or 
intercepted correspondence dealing therewith. 
Irish Intelligence Reports and co-operation with G.H.Q., H.F. 
thereon. 
Questions affecting Ireland. 
D2. Colonial Affairs, general correspondence with the Colonies. 
Questions affecting the Dominions and Colonies except Wei-Hai­
Wei, Hong Kong, Sarawak, North Borneo, Labuan, Straits 
Settlements, Ceylon, Aden and Egypt. 
D3. Oriental Affairs. Investigation (in consultation with G) and all 
correspondence regarding suspected espionage, sedition and 
treachery among Asiatics and Egyptians. Co-operation with India 
Office. Questions affecting India, the Middle East and the Colonies 
excepted from D.2.37 
MIS's list of staff for 22 October 1917 is slightly confusing. It shows that the head 
of D Branch was Hall and that he was assisted by two secretaries. D 1 comprised 
one officer and two secretaries. D2 is not listed, but it is probably a typing error, 
hence the confusion. D3 consisted of two officers with two secretaries. Thus, it is 
not possible to say how many staff D Branch employed at that time for certain.38 
However, it seems fair to assume that D2 probably had three or four staff, in 
which case, D Branch employed thirteen or fourteen members of staff at that time; 
being an increase of five or six staff compared to the total for December 1916. 
37 Ibid., pp.8-1O. 
3& TNA, KV 1/52, p.34. 
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Two further sections, D4 and D5, were added in October 1918, because MIS had 
established direct communication with the Special Intelligence Missions in allied 
countries, such as those at Washington and in Rome. D4 was given the duty of the 
co-ordination of these missions. D5 assumed responsibility for codes and ciphers, 
despatching telegrams, apart from those to MCOs in neutral countries (sent 
through MIlc) and inland telegrams sent en clair, and for the receipt and 
distribution of code and cipher telegrams. This code and cipher work had always 
formed part ofD Branch's duties.39 
The Near East and Far East sections were also re-arranged, with the transfer of 
work concerning suspects or seditious movements in, or connected with, the Near 
East from D3 to D2. This comprised the former Ottoman Empire (save 
Mesopotamia) and the countries of North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. 
The Far East sub-section, dealing with the activities of Japanese, Chinese and 
Siamese worldwide, remained with D3.40 
Until autumn 1918 the CSIB functioned as the clearing-house. However, as the 
work grew, the more important Colonial links frequently requested that they 
should also be able to correspond directly with each other. Having overcome the 
difficulty of finding a suitable cipher which could be used by all, on 19 September 
1918, some of D Branch's correspondents were put, with their agreement, in 
direct communication with each other, thereby enabling an interchange of 
information about suspects. MI5 equipped them with a special cipher and code, 
39 TNA, KV1119, p.IO. 

40 Ibid., pp.lO-ll. Japan was an ally, but may welJ have been regarded with growing reservations. 
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and they were to send copies of the reports that they exchanged to MI5 for its 
records. Australia, South Africa, Canada, New Zealand, Malta, Egypt, India, 
Singapore, Trinidad and Nairobi were included in these new arrangements, as 
well as the MCOs in charge of passport and travel control at Tokyo and New 
York, and the British Military Missions in Rome and Washington. This scheme 
was named the 'A' circulation, and unanimously approved by those involved.41 
By November 1918 D Branch had nineteen members of staff, comprising seven 
officers and twelve secretaries; a further five or six compared with a year earlier. 
The branch's growth illustrates the development of both preventive and detective 
work from a concern solely with Ireland to all external matters.42 
As each sub-section of D Branch was formed a separate section of MIS's central 
Registry was also created to handle its papers. Every section had its own card 
index, as well as the Registry's own general indices, and a specially selected H2 
worker was given responsibility for these files. By November 1918 D Branch's 
subject files were grouped into Indian and Oriental matters, Far East, and Near 
Several of D Branch's officers were chosen because they had experience in India 
and the Colonies and thus were thought to understand the local conditions there 
and 'the peculiarities of race and nomenclature,.44 Mr S. Newby, of D3, joined 
41 TNA, KVlII9, pp.20-21; TNA, KVlII5, p.19. 
42 TNA, KVlII9, pp.4 & 11-12. 

43 Ibid., pp.l2-13. 

44 Ibid., pp.l4-15. 
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MIS on 28 January 1916, having served with the Indian pOlice.45 By February 
1917 he was working in B Branch, moving to D Branch when it absorbed B 
Branch.46 
'By degrees the objects set forth in the Colonial Office circular memorandum 
came to be achieved.' In all of the Self-Governing Dominions and Colonies 
I means for collecting intelligence and passing it on were provided, 'so that it was 
,• 
I 
I 	 hardly possible for the movements of an enemy agent to escape observation'. 
Measures for the prevention of espionage were implemented, particularly for the 
•• 
.. 
control of ports, and much benefit was gained from comparing Colonial wartime 
legislation with the DORA and ARA. Connections were instituted between D~. 
•
.. Branch and all parts of the Empire, even the remotest ones, and the benefit of 
!i 
establishing cordial personal relations with the overseas authorities was proven.47~ ~ 
Hiley describes this advisory role of D Branch, noting how Kell and Holt-Wilson 
also supervised the formation of counter-espionage organisations throughout the 
Empire.48 An official report from October 1917 outlined how the branch served as 
a central clearing-house for the interchange of all information regarding enemy 
activities outside the area of military operations: 
The head of M.I.5. corresponds unofficially with all the Departments of 
the Home Government and has established direct personal relations with 
some official in each of the Dominions charged with duties of an 
analogous character. All these, at home and abroad, exchange information 
with the central office, while the officials in the Dominions to some extent 
45 TNA, KV1I52, p.60; TNA, KV1I59, p.7. 

46 TNA, KV1I52, p.51.

47 TNA, KV1I19, pp.19-20. 

48 Hiley, 'Counter-Espionage and Security in Great Britain during the First World War', p.648. 
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model their local policy and procedure upon that adopted in the United 
Kingdom.49 
The Colonial Governors or their representatives were invited to visit MIS 
whenever they had the opportunity, and those who did were shown the work done 
and the office system was fully explained to them.so Acting upon Kell's 
suggestion, the DMI wrote to the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) India, on 18 
January 1918, inviting consideration of the question of counter-espionage in India. 
The DMI proposed that a carefully selected officer should be attached to MIS for 
three months to gain an understanding of counter-espionage work in the UK, 
before moving on to take charge of the new counter-espionage section in India. 
Lieutenant-Colonel S.F. Muspratt DSO, ofthe lzth Cavalry, at that time serving as 
the Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General with the Cavalry Corps in 
France, was chosen, reporting for duty at MIS on 22 June 1918.51 
The constant exchange of information led to useful results. All of the Self-
Governing Dominions, apart from Newfoundland, and India, Egypt and the more 
important Colonies were given MI5's black list and the circulars amending it, and 
warnings about forged passports and such general subjects and the activities of 
Indian seditionists and of particular missionary and other societies, which MIS 
was convinced were German agencies, were passed on whenever necessary. 52 On 
8 January 1916 Andrew Bonar Law, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
49 TNA, INF4/9, pAl. 

50 TNA, KVlI19. p.20. 

51 TNA, KVlII5, pp.70-72 & 80. 

S2 TNA, KV1119, p.20. 
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transmitted a memorandum concerning the activities of German agents in the UK, 
which had been prepared by Drake, warning that: 
It has come to notice that German Agents coming to this country, many of 
whom are of neutral nationality, have now adopted the method of 
pretending to give information [particularly in connection with explosives 
and inventions] to various Government Departments about enemy trade or 
kindred subjects. By this means they hope to obtain some official letter 
from an officer of the Department concerned which, it is anticipated, will 
serve as some sort of laissez-passer to them in their visits to the various 
centres which are of interest to them .... 53 
To give an example of the links established, on 6 March 1917 the Governor-
General of Australia sent a telegram, through the Colonial Office, suggesting that 
the bona fides of Miss Emilie L.C.D. Rundle should be investigated. On 12 April 
1917 section G2 of MIS replied to the Colonial Office that: 
the bona fides of Miss Rundle may be regarded as sufficiently established, 
and that the suspicious acts mentioned in the telegram of the Governor 
General of Australia would appear to be capable of explanation from Miss 
Rundle's eccentricity and want of balance, of which both her solicitor and 
banker speak. 54 
The available evidence suggests that D Branch succeeded in managing to run such 
a worldwide system. When there were no direct links, it was arranged for 
infornlation to be passed on to MI5 via other War Office Departments or the 
Foreign Office. Therefore, MIS was in a position to obtain information about 
German activities in even the most remote comers of the globe, 'from Peru to the 
Dutch East Indies and the Islands of the Pacific', and 'a watch was kept on 
53 TNA, C0854/169, circular letter, and accompanying memorandum concerning the activities of 
German agents in the UK by Drake, from Andrew Bonar Law to Colonial Governors, 8 January 
1916. 
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German propaganda through missionaries or otherwise in every continent' .55 On 
10 August 1918 the Governor-General of Australia forwarded a copy of a letter 
from the native king of the Loyalty Islands, concerning a suspected German spy, 
to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.56 
Better known and more certainly a success was the Chakravarty case. Dr Chandra 
Kanta Chakravarty, a Bengali, and Ernst Sekunna, a close German friend of his, 
were arrested by the New York Police in New York in March 1917 and charged 
with conspiring for an attack on India through China, and using false passports. 
They admitted receiving $60,000 from Germany through Wolf von Igel, secretary 
to the German Military Attache in the USA, Captain von Papen. Their arrests led 
to great developments, and in July 1917 ninety-seven people were indicted in 
connection with this case by the Grand Jury at San Francisco. On 30 April 1918 
sentences from thirty days to two years, with substantial fines in many cases, were 
passed on thirty-two of them. The judge spoke of the inadequacy of these 
sentences, two years being the maximum that the law would allow. The evidence 
had been prepared by D3 in connection with the India Office, and two MI5 
officials went to America to assist with the case.57 
Similarly, in January 1917, an intercepted letter, which MI5 forwarded to SIB 
Melbourne, led to the Australian SIB's discovery that an Irish organisation, the 
54 TNA, C04181166, pp.45-51, letter and accompanying reports regarding an investigation into the 

bona fides of Miss E.L.C.D. Rundle, from MI5 to Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, 

12 Apri11917. 

55 TNA, KV1/19, p.13. 

S6 TNA, C04181170, pp.I08-III, letter forwarding a copy ofa letter from the native king of the 

Loyalty Islands, regarding a suspected German spy, 10 August 1918. 

57 TNA, KV 1119, pp.I3-14; Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence, pp.248-25I. 
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Irish National Association, with revolutionary and pro-German aims, whose 
leaders were members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, had existed in 
Australia since the beginning of 1916. Established in Melbourne, Sydney and 
Brisbane, the Irish National Association's object was the establishment of an 
independent Irish Republic, to be achieved by force with German assistance. It 
was discovered that money was being collected in Australia to assist armed 
rebellion in Ireland and sent to America to be transmitted to Germany for the 
purchase of war material. Intercepted letters showed that a request had been made 
from America that Germany should be provided with the names of Irish enemy 
sympathisers in Australia. The Australian SIB prepared a report on seditious Irish 
societies in the Commonwealth for the Government, resulting in the internment of 
seven of the leaders of the Irish seditionary movement on 19 June 1918.58 
D Branch's worldwide role demonstrates just how far MIS had evolved by the end 
ofthe war from its humble beginnings in 1909. As Holt-Wilson told his audience 
in a lecture delivered in 1934: 
Our Security Service is more than national, it is Imperial. We have official 
agencies co-operating with us, under the direct instructions of the 
Dominion and Colonial Offices and the supervision of the local 
Governors, and their chiefs of police, for enforcing local Security Laws in 
every British community overseas. 59 
D Branch's function also says much about MIS's role; particularly its lack of 
executive powers, such that much of its work was in directing the actions of other 
58 TNA, KV1115, pp.37-38; TNA, C04181170, pp.138-142, letter regarding the internment of 

seven members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, from Governor-General of Australia to 

Secretary of State for the Colonies, 29 August 1918. 

59 IWM, Kell MSS, Holt-Wilson, 'Security Intelligence in War', p.12. 
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agencies. In this sense, D Branch was the brain that stored information and co­
ordinated the other parts of the imperial counter-espionage body, which served as 
the eyes, ears, arms and legs to provide the brain with information and execute its 
directives. D Branch's work thus set the pattern of MIS's interest and concern in 
the colonial Empire until decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s: with MIS's 
overseas representatives, known as Defence Security Officers CDSO) where there 
were British garrisons and Security Liaison Officers (SLO) elsewhere, being 
posted throughout much of the Empire and in some allied states.60 
60 N. West, A Matter ofTrust: MI5 1945-72 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982), pp.l3 & 19. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: A BRANCH: ALIEN 

WORKERS 

The beginning of September 1914 experienced an influx of Belgian refugees, as 
thousands who had been made homeless by the German invasion fled to Britain. 1 
The first party of 437 refugees arrived on 6 September 1914. In addition, by the 
beginning of October it was estimated that 2,000-2,500 Polish and Russian Jews 
from Belgium had also settled in England? The sheer number of refugees made 
providing them with accommodation difficult.3 Acting in concert with the Local 
Government Board, Sub-Committees of the War Refugees Committee were 
formed to provide suitable accommodation for these Belgians. They were sent to 
areas that had been selected with the approval of the local police. Areas prohibited 
by the ARA were declared unsuitable. However, due to the sheer number of 
refugees the Local Government Board had to take accommodation wherever it 
was available. This was deemed undesirable for military reasons and the War 
Office raised this issue with the Local Government Board. A conference was held 
1 TNA, KV1113, p.3l. This chapter relies heavily on MI5 and Home Office records. The available 

material from the Ministry of Munitions regarding this subject is notably disappointing. Indeed, 

the three most relevant sounding reports catalogued by TNA are described as "wanting" (lost prior 

to transfer to rNA): TNA, MUN5/78/327/1: report and notes on alien labour, September 1915; 

TNA, MUN5/78/327/3: report of committee appointed to consider reception and employment of 

Belgian refugees, December 1914; TNA, MUN5/78/327/8: memorandum on conditions for aliens 

employed on munitions work, n.d. 

2 Sellers, Shot in the Tower, p.l2. 

3 TNA, KVII13, p.3l. 
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at the Local Government Board in November 1914, the Admiralty, Home Office 
and War Office being represented, which decided: 
1. Where Belgian refugees were not to settle. 
2. Arrangements for investigation of identity and bona fides. 
3. An organisation was to be set up for the reception of refugees to ensure 
that undesirables should be excluded from amongst those arriving from 
Holland. 
4. Refugees not to be employed on munitions or public works such as 
railways, unless properly vouched for. 4 
Exceptions regarding where Belgians could not live were granted in favour of 
cases where they were related to people already living in prohibited areas, 
employed on munitions or by government contract companies, and wounded or 
convalescing soldiers on leave.5 An Order in Council promUlgating these 
conditions was issued on 28 November 1914.6 
The question of finding jobs for the Belgian refugees came to the fore soon after 
they arrived. In order to avoid competition with British workers, both Belgian and 
British labour were to be paid at the same rate. Companies already employing 
alien workers had to submit their employees' names to the War Office (MIS), 
which sent special Belgian investigators to check their bona fides. It was also 
agreed that prospective workers had to be taken on via the labour exchanges and 
that MIS would examine them. All Aliens employed on confidential work were 
4 Ibid., p.32. MI5's view was that 'no measure short of official registration will serve to detect the 
presence among genuine refugees of undesirable persons who may have come to this country for 
the purpose of espionage or from other improper motive'. TNA, H045110737/261921, folder 172, 
B.B. Cubitt (War Office) to Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office, regarding the security 

problems posed by Belgian refugees, 18 November 1914. 

5 TNA, KV1I13, pp.32-33. 

6 Ibid., pp.31-32; TNA, KV1I14, '''A'' Branch Report. Summary', 1921, p.6. See TNA, KVl/13, 

'Appendix A, War Office Memorandum of Policy with regard to Belgian Refugees'; TNA, 

KVII13, 'Appendix A2, Order in Council, No 1700, November 1914'. 
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made to clearly understand that they were not permitted to leave the UK for the 
duration of the war, and employers were made to supply details of the kind of 
work of any alien worker who applied for permission to leave the UK. 7 
The work of munitions factories was vital to the war effort and, when accidents 
hindered production, suspicion fell on the Belgian refugees and other aliens 
working there. 8 As it was deemed advisable to take precautions to prevent enemy 
agents masquerading as imported foreign workers, on 15 December 1915 a 
conference was convened where it was proposed to transfer the Belgian staff 
employed by MI5 to the Ministry of Munitions. This was done by the beginning 
of March 1916, and the new organisation was labelled MMLI (Ministry of 
Munitions Labour Intelligence). As the initials MMLI 'were thought to give the 
work too much away they were afterwards camouflaged', and it acquired the new 
name PMS2 (Parliamentary Military Secretary, Section Number 2).9 
Following a wave of strikes on Clyde side in early 1916, owing to the effect that 
strikes had on munitions output, PMS2 assumed a growing interest in general 
labour unrest. As alien workers were deemed an important cause, PMS2 started to 
enquire if industrial unrest was receiving money from Germany or radical British 
groups. 10 
7 TNA, KVlI13, p.33. 

8 See, for example, Le Queux, German Spies in England, p.187. 

9 TNA, KV 11 13 , pp.33-34. 

10 Andrew, Secret Service, pp.194-195; TNA, KVlI13, p.34. The Commission of Enquiry into 

Industrial Unrest later reported that the main cause of discontent was that 'the cost of living has 

increased disproportionately to the advance in wages, and that the distribution of food supplies is 

unequal'. There was no evidence of any German influence behind industrial unrest. TNA, 

MUN5/49/300/34, 'Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest. Summary of the Reports by the 

Right Hon. G.N. Barnes, M.P.', 17 July 1917, pp.4-7. 
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On 30 March 1916 an Order in Council establishing conditions under which alien 
workers could be engaged was produced. The Aliens Restriction (Consolidation) 
Order, 1916, contained Article 22A regarding aliens engaged on munitions work. 
In effect, it meant that an alien could not perform munitions work unless 
permission had been obtained from the Minister of Munitions and he possessed an 
identity book attesting to this. Firms were not to employ an alien on munitions if 
this Order prohibited him from doing so. Employers were also duty bound to 
bring these provisions to the notice of any aliens they employed. 1I 
The Ministry of Labour made representations that PMS2's interest in general 
labour unrest might lead to the possibility of friction and was not a legitimate role 
for the Ministry of Munitions. 12 Whereupon, the question arose about MI5 re­
assuming some ofPMS2's duties and taking on some of the personnel. However, 
MIS's role was not to go beyond the initial investigation and decision about the 
bona fides of alien workers. It was not to assume responsibility for the later 
actions of these aliens, or the general safety of munitions factories. Crucially, all 
cases suggesting direct or indirect enemy influence were to be handed to MIS, as 
previously. J3 
It was suggested that only subordinate officials who had been solely employed in 
administering AR022A were to be taken on by MIS, with all existing records of 
aliens. It was also deemed necessary for an officer of the Ministry of Munitions to 
11 TNA, KV1I13, 'Appendix B, Aliens Restriction Order, March 1916', p.87. 
12 TNA, KVlII3, p.38. 
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be attached as a liaison officer to MI5, to help with enquiries concerning the 
credentials of aliens as set out in AR022A. 14 It was urged that, if the transfer was 
decided upon, offices should be taken as near to Waterloo House as possible, so 
that MIS could take suitable control. I5 A memorandum setting out these 
suggestions was put to Dr Addison, then parliamentary under-secretary at the 
Ministry of Munitions and later Minister of Munitions. On 3 April 1917 he 
informed Colonel Labouchere of PMS2 that he was going to invite MI5 to take on 
the part of the work concerning the organisation of controlled establishments for 
checking the bona fides of alien workers plus the administration of AR022A in 
partnership with the Ministry of Munitions, and to ask Scotland Yard to carry out 
the rest. 16 
The Home Office outlined this division of labour between MIS and the Special 
Branch in a circular to chief constables: 
M.I.SA will not however deal with certain matters hitherto dealt with by 
P.M.S.2, viz. (1) strikes, (2) labour unrest generally or (3) sabotage, except 
in so far as questions of enemy agency may be involved. Any suggestion 
of enemy agency should be carefully investigated by the Police, and if 
there appears to be evidence of such agency, M.I.SA should be 
communicated with. 
All reports with regard to (1) strikes, (2) impending strikes and labour 
unrest generally and (3) sabotage should in future be sent to the Home 
Office who will forward them to the Department or Departments 
concerned. 17 
13 Ibid., pp.38-39. 

14 Ibid., p.39. See TNA, KVlII3, 'Appendix D, Aliens Restriction Order', 1918. 

15 TNA, KVlI13, p.39. 

16 Ibid., pp.39-40. See TNA, KV1113, 'Appendix E, Memorandum laid before Dr Addison', 3 

April 1917. For Thomson's perspective see Thomson, Queer People, p.269; Thomson, The Scene 

Changes, p.312. 

17 TNA, H045/10809/311425, folder 39, Home Office circular to chief constables, 18 May 1917. 

These reports were to be sent to the Home Office, as it was deemed undesirable that it should 

become known that the Special Branch dealt with such matters. TNA H045/1 0809/311425, folder 
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This transfer of PMS2' s labour intelligence work to Special Branch, rather than 
MI5, has been viewed as a victory for Thomson and defeat for Kell. 18 However, in 
a minute to Cockerill, dated 18 January 1917, to accompany Major Sealy Clarke's 
comprehensive report on PMS2, Kell included the following points, explaining his 
attitude to labour intelligence: 
Now that this organisation has rightly shed their investigations regarding 
strikes and Labour troubles to Scotland Yard, they now confine their 
activities to Counter-Espionage, sabotage and the investigation generally 
of the bona fides of aliens employed in Munition Works (controlled). 19 
This suggests an alternative interpretation, that Kell actually did not want MI5 to 
be involved in gathering labour intelligence. 
On 21 April 1917 Mr Wolff of the Ministry of Munitions informed Kell of the 
Minister's decision and the transfer was from 23 April 1917.20 This required an 
Order in Council to amend AR022A, to provide the Admiralty and the Army 
Council with similar powers to the Ministry of Munitions.21 A memorandum was 
put to the Home Secretary by Order of the Army Council: 
It was made clear that the proposed amendment was not to be restricted to 
aliens working on munitions of war but was intended to cover many other 
forms of auxiliary and non-combatant war service, such as were open to 
aliens serving under voluntary war organisations officially subject to 
supervision by the Army Council. In short the general intention of the 
39, minute by Moylan, regarding this new Order, 27 April 1917. Reports of sabotage were passed 

on to the Home Office, Scotland Yard or MI5 via the Special Services Branch of the Ministry of 

Munitions Secretariat. TNA, BT6617, 'Memorandum to Heads of Departments on Procedure in 

Cases of Sabotage', by W.G.G., 25 October 1918. 

18 Smith, The Spying Game, p.77. 

19 TNA, KV1I13, Appendix C. 'Minute. B.M. passed to D.S.I. 18.1.17', p.89. 

20 TNA, KVII13, p.40. 

21 Ibid. 

289 

proposed amendment was to extend the system of formal approval to all 
aliens seeking employment in any kind of war service which might offer 
them special opportunities for espionage or mischief if evilly disposed.22 
The new Order in Council was issued on 22 April 1917.23 It allowed the powers 
granted to the Ministry of Munitions to be exercised on the Minister's behalf by 
any individual or individuals he deputed for the purpose, and made the alterations 
needed to make the Principal Order apply to the various types of work set out in 
the memorandum?4 The administration of this Order was undertaken by MIS 
(W ar Office) as of 23 April 1917 and a special branch (A Branch) was founded to 
deal with this new Order and the existing control of munitions work being 
undertaken by aliens?5 
A Branch took over PMS2's offices in Durham House, 16 John's Street, Adelphi, 
London. PMS2 had worked in conjunction with F Branch, of which A Branch can 
be considered an offshoot. Some of PMS2's staff were taken on by A Branch?6 
Captain F.H.L. Stevenson was placed in charge of A Branch. Formerly of the 
Highland Light Infantry, Stevenson joined MIS on 16 March 1917 but left shortly 
afterwards on 23 July 1917.27 His duties were general supervision, 
interdepartmental correspondence and decisions over questions of control. A 
Branch's distribution of duties for June 1917 was as follows: 
22 Ibid., pp.40-4l. See TNA KVlII3, 'Appendix K, Army Council Instruction No. 1640 of 1917'; 

TNA, H045110809/311425, folder 47, letter from Kell to Moylan, regarding the drafting of this 

new Order, July 1917; & TNA, H045110809/311425, folder 47, minute by Moylan, concerning 

the drafting of this new Order, 31 July 1917. 

23 See, 'Aliens in Munition Factories. Employers' Responsibility', The Times, 24 April 1917, p.3. 

24 TNA, KV1113, pAl. 

25 Ibid., pA2. 

26 Ibid. 

27 TNA, KV1I59, p.l3. 
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(1). Inspection of the proofs of nationality of all aliens employed or 
desirous of being employed in the manufacture of munitions of war, with a 
view to granting or withholding permission to work on munitions. 
(2). Registration of all aliens so employed and of their movements from 
one factory to another. 
(3) . Examination of all applications by alien munition workers for permits 
to leave the United Kingdom.28 
A Branch took on forty-four members of staff of PMS2 from 23 April 1917, 
comprising four officers, four male clerks and thirty-six women clerks. Two of the 
officers, Baron Sadoine and Monsieur Beer, both Belgians, were taken over by A 
Branch specifically to deal with their countrymen. Captain Stevenson was also 
one of the four officers taken over from PMS2?9 
The procedure up to 1917 had been as follows. The identity papers that aliens 
carried when they arrived in the UK were confiscated. They were then replaced 
with Provisional Certificates of Nationality. These were endorsed with the PWM 
(Permission to Work on Munitions) stamp if the holder had permission to work on 
munitions.3o 
Although aliens could be employed by firms performing confidential and vital 
work; they were not engaged on secret work, such as tanks, 'or anything that was 
to be sprung on the Enemy as a surprise'. Aliens were also not allowed to work in 
Admiralty shipyards. However, they were sometimes engaged on confidential 
28 TNA, KVlI13, pp.42-43. 

29 TNA, KVlI13, 'Appendix H, StaffofPMS2, 23 April 1917', p.142. 

30 TNA, KVlI13, p. 43. See TNA, KVlI13, 'Appendix Q, Endorsement and Cancellation Stamps 

used by PMS2 and MI5(a)', pp.176-180, for an explanation of how this system worked and 

examples ofPWM endorsement and cancellation stamps. 
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work such as assembling fuses and work involved with glass-blowing, because 
there was a shortage of workers with these skills.3! 
The PWM stamp was cancelled when permission to leave the UK was given.32 
Control was enforced at the ports, where aliens whose PWM stamp was 
discovered not to have been properly cancelled were held and their certificates 
forwarded to MI5 for cancellation.33 
The system in use in A Branch's Registry, which had been inherited from PMS2, 
was unsatisfactory. Therefore, Miss Harrison, of H2, inaugurated a new system, 
that was approved by Kell, on 7 June 1917.34 On 16 July 1917 Major H.E. 
Spencer took over A Branch from Captain Stevenson.35 On 28 July 1917 A 
Branch moved from Durham House to 5 Cork Street, Burlington Gardens, 
London.36 
The amendments to the Aliens Restriction Bill, suggested by MI5, caused A 
Branch's work to increase. The increasing demand to import alien workers 
necessitated extra provisions. Visas were still given when permits were granted to 
prospective employers. However all aliens from neutral countries were made to 
sign a declaration to stay in the UK for the war's duration. This encompassed 
virtually all imported alien workers. The attention of employers and social and 
31 TNA, KVlII3, p.29. 
32 TNA, KVlII4, p.ll. 
33 TNA, KVlII3, p.44. 
34 Ibid. See TNA, KVlII3, 'Appendix I, Miss Harrison'S Report (New System of Registry)' 7 June 
1917. 
35 TNA, KVlII3, p.44. 
36 Ibid. 
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benevolent organisations that worked closely with the army and navy was brought 
to the point that no alien could be employed on any kind of auxiliary war service 
without the Army Council's authorisation.37 
On 26 August 1917 Major J. Sealy Clarke took over A Branch from Major 
Spencer, who returned to E Branch as its head.38 Having served with the Wiltshire 
Regiment, Sealy Clarke joined MIS on 18 March 1915, leaving on 1 February 
1919.39 He worked in F Branch, before being appointed head of A Branch, and he 
left to become head ofG Branch on 15 April 1918.40 Throughout September 1917 
much preparation was undertaken in anticipation of the Order of the Home 
Secretary widening the scope of Article 22A of the Aliens Restriction Bill, and 
transferring its administration to the Army Counci1.4! 
On 9 October 1917 the Order was issued.42 A Home Office circular was sent to 
chief constables. 43 At MIS's instance it included a request for the police to inform 
MIS of any breaches of the Order that they came across.44 A circular letter was 
sent to all firms involved with munitions, informing them of the alterations to the 
administration of the Order.45 It was then found necessary to re-draft the 
memorandum concerning the conditions allowing aliens to work on munitions, to 
37 Ibid., pp.44-45. 

38 Ibid., p.45. 

39 TNA, KV1I59, p.5. 

40 TNA, KV1I52, pp.3, 11,59 & 66. 

41 TNA, KVlI13, p.45. 

42 Ibid. See TNA, KVlI13, 'Appendix G, Appendix II amending Article 22A, ARO, 22 August 

1917' . 

43 The Home Office circulated a copy of this new Order in Council to chief constables, 15 

September 1917. TNA, H045110809/311425, folder 54. 

44 TNA, KVlI13, pp.45-46. 
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make firms employ aliens only through the employment exchanges, so reducing 
the volume of necessary correspondence with A Branch. The conditions regarding 
the importing of alien labour started to become stricter when the 
Interdepartmental Committee decided to deny permission to import an alien 
unless their services were ofnational importance.46 
The need for the PWM stamp to be officially cancelled before an alien was 
permitted to leave the UK was demonstrated in the case of some Dutch 
glassblowers who had been recruited in Holland. Two of them worked at the 
Sheraton Glass Works and were persuaded to leave their employers by Madame 
Bolderman, a Russian woman, who paid each of them £20 to do so; her professed 
intention was to recruit them for private work in South Africa. When they 
attempted to embark at Liverpool, these men were stopped by the port control and 
passed to A Branch who did not allow them to leave the UK. This example also 
shows how A Branch worked with, and relied upon, E Branch. Another case, 
which illustrates the danger of private recruiting, was that of four Dutch 
glassblowers for whom Strachan, Osmell and Co. Ltd., London, acting for the 
Department of Mines and Industries, South Africa, asked the Colonial Office to 
provide help in getting permission for the four to go to South Africa. In concert 
with the Ministry of Munitions, A Branch withheld permission due to the want of 
glassblowers in the UK. It would also establish an unwanted practice if private 
45 Ibid., p.46. See TNA, KVlI13, 'Appendix L, Press Notice: Procedure Necessary for 

Endorsement in Identity Book', 10 October 1917. 

46 TNA, KVlI13, p.46. 
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recruiting of skilled workers for commercial work abroad, who were still needed 
for important work, was permitted.47 
As their departures were obviously hurried, it was decided not to require the 
cancellation of the PWM stamp of recalled Belgian soldiers and alien civilians 
called up to serve in the armed forces. Therefore, their identity books were taken 
at the ports and passed on to A Branch to complete its records.48 
The new national service or internment scheme appeared to provide chances for 
enemy aliens to find employment with companies undertaking secret and 
important work. The case of August Espenschied, a German, revealed an obvious 
defect in this scheme to make alien enemies productive. Espenschied was sent to 
Romford by the Sub-Area Substitution Officer as a substitution volunteer for an 
English worker at the Thames Haven Oil Works. This firm was not on the list of 
controlled firms or contractors given to A Branch and its workers escaped the 
watchful eye of A Branch. Espenschied had seen much at the works that he should 
not have before it was realised that he was an un-naturalised German.49 
The Admiralty's policy regarding the checking of the bona fides of aliens working 
for firms where Admiralty interests predominated was unclear. An instance of 
non-compliance at the Rolls Royce works gave, with the Espenschied case, the 
chance to broach this issue. Mr Evans of the Admiralty Law Branch was written 
to semi-officially, to ascertain if the Admiralty would take A Branch's 
47 The two cases are covered in ibid., p.47. 
48 Ibid., pAS. 
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endorsement of an alien's identity book to be an acceptable guarantee of his 
suitability for employment. In December 1917 the Admiralty made its policy 
clear. Evans stated that, as well as A Branch's endorsement, whenever Admiralty 
interests dominated, firms also had to gain the Admiralty's agreement to employ 
aliens.5o 
A Branch also made representations to the Air Board about the employment of 
aliens connected with aeroplane construction. The Air Board proposed to submit a 
list of the companies where aliens or individuals of enemy origin should not work 
to A Branch, and it was suggested to the Air Board that their contracts for certain 
types of work should have a clause that these individuals should not be engaged 
on those jobS.51 
An MI5 report provides an example of the policy adopted in a weak case. The 
police commenced the prosecution of a firm that had contravened AR022A, 
having not referred to the War Office. As this case was rather weak, the Chief 
Constable concerned was urged to drop it, and the Home Office was asked to 
notify chief constables that it was undesirable for prosecutions to occur without 
consulting the War Office, as it could easily happen that the firm's production 
might suffer, and also that it was desirable that the Ministry of Munitions should 
always be consulted regarding the policy of prosecuting a particular company. 52 
This demonstrates how compromises had to be reached between the often 
49 Ibid. 

50 Ibid., pp.48-49 & 51-52. 

51 Ibid., p.5l. 

52 Ibid. 
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conflicting demands of providing jobs for aliens, so that they would not be left to 
eat the bread of idleness, the need to find workers for munitions factories, so that 
essential production would not suffer, and counter-espionage. 
The Ministry of National Service, assisted by the police, attempted to put Austrian 
Jews on munitions work without the approval of the War Office or Ministry of 
Labour. A Branch pursued this matter and they were moved to rubber factories 
doing unimportant work; and their identity books were marked for these specific 
factories only.53 This renewed the issue of releasing alien enemies for 
employment in munitions, and the Home Office was told that it was deemed very 
unwise for such releases to occur without prior consultation with the War 
Office.54 
There are indications that MI5 had already begun to develop a concern with 
Bolshevism by this time. On 19 January 1918 Sealy Clarke wrote to Moylan of 
the Home Office, requesting information regarding any change of attitude noticed 
in Russians employed on munitions work and suggested that a circular should be 
sent to the police asking them to report any change of attitudes among Russian 
workers which might be denoted by 'pacifist or anti-war propaganda, a 
disinclination to continue to help in the production of Munitions, or any active 
tendency towards holding up supplies, either by restriction of out-put, or 
destruction of out-put of factories' .55 However, nothing came of this at the time, 
53 Ibid., p.52. 
54 Ibid. 

55 TNA, H045/10809/311425, folder 71, Sealy Clarke to Moylan, regarding the attitude of 

Russians employed on munitions work, 19 January 1918. 
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because Moylan did not think that the police would be of much use 'in the way of 
obtaining information as to the attitude of Russians employed on munitions. 
People inside the works in which they are employed are more likely to know of 
any special activities on their part' .56 
On 15 April 1918 Major S.C. Welchman, MBE took over A Branch.57 Formerly 
with Kell's old regiment, the South Staffordshires, Welchman had joined MIS on 
2 August 1915.58 He had served with G Branch, before becoming head of A 
Branch.59 The work of A Branch had now increased further due to the many cases 
of aliens working on munitions, whose records were checked by A Branch and 
details provided to the Director General of Labour Supply. Applications for 
auxiliary war service in the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) now 
required A Branch's endorsement, and YMCA headquarters submitted a great 
many names.60 In agreement with the Harbour Department of the Board of Trade, 
A Branch circularised approximately 325 ports, asking them to pass on the 
identity books and nationality papers of all aliens working there, to be endorsed 
by A Branch.61 A considerable number of the names of those applying for 
employment with the Ministry of Munitions and Air Board plus firms to whom 
the grant of government contracts was being considered were received.62 The Air 
Board made the decision not to engage enemy aliens at aeronautical works and 
presented a list of thirteen firms where aliens were not to be taken on unless they 
56 TNA, H045/10809/311425, folder 71, minute by Moylan, 22 January 1918. 

57 TNA, KVlI13, p.53. 

58 TNA, KV1I59, p.6. 

59 TNA, KV1/52, pp.17, 37, 52 & 66. 

60 TNA, KVlII3, p.53. 

61 Ibid. 

62 Ibid. 
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had the Air Board's permission.63 Nonetheless, the Ministry of National Service 
decided to engage 180 enemy aliens at Bramham Moor and 300 at Netheravon for 
the Air Board. However, they were only to work as land-labourers, and because 
there appeared little chance of them getting in a position to acquire information of 
military or naval use, the decision was reached that their identity books should not 
have the PWM stamp. A list of all those to be engaged should be provided and 
their details checked by A Branch prior to their employment.64 
On 30 July 1918 A Branch moved to Greener House, Haymarket, London.65 In 
September 1918 A Branch prepared a full list of enemy aliens employed on 
munitions, including their age, nationality and the name and address of the firms 
where they worked. There were roughly 900 names on this list, and it was 
submitted to Lord Cheylesmore of the Aliens Advisory Committee.66 All 
government employees were made to provide details of their own and their 
parent's nationality. They were sent to A Branch for vetting, causing a notable 
increase in A Branch's work.67 October 1918 brought further work. Over 2,000 
names of the staff of the Ministry of Munitions were submitted, and another list of 
enemy aliens working in munitions was prepared for the Aliens Advisory 
Committee. Following the Belgian Government's request for a complete list of all 
Belgians working in munitions for census purposes, a specialist staff was taken 
on, with the Belgian Government agreeing to pay the costs incurred. However, 
when the Belgian Government received the bill for this, it argued that 
63 Ibid. 

64 Ibid., pp.53-54. 

65 Ibid., p.54. 

66 Ibid. 
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govenunents provided each other with this kind of information for free. The bill 
for about £100 was dropped.68 
A Branch's work at this time also included reaching the decision that, after 5 
October 1918, no Dutch workers who travelled from Rotterdam were to work in 
munitions except for glass-blowing.69 Russian Jews of eighteen and nineteen 
years of age holding exemption certificates, and who were not included in existing 
Anglo-Russian arrangements, were no longer granted permission to work on 
munitions. 7o One can only speculate that this may have been over concern with 
Bolshevism, held by some at the time as inspired by Jews.71 
The decision was made in agreement with E Branch that in all forthcoming 
emergency cases, it would not be necessary for aliens with identity books 
endorsed for auxiliary war service and who wished to depart the UK to send their 
papers to A Branch for cancellation. The decision regarding permission to leave 
the UK was devolved to the port officer involved, who subsequently notified A 
Branch ofhis action.72 
67 Ibid. , 
68 Ibid., p.55. ~ 
69 Ibid. j70 Ibid. 

71 Winter has commented on the prejudice against Russian Jews shown in terms of the application 
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War', Journal o/Contemporary History, vo1.15 (1980), passim. 

72 TNA, KVlII3, pp.55-56. 
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In November 1918 the umbrella sub-title of Alien War Service hitherto used to 
cover A Branch's duties was changed to Auxiliary War Service, and several sub­
sections were added. 73 As Bird explains: 
Apart from the munitions industry, a number of other sensitive areas of 
employment were sUbjected to special scrutiny by MIS, including military 
and naval establishments, telegraph, telephone and railway companies 
involved in the transmission of official messages or carriage of members 
of the armed forces; hospitals dealing with military personnel; canteens, 
clubs or organisations of a social, benevolent or religious nature conducted 
wholly or partly for the benefit of or used by members of the armed 
forces. 74 
This illustrates how the scope, and scale, of A Branch's work had increased from 
being concerned only with aliens employed on munitions work, to all aliens in 
jobs that brought them into contact with the armed forces. 
This is also demonstrated by the growth in A Branch's staff. In November 1917 A 
Branch had forty-six members of staff, including five officers and forty-one 
clerks: consisting three British officers, two Belgian officers, two male clerks and 
thirty-nine women clerks.75 By November 1918 the staff of A Branch had 
increased by the addition of eight clerks to a total of fifty-four members, 
consisting as before of five officers and forty-nine clerks: including one OS02 as 
head of branch, two British officers, two Belgian officers, two male clerks but 
with now forty-seven women clerks. 76 
73 TNA, KVlI13, p.S7. 

74 Bird, The Control ofEnemy Alien Civilians in Great Britain 1914-18, p.301. 

75 TNA, KVlI14, p.16. See TNA, KVlI13, 'Appendix M, Staff of MIS (a) in November 1917'. 
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The following figures compiled by MIS give some idea of the scale of A Branch's 
work. Slightly more than 40,000 aliens, of whom approximately 800 were enemy 
aliens, had been accepted for work in munitions or other sensitive jobs by the end 
of January 1918, discounting individuals who were later permitted to leave the 
UK.77 Owing to the repatriation of aliens who had been employed in munitions or 
auxiliary war service, A Branch received approximately 18,393 identity books; of 
which 6,949 names were checked against its records by the end of March 1919. 
The A.E. (Aliens Enquiry) cards were completed and the identity books were 
passed on to their office of origin: twenty-seven of them were discovered to be 
undesirables. Their names were passed to E Branch, in order to prevent them 
returning to the UK. 78 
There was very little, if any, sabotage at British munitions factories during the 
First World War. It seems that practically all reported accidents were indeed 
accidents, and not successful acts of sabotage. Equally, it seems that Germany did 
not make any really concerted attempts to sabotage British munitions factories. In 
Felstead's well-informed words: 
It is one of the great mysteries of the war that with 32,000 Germans in this 
country no attempts at sabotage took place. Perhaps our vulnerable points 
were too well guarded; perhaps the certainty of detection was too great; 
whatever the reason it is beyond all doubt that we were never subj ected to 
sabotage of the kind so common in America in 1915 and 1916. I can state 
without fear of contradiction that there was not a single explosion which 
occurred in this country which was not ascribable to accident. Our 
casualties from this aspect of warfare were confined entirely to explosions 
which were inevitable in the manufacture of munitions on an immense 
77 Bird, The Control ofEnemy Alien Civilians in Great Britain 1914-18, p.30 1. 
78 TNA, KV1I13, p.62. 
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scale. And even the number of fires which took place was much less than 
in normal times.79 
Enough aliens were permitted to perform auxiliary war service. Therefore, A 
Branch did not hinder essential production. However, Bird concludes that 
ultimately 'the contribution of enemy alien civilian labour to Britain's war effort 
was negligible. The majority of enemy men of working age spent most of the war 
in internment doing little or no nationally useful work'. 80 A Branch did not 
receive anything like the same official censure that PMS2 did. By these measures 
A Branch was very successful. 
79 Felstead, German Spies at Bay, p.12. 

80 Bird, The Control ofEnemy Alien Civilians in Great Britain 1914-18, p.302. Ibid., pp.280-321, 
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CONCLUSION 
Apart from articles by Hiley, the existing literature tends to focus on the 
development of MIS as a whole and pays little attention to the six individual 
branches that constituted MIS by the armistice. Not even Hiley places each branch 
under the microscope and observes its specific development. In short, previous 
approaches analysed MIS at the macro level, but not at the micro level. This 
research suggests that much can be learned about MIS's development from a 
detailed study of its branches. Recently released material in TNA record class 
KV 1 made it possible to examine MIS at the micro level and set out the intimate 
workings of its six branches. Thus, this study offers the first monograph 
specifically focused on the organisational history of MIS from 1909 to 1918 as 
seen through the development and workings of its six individual branches. It was 
shaped by the relative uses and limits of this material: the unique usefulness of 
this material in describing MIS's branches and how they developed in 
comprehensive detail, and the limitations imposed by the descriptive, rather than 
analytical, nature of these reports, which did not pay so much attention to the 
related question of why MIS developed as it did. 
This study examined the evolution of MIS from its formation in October 1909 to 
the end of the First World War, paying particular attention to three questions. 
First, what did a map of the structure ofthe MIS organisation look like and "how" 
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did it develop as it did during its first ten years? Secondly, "why" did MIS 
develop as it did? Thirdly, "how effective" was MIS throughout this period? 
MIS began quite humbly in 1909 with a solitary member of staff, tasked with the 
limited remit of ascertaining the extent of German espionage in Britain and an 
uncertain future. By the armistice MIS's role had expanded considerably and it 
had begun to develop into an established security intelligence agency, with 844 
personnel spread over six branches covering the investigation of espionage, 
prevention, records, ports and travellers, overseas, and alien workers. MIS was to 
function as the link between the civil, military and naval authorities to enable the 
Government to decide what was required to prevent the betrayal of key national 
interests to the enemy. In accordance with this mission, MIS's duties lay in five 
areas: prevention, detection, control, records, and organisation. MIS took on four 
key roles. First, it was the central clearing-house for all counter-espionage 
information; it eventually became the hub of an imperial network. Secondly, it co­
ordinated all of those involved in counter-espionage. Thirdly, it was Britain's 
expert on counter-espionage matters. Fourth, MIS offered training in this work. 
MIS began to presciently acknowledge this development towards the end of the 
war, when it started to describe its role no longer as just counter-espionage but 
more broadly as defence security intelligence. 
These developments began in 1909 when Kell was appointed to enquire into the 
nature of Gennan espionage in Britain. Having detected a network of agents, MIS 
developed an investigative capability to counter this network, which later became 
305 
. j 
the realm of G Branch. Thus, MIS became the central clearing-house for all 
counter-espionage information, formed its own detective staff and took on the role 
of co-ordinating and directing the other players involved in counter-espionage. 
MIS's early work brought home to Kell the deficiencies in Britain's counter­
espionage defences and drove him to strive to improve matters. This 
administrative and legislative work would become F Branch's turf. These 
preventive functions, plus the production of reports on German espionage 
methods to educate others involved in counter-espionage, would see MIS become 
Britain's expert on these issues. Successful investigations and preventive 
measures both relied upon records, which function gave rise to H Branch. The 
control of ports and travellers was a vital wartime concern, therefore E Branch 
was soon created to focus on this. D Branch was eventually formed in recognition 
that MI5's imperial work had outgrown the duty of a sub-section and required a 
branch of its own. A Branch was formed to take over the part of the discredited 
PMS2' s work that had been concerned with vetting alien munitions workers. 
This study suggests that the main driver of these developments, if one key factor 
can be singled out, was the changing perception of the nature of the threat posed 
by German espionage. This perception was largely created by public hysteria over 
spy mania and the dangers posed by enemy aliens, rather than actual evidence. 
Nonetheless, although the German threat was largely illusory, MIS's work was 
driven by continuing fears of potential spies and changes in wartime legislation 
arose from a perception of the need to plug particular gaps in Britain's counter­
espionage defences. Fear of dissent and, from 1917 onwards, Bolshevism became 
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increasingly important drivers of MI5' s development towards the end of the war, 
precisely because of the perception that these activities were being directed by a 
German hidden hand. Other factors should also be noted as being of particular 
importance. In terms of grand strategy, it seems that Kell was very much 
implementing a programme that had been designed by his superiors, particularly 
in the early years. The way in which MI5 assumed the role as the axle to the 
wheel of counter-espionage was influenced by an appreciation that the best way to 
provide a quick and direct interchange of information was with a centralised 
counter-espionage bureau. Understanding that MI5 saw the fundamental principle 
behind its work as being that counter-espionage was naturally divided into the two 
halves of investigation and prevention helps to explain why MI5 developed the 
organisational structure that it did. Between 1909 and 1918 the organisation 
developed on these lines. Thus, on the eve of the First World War MI5 had two 
branches: one investigative and the other preventive, with a sub-section of the 
latter being concerned with records. By the end of the war MI5 had six branches, 
which had all clearly grown out of the investigative and preventive Branches. G 
Branch handled the investigation of espionage, while F Branch dealt with its 
prevention. Both were united by their dependence upon records, hence the 
centrality of H Branch and the rationale behind MIS's raison d'etre as the central 
clearing-house for all counter-espionage information. A, D and E were preventive 
branches, under Holt-Wilson, which grew as off-shoots from F Branch and G 
Branch. The scale of MIS's wartime expansion clearly reflected the general 
wartime growth of government. 
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It is instructive to place this study's interpretation of "why" MIS developed as it 
did within the historiography. It closely follows Andrew's analysis that MIS's pre­
war development was driven by the conviction that there was an extensive 
German espionage system in Britain, despite the reality that this network was 
small and third-rate. Andrew also charted how the perceived threat changed 
during the war and the impact this had on MIS's development, with the massive 
increase in spy mania in the opening months, the much smaller outbreak of 
genuine espionage and the gradual development of what was perceived as 
subversion. In so doing, Andrew has clearly identified the primary driver of MIS's 
development. This research only adds an additional focus on some of the 
secondary drivers. 
Boghardt also suggests that the perception that German espionage posed a truly 
grave threat was crucial to MIS's development. However, he does not make the 
key point that the perceived nature of the threat of German espionage did not 
remain constant, and that it was precisely the ways in which it evolved that shaped 
MIS's development, as Andrew has shown. 
Porter's interpretation that MIS's pre-war development was driven by an 
underlying apprehension that a European war was on the horizon and that its 
wartime expansion was fuelled by the dynamics of war seems accurate as far as it 
goes. These general factors alone do not, however, really explain why MIS 
developed the role and structure that it did. This study, like Andrew, has shown 
that other factors more specific to MIS also need to be taken into account. 
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Much the same can be said for Thurlow's interpretation that the 'security 
revolution' was a by-product of the threat of war and that the reversal of the 
liberal disregard for security and the passage of DORA enabled MIS's wartime 
expansion. He shows why MIS grew, but does not go any further and explain why 
its structure evolved in the particular way that it did. Of course, his study was not 
concerned with MIS's organisational history. This study has also shown that 
Thurlow's analysis that MIS's eventual movement into counter-subversion was 
driven by an erroneous perception that the main threats to national security 
emanated from foreign powers, such that domestic subversion was chiefly viewed 
as an agent of enemy states, is born out by recently declassified MIS records. 
Hiley's analysis that MIS's pre-war development was a response to 'spy fever' 
appears to be fairly accurate. However, this study does not agree that Kell was 
responsible for perpetuating this condition by submitting alarmist assessments. As 
this research, and Andrew, have shown, although Kell took a hard line on 
internment, he did not suffer from 'spy fever'. Hiley's claim that the 'dramatic 
advance' in MIS's wartime role followed a widening definition of counter­
espionage is very perceptive. However, this study, and Thurlow, have 
demonstrated that MIS's role in counter-subversion was not as unrestricted as 
Hiley has suggested. I 
This research reinforces the standard interpretation that MIS did comprehensively 
win the battle against its German foe, albeit that this opposition was decidedly 
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third-rate, which does detract somewhat from the sense of achievement, and 
defends it against the recent revisionist claims of Boghardt, whose evidence that 
MIS did not detect all of the German spies in Britain appears questionable to say 
the least. This study also endorses the traditional view that MIS did mount a few 
double agent and deception operations in order to mislead the enemy during the 
First World War, but they did not approach the sophistication or achieve the 
consummate success of the double-cross system of the Second World War. This 
seems to have been because, as Andrew has shown, MIS was more open to the 
possibility of turning agents into double-agents during the latter period than the 
former, when captured spies were generally despised as traitors so little thought 
was given to whether they could be used against the Germans. 
This study has demonstrated that much can be learned about MIS's development 
from a detailed study of the development of its six branches and their functions. G 
Branch illustrates how MIS's co-ordinating role made it the axle to the wheel of 
counter-espionage. Indeed, the way in which G Branch worked with many other 
agencies involved in counter-espionage emphasises that MIS had no executive 
powers, such that the ability to co-operate with others was an integral part of 
MIS's work and a key to its success. G Branch's close co-operation with MIS's 
other branches brings home the point that MIS's six branches can be seen as the 
different fingers of the same hand. G Branch also indicates how the growth of 
MIS and its branches was gradual and incremental. Wartime saw the scope of 
counter-espionage work broaden, with a consequent impact on MIS's growth. G 
Branch demonstrates particularly clearly how MIS's development was driven by 
1 This section summarises the literature review in the Introduction. 
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changes in the perceived threat posed by German espionage. G Branch illustrates 
how MIS's investigations of subversion were restricted to investigating if there 
was any enemy involvement. It did not have a more general role in counter­
subversion. G Branch demonstrated that by the end of the First World War MI5 
was beginning to develop a concern with Bolshevism. 
The way in which F Branch cast off sections of itself to become H, E and A 
Branches - just as D Branch grew out off G Branch - so that it could remain 
focused on its core preventive duties helps to explain "why" MIS developed the 
shape that it did. F Branch most powerfully demonstrates how much of MI5's 
work was in providing expert advice on counter-espionage. F Branch also shows 
that MIS's role in enforcing DORA was limited to the minute percentage of cases 
that involved suspected enemy activity. It did not have a wider role in enforcing 
public order. 
H Branch was very much the heart of MIS. It shows how much counter-espionage 
work relied on information and emphasises that MI5's role was very much as the 
central clearing-house for all counter-espionage information. Indeed, the 
information on undesirable aliens stored in MIS's Registry may well have been 
the key to MIS's post-war survival and development. 
The way in which E Branch's MCOs worked with other officials at the ports again 
illustrates MIS's role as the axle to the wheel of counter-espionage. The way that 
these relationships worked showed MI5's lack of executive powers; that MI5 had 
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to work with other agencies, it could not do it all on its own; that MIS could not 
simply give orders to these other agencies but relied on cultivating good working 
relations with them; and that MIS's particular contribution to these partnerships 
was its information and expertise in counter-espionage matters. E Branch also 
shows how MIS's contest with German espionage can be viewed very much as a 
gamekeeper trying to keep out poachers, often reacting to plug-in gaps in its 
defences that it had learned its opponent had been exploiting. Similarly, the way 
in which E Branch began by focusing on the threat from passengers then, once 
this gap had been plugged, moved on to the perceived threat from alien seamen 
and then the security of ports and docks shows how MIS reacted to changes in the 
perceived threat of gaps in its defences. The way in which MIS began to take an 
interest in port control in late 1914, because its investigations had shown that the 
control at the ports at that time was woefully inadequate, shows how MIS moved 
in to areas related to counter-espionage when it was felt that the existing system 
was not working well enough. 
D Branch provides a telling example of how MIS's development was gradual and 
MIS was always willing to learn lessons and improve its performance, such as in 
eventually letting some of the colonial links correspond directly with each other as 
well as through MIS, so as to speed up the interchange of information. D Branch 
further demonstrated MIS's role in providing advice on counter-espionage and in 
training personnel in this work. MIS's relations with the Colonies were like those 
with British police chief constables: MIS had no executive powers and had to rely 
on co-operation, not control. The way in which MIS always referred to itself as 
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the central SIB in its dealings with the SIB's throughout the Colonies captured 
MIS's role as the central hub of counter-espionage. Obviously, D Branch also 
pointed the way to MIS's subsequent development as an imperial security 
intelligence agency. 
An understanding of A Branch's development reveals much about MIS's relations 
with Special Branch. It also shows that these roles developed as they did partly 
because Kell did not want to assume a more general role in labour intelligence. He 
seems to have shared the attitude of some senior army commanders of that time 
that it was just not appropriate for soldiers to spy on British workers. It was a role 
more suited to the police. A Branch offers further affirmation ofMIS's developing 
interest in Bolshevism. MIS's role was restricted to counter-espionage and 
investigating enemy activities. Special Branch and other agencies were 
responsible for more general labour intelligence. The way in which A Branch's 
role grew from a concern with aliens working in munitions to all aliens employed 
on auxiliary war service demonstrates how MIS's role grew. MIS did not always 
simply get its own way over policy issues. It was but one of a number of 
competing voices. In A Branch's case, MIS's concern with counter-espionage had 
to contend with others' concerns over finding jobs for aliens and supplying 
enough labour so that production targets could be met. MIS moved into the work 
of vetting Belgian refugees wanting to work on munitions because of the 
perceived threat that enemy spies and saboteurs might be hiding in their midst. 
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It is instructive to divide the practice of espionage into four distinct stages, and to 
outline how MI5 tried to stop the German espionage organisation at each of these 
stages. Firstly, agents have to be recruited and trained. Punitive regulations, such 
as the OSA 1911 and DORA, were designed to deter people from becoming spies. 
Secondly, if they do not live there already, spies have to be infiltrated into the 
country where they are to conduct their activities. Wartime control of ports and 
frontiers erected the necessary barriers. Thirdly, agents must collect the required 
intelligence and perform other activities, such as sabotage. Schemes were 
designed to protect vulnerable points against sabotage. Measures were enacted to 
control access to sensitive areas. Legislation was also introduced to control 
people, especially enemy aliens, such as the ARA and DORA. Finally, spies must 
pass intelligence back to the intelligence organisation; which must be done in time 
for the intelligence to still be of use, rather than out-of-date. A number of 
measures were put into place to block likely channels of communication with the 
enemy such as control of ports and frontiers, cable and postal censorship and 
regulations forbidding illicit signalling at night. 
Beyond these general principles, evolving operational procedures also guided 
developments alongside the impact of changing threat perceptions. The best 
example of this is in the evolution of E Branch's work. E Branch's methods and 
activities developed as it sought to plug gaps in its defences that it learned the 
Germans had been exploiting. In so doing it learned from these experiences, 
which in turn informed the evolution of its operational procedures. Thus, in the 
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sense that MIS picked up its operational procedures as it went along, this process 
was pragmatic rather than doctrinal. In short, MIS learned by doing. 
Instructively, MIS's methods stood the test of time. In 1910 Kell wrote that 
counter-espionage work should be divided between active and passive measures. 
In 1991 Shulsky, whose Silent Warfare: Understanding the World ofIntelligence 
is the standard US textbook on the subject, also made the same distinction 
between active and passive measures? 
Similarly, writing an in-house history of MIS in 1946, Curry observed that MIS's 
functions were 'naturally divided into': 
1. detection or investigation 
2. prevention or security 
3. intelligence including records, and­
4. active deception of the enemy.3 
It is immediately striking how much this reads like analogous passages in MIS's 
historical branch reports produced in 1921 to capture the experiences of the First 
World War. The only important difference is in the far greater emphasis placed on 
deception during the Second World War. 
In terms of MIS's developmental ethos, it would be interesting to test how MIS's 
procedures compared with like organisations serving Britain's allies and enemies, 
particularly France, Russia, USA, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Turkey. 
2 Shulsky, Silent Warfare, p.99. 
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Unfortunately, although there is a considerable literature concerning counter­
espionage in these countries, there does not seem to be any relevant material 
available regarding the doctrine adopted in them. 4 
Moreover, this study poses important questions for the study of intelligence 
generally. How can the level of effectiveness of a counterintelligence organisation 
be measured? Against what criteria can MIS's performance be evaluated? The 
outcome of the war? Intelligence does not decide wars on its own. Other factors 
are much more important. The records of what intelligence the Germans managed 
to collect in spite of MIS indicate the level of payment Germany's agents 
demanded for this work, and the danger that they felt was involved in facing MIS. 
Tallies of how many agents were caught, against those who were not caught? 
How pleased, or displeased, the British government and armed forces were with 
MIS's performance? What MIS achieved in terms of counter-attacking German 
intelligence, such as with deception or double agents? 
Counterintelligence aims to do more than just defensively protect its own side's 
infonnation and neutralise enemy agents. At a deeper level, counterintelligence 
also aims to gather intelligence on enemy intelligence organisations and their 
methods, and to thwart them by misleading them through deception and the use of 
double agents. The ultimate goal of counterintelligence is to confuse the enemy 
intelligence organisation with deception, penetrate it with double agents, and 
3 Curry, The Security Service 1908-1945, p.60. 

4 For a concise comparison of British, French, Russian and German Intelligence between 1909­
1918 see J. Richelson, A Century ofSpies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: OUP, 

1995), pp.3-46. 
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recruit enemy intelligence officers as one's own agents to such an extent that it 
can almost control the enemy's intelligence organisation for the benefit of one's 
own side. This includes making sure that they fail to collect intelligence of any 
real value, that their assessment of intelligence collected is inaccurate and that 
one's own side's intelligence collection succeeds, because their 
counterintelligence has failed to prevent it. Indeed, recruiting enemy intelligence 
officers and agents as spies is one of the best ways of gaining access to 
intelligence about the enemy's intelligence operations against one's own side, 
particularly to discover who their agents spying against one's own side are. 
The assessments of MI5' s performance have been varied but its degree of success 
can be well summed up by using a cricketing analogy.s MI5 clearly beat Germany 
very convincingly. MI5 was never really truly tested by its third-rate German 
opponent. MI5 did not playa faultless, perfect game. It did not bowl all German 
batsmen first ball for nought. Of course, no team has ever played such a perfect 
game. Although it played a poor opponent, this does not detract from the fact that 
MI5 still acquitted itself admirably and showed that it knew the game very well, 
as it developed a sound organisational structure and evolved towards a good 
doctrine. MI5 also demonstrated some impressive moves, such as the round-up of 
German agents following the outbreak of hostilities. The scorecard would read 
that some German agents were bowled first ball for a duck. Most German agents 
were bowled without having scored any runs, but survived for a few balls. Some 
German agents lasted for a few overs, but made meaningless scores of only one or 
two runs. A couple of German agents stayed at the crease for a long time and 
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scored twenty or thirty runs, albeit in ones and twos, but no spectacular sixes, 
without ever really threatening to score a decent century or a potentially match­
winning double-hundred. 
It is clear, therefore, that this study has made some new contributions to the 
historiography. It builds significantly upon the foundations laid by Hiley and sets 
out probably the most detailed description of MIS's organisational structure 
available. It has taken full advantage of the great strength of MIS's historical 
branch reports, the detailed description of the structure and duties of MIS 's 
branches, to provide a pioneering examination of these branches. This research 
certainly follows other studies in appreciating the role that key factors which have 
already been identified, particularly spy mania and the changing perception of the 
nature of the threat posed by German espionage, played in MIS's development. 
Indeed, the detailed focus on MIS's branches has made it even clearer how MIS 
evolved in response to changes in the perceived threat. However, this study has 
also placed greater emphasis on a number of secondary factors than the current 
literature does. Following Hiley's lead, it has illustrated how MIS's organisational 
structure grew out of an appreciation that counter-espionage work naturally 
divided into investigative and preventive functions, which were both united by 
their mutual dependence on records. This research has also provided further 
evidence that MIS's development from 1916 onwards was influenced by wartime 
dissent, and also by Bolshevism from 1917 onwards, but, crucially, only in order 
to investigate if such activities were directed by a German hidden hand. Most 
S Porter, Plots and Paranoia, pp.l28-129, also uses a cricketing analogy. 
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strikingly, it has also demonstrated that Kell did not actually want MIS to assume 
a more general interest in labour intelligence at that time. 
The years 1909 to 1918 can thus be regarded as the formative years of MIS, as it 
developed from a small counter-espionage bureau into an established security 
intelligence agency. 
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APPENDIX I: THE NOMENCLATURE AND 

ORGANISATION OF MIS 
MIS was formed on 9 October 1909, as the Counter-Espionage Section of the 
Secret Service Bureau. (Although it has been variously referred to as the Home 
Section or Military Section of the Secret Service Bureau or as MO(t) in its early 
years to August 1914, in his official reports, Kell always called his organisation 
the Counter-Espionage Section of the Secret Service Bureau.) 
By October 1913 the Counter-Espionage Section of the Secret Service Bureau had 
divided into two main branches: 
A Branch: 'the investigation of cases of espionage and preparations for 
mobilisation' . 
B Branch: 'aliens registration, the selection of possible suspects and the 
upkeep of the Special War and other lists, with the "Observer Scheme" 
and the protection ofvulnerable points'. 
The first nucleus of the organisation, administration and records branch can be 
found in a sub-division of B Branch at that time concerned with: 
the translation, filing and custody of intercepted letters[;] the preparation[,] 
filing and custody of Secretary of State warrants[;] the arrangement and 
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comparison of handwritings and photographic records[;] the scheduling 
and filing of correspondence and the indexing and carding of information. 
On 4 August 1914 the Counter-Espionage Section of the Secret Service Bureau 
became known as M05(g). 
On 1 October 1914 M05(g) was re-organised into three branches; with a third, C, 
Branch having grown out of the sub-section of B Branch that had been concerned 
with records: 
A Branch: 'investigation of espionage and cases of suspected persons'. 
B Branch: 'co-ordination of general policy of Government Departments in 
dealing with aliens; questions arising out of the Defence of the Realm 
Regulations and Aliens Restriction Act' . 
C Branch: 'records, personnel, administration and port control'. 
A fourth branch, later to be labelled E, was formed in May 1915 to take over the 
fast developing work of organising and administering the control of ports and 
frontiers. 
Following the formation of this new sub-division, it was decided to reorganise 
MOS(g), so that on 11 August it became known as MOS, with four branches 
labelled E, F, G and H. The branch concerned with the control of ports and 
frontiers was designated E Branch, the preventive (B) branch became known as F 
Branch, the investigative (A) branch was thenceforth called G Branch, and the 
administration and records (C) branch acquired the title H Branch. 
321 
On 3 January 1916 MOS changed its name to MIS. 
D Branch was added on 21 September 1916 to further the connection of MIS's 
work overseas. 
Lastly, A Branch was formed on 23 April 1917 to deal with work related to the 
registration and control of aliens employed on war work in the UK. 
Thus, the complete organisation of MIS was:­
MIS: Special Intelligence - General. 
A Branch: Aliens War Service. 
D Branch: Overseas Special Intelligence. 
E Branch: Control of Ports & Frontiers. 
FBranch: Preventive Branch. 
GBranch: Detective Branch. 
HBranch: Administrative Branch (Office & Records).! 
I 1 This appendix summarises the relevant sections in Chapters One and Two. 
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APPENDIX II: ALPHABETICAL LIST OF 

GERMAN SPY CASES 

This appendix lists the ten German agents MI5 brought to book before the First 

World War (two of whom were also re-arrested following the declaration of war), 

the twenty-two who were scheduled to be "rounded-up" at the outbreak of war 

and the thirty-three MI5 settled accounts with during the war. Their names are 

given in capitals. All sources cited are from TNA unless otherwise stated. 

APEL, Fredrik Wilhelm Hemik. A German who worked in Barrow-in-Furness. In 

May 1913 his letters, which used a code to refer to ships being laid down, sent to 

a suspect address via the intermediary Heimich SCHMIDT were intercepted. Apel 

was a failure as a spy and MIS concluded that he could be disregarded. 

Nonetheless, he was placed on the special war list for arrest and interned under 

ARO on 4 August 1914. (KV1I40) 

BACON, George Vaux. An American journalist, who landed at Liverpool on 4 

September 1916. A letter he wrote to a spy address was intercepted, leading to his 

eventual arrest on 9 December. Bacon was tried on 26 December 1916 and 

sentenced to death, commuted to penal servitude for life. He was released to give 

evidence in the USA, and sentenced to one years' imprisonment there. (KV1/43; 

KV2/4-5; W0141/3/4) 
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BERNSTEIN, Major Enrico Lorenzo. Alias H. Laurens. The Australian born son 
of a Pole and his American wife. Bernstein claimed British nationality by virtue of 
his services to the crown with the West African Frontier Force. He later served as 
a major in the Brazilian army. On 5 August 1914 he wrote, under the name ofR. 
Laurens, requesting an interview with the Naval Intelligence Department, to 
provide photographs and descriptions of German agents in Britain. He was 
arrested at the Admiralty and charged with espionage because he had been trying 
to sell a secret document and cipher showing that the assassination of Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand of Austria had been planned by the Serbian legation in London. 
Bernstein was conveyed to Brixton Prison under a deportation order on 12 August 
1914, but the order was suspended and he was released to work for Mllc in 
September 1914. (KV41112) 
BLACKBURN, Robert Arthur. Born in 1896 and employed by his father to help 
manage a lodging-house in Liverpool. He was an impressionable youth, who 
excited his imagination by reading adventure novels. He wrote to the German 
Embassy in London offering his services and received a reply from Berlin, signed 
Leo Sirius, enclosing questions about defences and shipbuilding on the Mersey. 
He was paid for his answers and sent more questions in June 1914. The letter of 
June 1914 had been posted via KLUNDER, so HOWs were taken on 
correspondence to Blackburn and Sirius. Blackburn was arrested on 16 August 
1914. He pleaded guilty at trial, but stated that he had only given the Germans 
information that was in the newspapers and accessible to the public, and 
sentenced to two years' in a borstal. (KVI/41) 
I 

I 
~ 
I 
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BOURNONVILLE, Eva de. Danish born, but naturalised Swedish; she had 
worked as a shorthand clerk and typist at the Danish legation in Stockholm. Came 
to England purportedly for recreation, reaching London in September 1915. The 
postal censorship detected secret writing in letters that she wrote, under fictitious 
names, to an address in Stockholm. She was eventually identified by her 
handwriting on a telegram sent to an address in Stockholm. Following 
surveillance, de Bournonville was arrested on 5 November. She was found guilty 
at trial and sentenced to hang, which was commuted to penal servitude for life on 
the advice of the Home Secretary. (DPP1I32; DPP4/51; KV1I43) 
BRABER, Cornelius Marinus den. Dutch seamen purporting to represent a firm 
selling custard pOWder, van Brandwijk and Company. On 9 June 1915 the British 
consul-general at Rotterdam wrote that Jan van Brandwijk, whose shop was 
known to be the centre for a section of the German secret service, was reported to 
be sending Dutchmen to spy in Britain, naming Braber and STAD. When the 
police searched his rooms, they found dummy cases of custard powder, no 
samples and that he had not done any business. Braber was arrested on 23 June 
1915 for not having given proper particulars to his landlord. The charges failed on 
a technical point and Braber was freed. However, there was no doubt as to his 
intentions to spy and Braber was interned under DRR14B. (KVl/42) 
BRECKOW, George. Alias George T. Parker and Reginald Rowland. Breckow, 
the German-born son of a failed Russian landowner, landed at Tilbury on 11 May 
I 
I 
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1915 disguised as Reginald Rowland. Under the check on Dierks and Company, 
the censorship discovered a telegram of 30 May despatching money to Rowland. 
BreckowlRowland was arrested on 4 June. The censorship had also stopped 
suspicious letters signed George T. Parker, and his handwriting showed that they 
were Breckow's work. Breckow's possessions included spy equipment. He was 
shot in October 1915. (DPP1I30; H014411437/298806; KV1I42) 
BROWN, William F. Born in Australia of German parentage. Served with the 
Royal Naval Reserve, before joining the Metropolitan Police, from which he was 
sacked in 1910. In October 1911 a W.F. Brown was discovered to be 
corresponding with and receiving money from Reimers. No more was heard of 
Brown for several years. In February 1914 he took up a post making scale 
drawings of a seaplane being produced by the Talbot Quick Waterplane 
Company. He quit this job after one week, saying the machine was a failure. 
However, one of his co-workers had seen Brown with a cheque for £75 and the 
common opinion was that his aim had been to gather secrets of aeroplane 
construction and sell them. The company informed the police and Brown was 
identified as ex-police constable Brown by his handwriting. He was arrested on 7 
August 1914, but nothing incriminating was found and he was released. (KV1I39) 
! 	 BUSCHMAN, Fernando. A Brazilian subject of German origins, who landed at 
Folkestone on 14 April 1915. A telegram from the known agent recruiter Dierks I 
I 
asking Buschman to return to Holland to confer with his business partner Flores 
I 
; 	
was intercepted on 4 June and he was arrested the next day. Investigation revealed 
l 
1 
I 
; 
326 
J 
that Buschman had not concluded any business in Britain, he was well equipped 
to be a spy and his papers were covered with very small figures in secret ink. He 
was shot on 19 October 1915. (DPPl/31; KV1I42; W071/1313; W014112/l) 
CASEMENT, Sir Roger. A British subject, who served in the consular service, 
being knighted, and ending his career as consul general in Rio de Janeiro. After 
his retirement, Casement returned to Ireland, where he took an active part in 
organising the Irish National Volunteers. Soon after the outbreak of war, 
Casement travelled to Germany, via the USA, in the hope of gaining support for a 
rebellion in Ireland, where he endeavoured to enlist POWs from Irish regiments to 
form an Irish Brigade to fight against Britain. Casement returned to Ireland in a 
German submarine at the time of the Easter Rising. He was arrested immediately, 
on 21 April 1916. He was found guilty of high treason, sentenced to death and 
hanged in August 1916. (KV4/113) 
DIEDERICHS, F. von. A pensioned commander in the German navy. He arrived 
in England shortly before the outbreak of war and wrote to Captain von Prieger of 
German naval intelligence, giving details of British naval mobilisation. There was 
a HOW for this address and von Diederichs was placed on the special war list, 
being arrested on 4 August 1914 and detained under ARO. (DPP1I26; KV1I41) 
DOWLING, Lance-Corporal Joseph. A British subject, whose father was a 
prominent Sinn Fein member. Dowling went to France with the BEF and was 
captured by the Germans in August 1914. In July 1915 it was reported that he had 
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joined the Irish Brigade and acted as a recruiting agent amongst Irish POWs. On 
13 April 1918 the Naval Intelligence Department (NID) learned that a man had 
landed on the Galway coast the previous morning, stating to be the sole survivor 
of S.S. Mississippi, which had been torpedoed the night before. Enquiry by NID 
revealed that the Mississippi had not yet left the Clyde and NID requested that the 
man should be brought over to London for questioning. Under interrogation by 
NID, Dowling admitted that his story was untrue, and that he had been brought 
over by a German submarine. At first the only explanation he would give was that 
Germany wanted information about Ireland. Hall, DNI, did not believe the story 
and promised Dowling protection if he would reveal the whole truth. He finally 
admitted that he had instructions to get in touch with the leaders of Sinn Fein, and 
spoke of a German expedition to Ireland. Dowling was found guilty at trial and 
sentenced to death. However, owing to Hall's action, the sentence was commuted 
to penal servitude for life; with Dowling being released in 1924. (DPP1I51; 
H0144/3444; KV41113) 
EARLE, Martha Wilhelmina Clara. A British subject by marriage of German 
birth. On 7 November 1914 the police informed MI5 of her origins and that her 
sister was the German Baroness von Bothmar. During 1916-1917 the censorship 
informed MI5 that Earle was hostile: communicating with suspects in Spain, 
receiving warnings in code from Baroness von Bothmar, and herself using a code. 
Earle was arrested on 14 May 1918, tried on 16 September and sentenced to 
twelve months' imprisonment. (CRIMI1176/1; KVI/44) 
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EDWIN, Edward. A Swedish masseur employed treating wounded soldiers in 
Dover, where he tried to solicit information from soldiers and incite them to 
desert. Informed upon by two wounded soldiers, he was found guilty by court 
martial on 2 October 1915 on three counts of attempting to elicit information and 
sentenced to seven days' imprisonment with hard labour and to be deported at the 
end of his sentence. It was later discovered that he had been arrested earlier in 
April for examining military works near Dover. (KV1/42) 
ENGEL, Johann. Retired from the German navy with a pension of £60 per annum. 
The HOW on KRUGER proved that Engel received a £40 a year subsidy from 
German secret service funds. He was kept under observation from September 
1911, placed on the special war list and arrested on 4 August 1914. (KV1I39) 
ERNST, Karl Gustave. A British born hairdresser of German origin, living in 
Caledonian Road, London. Ernst had joined the Germans as an intermediary 
through KRONAUER in 1910. His correspondence had been on check since 
November 1911 and he was arrested on the outbreak of war. As he claimed 
British nationality, Ernst could not be dealt with like the other alien agents and he 
had to be brought to trial, where he received seven years' penal servitude. 
(CRIMlI151/2; DPPl/27; KV1/39) Cook claims that the first lead in the Ernst 
case actually came in 1907: when a German naval intelligence officer, among the 
Kaiser's entourage on a visit to Britain, was shadowed going to Ernst's shop to 
check out his suitability for work as an intermediary. Accordingly, Ernst's 
correspondence was placed under check and he was detected as soon as he began 
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working for Steinhauer in 1910. (Cook, M, pp.202-203) However, the available 
evidence suggests that Ernst was not detected until November 1911, owing to the 
check on Steinhauer's correspondence. 
FOWLER, Frederick Willia.m. A British hairdresser living in Penarth, whose 
German wife was the sister of KRUGER. Fowler was known to have 
communicated with a spy address in Hamburg and to have received 
correspondence through KLUNDER, one of Steinhauer's intermediaries. Fowler 
I was arrested on 5 August 1914 and charged with communicating information calculated to be useful to an enemy. He was severely cautioned and discharged. In 
l September 1914 he joined the Royal Field Artillery. (KV4/112) 
I 
GOTEN, Leon Francois van der. A Belgian diamond cutter who, having worked ~ 
for the French, Belgian and British secret services to establish a courier service to 
smuggle news out of Belgium, became a double-agent and traitor, because of ~ 
i 
quarrels with other Belgian agents, mainly over money. Learning of his quarrel ~ 
I and fearing that he might decide to work for the Germans, the French secret I 
I 
service, pretending to be the Germans, entrapped van der Goten by sending him 
I 
on a mission to England to spy for Germany. He was arrested on his arrival at 
I 
(
-
Hull in June 1917, and sent to Scotland Yard for interrogation. He was sentenced 
to death in September 1917, commuted to penal servitude for life. (KV1I44; 
W014113/6)I 
r• 
I 
; 
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GRAVES, Armgaard Karl. Alias Dr Graves and Max Meincke. A German, who 
came to Edinburgh in January 1912, where he masqueraded as a doctor. 
Steinhauer wrote to KRUGER that he would soon receive letters addressed to 
William Lewis, which were to be forwarded to Berlin. In late January a report, 
signed Meincke, was sent from Edinburgh to Lewis. Another envelope with the 
same postmark containing a note and visiting cards inscribed A.K. Graves was 
also sent to the same address. The report provided items of military and naval 
information, and a later report covered secret movements of Royal Navy ships. A 
number of messages to Graves were intercepted via ERNST. Search of his rooms 
revealed a telegraphic code, a coded wire to Lewis and a pawn ticket in the name 
of Max Meincke. Graves was arrested in April 1912, convicted and sentenced to 
eighteen month's imprisonment. (KV1I40) 
I GREITE, Frank L. Theodore. Alias Theodore Greitl, Frank Theodore Greitl and 
Frank L.T. Griebe. A German commercial traveller, who claimed American 
I citizenship, which the US Embassy in London denied. Owing to information from 
an informer, MIS was warned of the arrival of a Theodore Greitl, a ship's captain, 
, 
I who would come via Rottedam on route to the USA and sign his telegrams Frank 
I Greitl. On 8 October 1915 orders were given to arrest him on landing. On 9 
October the vice consul at Le Havre signalled that Frank L.T. Griebe, an 
American commercial traveller in the oil-cake business, had crossed the previous 
day bound for Hull. On 20 January 1916 MIS's registry suggested that F.L.T. 
Greite was identical to the alleged spy Theodore Greitl, but G Branch did not 
think so. On 18 March the censorship submitted a curious telegram, signed 
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Suzanne Greite, recalling him on business. On 22 March the port officer reported 
his frequent travels between England and the continent. The next day the consul 
general at Rotterdam wired the Foreign Office that Frank Theodore Greitl, who 
was probably a German agent, was returning to England. Upon receiving this 
message, G Branch decided that he should be searched thoroughly every time he 
travelled, and detained if he could not provide proof of doing genuine business. 
Thus, the port officer detained Greite and sent him to Scotland Yard. After 
questioning, he was arrested and a search of his effects revealed the possession of 
a spy address. Greite was found guilty at trial and sentenced to ten years' 
imprisonment. (KVl/43) 
GROSSE, Heinrich. Alias Captain Hugh Grant. Involved in espionage at 
Portsmouth from 1911, where he posed as merchant marine Captain Grant and 
solicited a naval pensioner to provide information on coal at ports. Infonned upon 
by the pensioner, he was arrested on 5 December. Had corresponded with 
Steinhauer, Peters sen (an alias used by Steinhauer), KRUGER and KRONAUER. 
Tried 9 February 1912 and sentenced to three years penal servitude. Released in 
May 1914 but re-arrested on 6 August 1914 and deported in June 1917. (DPP1/16; 
KVl/39) 
GUERRERO, Adolfo. Spanish journalist, who could not speak English. In 
January 1916 the Admiralty informed MI5 that Gennan agents would be coming 
to Britain posing as Spanish journalists. On 1 February Guerrero landed at 
Folkestone. The port officer signalled his arrival and the hotel he was heading for. 
I 
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Guerrero was kept under observation and checks were placed on his 
correspondence. Suspect marks before initials were noted in the letters that he 
wrote. Guerrero was arrested on 18 February; a spy address was found amongst 
his papers and he possessed a forged identity card. He was found guilty at trial 
and sentenced to death, which was commuted to ten years' penal servitude. 
(KVl/43) 
HAGN, Alfred. A Norwegian journalist, who arrived in England in April 1917. 
On 7 May MIl c signalled that Hagn was a German agent, their information 
coming from the Christiania Police. Melville was sent to stay in Hagn's hotel in 
order to investigate the case. Having befriended Hagn, Melville gained access to 
Hagn's bedroom and removed some liquid from a bottle there, which analysis 
revealed to be an invisible ink. Interception of his correspondence revealed 
nothing, but he was arrested on 24 May 1917 for possessing secret ink. Under 
interrogation, Hagn confessed that he had agreed to spy for the Germans. He was 
sentenced to death, commuted to penal servitude for life, and deported in 
September 1919. (DPPl/48; KV1/44; W014113/5) 
HAHN, John. A British baker and confectioner of German parentage. A letter 
dated 24 February 1915, and posted in Deptford, written to MULLER contained a 
secret message and was signed Hahn. Reference to the aliens register suggested 
John Hahn. Hahn's shop was raided on 24 February and evidence was found that 
he had written to MULLER, so he was arrested. He was tried and sentenced to 
seven years' penal servitude. (KV1I42) 
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HATTRICK, John James. Alias Walter J. Devlin. Deserted from the Royal Navy 
in 1909 after seven-and-a-half years' service; found, but not recalled for further 
service. In March 1912, using an indecipherable signature, he wrote to The Head, 
Intelligence Department, War Office, Germany offering information and 
providing the wording of an advert to be inserted in the Daily Mirror if his offer 
was accepted. This letter was intercepted and Melville, under cover as a German 
agent, placed the advert. Hattrick answered from Devonport under the alias Walter 
J. Devlin. The correspondence continued for some weeks, until Melville 
persuaded DevlinlHattrick to eventually drop all pretence and provide his real 
name and address. At a meeting in May 1912 Hattrick signed a contract agreeing 
to gather intelligence needed by the Germans in return for a salary. The next day, 
Hattrick took Melville, whom he believed to be a German agent, into the 
dockyard, where he was detained for attempting to communicate information to a 
foreign power. Hattrick replied that his aim had only been to extort money from 
the Germans. He was released, having been cautioned that this case was held in 
abeyance against his good behaviour. The fright cured Hattrick. He entered the 
merchant service and in September 1912 his discharge papers noted "conduct very 
good". (KV1I40) 
HEINE, Lina Mary. A German teacher of languages. On 1 April 1914 the check 
on SCHNEIDER's correspondence brought Heine's activities to MIS's notice. 
Further proof was obtained when a check on a known spy address revealed a letter 
from Heine, sending a sketch of the searchlights at Portsmouth and answers to 
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questions on a list that had been sent to her in April. She was placed on the special 
war list and arrested on 4 August 1914. (KV1I41) 
HEINE, Max Powert. The Gennan husband of UNA HEINE. Max Heine was 
present when LIN A HEINE was apprehended and was also arrested, because he 
failed to give a satisfactory account of himself. He died at Portsmouth Prison on 1 
December 1914 whilst pending deportation under ARO. (KV4/112) 
HENSEL, Paul. Alias Irving Guy Ries. Hensel, a German, landed at Liverpool in 
July 1915, impersonating Ries, with a forged US passport, his supposed purpose 
being to make new clients for three American fIrms dealing in hay or corn. On 3 
August the GPO reported that he had received a suspect money order from 
Madame Cleton of Rotterdam. This was followed by intelligence from Rotterdam 
that the German consulate had been instructed by GHQ Wesel to pay Madame 
Cleton, an alias used by the wife of the known agent recruiter Dierks, money for 
the mission of Ries. On 8 August, when RieslHensel approached the American 
consulate to get a permit to travel from Hull to Copenhagen, the American 
consulate noticed that his passport was a forgery and impounded it. Hensel was 
arrested on 10 August, found guilty and shot. (DPPl/39; KV1I42; W07111238) 
HENTSCHEL, Karl. A teacher of languages, probably of German descent. In 
1909 he moved to Sheerness, where he had a number of naval officers as pupils, 
from whom he learned important details in technical conversation. In October 
1909 he sent round a new circular advertising his teaching, which was intercepted, 
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and MIS placed him on the possible suspect list. Hentschel married Patricia Riley, 
one of four attractive daughters who had many admirers among naval men in 
Chatham, and moved to Chatham, establishing a school in January 1910. In 
February his wife became his assistant, and it was she who engaged PARROTT. 
In June 1911 the Hentschel's left for Australia, by which time MIS did not have 
any definite proof against Hentschel. They returned to Britain in March 1912 and 
MIS opened a HOW on Hentschel and thus discovered he was running the agent 
PARROTT. In June Hentschel returned to Australia. By July 1913 the Germans 
had stopped paying Hentschel his salary and in September he returned to Britain, 
having quarrelled with his wife who had left him. Driven to despair by the failure 
of his attempts to get his wife to return to him, Hentschel contacted Scotland 
Yard, offering to provide information about the German secret service and 
requesting work for the British. To remove the difficulty of an inconvenient 
exposure, the authorities treated it as a confidential communication for which 
payment had been given, dropped any charge and Hentschel was freed. No action 
was taken against his wife. (KVl/40) 
IRELAND, Frederick James. In 1910 Ireland became an assistant to the 
hairdresser, and German agent, KRUGER, his uncle by marriage. In 1911 he 
joined the Royal Navy. On 16 November 1911 a letter from KRUGER to 
Steinhauer was intercepted, in which he offered the services of his nephew. In 
February 1912, Ireland was arrested after an incriminating letter had deliberately 
been opened in his presence by the authorities. It was thought undesirable to bring 
Ireland to trial, because of the type of correspondence that would need to be 
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produced in court, so Ireland was dismissed from the Navy but not prosecuted. He 
was placed on the special war list to be searched in the event of war and arrested 
on 5 August 1914, being released because no new incriminating evidence had 
been found and it was undesirable to produce that which had prompted his arrest 
in 1912. (KV1/39) 
JANSSEN, Haicke Marinus Petrus. A search of telegrams at Southan1pton 
revealed a wire from Janssen, a Dutch sailor, to the known spy address of Dierks 
and Company. Janssen was arrested in May 1915, a search of his rooms revealed 
spy equipment and he was shot in July. (DPP1I33; KV1I42; W071/1312; 
WOI41/1/6) 
JAPPE, Abdon. A Danish electrician employed in Plymouth, Jappe was 
approached by a British detective pretending to be considering illegal copper trade 
with Germany. Agreeing, Jappe tried to recruit the detective and revealed secret 
codes. Arrested on 29 May 1915, he was sentenced to three years' penal servitude 
in November. Subsequently, he was deported in view of the agent provocateur 
tactics employed. (ADM1311120; KVl/42) 
KLAUER, Wilmelm. Alias William Clare. A kitchen porter who had been 
working in England since 1902; he pretended to be a trained dentist, having also 
worked as a dentist's assistant. He lived off his wife's earnings as a prostitute. In 
November 1911 a letter from Portsmouth signed W.H. was intercepted on its way 
to Herr G.F. Steinhauer, Postsdam. W.H. offered the services of a dentist, who 
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knew many naval personnel and could obtain useful information. The dentist's 
name and address were revealed in December 1911, when a letter from Berlin was 
stopped because the handwriting had been identified as that of PARROTT's 
correspondent. It was addressed to William Clare, dentist, Southsea. Klauer 
moved to Portsmouth in 1912. There was no concrete evidence that he was a spy 
until October 1912, when Levi Rosenthal, a hairdresser of Portsmouth, informed 
the police that an unknown man offered him money if he would get a confidential 
book on submarines from the dockyard. In a plot to entrap this man, who turned 
out to be Klauer, Rosenthal promised that a naval man would obtain a confidential 
book on submarines for him. The book was handed over in February 1913 and 
Klauer was arrested shortly after he left Rosenthal's shop. Klauer was found 
guilty, sentenced to five years' penal servitude and deported upon his release. 
(KV1I40) 
KLUNDER, August Wilhelm Julius. A German hairdresser and tobacconist in 
London. Klunder was suggested to Steinhauer by KRONAUER in January 1912 
and taken on as an intermediary. MIS obtained Klunder's description two days 
after KRONAUER had suggested him to Steinahuer. Klunder was placed on the 
special war list in January 1912 and arrested on 4 August 1914. Search revealed 
an insurance book, which demonstrated that Klunder was in touch with Heinrich 
SCHMIDT, a known German agent. He also made statements to the police 
concerning his links to Reimers, an alias used by Steinhauer, and revealed the 
address of SCHUTTE, to which he had forwarded letters. He was dealt with under 
ARO and detained pending deportation, later being interned. (KV1I39) 
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KRONAUER, Marie. Alias Marie Croner. Wife of Wilhelm Kronauer, who used 
the alias Neumann and changed his name to William Croner, a German agent who 
committed suicide after his role as an intermediary was revealed during 
GROSSE's trial. Following her husband's suicide in January 1913, Marie 
Kronauer wrote to Steinhauer asking for help. He replied sending her the draft of 
a letter that she could use to apply to continue her late husband's work as an 
intermediary. A check was placed on her correspondence, however, she does not 
seem to have accepted Steinhauer's offer. Nonetheless, she was placed on the 
special war list, arrested on the outbreak of war and charged in connection with 
ERNST. The charge was not proceeded with and she was interned on the grounds 
of her association with well-known German agents. (KVl/39) 
KRUGER, Otto. A German hairdresser of Kilburn, who came to London about 
1910. By November 1910 the Kilburn postmark had been noted on letters to 
SCHULTZ and GROSSE. In November 1911 Kruger's letter offering the services 
of his nephew, Ireland, to Steinhauer was intercepted and a check was placed on 
his correspondence. Kruger was eventually arrested on 5 August 1914 and 
detained pending deportation. In December 1916 MI5 allowed his application to 
be repatriated as a POW over forty-five years old. (KVl/39) 
KUPFERLE, Anton. Born a German, he was educated in America and became a 
naturalised US citizen, but returned to Germany to serve in the army. He was 
chosen to come to England as a spy and sailed for Liverpool on 4 February 1915, 
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as an American importer of woollens. Letters from Kupferle to the known spy 
address of Leibacher were intercepted on 17 and 18 February, containing 
messages in secret ink. He was arrested in London, following the interception of a 
letter which revealed his whereabouts there. Kupferle was tried but committed 
suicide on 20 May before the trial was completed, having left behind a written 
confession that he had spied for Germany. (H0144/1415/277302; KV1I42; 
W01411113) 
LODY, Carl Hans. Alias Charles A. Inglis. A lieutenant in the German naval 
reserve and travelling agent for the Hamburg-Amerika Line. Lody arrived at 
Newcastle on 27 August 1914 under cover as an American, Charles A. Inglis. He 
was detected by the censorship, which revealed that Inglis was in communication 
with a known spy address in Stockholm. Lody was apprehended on 2 October, 
found guilty by court martial and shot. (DPP1I29; KV1I39; W032/4160-1; 
W0141182) 
LOZEL, Franz Heinrich. A German photographer who had worked at Sheerness 
since 1887. Even before MIS was born, the Admiralty had suspicions about Lozel 
and orders had been given that he was not to be permitted on any warship. Despite 
this, he seemed to have photographed groups on board ship, as a rule choosing a 
gun for his background. In December 1911 the military police arrested Lozel for 
photographing the defences, but examination of the films did not prove this, so he 
was released. In October 1913 HENTSCHEL stated that Lozel was a German 
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agent. On 4 August 1914 Lozel was arrested for carrying a camera on the seawall 
at Sheerness and interned under ARO. (KV1I39) 
MADDICK, S. A British electrical fitter in Portsmouth dockyard. On 20 April 
1914 an A. Ransom of Potsdam wrote to Maddick in a way showing that he had 
offered his services to Germany and that he was happy to accept them. Following 
an exchange of letters, Maddick arranged to meet an agent in Ostend on 7 June. 
However, on 1 June, Maddick confessed his intentions to the dockyard authorities 
and was arrested. His confession was notified to MIS, who had been observing the 
case since 20 April, when RODRIGUEZ had been instructed to check out 
Maddick for the Germans. The police took Maddick into custody and MIS took 
charge of the case. It became clear that Maddick was not of sound mind, so he 
was discharged and put into an asylum. During the war, Maddick was released as 
his doctor thought that he was not insane and interned under DRRI4B, because it 
was felt that he needed watching. (KVI/41) 
MARKS, Joseph. A German who had been educated in the USA and carried a 
forged American passport. The American minister at The Hague thought that 
Marks' passport was a forgery and warned the British consulate, and on 25 June 
1915 Rotterdam reported that Marks was being sent to Britain as a spy by GHQ 
Berlin. He was reported as crossing to Tilbury on 15 July. A port officer 
recognised and challenged Marks on the ship, and he immediately requested to 
see an intelligence officer, to whom he would give useful information. Marks was 
charged by court-martial with having performed an act preparatory to committing 
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an offence, by travelling to Britain with the intention of spying, found guilty and 
sentenced to five years' penal servitude. (DPP1I34; KV1I42) 
MELIN, Ernest Waldemar. A Swede. On 16 March 1915 a British agent in 
Holland informed MIS that E.W. Melin of 23 Upper Parkway, Hampstead, 
London was working for the Germans. In June 1915 suspicious letters addressed 
to Melin were intercepted. Questions in secret writing about British ships were 
written between the lines of warm family letters. The house was searched and spy 
equipment was found. Melin was arrested on 14 June 1915 and confessed whilst 
• 
I 
I 	 in gaol. He was tried by court-martial, found guilty and shot. (DPP/35; DPP4/49; 
KV1I42; W0141/2/3) 
j 
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MEYER, Albert. The censorship tested a suspicious looking letter dated 29 June 
1915 and found a hidden message giving information about the Thames defences, 
Chatham dockyard, etc. It was posted in London and addressed to one Mrs 
Goedhardt, van Blallkellburgestraat, The Hague, which address was placed under 
check. A letter from 1 Margaret Street, London led the police to call at this 
address. They gained access to the room and matched the handwriting on a label 
to that of the letters. Albert and KATHERINE MEYER, the man and wife who 
lived there, were arrested on 30 August 1915. Spy equipment was also discovered. 
Albert Meyer was found guilty and shot. (DPPl/36; KV1I42; W0141/83) 
MEYER, Katherine. Wife of ALBERT MEYER. Katherine Meyer was arrested at 
the same time as her husband. There was no evidence against her; however, she 
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was a woman of loose morals and it was felt that ALBERT MEYER had gained 
some of his information through her associations. She was briefly imprisoned, 
interned and later put in a lunatic asylum. (DPP1I36; KV1I42; W0141183) 
MULLER, Karl. Alias Leidec. A Russian, reputed to be of German parentage, 
who had settled at Antwerp. He landed at Sunderland in January 1915, carrying 
Russian papers and stating that he had been released from a German prison. 
Checks on Leibacher's correspondence revealed letters of 3 and 4 February 
containing secret messages, signed AEl11 and posted in the WC district of 
London. On 15 February Muller was signalled from Rotterdam as being a German 
agent and receiving letters in London addressed to a Leidec. He was arrested on 
25 February and search of his rooms revealed incriminating evidence, as four of 
the stamps specially marked as to be used in the WC district were discovered to in 
his possession. Muller was tried in June 1915, found guilty and shot. (DPP1I38; 
KV1I42; W014112/2) 
PARROTT, George Charles. A petty officer in the Royal Navy, serving at the 
gunnery range at Sheerness. Taken on as an agent by HENTSCHEL's wife 
Patricia, with whom he may have had an affair. Parrott corresponded with her 
during the grand manoeuvres of 1910 and provided her with information, so that 
these letters gave her a hold over him. Parrott eventually accepted money from the 
Germans to answer questions about guns, etc. In March 1912 MIS opened a HOW 
for HENTSCHEL and thus discovered the activities of Parrott. In July Parrott 
went to Ostend and was shadowed by Melville, who observed that Parrott's sole 
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reason for going there appeared to have been for a confidential conversation with 
a German. Parrott was dismissed from the Navy in August, tried in November and 
sentenced to four years' penal servitude. (DPP1/20; DPP1I48; 
H0144/1250/233717; KV1I40) 
RIMANN, Walter. Alias Germanikus. A German teacher of languages in Hull. In 
January 1912 the check on Steinhauer's correspondence showed that he was 
corresponding with a man writing from Grimsby and Hull who signed himself 
Germanikus, later discovered to be Rimann. He was placed on the special war list 
for arrest. However, when action was due to be taken he had already escaped, 
having left for Zeebrugge on 1 August 1914. (KV1I40) 
RODRIGUEZ, Albert eeIso. An alias, the true identity of the spy who 
masqueraded as a Spaniard named Rodriguez is in doubt. He came to Portsmouth 
in March 1914 and taught languages. He was detected when a message he sent to 
a known spy address on 30 March 1914 was intercepted, and placed on the special 
war list. Further evidence against Rodriguez was obtained on 3 August 1914 when 
the wife of the manager of the language school where he worked informed the 
police that he was a spy and handed over letters as proof. Rodriguez was arrested 
later that day, subsequently dealt with under ARO and interned on 11 August 
1914. (KVI/41) 
ROGGEN, Alfredo Augusto. A Uruguayan, who landed at Gravesend on 30 May 
1915, ostensibly as a farmer wishing to buy horses and agricultural machinery. He 
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was detected by the postal censorship after he had posted two cards in Edinburgh 
on 8 June 1915 to known spy addresses in Holland and arrested the next day. His 
notebook contained spy addresses, he possessed material for secret writing, and 
most importantly a map of the North Sea on which some minute characters, words 
and figures were detected. He was found guilty, sentenced to death and shot in the 
Tower of London on 17 September 1915. (DPP1I40;KVl/42; W0141/61) 
ROOS, Willem Johannes. A search of telegrams at Edinburgh and a check on 
Dierks and Company showed that Roos, a Dutch sailor, had wired to and received 
money from Dierks and Company. Search of his effects revealed spy equipment 
and the address of where JANSSEN was staying. Roos was shot in July 1915. 
(DPP1I33; KV1I42; W07111312; W014111/6) 
ROSENTHAL, Robert. A German, posing as an American gas lighter salesman. 
In April 1915 Rosenthal wrote a letter from Copenhagen to Franz Kulbe in Berlin 
containing a secret message that he was going to start spying in Britain under the 
cover of selling gas lighters and signed it Robert Rosenthal. Through some postal 
miss-sort, the letter came to Britain, where the censorship detected the secret 
message. MIS knew that the address of Kulbe was used by Captain von Prieger, 
chief of the naval secret service, and ordered the arrest of any commercial 
traveller in gas lighters named Rosenthal. Rosenthal was arrested at Newcastle on 
the night of 11 May attempting to embark for Bergen. He confessed under 
interrogation. Spy equipment was also found amongst his possessions. Rosenthal 
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was found guilty by court-martial and hanged. (DPPII41; H0144/288639; 
KV1I42; W014115) 
RYSBACH, Kurt Herlot de. British subject of Austrian descent. On 9 July 1915 
de Rysbach wrote to a Mr 1. Cords at the spy address that had been used by 
ZENDER. In a secret message, he said that he had a brother on HMS 
Commonwealth who would furnish information. A check on letters to the crew of 
the Commonwealth provided de Rysbach's address. The brother was checked and 
exonerated. De Rysbach was arrested on 26 July and materials for secret writing 
were found in his rooms. De Rysbach's British nationality entitled him to a civil 
trial. He was tried on 20 September, the jury disagreed on their verdict and he was 
remanded in custody. At de Rysbach's second trial, the jury found him guilty and 
he was sentenced to penal servitude for life. (DPP1I42; KVl/42) 
SCHMIDT, Heinrich. A German, who began working for the Germans at 
Devonport in 1913. Unable to get the right job or contacts to be of use as a spy, he 
worked as a scullery-man in a hotel. MI5 discovered him because of a remittance 
sent via KLUNDER. His reports were intercepted, but they showed considerable 
caution and there was really nothing in them. Whilst he was away, his possessions 
were searched and, although there was proof of his intentions, there was not 
enough evidence to secure a conviction. He was arrested on 12 August 1914 and 
held as a POW. (KV1I40) 
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SCHNEIDER, Adolf. A German clerk with a London finn, who accepted work as 
an intermediary for Steinhauer about January 1914. He was detected thanks to 
postal interception, arrested on 4 August 1914 and eventually interned under 
ARO. (KV1I39) 
SCHROEDER, Frederick Adolphus. Alias Gould. A retired German soldier, who 
first came to notice in 1898 as receiving payment from Steinhauer. In 1904 he 
wrote to Steinhauer about employing a retired RN captain, James Butler-Carter, 
but subsequently retired from espionage and acquired the Queen Charlotte Hotel 
at Rochester in 1908. Reinstated as an agent in 1912 after threatening to expose 
Steinhauer, but his intercepted reports proved only of a general nature. Moved to 
London in 1913 and arrested 22 January 1914 after his wife was arrested at 
Charing Cross with incriminating but mostly non-confidential documents. Pleaded 
guilty and sentenced to six years' penal servitude with recommendation for 
subsequent deportation. (CRIMlII45/2; DPP1I28; KVl/41) 
SCHULTZ, Dr Max. A German, who held a doctorate in philosophy, and had 
settled at Plymouth in 1911 as a language teacher. In July 1911 he offered Samuel 
Hugh Duff, a local solicitor, employment as correspondent for a German 
newspaper. He later told Duff that his job would be to send the latest news on 
naval and military matters to certain addresses. While playing along, Duff 
informed the police. Schultz also tried to engage a Mr Tarren, whose work for the 
National Cash Register provided him with access to the dockyard. Tarren also 
informed the police. MI5 directed that Duff and Tarren were to accept payment 
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from Schultz, to take any journeys requested, to record any work done for Schultz, 
note all the addresses he mote to, which included Neumann, an alias used by 
Wilhelm KRONAUER, and to pass on all the questions he asked to which MIS 
would provide suitable answers. Schultz was arrested in August 1911, found 
guilty at trial and sentenced to twenty-one months' imprisonment. (F037111126; 
KV1I39) 
SCHUTTE, Heinrich. A German subject, who had settled in Portland in 1900. 
Attention was first drawn to the possibility that Schutte was a German agent 
through the registration of aliens. The Chief Constable of Dorset also pointed to 
the fact that Schutte had no visible means of support and to the possible source of 
his information, his son John who was employed as an assistant storeman for the 
Royal Navy Service Stores at Portland. When, on MIS's suggestion, he was 
offered a transfer to another place, John Schutte resigned from the dockyard rather 
than be moved. Proof of Schutte's guilt was gained from the check on Reimers's 
correspondence: many reports sent by Schutte to Reimers were intercepted 
throughout 1911-1913, covering the movements of ships and a sketch of Portland 
Harbour. Schutte was placed on the special war list, arrested on the outbreak of 
war and interned. (KV/39) 
SMITH, Mrs. A British subject of German origin. Smith's German background 
was reported to the police, who directed that she should be kept lmder observation 
and infornled MIS. In 1917 the censorship signalled that she had been attempting 
to smuggle pacifist literature to a relative in South Africa in parcels. Coded letters 
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about the U-boat and Zeppelin campaigns were also intercepted, leading to her 
arrest in November 1917 and sentence to two years' penal servitude. (KV1I44) 
STAD, David. Dutch seamen purporting to represent a firm selling custard 
powder, van Brandwijk and Company. On 9 June 1915 the British consul-general 
at Rotterdam wrote that Jan van Brandwijk, whose shop was known to be the 
centre for a section of the German secret service, was reported to be sending 
Dutchmen to spy in Britain, naming Stad and BRABER. When the police 
searched his rooms, they found dummy cases of custard powder, no samples and 
that he had not done any business. Stad was arrested on 23 June 1915 for not 
having given proper particulars to his landlord. The charges failed on a technical 
point and Stad was freed. However, there was no doubt as to his intentions to spy 
and Stad was interned under DRR14B. (KV1I42) 
VIEYRA, Leopold. Alias Pickard. A Dutch dealer in second-hand films detained 
when he landed in England on 6 May 1916 on information received from Mllc in 
Rotterdam through an informer who was the former lover of Vieyra's mistress. 
Arrested formally on 24 August and a secret ink was found among his 
possessions. Sentenced to death in November but commuted to penal servitude for 
life. (DPP1I47; KV1I43; KV2/3; KV41113) 
WELLER, Captain Kurt von. A retired officer of the Prussian Foot-Guards. 
Arrived in Ireland in August 1913, purportedly to learn English and for his health. 
The police reported him to MIS in December 1913. Von Weller was arrested on 
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10 August 1914. Maps of Cornwall and its railway communications containing 
information which might be useful to an enemy were discovered in his possession. 
He was discharged and served with a deportation order, eventually being 
exchanged for an English officer POW in October 1915. (H0144/1338/258086; 
KV4/112) 
WERTHEIM, Louise Emily. Born a German Pole, but became a British subject 
by marriage. She aroused suspicion in Inverness by ordering a car to drive to 
Cromarty. The Chief Constable, who had been warned about her, because 
BRECKOW's possessions had included the receipt for a registered letter to an L. 
Wertheim of Inverness, interviewed Wertheim at her hotel and obliged her to 
return to London. He reported the matter to the Metropolitan Police, who arrested 
her on 9 June 1915. Search revealed a letter from George T. Parker, an alias used 
by BRECKOW, spy equipment, a visiting card from Rowland another alias used 
by BRECKOW, and spy addresses. She was sentenced to ten years' penal 
servitude. (KV1I42; W01411311) 
ZENDER, Ludovic Hurwitz Y. A Peruvian, who pretended to be in the tinned fish 
business. Telegrams sent from Glasgow during May 1915 by Ludovic Hurwitz to 
an August Brockner (or Brochner) of Christiania attracted the attention of code 
experts, because of suspicious messages about orders for fish, which resembled 
the code used by JANSSEN and ROOS. Zender was arrested at Newcastle on 2 
July. Investigations revealed that Zender had not conducted any genuine business, 
that Brockner was a post box for German espionage, and, most tellingly, an expert 
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in the fish trade proved that Zender's telegrams to Brockner could not be about 
ordering fish, because he was ordering fish out of season, in wrong quantities and 
packaging, and was probably a code. Zender was found guilty and shot. 
(DPP1I44; KV1I42; W014112/4) 
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APPENDIX III: DUTIES OF BRANCHES IN 

NOVEMBER 1918 

A BRANCH 

Auxiliary War Service 

(i) Questions affecting the enforcement of Article 22A of the Aliens Restriction 
(Consolidation) Order, [1916], and the Army Council Instructions 1640 of 1917. 
(ii) Examination of credentials of all aliens and British subjects of alien 
parentage employed in HM Military Forces in consultation with AGI3. 
(iii) Examination of credentials of all persons proposed for employment III 
Government Departments, as referred. 
(iv) Examination of credentials of personnel of auxiliary war services whose 
duties bring them into contact with members of His Majesty's Forces. 
(v) Examination of credentials of personnel employed on railways or in hotels 
belonging to railway companies. 
(vi) Questions ofpolicy arising from the presence of aliens in munitions factories. 
Al 
(i) Consideration of applications from persons of alien nationality, employed upon 
munitions and in auxiliary war service, for permits to leave the United Kingdom. 
(ii) Consideration in consultation with the Ministry of Munitions of applications 
from firms engaged upon munition work to import labour from abroad. 
A2 
(i) Consideration of applications for the employment of aliens on 
munitions as submitted by Labour Exchanges. 
A3 
(i) Visits to firms and factories for examination of aliens. 
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(ii) Interviews and examination of aliens desirous of obtaining permission to work 
on munitions or to leave the United Kingdom. 
A4 

Correspondence with firms engaged on munitions work on the subject of:­
(i) Aliens engaged and discharged. 
(ii) Procedure necessary in order to obtain permits for persons to work on 
munitions. 
(iii) Contraventions of Article 22A. Aliens Restriction (Consolidation) Order, 
1916. 
(iv) Circulation of the names of firms holding contracts for the supply of war 
material, as recorded in the monthly lists sent in by the War Office and Ministry 
of Munitions. 
(v) Submission of the cases of all aliens working in prohibited firms to that branch 
of the Ministry of Munitions concerned. 
(vi) Endorsement of the papers of the partners and managers of firms with 
permission to work on munitions, other than in the case of contracts submitted by 
the Air Board. I 
DBRANCH 
Imperial Overseas Special Intelligence. 

Irish Oriental and Near Eastern Affairs. 

(i) Co-ordination of Imperial Special Intelligence Services In the Overseas 
Dominions, India and the Colonies. 
(ii) Co-ordination of the work of Special Intelligence Missions ill Allied 
Countries. 
(iii) Correspondence with the Dominions, India and the Colonies by letter and 
cable. 
(iv) Collection and communication of Special Intelligence, affecting the 
Dominions, India and the Colonies. 
(v) Co-operation with the Colonial Office. 
1 TNA, KVlI13, pp.57-59. 
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(vi) Investigation of cases of espionage and sedition in Ireland in consultation 
with G. 
(vii) Co-operation with the Home Office and other Government Departments on 
matters connected with German-Irish-American intrigues. 
(viii) Ciphers and codes. 

Dl 

(i) Irish-American Affairs. Examination of censored letters or intercepted 
correspondence dealing therewith. 
(ii) Irish Intelligence Reports and co-operation with M041B thereon. 
D2 
(i) Colonial Affairs. General Correspondence with the Colonies. 
(ii) Questions affecting individuals of Near Eastern nationalities and Near Eastern 
Affairs. 
D3 
(i) Oriental affairs. Investigation (in consultation with G) and all correspondence 
regarding suspected espionage, sedition and treachery among Asiatics. 
(ii) Co-operation with the India Office. 
D4 
(i) Co-ordination of Special Intelligence Missions in Allied Countries. 
(ii) Receipt, distribution and despatch of correspondence. 
(iii) Posts. 
D5 
(i) Ciphers and codes. 
(ii) Despatch oftelegrams, other than those addressed to MCOs in neutral capitals 
(sent through MIlc) and inland telegrams en clair. 
(iii) Receipt and distribution of code and cipher telegrams.2 
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EBRANCH 
Control of Ports & Frontiers. 
(i) Military Policy connected with the control of civilian passenger traffic to and 
from the United Kingdom. 
(ii) Co-operation with the Home Office and GHQHF for the control of alien 
seamen at ports in the United Kingdom. 
(iii) Control of Port Intelligence Services other than within theatres of operations. 
(iv) Control of Military Permit Offices:­
19, Bedford Square, W.C. 

18, Rue Chauveau Lagarde, Paris. 

(v) Censorship by Military Control Officers at certain ports by arrangement with 
MI9. 
(vi) Control of the Military Ports Police. 
(vii) Control of Military Control Officers abroad. (In the case of neutral countries 
this is done through MIl c) 
E1 
(i) Examination of reports from all Military Controls, both in the UK, and in 
Foreign Countries. 
(ii) Drafting and distribution of counter-espionage reports and circulars. 
(iii) Examination of reports on enemy agents in foreign territory. 
(iv) Communications with MCOs in Switzerland, Spain, Scandinavia, Japan, 
Denmark, Italy, Russia, Greece, Portugal and the United States of America, on 
questions regarding passenger traffic to and from the UK and British Possessions, 
and visa of passports in those countries. 
(v) Ministry of Labour Committee. 
E2 
(i) Examination of applications for permits to leave the UK for Holland, 
Scandinavia, Denmark, Russia, Iceland, South America, Spain and Portugal, as 
submitted by the Horne Office Permit Office. 
2 TNA, KVlI19, pp.ll-12. 
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(ii) Examination of applications for permits to leave the UK for France, Spain and 
Portugal, Switzerland, Italy and Greece, also for Egypt, Salonika and Palestine, as 
submitted by the Military Permit Office. 
(iii) Examination of applications for passports, as submitted by the Foreign Office 
Passport Office. 
(iv) Examination of applications for Home Office Permits for British subjects of 
enemy alien origin and of enemy aliens of British origin, to leave the UK. 
(v) Final examination of applications by alien munition workers to leave the UK. 
(vi) Final examination of cases of civilian workers proceeding on pink Laissez 
Passers to work in the zone of the Army, as submitted by FW5. 
(vii) Examination of such cases as are referred to MI5 by the American Permit 
Office. 
(viii) Examination of cases of persons leaving the UK under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Information. 
(ix) Drafting and distribution of circulars concerning persons who should not 
leave the UK without special reference to MIS. 
(x) Drafting and distribution of circulars concerning persons who have received 
"No return" and "Special No Return" permits from the Home Office Permit 
Office or from the French Authorities. 
(xi) Making of all necessary arrangements for the journeys of MI5 staff and 
personnel and of certain other members of the Directorate of Military Intelligence 
travelling on duty.3 
FBRANCH 
Prevention ofEspionage. 
(i) Policy and records of measures for preventing espionage and hostile activities 
dangerous to military security. 
(ii) Military policy in dealing with police authorities and the civil population 
including aliens. 
(iii) Initiation and examination of legislative proposals relating to counter­
espionage, and of executive schemes and instructions for the application of 
measures for counter-espionage and the control of aliens and undesirable persons. 
3 TNA, KV1I20, pp.54-56. 
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(iv) Aliens Restriction Order and Defence of the Realm Regulations affecting 
Special Intelligence duties. 
(v) Co-ordination of counter-espionage methods in the United Kingdom and 
British Overseas Dominions, Colonies and Allied Governments, in co-operation 
with D. 
(vi) Classification of persons, for purposes of military security, as regards the 
degree of their loyalty or hostility to the British and Allied Cause. 
(vii) Policy as to Identity Books and procedure intended to establish identity or 
bona-fides for counter-espionage purposes, or for use by the Intelligence Service. 
Special intelligence passes. 
(viii) Military control of inland movements of aliens. Inland and Travelling 
Passes. Control of Sketching and Photography. Prohibited and Special Military 
Areas. Defence of the Realm Permit Books. Counter-espionage Warning Notices. 
Powers and jurisdiction of competent Military Authorities for purposes of 
counter-espionage. 
F 1 
Co-operation with Civil Authorities regarding Personal Credentials ofaliens and 
others. 
(i) Cases of aliens and civilians referred by the Home, Scottish and Foreign 
Offices, Police, or other Civil Authority for military opinion or assistance. 
(ii) Examination of referred cases of enemy aliens in connection with deportation, 
internment, or exemption or release there from. 
(iii) Examination of referred cases of the credentials of civilian applicants for 
facilities to enter, leave or travel in the United Kingdom during war, including 
prisoners of war returned or escaped from the enemy, and licenses or facilities 
under the Aliens Restriction Order. 
(iv) Examination of applications, as referred by the Home Office, for 
naturalization as British Subjects. 
(v) Examination and preparation of reports and articles on general alien activities, 
and recommendations affecting the present policy for purposes of counter­
espIOnage. 
F2 
Co-operation with the Naval, Military and Air Force Authorities regarding 

Personal Credentials of aliens and others. 
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(i) Cases of persons of supposed alien connection referred by Naval, Military or 
Air Force Authorities, or Ministry of Munitions, for opinion or assistance. 
(ii) Applications from aliens addressed to the War Office (other than those 
connected with DRR14 and 14B). 
(iii) Examination of credentials of applicants for special naval or military facilities 
as referred, including candidates of alien connection seeking commissioned rank, 
and licenses of facilities under the DRR. 
(iv) Records of foreign Officers and Officials in the United Kingdom. 
(v) Examination and preparation of reports and articles on alien activities in naval 
and military affairs. 
(vi) Marriage of naval and military personnel with enemy aliens as referred. 
F3 
Disposal and supervision of suspects and undesirables otherwise than by 
prosecution. 
(i) Examination of proposals to issue, revoke, or vary orders under Defence of the 
Realm Regulations 14 and 14B. 
(ii) Maintaining records of removals and restrictions imposed under Defence of 
the Realm Regulations 14 and 14B. 
(iii) Co-operation with GHQ Great Britain in the disposal of dangerous persons, 
and application of special restrictive measures in case of military operations. 
FL 

Legal Procedure. 

(i) Preparation and examination of legislative drafts and measures for counter­
espionage and Special Intelligence purposes. 
(ii) Preparation and examination of draft administrative instruction arising out of 
the Defence of the Realm Regulations. Consultations with law officers and 
draftsmen. Legal advice. 
(iii) Examination of proposals to make, or vary the administration of Prohibited 
Areas, Special Military Areas, Protected Areas, Controlled Photography Areas, 
and Government Lands. 
(iv) Powers and Jurisdiction of Competent Military Authorities for purposes of 
counter-espionage and military security. 
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(v) Preparation of reports and articles on the administration of the Defence of the 
Realm Regulations and Aliens' Restriction Order, as affecting counter-espionage 
and military security. 
(vi) Preparation of cases for prosecution by the Public Prosecutor at the instance 
of MIS. 
GBRANCH 
Detection of Espionage. 
(i) Control of investigation of all cases of enemy espionage and sabotage in the 
United Kingdom. 
(ii) Detection, arrest and bringing to justice ofoffenders. 
(iii) Counter-espionage and classification of the methods employed by enemy 
espionage and sabotage agents. 
(iv) Co-operation with Government Departments, naval and military authorities 
and police for the above purposes. 
(v) Control ofIntelligence Police at Headquarters. 
(vi) Surveillance of suspicious characters. 
(vii) Preparation of cases against persons arrested for prosecution by military and 
civil authorities in connection with espionage. 
(viii) Examination of suspicious letters and cables as referred. 
(ix) Investigation into evasions of censorship. 
(x) Registration and Records of Home Office Warrants and special Censorship 
checks as imposed. 
(xi) Correspondence and communication with Allied Military Missions in the 
United Kingdom on matters affecting counter-espionage services. 
(xii) Investigation into the activities, where detrimental to national interests, of 
persons ofRussian, Finnish, Polish and Czecho-Slovak nationalities. 
(xiii) Investigation of seditious and pacifist propaganda prejudicial to military 
security. 
4 TNA, KV1I57, pp.lO-12. 
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Gl 
(i) Investigation into cases of espionage and sabotage by foreign agency in the 
United Kingdom, also counter-espionage and classification of methods of 
espionage and sabotage. 
02 
(i) General duties connected with enquiries into the bona fides of persons in the 
United Kingdom (as previously) 
(ii) Co-operation with Government Departments, Naval and Military Authorities 
and Police for above purposes. 
G2a 
(i) Examination of suspicious letters and cables referred by Postal and Cable 
Censors, Commandants of POW Camps, or other Government Departments, for 
enquiry; and investigation connected therewith. 
(ii) Investigation into irregular methods of correspondence and evaSIOn of 
censorship. 
G2b 
(i) Executive duties connected with enquiries into the bona fides of persons in the 
United Kingdom. 
(ii) Preliminary investigations into cases of suspected persons. 
(iii) Correspondence with Police Forces 	of the United Kingdom on the above 
subjects. 
G3 
(i) Correspondence and Communication with Allied Military Missions in the 
United Kingdom affecting counter-espionage services, and the suitable 
distribution of infonnation from these sources. 
(ii) Special investigation into the cases of suspected persons m diplomatic, 
financial, and political circles. 
G3b 
(i) Liaison Officer with Postal and Cable Censors. 
(ii) Registration and control of records showing all Bank and Postal remittances 
sent to individuals in the United Kingdom from neutral European countries and 
investigation in connection therewith. 
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(iii) Registration and Records of Home Office Warrants and Postal and Cable 
Censorship checks as imposed. 
G4 
(i) Russian, Finnish, Polish and Czecho-Slovak affairs. 
(ii) Investigation of cases of persons of the above nationalities and of their 
activities in connection with Bolshevism, espionage, strikes, pacifism, &c in the 
United Kingdom. 
(iii) Investigation into the bona fides of persons of the above nationalities entering 
or leaving the United Kingdom, or applying for permits to work on munitions; and 
of all persons travelling to or from Russia, together with those recommended by 
MIR for employment in Russia. 
(iv) Investigation of cases of sedition and dissemination of peace propaganda, and 
of offences committed against DRR27 and 42, otherwise than through the Press. 
(v) Collection of evidence and transmission to the Home and Scottish Offices of 
cases not directly affecting military security or arising from enemy activities. 
(vi) Examination and preparation of reports and articles on sedition and peace 
propaganda as affecting military security. 
GL 
(i) Preparation of cases against persons arrested for prosecution by military and 
civil authorities in connection with espionage. 
(ii) Investigation of reports on enemy agents in Allied and neutral countries as 
referred. 
OP 
(i) Control of Intelligence Police at Headquarters. 
(ii) Surveillance of suspicious characters. 
(iii) Special enquiries where secrecy and rapidity are desirable. 5 
HBRANCH 
Organisation and Administration. 
(i) Questions affecting the personnel of the counter espionage service. 
s TNA, KV1I44, pp.113-118. 
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(ii) Questions affecting the records and documents of the counter-espionage 
service. 
(iii) Organisation, mobilisation, and demobilisation of the counter-espionage 
service. 
(iv) General control of office procedure, discipline and routine. 
(v) Interior economy of the counter-espionage service. 
(vi) Questions affecting finance. 
(vii) Provision and maintenance of buildings, equipment and supplies. 
(viii) Arrangements for interviews. 

HI 

(i) Compilation of historical records and statistics. 
(ii) Compilation ofweekly, monthly and circular reports. 
(iii) Compilation of summaries and precis of documents. 
(iv) Extracts from the Press and distribution to branches concerned. 
(v) Editing of all documents, reports, etc printed in MIS 
H2 
(i) Registration and transit of documents. 
(ii) Indexing, filing and custody of documents. 
(iii) Temporary custody of documents belonging to other offices. 
(iv) Destruction of obsolete documents. 
(v) Consultation of indices, production of relevant documents and decisions as to 
identity. 
H3 
(i) Interior Economy. 
(ii) Engaging of domestic servants. 
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(iii) Detail of orderly duties of soldier clerks. 
(iv) Supervision of the duties of messengers, lift attendants, stokers, cooks, 
cleaners, boy scouts and motor car drivers. 
(v) Detail of motor cars. 
(vi) Allocation of rooms. 
(vii) Use of rooms for lectures and committee meetings. 
(viii) Provision of stationery, army books and forms, periodicals, papers, office 
equipment, furniture and keys. 
(ix) Upkeep of buildings, bells, lights and lifts. 
(x) Supervision of destruction of confidential waste paper, and the collection of 
other books and paper for handing over to WO Contractors. 
(xi) Issue of Passes, railway warrants, and reduced fare tickets to soldiers 
employed in MI5. 
(xii) Custody oflost property. 
(xiii) Catering. 
H4 
(i) Estimates. 
(ii) Contracts. 
(iii) Accounts. 
(iv) Pay and allowances. 
(v) Insurance. 
(vi) Card Index ofpersonnel ofMI5 Staff. 
H5 
(i) Control, selection, and discipline of all women employed on executive and 
clerical duties, and of girl messengers. 
(ii) General control of the work ofthe Registry and branch clerical staffs. 
(iii) Maintenance and custody ofrecords ofservice of women. 
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H5a 
(i) Control, selection, and discipline ofgirl messengers. 
H6a 
(i) Compilation of MI5 black list. 
(ii) Replies and questions as to identity, etc. arising out of MI5 black list (from 
GHQlb, MCO's, etc). 
(iii) Writing of special precis at request of other branches of MIS. 
H6b 
(i) Compilation of Special Intelligence Index. 
(ii) Study of all black lists and CE indices available. 
(iii) Arrangements for collection of material for black lists and SI Index. 
H6c 
(i) Compilation ofIdentity Forms for personal files. 
H7 
(i) Office routine. 
(ii) Correspondence. 
(iii) Preparation of Office Instructions and Circular Memoranda. 
(iv) Officer personnel. 
(v) Preparation oflists of books for office use. 
(vi) Receipt and distribution of cash. 
(vii) Custody and distribution of secret and confidential documents. 
(viii) Engagement of male clerks. 
(ix) Technical Sections, Records and Returns. 
H7a 
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I (i) Photography. 
(ii) Laboratory. 
I H7b 
(i) Interviews at War Office. 
I 
(ii) Work at War Office. 

H7c 

I 
 (i) Printing and Binding. 
(i) Roneographing. 
(ii) Duties connected with Grey List and Police Gazette. I 
I H7d 
(i) Returns. 

(ii) Duty Rosters. 

I (iii) Custody and upkeep of records of service of officers and male clerks. 

I (iv) Office Gazette. 

(v) Issue of Standing Passes.6 

I 

I 

I 

I 6 TNA, KV1I49, pp.76-81. 
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1916-1918. 
H04511 0828/323249 - ALIENS: notice for the guidance of aliens landing in 
United Kingdom, 1916. 
H045/10831/326287 - ALIENS: central register of aliens in United Kingdom, 
1916-1919. 
H045110831/326555 - ALIENS: scheme for employment of aliens on national 
service, 1917-1919. 
H045/10839/332271 - ALIENS: issue of identity books to Belgian refugees, 
1917-1918. 
H045110839/333624 - WAR: spread of diseases among animals by enemy 
agents, 1917-1918. 
H045110841/335981 - ALIENS: Precautions against enemy agents at British 
ports, 1917-1918. And WAR: Precautions against enemy agents in British ports, 
1917-1918. 
H045110881/338498 - ALIENS: supervision of enemy aliens at large in United 
Kingdom, 1917-1918. 
H045/10882/343995 - ALIENS: British women married to Germans - exemption 
from the Aliens Restriction Order, 1917. 
H045/10882/344019 - ALIENS: repatriation of Belgian refugees, 1917-1919. 
H045110890/355539 - CRIMINAL: definition of "enemy agent' in the Defence 
of the Realm Regulations, 1918. 
H045/10892/357291 - POLICE: appreciation of work done for MI5 by police 
officers, 1918. 
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H045/10898/368063 - ALIENS: registration of persons born in neutral or 
friendly countries of fathers of enemy origin, 1918. 

H045/22901 - POLICE: national intelligence service: scheme for forming, and 

for incorporating the police, 1917-1923. 

HOI44112501233717: Parrott, George G. Court: C.C.C. Offence: Communicating 
information to the enemy. Sentence: 4 years P.S, 7 January 1913. 
H0144/1338/258086 - ALIENS: Captain Kurd von Weller acquitted of spying. 
Repatriated in exchange for Lord De Ramsey, 1914-1915. 
H0144113581261916 - ALIENS: Aliens Restriction Orders - prohibited areas, 
1914-1916. 

H0144/1415/277302 - Kupferle, Anthony. Court: C.C.C. Offence: Espionage. 

SENTENCE: committed suicide before trial took place, 25 March 1915. 

H0144/1429/288639 - Rosenthal, R. Court: London Court Martial. Offence: 
Espionage. Sentence: Death, 6 July 1915. 

H014411437/298806 - Breckow, George T. Court: C.C.C. Offence: Assisting the 

enemy. Sentence: Death by shooting, 7 September 1915. 

H0144/1484/349684 - DISTURBANCES: Industrial unrest, strikes, sabotage, 
pacifist organisations, arrangements for police reports, 1917-1918. 
H0144/1498/364780 - CRIMINAL: "The Black Book" mentioned in the criminal 
libel action against Mr. Pemberton-Billing, M.P., 1918. 
H014411552/199768 - DISTURBANCES: South-Wales miner's strike 
(Tonypandy riots), 1910-1920. 
H0144/3444 - CRIMINAL CASES: DOWLING, Joseph, 1918-1924. 

H0144/11720 - ALIENS: Internment of enemy aliens during 1914-1918 War. 

Classified list, 1918-1930. 

H0144/17485-7 - ALIENS: Peter Michailevitch Petroff, interned under DRRI4B, 

13 January 1916-13 March 1933. 

H0144/23414-509 - TREASON: Sir Roger Casement, 1922-1959. 

H016111-5 - Diaries of Roger Casement, 1901-1911. 

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION (INF) 
INF4/9: Deposited Papers of Sir Robert Donald: Memoranda and Reports, n.d. 
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SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE (J) 
J17/662 - Rex V Sir Roger David Casement and Daniel Julian Bailey, 1916. 
J93/3 - Rex V Sir Roger David Casement and Daniel Julian Bailey: shorthand 
notes of trial, 26 June 1916-19 July 1916. 
J1301119 - READING, Lord: Capital Offence (Casement trial), 1916. 
SECURITY SERVICE (KV) 
KVl/l, 'Organization of Secret Service. (Note prepared for D.M.O. on the 4th Oct. 
1908),,4 October 1908. 
KV1I2, 'Espionage in Time of Peace'; War Office branch memorandum, 1908­
1909. 
KV1I3, 'Memorandum re Formation of a S.S. Bureau', 26 August 1909. 
KV1I4, 'Intelligence Methods', 1909. 
KV1I5, Copy of Kell's Letter accepting Secret Service Post and CV, 19 
September 1909 & 1 915. 
KV1/6, CIn Meeting: Kell's Presentation of Work and Records of Bureau, 3 
March 1914. 
KVII7, 'List of fersons arrested as Foreign Agents, and of Prosecutions 
undertaken up to 4t August 1914',4 August 1914. 
KV1I8, 'Memoir by William Melville MVO MBE, ex-Supt of Metropolitan 
Police who was Kell' s first detective' , 31 December 1917. 
KV1/9, 'Kell's Bureau's six-monthly progress reports 1909-1914',1909-1914. 
I KVlII0, 'Kell's Diary 116110-2817111',1 June 1910-28 July 1911. 
KV 1111 , Analysis of Accounts for February-October 1917, February 1917­
" 
I 

October 1917. 

KV1112, Analysis of Accounts for February-September 1919, February 1919­
I 

September 1919. 

KVlI13, 'Report on the A. Branch ofM.I.5.', 1921. 

KVlII4, '''A'' Branch Report. Summary', 1921. 
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KVlII5, "'D" Branch Report. Imperial Overseas Intelligence. VoU', 1921. 
KV 1 /16, "'D" Branch Report. Imperial Overseas Intelligence. Vol.lI. 
Appendices', 1921. 
KVlI17, '''D'' Branch Report. Imperial Overseas Intelligence. Vol.lI!. Eastern 
Mediterranean Section and Appendices', 1921. 
KV1/18, '''D'' Branch Report. Imperial Overseas Intelligence. VoLIV. Cyprus 
Section and Appendices', 1921. 
KV1/19, '''D'' Branch Report. Summary', 1921. 
KVl/20, '''E'' Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. VoLl', 1921. 
KV1I21, "'E" Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. Vol.I1', 1921. 
KV1I22, '''E'' Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. Vol. III, , 1921. 
KV1I23, '''E'' Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. Vol.IV', 1921. 
KV1I24, "'E" Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. Vol.V. First and 
Second Supplements', 1921. 
KV1I25, "'E" Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. Vol.VI. Third 
Supplement. The Military Control Office, New York', 1921. 
KV1I26, "'E" Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. Vol.Vn. Fourth 
Supplement. History of the Port of Hull', 1921. 
KV1I27, "'E" Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. Vol.VIII. Fifth 
Supplement. Illegal Methods of Obtaining Passports', 1921. 
KV1I28, '''E'' Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. Vol.IXA. 
Appendices', 1921. 
KV1/29, '''E'' Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. VoLIXB. 
Appendices', 1921. 
KVl/30, '''E'' Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. Vol.x. 
Annexures Nos.l-52', 1921. 
KV1I31, "'E" Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. VoLXI. 
Annexures Nos.53-84', 1921. 
KV1/32, '''E'' Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. Vol.XIlI. Index. 
A to N.E.P.', 1921. 
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KV1I33, '''E'' Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. Vol.XIV. Index. 
N.E.P. Ships to Zurich', 1921. 
I 

KV1I34, "'E" Branch Report. Vol.XV. Summary', 1921. 

,I KV1I35, "'F" Branch Report. The Prevention of Espionage. VoLl', 1921. 

KV 113 6, '''F'' Branch Report. The Prevention of Espionage. VoUI', 1921. 

KV1I37, '''F'' Branch Report. The Prevention of Espionage. Vol.II!. Appendices', 

1921. 

KV 1138, "'F" Branch Report. Summary', 1921. 

1 

KV 1139, '''G'' Branch Report. The Investigation of Espionage. VoU', 1921. 

KV 1140, '''G'' Branch Report. The Investigation of Espionage. VoUI', 1921. 

KV 1141, '''G'' Branch Report. The Investigation of Espionage. Vol. III, , 1921. 

I KV 1142, '''G'' Branch Report. The Investigation of Espionage. V oLIV', 1921. 

I

• KV1I43, '''G'' Branch Report. The Investigation of Espionage. Vol.V', 1921. 

I KVl/44, '''G'' Branch Report. The Investigation of Espionage. Vol. VI', 1921. 

I 
KV1I45, "'G" Branch Report. The Investigation of Espionage. Vol.VII', 1921. 
KV1I46, "'G" Branch Report. The Investigation of Espionage. Vol.III. 
I Appendices and Annexures', 1921. 
• 
I 
I KV1I47, "'G" Branch Report. The Investigation of Espionage. Vol.IX. Index', 
I 1921. 
I 
• KV1I48, 'Rough Draft Summary ofthe G Branch Report', 1921. 
I 	 KV1I49, '''H'' Branch Report. Organisation and Administration. Vol.l. Chapters 1 
to 5', 1921. 
• 
KV1I50, '''H'' Branch Report. Organisation and Administration. VoLlI. First 
Supplement. Report on Women's Work', 1921. 
KV1I51, "'H" Branch Report. Organisation and Administration. Vol.lII. Second 
Supplement. Copy ofa Monthly Report (June 1918)" June 1918. 
KV1I52, '''H'' Branch Report. Organisation and Administration. Vol.IV. 
Appendices and Annexures', 1921. 
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KVlIS3, "'H" Branch Report. Organisation and Administration. Vol.IVB. 
Annexures. (Papers.)', 1921. 
KVlIS4, '''H'' Branch Report. Organisation and Administration. Annexures. 
(Books.) No.23. Duties of "H" Branch (Dec. 1917). I-P Book 12', December 
1917. 
KVlISS, 'Work of the Registry. (M.I.S H.2.)', October 1917. 
KVlIS6, 'Office Instructions. June, 1916', June 1916. 
KVlIS7, '''H'' Branch Report. Organisation and Administration. Vol.VI. 
Annexures. (Books.), MIS Distribution of Duties, November 1918', November 
1918. 
KVlIS9, 'Chronological List of Staff taken to 31 December 1919', December 
1919. 
KV1I61 , '''H'' Branch Report. Organisation and Administration. Vol.Vn. 
Annexures. (Books.) No 30. M.I.S . B.L. - Volume XIV (October 1918)', October 
1918. 
KV1I63, 'H. Branch Report. Summary', 1921. 
KV1I6S, 'Control of Aliens in the United Kingdom. Volume II. 1914 to 1915', 
1914-191S. 
KV1I66, 'Control of Aliens in the United Kingdom. Volume III. 1916 to 1917', 
1916-1917 and 1939. 
KV1I67, 'Control of Aliens in the United Kingdom. Volume IV. 1918 to 1927', 
1918-1927. 
KV 1/68, 'Contents of Reports', 1921. 
KV1I69, Analysis of Accounts for April 1915-January 1916, April 1915-January 
1916. 
KV 1 170, Analysis of Accounts for January 1916-January 1917, January 1916­
January 1917. 
KV1171, '''E'' Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. Annexure 
No.84. Aliens Restriction Order. Passenger Traffic. General Instructions to Aliens 
Officers at Approved Ports (Home Office, 31 January 1918)',31 January 1918. 
KV1172, "'E" Branch Report. The Control of Ports and Frontiers. Annexure 
No.8S. The Port Officers' Guide', undated. 
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KVlI73, 'H.M. Postal Censorship (M.I.9.). The Testing Department (M.I.9.c.). 
Short Report on work done during the War', Vol. 1 ,April 1919. 
KVlI74, 'H.M. Postal Censorship (M.I.9.). The Testing Department (M.I.9.c.). 
Short Report on work done during the War', V 01.2, April 1919. 
KV2/1-2 - PERSONAL FILE: MATA HARI: "Mata Hari" alias MCLEOD, 
Marguerite Gertrude. German spy executed by the French in 1917, 4 December 
1915-14 March 1924. 
KV2/3 -PERSONAL FILE: Leopold VIEYRA, 12 May 1916-27 October 1952. 
KV2/4-5 - PERSONAL FILE: George Vaux BACON, 7 November 1916-23 
March 1917. 
KV2/6-10 - PERSONAL FILE: CASEMENT: Roger, 13 November 1914-11 July 
1921. 
KV2/514-5 - PERSONAL FILE: Eamon DE VALERA: Irish, 2 August 1915-31 
March 1949. 
KV2/663-667 - National Council for Civil Liberties, 16 June 1916-22 February 
1934. 
KV211410-1416 - PERSONAL FILE: Nicolas Clementievitch KLISHKO & 
Phyllis KLISHKO, 1 January 1915-31 December 1972. 
KV311 - COUNTER ESPIONAGE LAWS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES: other 
nations' laws regarding the offence of espionage, 1908-1918, 1905-1918. 
KV3/2 - INVISIBLE INK AND SECRET WRITING: first volume on World War 
1 secret writing, 1917-1919. 
KV4/9 - SECTION HISTORIES: report on the operations of B1H in connection 
with Northern Ireland and Eire during the Second World War, 1 January 1946-31 
December 1946. 
KV41112 - MI5 'Game Book'. First of two volumes ofMI5 case summaries from 
the period 1909-1937, 1 January 1909-31 December 1937. 
KV41113 - MI5 'Game Book'. Second of two volumes of MI5 case summaries 
from the period 1909-1937, 1 January 1909-1 December 1937. 
KV41114 - MI5 'Game Book'. MI5 case summaries from the period 1909-1937, 
26 August 1927-20 October 1937. 
KV4/127 - Security Service organisation from 1918 to 1939, induding staff-lists, 
1 November 1918-31 December 1939. 
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KV41128 - division of duties between Home Office Director of Intelligence, 

Scotland House and the Security Service. Papers relating to the period when 

responsibility for the study of subversion lay with the Metropolitan Police, 1 

January 1919-31 January 1919. 

KV41129 - appreciative letters from and to the Security Service. Beginning with 
letters of thanks exchanged with departments and police forces at the end of the 
First World War, the file contains other similar letters, as well as those exchanged 
on po stings of individuals, 11 November 1918-8 August 1942. 
COMMISSIONER OF THE METROPOLITAN POLICE (MEPO) 
MEP02/10659-74 - Casement Papers, 1914-1921. 

MEP03/243 - William Le Queux: request for personal protection, 1914. 

MEP03/2435 - aliens holding liquor licences or employed in licensed houses in 

wartime: reports to local authority, 1914-1915. 

MEP03/2444 - MATA HARI: Margaretha Geertruida ZEELE known as MATA 

HARI: convicted of espionage and executed on 15 October 1917,1915-1917. 

MEP03/2446 - householder's liability to report aliens living on premises, 1916­
1918. 

MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT (MT) 
MT25/2 - Ministry of Shipping, 1917-1921: Correspondence and papers, 1917­
1921. 

MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS (MUN) 
MUN4/3588 - INTELLIGENCE: intelligence service reports, 15 December 1916­
15 June 1917. 
MUN5/49/300/34 - 'Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest. Summary of 
the Reports ofthe Commission', Rt. Hon. G.N. Barnes, M.P., 11 July 1917. 
MUN5178/32711 - Report and notes on alien labour, September 1915. 
MUN5/78/327/3 - Report of committee appointed to consider reception and 
employment of Belgian refugees, December 1914. 
MUN5/78/327/8 - Memorandum on conditions for aliens employed on munitions 
work, n.d. 
PRISON COMMISSION (PCOM) 
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PCOM912315-40 - SIR ROGER CASEMENT, c.1916-1969. 
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE (PRO) 
PR030/57175 - KITCHENER PAPERS [PRIVATE PAPERS NOT PUBLIC 
RECORDS]: correspondence relating to the discussion of aliens in the CID in 
1914,1914. 
WAR OFFICE (WO) 
W032/4160 - MEMORIALS AND GRAVES: Graves (Code 36 (C): Place of 
burial of KARL HANS LODY, 1936. 
W032/4161 - MEMORIALS AND GRAVES: Graves (Code 36 (C»): Request 
from the German Embassy for the removal of the body of KARL HANS LODY to 
another burial ground, 1934. 
W032/4892 - SECURITY: General (Code 84 (A)): Conference on control of 
passenger traffic between England and Continental ports, 1914-1915. 
W032/4898 - SECURITY: General (Code 84 (A)): Observations on imprisoned 
espionage agents and appeal by F L T Greite for review of sentence, 1920-1921. 
W032/5364 - ALIENS: General (Code 74 (A): Release of enemy aliens under 
bond, 1914. 
W032/5368 - ALIENS: General (Code 74 (A)): Question of authority for arrest 
and internment, 1914. 
W032/5370 - ALIENS: General (Code 74 (A)): Question of authority for arrest 
and internment. Instructions for carrying out orders for arrest, 1914-1915. 
W032/5372 - ALIENS: General (Code 74 (A»): Liability of aliens for military 
service on return to homeland despite oath taken to effect release, 1915-1916. 
W032/5553 - INTELLIGENCE: General (Code 69 (A)): Abolition of 
intelligence organisation for dealing with revolutionary and industrial unrest in 
United Kingdom, 1919-1920. 
W032/8873 - ALIENS: General (Code 74 (A): Legal powers necessary to deal 
with suspicious aliens. Question of amendment to Official Secrets Act, 1907. 
W032/9098 - HOME DEFENCE: General (Code 90 (A)): Memorandum on 
duties of the Police in the event of War, 1911-1914. 
W032110776 - ARMY ORGANISATION: General (Code 14 (A): History of 
Military Intelligence Directorate, 1920-1921. 
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W032115541-2 & 44 - Prisoner of war, Capt Lt Franz Rintelen, 1915-1918. 
W07111237 - Melin, E W. Offence: Espionage, 1915. 
W07111238 - Ries, I O. Offence: Espionage, 1915. 
W071/1239 - Van Der Ooten, L F. Offence: Espionage, 1917. 
W071/1312 - Roos, W.J. and Janssen, S.S. Offence: Attempting to communicate 
information to the enemy, 1915. 
W07111313 - Buschman, F. Offence: Supplying information to the enemy, 1915. 
W0941103 - Documents concerning prisoners confined in the Tower of London 
for espionage during the First World War, including those executed, 1914-1918. 
W0941104 - Two papers notifying the Tower authorities of Sir Roger Casement's 
arrival and departure, April 1916-May 1916. 
WO 1 061262 - Report of the Commission concerning the native rising within the 
Nyasaland Protectorate, 1916. 
W0106/295 - Cable Censor's Handbook, incorporating MI8 list of enemy traders 
and their agents, 1917. 
W014111/3 - Espionage charge against Anthony Kupferle, 1915. 
W014111/5 - Robert Rosenthal. Espionage charges, 1915. 
W01411116 - W J Roos. Espionage charges, 1915. 
W014111/7 -H M P Jannsen. Espionage charges, 1915. 
W0141/211 - F Buschmann. Espionage charges, 1915. 
W01411212 - C F Muller. Espionage charges, 1915. 
W0141/2/3 - E W Melin. Espionage charges, 1915. 
W014112/4 - L H Zender. Espionage charges, 1915. 
W0141/3/1- R Rowland and Mrs L E Wertheim. Espionage charges, 1915. 
WO14113/2 - I Guy Ries. Espionage charges, 1917. 
W014113/4 - Charges of spying against G V Bacon and trial by Court Martial, 
1917. 
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W014113/5 - Charges of spying against Norwegian Alfred Hagn and 
commutation of sentence, 1917. 

W014113/6 - Charges of spying against L F Van der Goten, Belgian subject, 

1917. 

W0141/61 - Auguste Alfredo Roggen: Espionage, 1915. 

W0141/82 - Hans Lody or Lodi, alias C Inglis: espionage, 1914-1915. 

W0141183 - Albert Meyer: espionage, 1915-1916. [Formerly classed as: 

W032/3903.] 
W0158/981 - 'Lecture on Prevention of Leakage of Information', by Lt-Col W. 

Kirke, GS(I)b, May 1916. 

WO158/984 - instructions on the collection and transmission of intelligence in the 

United Kingdom, March 1916. 

W0158/989 - General Headquarters, Home Forces: Intelligence Circulars. N06: 

alleged enemy signalling in Great Britain, 1 May 1916-31 May 1916. 
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